

INFORMATION NOTES

No. 2

UPPER SILESIA

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
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


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**POLISH-GERMAN  
BORDERLANDS**

BOUNDARY OF POLAND

SCALE OF MILES  
0 10 20 30 40 50

## I

## The Problem

The geographical name of Silesia relates to territory lying in the very heart of Europe between the 48th and 52nd degree of Latitude and between the 15th and 19th degree of Longitude east of Greenwich. Before the end of the First World War the major portion of Silesia formed part of the German Empire, while its south-western areas, the co-called Opawa (*Troppau*) Silesia and Cieszyn (*Teschen*) Silesia belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

That portion of Silesia which in 1918 belonged to Germany formed, at that time, one province (*Provinz Schlesien*), the administrative division of which consisted of three Regencies (*Regierungsbezirke*). The Lignica (*Liegnitz*<sup>1</sup>) Regency, with the capital of that name, was situated at the far north-western end. In the centre lay the Regency of Wrocław (*Breslau*) which was, at the same time, the capital of the Regency and the whole province. These Regencies bore the name Lower Silesia (*Niederschlesien*). At some periods that name applied exclusively to the Lignica Regency, while the term Middle Silesia (*Mittelschlesien*) was used in connection with the Wrocław (*Breslau*) Regency. The south-eastern part of the Silesian province comprised the Opole (*Oppeln*) Regency, with the capital at Opole; the name Upper Silesia (*Oberschlesien*) was generally used to describe that region of Silesia.

The whole of that province formed part of Poland until the 14th century and its major part had until the 18th century been inhabited by a population of Polish origin who preserved Polish as their mother tongue. The years of systematic Germanization and colonization of that territory by German settlers did not pass without effect. Eventually the only compact agglomeration of Poles was to be found in the south-eastern part of the Silesian province, and it was on their behalf that the Polish delegation to the Paris Peace Conference claimed its incorporation into Poland.

All sources, now accessible, indicate that during the Paris Peace Conference experts recognized with considerable unanimity Poland's right to the incorporation into the newly reconstituted Polish State of almost the entire contemporary Opole Regency, i.e., of so-called Upper Silesia. A small portion of the western counties (*Kreise*) was excluded from the incorporation; a part of it, namely, that of the Raciborz (*Ratibor*) district, being assigned to Czechoslovakia. This is the Hulczyn (*Hultschin*) region.

That opinion was shared by the Commission on Polish Affairs, which under the chairmanship of Jules Cambon worked out a detailed report on the Polish-German frontier and submitted it to the Supreme Council sitting at Paris.<sup>2</sup>

Eventually, within the boundaries fixed by experts, Upper Silesia was allocated to Poland in the first draft of the Versailles Treaty, which was solemnly handed as Conditions of Peace to the German delegation on May 7, 1919.

<sup>1</sup>Besides the established historical Polish names this document also gives the German names.

<sup>2</sup>cf. Report No. 1 of the Commission on Polish Affairs: *Frontier between Poland and Germany*, March 12, 1919. See also *The Cambridge History of Poland 1697-1935*, Cambridge, 1941, pp. 490-519.

The Germans reacted violently and, in the face of their opposition, ethnographic considerations yielded to the tendency towards political concessions. Statesmen whose final word weighed upon the decisions of the Allied and Associated Powers agreed that a plebiscite should be taken in Silesia. This plebiscite was carried out on March 20, 1921, in circumstances which were in every respect highly unfavourable to Poland and to the Polish majority in Upper Silesia. The final result was that only a small strip of the land originally granted was incorporated within the Polish frontiers. Such was the outcome of the plebiscite, in spite of the fact that the note of the Allied and Associated Powers of June 16, 1919, in reply to the German remonstrances was bound to state:

"... it is emphatically untrue that she (Poland) has no claims which could be supported on the principles of President Wilson. In the district to be ceded, the majority of the population is indisputably Polish. Every German book of reference, every school book teaches the German child that the inhabitants are Polish in origin and in speech."

In the end, however, the Germans retained the major part of Upper Silesia and made out of it an administrative unit of the Opole Regency, which henceforth will be called "Opole Silesia."<sup>3</sup>

Thus, on the eve of the war the name Upper Silesia applied to Silesian territories belonging to Germany as well as to those included in Poland. In 1939, the Germans incorporated the Hulczyn region—seized from Czechoslovakia—into the Opole Regency. The Polish part of Silesia comprised in 1939, not only the territory ceded to Poland after the plebiscite, but also the so-called Teschen Silesia. This whole area formed part of the Polish administrative unit of the Silesian voievodship with the capital at Katowice.

The Polish-German frontier ran through the middle of the coal basin and through the great industrial area, which constitutes all Upper Silesia, both Polish and German. The Poles on many occasions emphasized the disadvantage of such a frontier, and the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, proved how right they were in their view. Within a few hours the full weight of the concentrated German Panzer Divisions smashed through the frontier and paralysed Polish Silesia—the most important centre of Polish war production. Several days later all Upper Silesia was again under German domination.

The German administrative measures which immediately followed the armed occupation, show clearly that the Germans had no intention of deviating from their old aims, well-known to students of Silesian problems. In the east, Upper Silesia borders on the territory of mines and foundries with the great industrial centres of Sosnowiec, Dąbrowa Górnicza and Chrzanów. Poland's administrative system included these areas of great wealth in coal in the Kielce and Cracow voievodships.

From February 1, 1941, the Germans created a new Upper Silesian province (*Gau Oberschlesien*), which included not only the Polish province of Silesia and the former Opole Regency, but also the above-mentioned districts; the new province became an integral part of the Third Reich. Thus, administratively, they have consolidated and made into one entity the coal mining and the industrial areas; the former being the largest coal basin in Central Europe.

The Germans have long been striving to possess the whole of that rich territory. They aimed at its incorporation just as relentlessly as they

<sup>3</sup>Statistical data are given in Appendix No. 1.

wanted to subjugate the entire area of Poland which represented the natural market for the Upper Silesian production. He who holds Upper Silesia dominates Poland economically.

Past experiences compel the Poles to draw the necessary conclusions, and to-day they aim not only at the liberation from the German yoke of those Silesian regions which were Polish on the outbreak of war. The Poles have reverted<sup>4</sup> to the claims they put forward at the Paris Peace Conference and insist on the incorporation of the whole of Upper Silesia into Poland. They do so:

- (1) because they desire to unite the Polish majority in the Opole Regency with Poland;
- (2) they wish to lengthen Poland's frontier with Czechoslovakia, with whom they desire to establish a closer political and economic co-operation; and
- (3) because the union of all Upper Silesia and Poland would broaden the basis of the economic development of the Polish State.

## II

### Nationality of the Population of Opole Silesia

A German writer<sup>5</sup> used, when writing about the pre-1918 division of Silesia into Upper and Lower Silesia, the term *Polnisch Schlesien* to describe its south-eastern area. He applied that name to the larger part of the contemporary Opole Regency and to two eastern counties (*Kreise*) of the Breslau Regency, namely: Namysłów (*Namslau*) and Syców (*Gross Wartenberg*<sup>6</sup>). He described *Polnisch Schlesien* thus:

"Polish Silesia . . . is characterized by its barren soil . . . its harsh climate . . . large areas covered with forests and above all by its Polish population . . ."

This description illustrates the situation exactly as it was on the outbreak of this war. There were compact agglomerations of Poles who remained there defying the pressure of Germanization and numerous harsh measures aiming at the colonization of the territory by German settlers. Documents and detailed statistics concerning the nationality of the population prove that this statement is amply justified (Appendices Nos. 8 and 12). The figures of the German census illustrating the number of Poles in Upper or Opole Silesia should be consulted:

Year	Percentage	In thousands
1861	59.1	666
1890	58.2	918
1900	56.1	1,048
1905	56.9	1,159
1910	53.0	1,169

The decline in the proportion of Poles not only shows the slow progress of Germanization, but to a greater extent reveals the improved methods of deliberate falsification of statistical data employed by the German administration. British experts dealt with these falsifications when analysing the national situation in the eastern provinces of the Reich

<sup>4</sup>The problem of Upper Silesia has been analysed for the first time during this war in a study, published as a "private copy," by Dr. Marian Seyda, under the title *Poland and Germany and the Post-War Reconstruction of Europe*, September, 1942.

<sup>5</sup>Johannes Ziekursch: *Hundert Jahre schlesischer Agrargeschichte vom Hubertusburger Frieden bis zum Abschluss der Barmenbefreiung*, Breslau, 1915.

<sup>6</sup>In 1910 half of the population of these two districts was still Polish.

in their report for the Paris Peace Conference. In an H.M. Stationery Office publication of 1920, entitled *Handbooks—Prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office*, there appears the following extract dealing with the census taken in East Prussia:

“ . . . it must be concluded that the figures have been falsified in order to give the impression that the Poles are diminishing in number relatively to the Germans. The falsification appears to have extended to Poznania and Upper Silesia.” (pages 12—13)

Dr. Ludwig Bernhard condemned German censuses of the population with equal severity:

“These figures, politically so important, are to-day in Germany completely unreliable.”<sup>7</sup>

In the *Vossische Zeitung* No. 104, of May 1, 1926, the following comment on the 1925 census of the population was made:

“The figures recently published on the decline in the Polish speaking population of Upper Silesia should not create any delusions that there has been any essential change in the actual situation of the Polish population. On such official occasions as when a statistical census of the population is taken, data is only too often given which does not correspond to the facts. To avoid unpleasant consequences, the inhabitants give the German language as their mother tongue, even though at home, both formerly and now, they speak Polish.”

The “creation” of a new Upper Silesian “nationality” or elaborate explanations by some German writers (e.g., Walter Geisler) that the Poles in that territory speak a dialect *Wasserpölnisch*, which has nothing in common with High Polish, can be regarded only as a dishonest attempt at a deliberate misrepresentation of the nationality question in Opole Silesia. The term “bilingual” used by German statistics since the beginning of the 19th century also comes under the heading of falsification of the national census. This “bilingual” group naturally includes only Poles, because Polish-speaking Germans would never admit the fact publicly.

Adding the so-called bilingual population to the 53 per cent. of Poles shown in the territory of the contemporary Opole Regency by the 1910 census the figure of 58.7 per cent. is attained which at that time represented the Polish majority. Polish students (e.g., Professor Romer), taking into account the inaccuracies and deliberate falsifications in German statistics, estimated the number of Poles as being over 60 per cent. In 1925 the official German census of the population showed almost 43 per cent. of Poles in Opole Silesia. It may be safely accepted that on the outbreak of this war, of the total population of 1,529,258 over 800,000 were Poles, a clear majority, despite the growing pressure of Germanization.

The distribution of the Polish population in Opole Silesia is uneven. The German element prevails in urban districts, while rural areas are in almost every case entirely Polish. The highest density of the Polish population is found on the right bank of the Oder, the lowest in the western counties of Opole Silesia: Głupczyce (*Leobschütz*), Grotków (*Grotkau*) and Nisa (*Neisse*). In 1919, British experts estimated the proportion of Poles on the right bank of the Oder at 75.83 per cent., on the left bank of the Oder the Polish element in rural areas was estimated at up to 67 per cent.<sup>8</sup>. At the present time these proportions are lower as a consequence of the progress of forcible Germanization.

<sup>7</sup>*Die Fehlerquellen in der Statistik der Nationalitäten*, published in Dr. Weber's book *Die Polen in Oberschlesien*, Berlin, 1914.

<sup>8</sup>*Handbooks*, op. cit. p. 6.

Some parts of the Raciborz (*Ratibor*) and Glupeczyce (*Leobschütz*) counties possess also a Czech population. It may be taken for granted that that population is nationally conscious and on this account Czechoslovakia has an ethnographic right to these areas. The national consciousness of the Polish population, however, is much stronger and more deeply-rooted. Its resistance to Germanization, so extensively applied by the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, has been worthy of special consideration. The preservation of national consciousness in the face of attempts at total extermination of everything non-German represents certainly the most splendid page in the history of the Silesian people, who for 600 years have been separated from Poland and yet have remained faithful to that country and its culture.

### III

#### Social and Political Conditions

H. J. Gumbel, Professor of Heidelberg University, wrote a number of works on the organization of terrorist formations known as *Freikorps*, *Selbstschutz* and *Schwarze Reichswehr*. In one of his books<sup>9</sup> he describes in the following manner the terrorist activities conducted by the Germans before the Silesian plebiscite held after the German delegation had succeeded in obtaining the necessary decision in Paris:

"A denunciation, a suspicion without foundation under the given circumstances was sufficient. The man concerned was fetched from his lodgings and instantly shot . . . All this because the man was a Pole or was considered a Pole and worked for union with Poland."

Severing, the Minister for Home Affairs, admitted frankly in his memorandum for the German Reichstag (March 3, 1926):

" . . . the suspicion of possessing Polish sympathies was sufficient to have the respective person given over to the *Selbstschutz*."

The terror experienced by the population was one of the most important causes for the unfavourable outcome of the plebiscite for Poland.<sup>10</sup> It was the more effective because along with actual physical compulsion exerted on the Polish population, the social conditions in Silesia facilitated the application of terror.

For centuries the national oppression of the Silesian Poles was carried on simultaneously with social persecution (Appendix No. 9). The social structure of Opole Silesia has remained until the present day the same as it has been during various periods of Prussian domination. The native Polish population was and is composed of workers and peasants. It has continually been subjected to exploitation by the upper classes which were almost exclusively German. That exploitation has been and still is particularly intense in the mining industry. With regard to the situation before the First World War the British experts in their memorandum already quoted, said: "Workers engaged in the mining industry of Upper Silesia are but poorly paid. . . . Their wages compare badly with those of Western Germany." A comparison of earnings in Opole Silesia after 1918 (Appendix No. 5) with wages in the remainder of Germany, not exclusively in the mining industry, indicates that the exploitation of workers and employees had not diminished in Silesia. It should be remembered that the working classes form more than 51 per cent. of the population of Opole Silesia (Appendix No. 2).

<sup>9</sup>H. J. Gumbel, *Verräter verfallen der Feme*, Malikverlag, Berlin, 1929 ; p. 175.

<sup>10</sup>Detailed information on the conditions prevailing in Upper Silesia at the time of the plebiscite and on the results of the plebiscite may be found in Appendix No. 11.

In agriculture, in which over one quarter of the population is employed, the situation was by no means better. British students<sup>11</sup> painted the situation in sombre colours:

"The small landholders had, in many cases, lost their land and communal rights and were constrained to work as day labourers. The kind who 'lived in' was poorly paid, and a man and his wife together earned in Silesia no more than a single labourer in Mecklenburg."

It is not surprising that the Polish population was compelled to emigrate, thus supplying manpower for the development of western German industry.<sup>12</sup> Even after 1918 the condition of the Poles in the rural areas of Opole Silesia had not improved. On the contrary, it deteriorated enormously under the Nazi regime owing to the introduction of the so-called *Reichserbhofgesetz* and the application of the decree regarding the security of frontiers. The first decree based on Nazi principles (*Blut und Boden*) placed the Polish peasants outside the right to legal protection of their property. The second made them the victims of unilateral and unrepealable decisions of the German administration. These decrees caused the dispossession of many Polish peasants, whose farms in some cases had belonged to the same Polish family for generations.

The social dependence of the Polish population<sup>13</sup> facilitated the process of Germanization. And where the latter failed, the pressure exercised upon the Poles by the privileged German classes stifled any manifestation of national feelings in the Silesians. This was particularly true of the plebiscite, when an insufficient number of votes for Poland were cast even in overwhelmingly Polish districts. Hence the unjust result of the plebiscite.

An idea of the injustice of the plebiscite results when compared with the proportion of the Polish population revealed by the German population census, can be obtained by comparing the result of the plebiscite in certain counties, which after 1920 remained German, with those of the population census of 1910 and 1925.

County ( <i>Kreis</i> )	Proportion of Poles in 1910 census %	Proportion of Polish votes in the plebiscite %	Proportion of Poles in 1925 census %
Koźle ( <i>Cosel</i> ) .. .. .	75.0	29.9	63.7
W. Strzelce ( <i>Gr. Strehlitz</i> ) .. .. .	79.2	58.6	73.8
Opole (rural district) .. .. .	75.8	38.8	74.1
Oleśno ( <i>Rosenberg</i> ) .. .. .	80.7	42.0	71.1
Toszek-Gliwice ( <i>Tost-Gleiwitz</i> ) .. .. .	76.4	63.3	65.0
Kluczborek ( <i>Kreuzburg</i> ) .. .. .	47.2	6.5	24.6

If it is remembered that the pressure of the German upper classes<sup>14</sup> influenced every census of the population, we are justified to state that the intrinsically Polish character of that part of Upper Silesia which remained to Germany after the First World War is more outstanding than is shown by German sources.

<sup>11</sup>*Handbooks*, op. cit. p. 25.

<sup>12</sup>Eberhard Franke, *Die Polnische Volksgruppe im Ruhrgebiet* (1870-1940), Berlin, 1942. The author calls attention to the fact that in the Ruhr there were before the First World War nearly 1,400 Polish organizations. Polish sources estimate the number of Poles in the Ruhr at present at 100,000.

<sup>13</sup>cf. G. Kaeckenbeeck, *The International Experiment of Upper Silesia*, Oxford, 1942.

<sup>14</sup>cf. Appendix No. 4.

The union of Opole Silesia with Poland would not only satisfy the national feelings of the population, but it would also be a further step towards its social emancipation. It would also fulfil the stipulations of point Six of the Atlantic Charter:

“After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.”

#### IV

#### German Aims

Upper Silesia's special importance is due to her rich deposits of raw materials. Apart from coal she possesses rich deposits of zinc, lead and cadmium (Appendix No. 6). That is why the Germans at the Paris Conference were so strongly opposed to territorial cessions in Silesia.

The enormous growth of the German armament industry since 1870 has been made possible not only by Alsace and Lorraine, but to a large extent by Silesian resources. Two American historians<sup>15</sup> rightly observe that: “Alsace Lorraine and Silesia furnished coal and iron . . . In 1871 Germany had produced approximately one-fifth as much coal as did England; in 1913 her production almost equalled England's. In 1880 her iron output was one-third as large as England's; only twenty years later Germany surpassed England in iron mines—and yet imported iron to satisfy her industrial needs.” The Silesian contribution to the progress of that industrialization was indeed enormous and it played an important part not so much in Germany's peacetime economy, as in her preparations for war.

The fact that Silesia's importance for Germany's peace time economy is smaller, is based on the distance which separates that industrial area from the centre of the Reich.<sup>16</sup> Hence the German mining industry and foundries in that area required specially reduced tariffs and special financial help in order to enable them to stand up to the competition with the Ruhr valley production. On the other hand, Upper Silesian production increased always when the Germans intensified their armaments. The importance of Upper Silesia for armaments was strongly emphasized in a memorandum submitted in July, 1917, by the Opole Chamber of Commerce to the contemporary Reich Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg. That memorandum stated *inter alia*:

“It will not be saying too much to point out that it would be impossible to carry on the war with its considerable demands for industrial products in the most varied spheres of military technique, if the industry of Upper Silesia were unable to aid the German nation in meeting the needs of the war to the full.”

The speedy development of the Third Reich's industrial production in that part of Upper Silesia which, following the 1921 plebiscite remained German, proves the role which that territory plays in Germany's arma-

<sup>15</sup>V. L. Albjerg and M. Hall Albjerg, *From Sedan to Stresa*, London, 1938; pp. 17 and 19.

<sup>16</sup>Even in Berlin which is nearer to Silesia than to Westphalia, there was great competition between Upper Silesia and Westphalia with regard to the sale of coal. In 1899 Greater Berlin consumed 63.11 per cent. of Upper Silesian coal, in 1910 only 46.02, and in 1913 the turnover fell to 43.7. Also after the First World War there was a steady decline in the consumption of Upper Silesian coal; for instance, in 1930 Berlin's consumption of Upper Silesian coal decreased by 35.7 per cent., compared with that of 1929, while the decline in consumption of Westphalian coal during the same period was only 9.4.

ments. No wonder that the German press calls Opole Silesia "one of the largest armourers' workshops of the Great German Reich" (*Eine der grössten Waffenschmieden des Grossdeutschen Reiches*). In this war Opole Silesia has for the longest time remained an unraided target. When separated from Germany it would for ever cease to be the arsenal of her armaments.

Apart from being an important war production centre, Upper Silesia is also a coal basin for the smaller states of South-Eastern Europe, including Italy. Before 1918 the Germans were particularly anxious to retain that base, as it was essential for their economic expansion in territories stretching along the Berlin-Baghdad Line. Irreconcilable to her loss of a part of Silesia in 1921, Germany almost at once started a propaganda campaign to recover that territory.

Opole Silesia, however, has not only an economic and political importance for Germany. The territory of Silesia (see map on p. 4) is like a wedge driven deeply between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Thus, a German province creates a *place d'armes* whence to direct thrusts towards both these countries and hit them in their most vulnerable spots by paralysing their industrial centres. Besides that, the Silesian wedge extends German territory towards the so-called Moravian Gate, through which the way leads to the Danubian valley and onwards to the Balkans.

The strategic value of Silesia apart from her economic importance was already fully appreciated by the builder of modern Prussia, Frederick the Great. At the time of the growth of Prussian power and her rivalry with Austria, Silesia as no other territory, was the object of conflict between the two Powers.<sup>17</sup>

On the eve of the First World War the joint General Staffs of Germany and Austria conceived a strategic plan directed against Russia in order to exclude even the remotest possibility of Silesia's falling to the enemy, and to use that area as an operational base against Central Poland.

After 1920 the Germans built extensive fortifications in Silesia beginning in Zielona Góra (*Grünberg*) and ending in Raciborz (*Ratibor*). Bridgeheads at Wrocław (*Breslau*) and Opole were to serve as bases for further thrusts against Central Poland. The Wrocław bridgehead was to serve for an attack directed towards Kępno-Łódź, while the Opole bridgehead was used as a base for a thrust in the direction of Częstochowa-Warsaw. To ensure the security of their rear the Germans liquidated Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1939. On September 1, 1939, the armies of Generals von Reichenau and Blaskowitz led their offensive from Silesia towards Poland's capital which, at the same time, was attacked by von Kuechler marching southwards from East Prussia.

The strategic danger which the Silesian wedge represents cannot be completely eliminated by the seizure of Opole Silesia from Germany. But such an action would lengthen Poland's frontier with Czechoslovakia. The German frontier would thus be pushed northward and the danger of a direct attack on Czechoslovak and Polish industrial centres would be minimized. The danger would, however, still remain. Complete security necessitates other additional guarantees: demilitarization of the remainder of the Silesian province (*Provinz Schlesien*) would be one of these conditions.

<sup>17</sup>*Die Gebote des Raumes*, an article in the *Kattowitzer Zeitung* of March 9, 1941. Cf. also T. Babington Macaulay, *Frederick the Great*.

The German Delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris stubbornly refused to cede Upper Silesia to Poland giving as one of the reasons that Poland was incapable of solving the manifold economic problems of that territory. But the absorption of Poland's part of Upper Silesia by the Polish economic organism after the First World War, as well as the able economy carried out by the Poles in the Silesian voievodship with its capital at Katowice manifestly proved that the German thesis was wrong. Poland not only absorbed organically the industrial districts assigned to her, but built and developed an entirely new industrial centre between the Vistula and its tributary, the San, east of Upper Silesia. Poland is capable to-day of absorbing Opole Silesia as well. That such a possibility exists may be proved by Poland's consumption of coal. She can increase the consumption of the most valuable resources of Silesia; this is obvious when the figures of coal consumption per head in 1935 in the following countries are compared:

Great Britain . . . .	3,907 kg.
Germany . . . . .	2,041 „
France . . . . .	1,581 „
Czechoslovakia ..	1,229 „
Poland . . . . .	568 „

The consumption of coal in Poland, however, was increasing steadily in subsequent years : in 1937 it reached the figure of 720 kg. per head, and 754 kg. in 1938.

Even the Germans cannot deny (Appendix No. 7) that Poland and no other country constitutes the natural hinterland of the whole of Upper Silesia and not merely of that part which was allocated to Poland after the First World War.

## V

### Conclusions

In the opinion of the eminent German historian, Droysen,<sup>18</sup> the acquisition of Silesia in 1742 not only increased the area of Prussia by one-third of her total area, but meant "the beginning of profound changes in the European system of states." From an insignificant frontier duchy Prussia rose to the rank of a European power and began to influence the trend of German thought and policy. If to-day Germany were deprived of at least the south-western part of Silesia, it would, perhaps not fully, but to a very large extent, equal in its importance the event of 1742 in the history of Europe. It could contribute to the breaking of Prussia's influence in the German Reich and thus stop the aggressive tendencies of the German nation.<sup>19</sup>

Ethnographic considerations favour the incorporation of the majority of counties of Opole Silesia into Poland. The Polish population is native to the area. For the same reason the western parts of the south-western district of Opole Silesia ought to be assigned to Czechoslovakia. As well Poland ought to obtain the western counties of Opole Silesia, which now have a German-speaking majority, because it is the only means by which the German frontier could be pushed further away from the vital industrial centres of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the frontier between the latter two countries could thus be lengthened.

<sup>18</sup>G. Droysen, *Die Geschichte der preussischen Politik*, 5. Teil—*Friedrich der Grosse*, Leipzig, 1876 ; vol. II, p. 3.

<sup>19</sup>J. M. Winiewicz, *The Polish-German Frontier*, London, 1944.

The problem of Opole Silesia, however, is by no means a trifling frontier question between Poland and Germany, although the area in question slightly exceeds 3,700 square miles. This problem must interest the whole of Europe because of the natural wealth and productive capacity of that part of the continent; it is of importance owing to its part in Germany's war production and as a coal reservoir for all the smaller states, lying between the Baltic and the Mediterranean.

The importance of Silesia for the whole of Europe results from the former's geographical position. It forms a deep ridge of German influence in the Balkans, which can be controlled by means of its natural resources and by Silesia's proximity to the vital communication artery of that part of Europe, the Danube. Possessing Silesia the Germans are the virtual masters of the Danubian Basin and the Balkans. But Germany ejected from Silesia as far as Wrocław (*Breslau*), loses the impetus of her activity in South-Eastern Europe.

Arguments in favour of the readjustment of frontiers in that territory, a question vital for the whole of Europe, may be summarized by the following points:

**1. The necessity of establishing durable security** in those regions of the European Continent by cutting the wedge between Poland and Czechoslovakia which is, at the same time, directed against the Danubian Basin. This would shorten the Polish-German frontier and lengthen the Polish-Czechoslovak boundary and would constitute a useful check on the Germans and facilitate a common defence against eventual German aggression. This measure is indisputably in accordance with the intentions of Article 8 of the Atlantic Charter.

**2. The necessity of weakening the German war and industrial potential.** Opole Silesia owing to her enormous natural resources became one of the main bases of German war production. Even during the last winter many investments, exclusively serving war requirements, were made in that region by the Germans. They have put into operation plants producing synthetic petrol, lubricating oil and other coal-derived products.

**3. The necessity of strengthening the economic potential of countries threatened by German military aggression or her economic supremacy.** This point does not concern Poland only, although her chances of economic development would become greatly enhanced as a result of the incorporation of Opole Silesia. It equally concerns all countries situated in the belt extending from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The economic structure of those countries—with the exception of Czechoslovakia—has been one-sided, and largely agricultural. Consequently, it resulted in economic and then political dependence on aggressive Germany. Their economic development would give them economic and political freedom. These countries should co-operate closely, the more so as their access to natural resources situated in Poland—a state much smaller than Germany—would be easy and not involving similar risks of a political nature.

Appendix No. 1

**REGENCY OF OPOLE**  
**Area, Population and Density\***

County ( <i>Kreis</i> )	Area in sq. km.***	Population	Density per sq. km.
<i>Rural—</i>			
Bytom ( <i>Beuthen-Tarnowitz</i> ) .. .. .	106.93	94,568	884.4
Koźle ( <i>Cosel</i> ) .. .. .	662.82	90,305	136.2
Niemodlin ( <i>Falkenberg</i> ) .. .. .	604.55	40,820	67.5
W. Strzelce ( <i>Gross-Strehlitz</i> )** .. .. .	892.76	94,062	105.4
Grotków ( <i>Grottkau</i> ) .. .. .	535.79	40,374	75.4
Dobrodzień ( <i>Guttentag</i> )** .. .. .	322.77	21,888	67.8
Kluczborek ( <i>Kreuzburg</i> )** .. .. .	555.08	51,485	92.8
Głupczyce ( <i>Leobschütz</i> )** .. .. .	692.37	82,518	119.2
Nisa ( <i>Neisse</i> ) .. .. .	674.8	70,906	105.1
Prudnik ( <i>Neustadt</i> )** .. .. .	799.5	96,538	120.7
Opole ( <i>Oppeln</i> ) .. .. .	1,394.82	145,087	104.0
Raciborz ( <i>Ratibor</i> ) .. .. .	501.62	62,753	125.1
Oleśno ( <i>Rosenberg</i> ) .. .. .	892.64	57,265	64.2
Toszek-Gliwice ( <i>Tost-Gleiwitz</i> ) .. .. .	850.53	95,305	112.1
<i>Towns—</i>			
Bytom ( <i>Beuthen</i> ) .. .. .	30.25	101,084	3,341.6
Gliwice ( <i>Gleiwitz</i> ) .. .. .	56.35	117,240	2,080.6
Zabrze ( <i>Hindenburg</i> )** .. .. .	44.06	126,220	2,864.7
Nisa ( <i>Neisse</i> ) .. .. .	23.91	37,859	1,583.4
Opole ( <i>Oppeln</i> ) .. .. .	30.91	52,977	1,713.9
Raciborz ( <i>Ratibor</i> ) .. .. .	42.88	50,004	1,166.1
Regency of Opole .. .. .	9,715.35	1,529,258	157.4
Silesia ( <i>Provinz Schlesien</i> ) .. .. .	36,696.40	4,815,797	131.2
Germany (except Austria) .. .. .	470,543.77	69,316,526	147.3

\*Without the incorporated territories of Czechoslovakia. Census of May 17, 1939.

\*\*Counties with a steadily decreasing number of inhabitants.

\*\*\*One sq. kilometer equals 0.386 sq. mile.

Source: *Die Bevölkerung des Deutschen Reichs nach den Ergebnissen der Volkszählung 1939.—Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Band 552, 1, Berlin, 1943.*

## SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

## (a) Occupations.

In every 100 inhabitants of Opole Silesia including families, there lived on:

Agriculture and forestry .. .. .	25.7
Industry and crafts .. .. .	37.4
Commerce and transport .. .. .	13.0
Public service .. .. .	6.4
Domestic service .. .. .	1.7
Independent without occupation .. .. .	15.8
(including pensioners)	

## (b) Social structure.

In every 100 inhabitants of Opole Silesia, including families, were:

Independent (including higher civil servants)	16.4
Members of families assisting in work ..	9.2
Civil servants (including soldiers) .. ..	5.6
Employees .. .. .	7.2
Labourers .. .. .	44.2
Domestic servants .. .. .	1.6
Without definite occupation .. .. .	15.8
Unemployed .. .. .	18.4

Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1937.

## PARTICIPATION IN THE NATIONAL INCOME OF GERMANY

National income per inhabitant, in marks p.a.:

	1913	1928	1934
Opole Silesia .. .. .		850	554*
Lower Silesia .. .. .		1,057	708
Brandenburg .. .. .		1,140	799
Whole of Prussia .. .. .	755	1,174	794
Bavaria .. .. .	629	1,041	733
Germany .. .. .	766	1,185	804

\*The lowest participation in the whole of Germany.

Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1938.

## AGRARIAN SYSTEM

Percentage of land (*Betriebsfläche*) under different classes of agricultural holdings:

%	0.51—2	2—5	5—20	20—100	Over 100 ha.*
Opole Silesia .. .. .	3.3	8.7	32.1	11.1	44.8**
Lower Silesia .. .. .	1.3	4.6	26.1	20.3	47.7***
East Prussia .. .. .	0.7	2.5	18.3	31.6	46.9
Germany .. .. .	2.3	6.3	25.6	27.9	37.9
Rhineland .. .. .	4.0	11.4	34.1	20.5	30.0
Oldenburg .. .. .	1.8	6.5	32.8	45.2	13.7

\*One hectare equals 2.471 acres.

\*\*587 holdings.

\*\*\*2,643 holdings.

Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1937.

## WAGES PER HOUR IN PFENNIGS

(a) <i>Coal Mines</i>		1933	1937
Opole Silesia .. .. .		50.8	77.3
Lower Silesia .. .. .		49.1	72.7
Ruhr Basin .. .. .		62.7	99.5
Aachen District .. .. .		56.2	86.1
Germany (average) .. .. .		55.6	95.5
(b) <i>Metal industry</i>			
Silesia .. .. .		53.5	72.4
Westphalia .. .. .		55.8	83.5
S.W. Germany .. .. .		57.5	83.7
Germany (average) .. .. .		61.8	77.9
(c) <i>Chemical Industry</i>			
Opole Silesia .. .. .		51.0	65.6
Westphalia .. .. .		72.8	83.2
S.W. Germany .. .. .		69.2	96.0
Germany (average) .. .. .		70.1	87.1

Source : *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, 1937.*

## THE MINERAL WEALTH AND ITS EXPLOITATION

(a) *Coal*

The area of coal fields in Opole Silesia covers : 600 sq. km.

Coal deposits (up to 1,000 m.) : 8.7 milliard tons.

Production :

1913.....	11.9 million tons	1935.....	19.0 million tons
1924.....	10.9 " "	1937.....	24.5 " "
1932.....	15.3 " "		

German rearmament caused increase in production after 1932.

In 1935 the export of coal from Opole Silesia amounted to 1.7 million tons. The sale to Germany (except Silesia) amounted 11.8 million tons.

(b) *Iron and Steel*

Production	Pig Iron	Steel	Rolled Iron
1913	381,000 tons	355,000 tons.	—
1924	262,000 "	—	—
1925	—	359,000 "	286,000 tons
1932	31,000 "	176,000 "	85,000 "
1935	175,000 "	380,000 "	210,000 "
1936	207,000 "	450,000 "	314,000 "

(c) *Zinc and Lead*

Deposits of zinc ore and lead ore are estimated at about 11 million tons.

Production	Zinc Blend	Lead Ore	Sheet Zinc
	<i>(in thousand tons)</i>		
1913	92.5	15.3	4.0
1925	50.0	7.0	4.0
1932	112.4	18.0	7.9
1935	121.5	24.4	10.9
1937	103.3	19.7	—

(d) *Synthetic Petrol*

In both districts, Opole Silesia and the Waldenburg Basin (Lower Silesia) are found factories for synthetic petrol, processing coal. The production is several times higher than that of benzine in Poland before the present war. It is impossible to judge the extent of this production because for obvious reasons the Germans do not publish the exact data.

## LINKS OF OPOLE SILESIA WITH THE POLISH HINTERLAND

## (a) For Germany: Arsenal.

I. *Upper Silesia—Handbooks prepared under the Direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office.* No. 40. London, 1920; pp.41-42.

“ . . . There is little to add to what has been said above. The chief source of Silesian prosperity is the coal of Upper Silesia. If the *Regierungsbezirk* of Oppeln were united to Poland, this coal would pass from the control of Prussia; in that case it is possible that the industries of what had hitherto been Russian Poland would use more Silesian coal than they did before the war. Less coal, it is true, would go from Upper Silesia to German markets; but this might happen even if the coal-field remained in the German state, for the development of the waterways of Western Prussia has long given the coal of the Ruhr basin an advantage over that of Silesia in certain parts of Germany which used to rely mainly upon the latter. For instance, in 1890, 72 per cent. of the coal consumed in Berlin was supplied by Upper Silesia, whereas in 1901 only 54 per cent. came from that source.”

II. *New German Arsenal—The Times*, October 1, 1943.

“ . . . Since it became clear that the air raids on the Ruhr and Western Germany could not be effectively parried, Speer’s efforts have been directed towards building up new factories in the south-eastern districts of the Reich; Saxony, Thuringia, Bohemia and Lower Austria have all had their share, but the real substitute for the Ruhr has been created in Upper Silesia. Upper Silesia was already an industrial area of first-class importance. The coalfield there runs in seams from 6 ft. to 30 ft. thick, which are closer to the surface than those of the Ruhr. Near to it are the largest zinc deposits in Europe. It has enormous foundries, blast furnaces and rolling-mills.

The peace time production of the area was more than 400,000 tons of pig iron. The industrial plant has now been immensely developed. It includes, for example, three new works for the production of synthetic oil from pit coal and scores of new armament factories. These are reported to be very well camouflaged—most of them in wooded hill country—and the new concerns which are not in the coalfield itself have underground assembly shops.

Here are produced the barrels of the anti-aircraft guns which used to be made by Krupps in Essen, as well as shells and bombs of every calibre. Skilled workers have been transferred from the Ruhr and reinforced by metal workers from Italy and Poland.

The Upper Silesia industrial area is of particular importance now as it has equally good railway communications towards the eastern front and southward through Austria to Italy and the Balkans. Whereas factories in Austria and Bohemia have been attacked by Allied bombers, it is out of range for the present. It is vital for the supply of munitions to the German armed forces that it should remain so.”

## (b) For Poland: A natural link.

I. Andrzej Wierzbicki, *Prawda o Górnyim Śląsku* (The Truth about Upper Silesia), Warsaw 1921, quotes on pages 77-101 a memorandum addressed by the Chamber of Commerce at Opole to the German Chancellor von Bethman-Hollweg in July, 1917. The memorandum contains the following passage:

“ In view of the unfavourable situation of the Upper Silesian industrial region, Poland will remain extremely important for its economic development in the future, and one can even say, will be an irreplaceable factor. If Poland were not to be exploited by Upper Silesia over a long period, then the Silesian industry would be compelled to terminate and its value for the reconstruction and development of the German State would be diminished.”

II. *Economic Interdependence of Upper Silesia and the General Government—Kraakauer Zeitung*, September 30, 1943; as quoted by *News Digest* (21.10.1943).

“ . . . The present war has for the first time made Silesia into a complete whole. . . . But not only is Upper Silesia a whole for the first time in its history, it is also the first time in history that it has a natural hinterland open to it, so that it is able to extend its energies unchecked in all directions. It is true that there are still customs and currency barriers between it and the General Government, but they are no longer frontiers which hamper the interchange of trade, for the General Government as a component part of the Greater German Reich is striving to maintain the closest economic connections (*Bindungen*) with the Reich.

The General Government is a natural market for the heavy industry of Upper Silesia. Upper Silesia is also greatly interested in supplying nearby markets with more of its coal products instead of, as hitherto, sending three-fifths of them to zones 200 km. away. If the General Government is to be an even more absorbing market than it is to-day, it must develop an efficient industry of its own. When planning the peace time industry of the General Government one should think of it in terms of an industry of consumers goods based on agriculture, that is to say, of an industry for working up agricultural products (*landwirtschaftliche Veredelungsindustrien*). The General Government can also be a favourable place for branches of industry requiring intensive labour. Even before the war Warsaw had developed a many-sided production of all kinds of articles for daily use, which found a ready market in Upper Silesia, as for instance, pharmaceutical products, drugs, fancy goods, leather goods, etc. For all these goods, and especially food products, Upper Silesia offers a capacious market. These are only a few of the many possibilities of extending and intensifying the interchange of goods between the two areas."

*Appendix No. 8*

### POPULATION ACCORDING TO NATIONALITY

I. *Concerning the number of Polish Silesians*, an article from *Schlesische Zeitung*, Breslau, March 4, 1844.

"... A German clergyman in Upper Silesia writes in the *Silesian Church Magazine*: According to rather accurate estimates the number of Silesia's inhabitants who only speak Polish and do not understand German approaches 600,000. No teacher of the Polish language is employed at the secondary school or even at the Teachers' College in *Oberglogau* which trains the teachers for the population; therefore, there is no opportunity to learn the language. The consequence will be that the school children will need an interpreter in their intercourse with the teachers and one for the minister of the parish. This is already universally the case during legal proceedings with the Polish speaking inhabitants."

II. *Die Polnische Sprachfrage in Preussen*, Leipzig, 1845; p. 380.

"A report by a Catholic priest from Upper Silesia, dated the beginning of 1842, states:

... Training in the Polish language is not only neglected, but it is despised, suppressed, exterminated. In no secondary school of Upper Silesia is Polish grammar or spelling taught. The pupils are left in utter ignorance of the literature of their mother tongue.

The author continues to depict the evil consequences of such linguistic ignorance among the young priests and legal officials. The position in the elementary schools is no improvement to that existing in the secondary ones and the same applies to the Teachers' Training Colleges.

The bad outcome of such an unilateral training of the teachers (only in German) became apparent very quickly. Some do not teach the children to read Polish. Religious instructions are frequently only in German (this is the case in *Bauerwitz*). The German School Inspector gave a chaplain the following well-intended advice: he should give religious instruction only in German and here and there insert a Polish word or two.

The author goes on to tell us that many schools deliberately plan the extermination of the Polish language; this is not only the case in big towns but also in many villages. Nothing at all is written or memorized in Polish and it is prohibited to speak Polish. These exacting teachers are mostly German by birth and seem to be employed with the immediate purpose of Germanizing the parishes. Many teachers start in this harsh manner but after some years realize the uselessness of their endeavours:

Also the religious services are used to oust the Polish language. In *Bauerwitz* every third Sunday and holiday a sermon is held in German although the entire parish consists of Moravian inhabitants and only a few German immigrants. Where a couple of Germans wish it, the priest is forced by the Government to preach once a month in German.

The report ends with a remark made by the Governmental Head M. to the Inspector of the Schools in K. This influential official said to the school master: On no account mention to me that Polish is still being spoken in that district; I wish to hear none of it!!”

III. Leon Dominian, *The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe*—Published by the American Geographical Society of New York, 1917; pp. 126-127.

“German Poland, from Upper Silesia to the Gulf of Danzig, contains about 4,000,000 Poles. In Upper Silesia they constitute 61 per cent. of the population and number about 1,300,000. This majority has been maintained, in the face of aggressive Germanization, since the first half of the fourteenth century. Upper Silesia is the best endowed section of Polish territory.

The greyish soil which forms the surface of the Oder valley is eminently fitted for cereal and beet cultivation and the farmers of this soil are generally Poles. They often represent 90 per cent. of the rural population. In the cities and generally speaking in the industrial field they are labourers. Capital and the management of the factories and of mines are in German hands. The most interesting feature of the clash between Germans and Poles in Upper Silesia is found in the failure of the Germans in their efforts to force their language upon an alien people.

Silesian Poles were never so conscious of nationality as they are to-day. They band together in order to resist Germanization more effectively. Small tradesmen, petty farmers and professional men organize themselves into bodies to which individual interests are entrusted whenever German methods become intolerable. But the greatest asset of Polish nationality in this fight against annihilation is its high birth rate.”

IV. *Upper Silesia—Handbooks prepared under the Direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office.* No. 40. London, 1920.

“If the Oder is taken as the racial boundary, the eastern part of the *Regierungsbezirk* forms a solid block of Polish territory. Outside the four towns of the industrial district the percentage of Poles in the population is as high as in any other large district, Russian Poland included. Among the German inhabitants of the four towns, moreover, are military and other officials of all grades, who are not indigenous and should not be included in an estimate of the permanent population.

The Czech-Slovaks of Upper Silesia nearly all live in the western part of the rural *Kreis* of Ratibor, where they form 60 per cent. of the population. They are also found in the proportion of 10 per cent. in the adjoining *Kreis* of Leobschütz.

It should be observed that, strictly speaking, the Germans of Silesia, like those of East Prussia, are racially very mixed, and probably as much Slavonic as Germanic in blood. The modern national division, however, only follows the racial division in as far as it coincides with a difference of language.

The Germans of Upper Silesia speak a Middle German dialect common to the whole province, and allied to the dialects of Lusatia and Thuringia. The Polish dialect of Upper Silesia, called by the Germans ‘Water Polish,’ has a number of German expressions, and differs in a few points from the standard language. These, however, are not sufficient to prevent Silesian and other Poles understanding one another’s speech; and standard Polish is used by Silesian Poles in writing.

Since 1873 the Prussian authorities have made persistent and rough-handed efforts to replace the Polish language by the German, but this the Poles have hitherto effectively resisted.” (p. 7)

“The district of Oppeln, where the Poles are in a large majority, is in sympathy with the Polish feeling in Poznan, and acts with the Polish section of the Reichstag . . . The existence of the Polish national feeling in Silesia has been an element in German policy, for Bismarck said that ‘our geographical position, and the intermixture of both nationalities in the eastern provinces, including Silesia, compel us to retard, as far as possible, the opening of the Polish question.’\* Nearly a quarter of the whole population of the province (Silesia, with the capital in Breslau) is Polish, and Poles constitute an overwhelming majority in many parts.” (p. 20)

\*Bismarck, *Reflections and Reminiscences*, translated by A. J. Butler, vol. I, p. 342.

V. Walter Geisler, *Die Sprachen - und Nationalitätenverhältnisse an den deutschen Ostgrenzen und ihre Darstellung.*—Justus Perthes in Gotha, 1934; pp. 40-42.

“ Since 1742 German nationality has gained considerably in Upper Silesia. The officials were expected to know Polish, yet the learning of German was regarded as essential for raising the cultural level. Until the *Kulturkampf* schooling was bilingual. Yet elementary schooling in the villages was neglected in a deplorable manner with the result that the population in spite of all good intentions, was not sufficiently imbued with German culture. The loss could not be redressed despite later attempts to do so. . . . The German counter-blow to the Polish propaganda only came late—at the beginning of our century—and was most effective in the sphere of social assistance. The census of 1910 clearly shows the result, because formerly many professed to be Poles from a spirit of opposition. . . . We must say a little about the language of the Upper Silesians; if they are not linguistically Germanized, they speak a language different to High Polish, a mixed language popularly called *Wasserpölnisch*.”

VI. Gauleiter Fritz Bracht, *OS—20 Jahre nachher*, an article in *Völkischer Beobachter*, June 25, 1942.

“ The previous treatment of the Upper Silesian . . . who was an excellent soldier and workman, but was called in the army and workshop and wherever he appeared a *Wasserpölnack*, caused him to waver in his vows to Germany. The wrong education policy of the middle of the nineteenth century which introduced the official Polish language as a medium of instruction now bears fruit. The Upper Silesian, who hitherto knew no High Polish, gained command of the language. Polish propaganda now is linked with the use of the language.”

VII. Robert E. Dickinson, *The German Lebensraum*, London, 1943; p. 80.

“ The Reich province of Upper Silesia had in 1910 a population. . . of whom 60 per cent. spoke a Polish dialect known as *Wasserpölnisch*. Formerly a thinly-peopled land, its great growth during the last seventy years has been due to the development of its coalfield, the second largest in Europe. The area west of the Oder is good farmland, but to the east and especially in Upper Silesia, much of the land is still under forest. The advantage of German settlement into Upper Silesia commenced in the sixteenth century. In 1790 Breslau was still largely Polish in speech, and the Oder still forms the approximate border between German and Polish speech. The forested area of Upper Silesia, where the coalfield is situated, was originally entirely Polish in speech, but in 1918 the Germans formed the middle class in towns, and the Poles the poorer classes in the industrial districts, in the coalmines and in the poorer farming areas east of the Oder. The overwhelming majority of the Polish-speaking people are native to the area.”

Appendix No. 9

## SOCIAL CONDITIONS

I. I. Partsch, *Schlesien. Eine Landeskunde für das Deutsche Volk*. Breslau, 1896-1911; vol. II, pp. 14, 15, 16, 20-24.

“ The cramped and poverty stricken existence, as well as the character of the agricultural population of Polish Upper Silesia have frequently been depicted. Where reality provides crude colours it is easy to describe scenes with ghastly impressiveness. Only a knowledge of the past, however, leads to an understanding of the people and circumstances.

The fate of the district has been especially influenced by the fact that the basis of the population has remained Polish, and that the German colonisation could only gain predominance in the towns, but not in the country. This development was aided by historical facts. As long as the subterranean resources had only incompletely or not at all been exploited, any active economic relation to the German west did not exist; the district had no valuable produce to offer and, therefore, possessed no purchasing power to absorb goods from the west in appreciable quantities.

Only the eighteenth century offers detailed descriptions of the economic condition of the Silesian peasantry, descriptions based on long experience.\* The instances are so striking that wherever Knapp wishes to depict the bad conditions existing before the liberation of the peasants in Prussia, he always picks his examples from this part of the

country.\*\* The peasants very few of whom were living on inferior holdings as free people, suffered under the burdens of unclearly defined compulsory service to the lord of the manor, duties which in the case of large holdings caused difficulties in tilling, and with the small ones increased the burdens of existence . . .

Since 1748 the Great King devoted much time to the protection of peasant property against the encroachments of the large estate owners . . . but nothing was done to lighten the burden of the compulsory services or serfdom. The first outburst appealing to public opinion accompanied with descriptions of the sufferings and depravity of the Upper Silesian people who frequently had 'nothing of human beings about them except the appearance,' could be heard towards the end of Frederick's reign. But naturally no great difference resulted . . .

Recent decades have brought some improvement in these conditions. A large part of the population, however, still lives in poverty-stricken little houses without foundations and very closely packed in low, ill-ventilated, unboarded rooms very frequently under the same roof as the animals . . .

Their food chiefly consists of potatoes and sour cabbage (*kapusta*). Bread is consumed very little, in fact less than might be desired, all the more is meal soup taken with pork fat and bacon (*zur*), which is the real national dish of the Upper Silesian. Animal breeding, practised even by very small owners, chiefly serves to pay the rent and cover the other expenses. For many the only dairy produce of the cow left for their own use is the remainder of the buttermilk, and only the more fortunate ones are able to fatten a small pig for their own consumption, the poorer people even turn that into money. They must clothe themselves, even if they go bare-footed. Thus thousands lead their lives in hardship bordering on poverty. If illness breaks out or the potato crop is a failure, then they are the victims of dire need. They have no reserves on which to fall back . . .

In such times the resistance of a greatly tried people is put to a severe test, all weaknesses and defects appear in their worst forms and contribute to the misfortune of the nation. In an impoverished state the peasant easily becomes the prey of ruthless exploitation, all the more so if his educational level is low. The Upper Silesians are by no means untalented. . . . but the result of school education was still extremely insufficient in the middle of the nineteenth century. The more impartial observer was inclined to put most of the blame on the clergy for these bad conditions. The state must, however, be blamed for a long and initial neglect. Only if it constantly keeps in mind its responsibility and duty to maintain full control of education under the extremely difficult conditions existing in this district can the unquestionable result obtained during recent years be maintained and improved. The essential task of the state will be to train a stock of teachers from Upper Silesia itself, people who know the language of the country (Polish) and are able to initiate others into the German language for instructional purposes. On the other hand purely German teachers must be trained in Silesian colleges to realise the difficulties of instructing pupils in a foreign mother tongue . . .

II. Rudolf Virchow, *Briefe an seine Eltern*, Leipzig, 1907; pp. 124-129.

The eminent Pathologist and opponent of Bismarck, Rudolf Virchow, was sent in February, 1848, by the Prussian authorities to investigate a typhus epidemic in Upper Silesia. On arrival at Rybnik he wrote to his father:

"Dear Father,

Since yesterday we are in the centre of the infected area, some eighty miles from the residential town . . . To-day we have undertaken an excursion to Radlin and Loslau to-morrow we shall go to Sohrau, the day after to the country and on Sunday probably to Pless. The misery is limitless, and you can plainly see what can become of a population enslaved by Catholic Hierarchy and Prussian Bureaucracy. The bluntness and abject servility are terrifying. . . . The towns look quite passable, but the villages which are sometimes miles away in pasture land are very bad. The houses are of piled timber—log huts; the rooms are very small, the animals live with the people, the windows are small and cannot be opened, the largest part of the room is occupied by the stove and the beds. The people are miserable objects who walk with bare feet on the snow, their feet are mostly dropsical, their faces pale and their eyes dull. They are very subservient, they kiss your arm, the lappet of your coat and your knee all in one breath. It is disgusting. It is fairly certain that typhus has spread so widely owing to starvation. The extent of the epidemic is enormous; the number of orphans in the districts of Rybnik and Pless is officially estimated at 3,000 . . . At present the feeding of the

\*Kaulfersch, *Der gegenwärtige Zustand Oberschlesiens*, 1786.

\*\*Knapp, G. F., *Die Bauernbefreiung und der Ursprung der Landarbeiter in den älteren Teilen Preussens*, Leipzig, 1887.

population takes place everywhere, but very insufficiently. Each person receives daily one pound of flour and a little salt, but owing to the population being accustomed to live on potatoes they do not know how to prepare meals from the flour . . . That illness has taken such a hold and starvation has spread so alarmingly justifies the harshest reprimand of the officials from the *Oberpräsident* down to the *Landrat*, but I shall pass that over until later when it will probably be even more evident."

This has obviously taken place by the time Virchow writes the next letter to his father on February 29th, 1848, this time from Sohrau. He tells his father:

"The epidemic increases rather than diminishes. As it covers a wider area so fast new cases are reported. Deaths, however, are much less frequent than hitherto. On the one hand the weak and feeble have already died, on the other hand medical treatment is more general. But there are still many villages to which no physician has come. The number of villages is so great and they are so widespread that you could only speak of a proper treatment if the government were to send four times as many physicians as they do. There is no doubt that the pestilence would never have gained such a grip had reasonable precautions been taken and if the government, especially Minister von *Bodelschwingh* had not by his suspicion and stubbornness sacrificed as many people as a small war would have cost. Now huge sums of money are spent, officials sent in droves, but nobody can make the dead live again and many people will eternally keep the germs of ill health in their systems . . ."

III. William J. Rose, *The Drama of Upper Silesia*, London, 1936, Chapter: *A Capitalist Culture Pattern*; pp. 161-162.

" . . . Something like a climax of incompatibility was reached in the land by the spring of 1913, when a general strike of all the miners broke out. A good account of its preparation can be found in the speech made by Deputy Korfanty in the Prussian Diet on April 16. Since the previous autumn, the Polish Trade-Union leaders had been set on getting more livable conditions of labour for their men. All in vain. Though the cost of living had risen during the preceding years, so that plenty of the unskilled workmen had only earned enough daily to pay for two, at the best three, pounds of meat, and at the same time the price of coal had greatly improved since the quiet years 1907-1910, wages remained as before—some forty per cent. below those of the Westphalian area. At the same time the hours were longer. The demands were, therefore, for a shorter, eight-hour day; a wage approaching that paid to German miners elsewhere; more human treatment while at work; and the recognition of the unions. When not even fair promises could be obtained, a strike followed at the end of April and lasted nearly four weeks.

Though sympathizing with the men, State Secretary Delbrueck refused to intervene since the employers had not appealed to him. The moment was a dramatic one, for the Balkan war was on, the larger military budgets for the Reich had just been wrung from Parliament, and a huge political strike was on in Belgium. Coal was being called for, and the men knew that they could find work either in Westphalia, or on the Austrian side, not to mention France itself. Their discipline was exemplary; but at the end of a week some ninety thousand men were out—nearly three-fourths of all employed. The charge circulated in the German press that the whole thing had political tendencies was roundly rejected by Korfanty in Parliament.

Not a few of the clergy tried to help the owners by urging the men to return to work. To one miner, who showed that he had eighty marks a month and eight mouths to feed, the answer was given that 'a good Catholic never should complain!' The outside German press began reckoning the losses in dividends as the price of shares began to drop. In coal alone, the first week of the strike was estimated to have cost the employers some ten million marks. In Upper Silesia it was noted that the Hakatist press issued an appeal to the workers—in Polish! Clearly that despised tongue had its uses, too.

By way of exerting pressure, the managers began to give notice to the strike leaders that they must vacate their dwellings. On the workers' side, thousands packed their bags and left for the Rhineland, while other thousands invaded the offices seeking passports for France. Before the middle of May all except five of the fifty-eight mines promised a change for the better on the lines demanded, if the men would go back. Having enjoyed their Maytime holiday, the men took the managements at their word and returned to work. They had won a moral victory, but nothing more. On going back they found their managers resentful and not at all anxious to either lessen the hours or make provision for increase in wages. In a long official report General Director

Willinger wrote :

'The miners' strike was the biggest wages movement that Upper Silesia has ever experienced. It has ended with complete disaster for the workers. . . . With the greatest confidence and with the concurrence of others, I declare that the causes of the strike were political and not economic ones. It was called forth and supported entirely by the Polish Organization of Trades' Unions, a society with quite obvious political ear-marks, and serving the ends of the Poznanian politicians. . . . The fight was one against Germans in Upper Silesia, and its purpose was the support and confirming of Polish interests in the land.'

As an expression of the concerted view of the industrialists, he declared himself opposed as before to the demand for an eight-hour day. Clearly the lot of the Upper Silesian worker was not getting any better."

IV. Georges Kaeckenbeeck, *The International Experiment of Upper Silesia*, Oxford University Press, 1942; pp. 341 and 352.

"The Polish minority in Germany had never had minority schools. They had always gone to the German schools, and knew full well that on their German education depended their economic existence in Germany. These people wanted to talk Polish among themselves, wanted to pray in Polish, but the German schools were the means of education and economic preparation . . .

A circumstance which still added to the difficulty was that two minorities (Germans in Polish Silesia and Poles in German Silesia) were in no way equal, the Polish minority in Germany consisting mostly of peasants and miners—the most intellectual members having gone to Poland, while the German minority in Poland almost entirely consisted of more instructed, socially better situated elements ; comprising the leaders of industry, members of the free professions, technical experts and many qualified workers. A consequence of this inequality was that the same provisions often wrought very different results on each side, results which . . . must have been galling to the Poles."

Appendix No. 10

## THE SILESIAN QUESTION IN 1919

I. *Proposed New Boundaries for Germany*. Prepared in 1919 by the American Intelligence Section—Document 441 in : David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Peace*, New York 1924, pp. 49-50.

"It is recommended that on the west the Polish-German frontier should follow the linguistic frontier as closely as topography and peculiarities of the railway system permit.

The principle would dictate the inclusion in Poland of the largest part of Upper Silesia (The Regency of Oppeln), which contains very rich deposits of coal and iron ; and the whole of the province of Posen, except for some border district on the south-west and north-west,

The frontier, traced on map . . . would include practically no districts, which have not a Polish majority, and usually an overwhelming majority. In order to make a fairly straight frontier and to avoid cutting railway lines in inconvenient fashion, it has in some places been necessary to include small groups of German communities towns or villages, but there are about as many cases where Polish communities have been left inside the German frontier."

II. *Conditions of Peace of the Allied and Associated Powers* (May 7, 1919). Complete reproduction of the official text. Publication by H. R. Engelmann, 1919 ; p. 21.

"Article 27 : The boundaries of Germany will be determined as follows . . .

6. With Tchecho-Slovakia : The frontier of the 3rd August, 1914, between Germany and Austria . . . to the point north of the salient of the old province of Austrian Silesia situated at about 8 kilometres east of Neustadt.

7. With Poland : From the point defined above in a northerly direction to the point of the salient of the eastern boundary of the *Kreis* of Falkenberg, which is about 3 kilometres east of Puschine : a line to be fixed on the ground passing east of Zulz ; thence the eastern boundary of the *Kreis* of Falkenberg, then the boundary between Upper and Middle Silesia, then the western boundary of Poznania to the Bartsch . . ."

## THE PLEBISCITE OF 1921 AND AFTER

I. H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, London, 1924 ; vol. VI, pp. 264.

“ . . . It must not, however, be disguised that the opposition to the plebiscite was very strong. This opposition rested not only on the theory that it was an error to make any concessions to the Germans, but also on considerations affecting this particular case. It insisted on the difficulty of providing the troops necessary to maintain order, and it laid special stress upon the illegitimate pressure exercised upon the Polish lower classes by priests and pastors, officials and teachers, capitalists and managers. To meet this contention the period before the taking of the plebiscite was in this instance unusually prolonged. There was a real danger that the Polish movement, which was certainly gaining strength, had not yet attained sufficient force to enable the Polish labourer to judge clearly the issues which were at stake. The uneducated Polish voter is liable to be affected by German statements that he will lose his industrial insurance, and perhaps even his livelihood if he votes for union with Poland. The result might be a vote which did not express the real wishes of the people, and might be bitterly regretted in later years by the majority of the population. Such a state of affairs would be certain to cause trouble both locally and in Poland. There is no need to disguise the reality of this danger, but its seriousness was estimated differently by different observers.”

II. K. Smogorzewski, *The Farce of Plebiscites, in Free Europe*, April 24, 1943.

“ Let us now consider Upper Silesia, where the plebiscite area was 4,160 sq. miles with a population of 1,942,000 inhabitants, 74 per cent. of whom spoke Polish as their mother-tongue. The Inter-Allied Commission was presided over by the French General Le Rond. Britain was represented by Colonel H. F. P. Percival and Italy by General A. de Marinis. The voting took place on March 20, 1921, and 1,186,234 persons polled. 479,414 votes (40.4 per cent.) were cast for Poland, and 706,820 for Germany.

To guarantee the absolute fairness of the plebiscite lay beyond the means at the disposal of General Le Rond. Six factors favoured the Germans to the detriment of the Poles :

1. The Inter-Allied Commission assured the plebiscite area nothing more than a kind of supervision which the Prussian officials under the Landrats of the old Prussian administration, as yet still in office, well knew how to evade. Scorning impartiality the Prussian officials exerted all their influence in the service of German propaganda. Although after the second Polish insurrection the official policing of the plebiscite area was put in neutral hands, German terrorist activities never ceased. A glaring example of this was the assassination of two hundred Poles of Upper Silesia, who were seeking to counterbalance German propaganda.

2. Important German landowners and industrialists brought serious economic pressure to bear on the workers and peasants of Upper Silesia. It must be remembered that seven German proprietors, including the Prussian State, alone owned 286,697 hectares, or 27 per cent. of the total province, and that 258 German landowners had in their hands 57 per cent. of the soil. But while 99 per cent. of the high grade employees in the heavy industry were Germans, of a total of 172,000 miners in Upper Silesia, 146,000 were Polish, as were 50,000 of a total of 58,000 iron and steel workers.

3. The great majority of the Catholic clergy of Upper Silesia, who were in the diocese of Cardinal Bertram, Archbishop of Breslau, were of German nationality, while Poles, whose national sympathies were known, were rarely appointed.

4. To the biased feeling of the administration, the German terror, the pressure exerted by industrialists and landowners, and the exploitation of religion by the German clergy, must be added the nature of German propaganda. It will suffice to quote one example. On March 18, 1922, the Germans produced a faked issue of the Polish journal *Katolik*, a Beuthen paper, printing on the front page an appeal to all Upper Silesians to vote for Germany. The copies of the counterfeit were distributed throughout the plebiscite area with the complicity of the post office officials, all of them German, who handed over the genuine copies of *Katolik* to the German commissariat.

5. The Peace Conference included in the plebiscite area the German enclaves of Leobschütz and the eastern part of Neustadt, with Oberglogau as its centre, regions which the Poles never claimed. The result of this was to increase the German vote by 97,664.

6. Finally, of 192,408 emigrants, 182,288 voted for Germany.”

### III. Letter of the Polish Episcopate to the Pope on the Question of Upper Silesia.

On December 1st, 1920, the Polish Telegraph Agency published the text of a letter sent by the Polish bishops to the Pope, dealing with the German preparations for the Silesian plebiscite :

"On November 21st, 1920, Cardinal Bertram of Breslau prohibited the Upper Silesian clergy, under the penalty of suspension, to take part in the plebiscite campaign without special permission granted by the local parson, and those who do not belong to the diocese of Breslau have been altogether forbidden to take part in the said action.

Cardinal Bertram's order is an unjustifiable step as it virtually hands the plebiscite over to the German clergy : 75 per cent. of the parsons of Upper Silesia are—in consequence of Prussian domination—of German nationality and they refuse to allow Polish clergy, and priests of Polish nationality, to take any active part in the plebiscite campaign.

Moreover, this order is contrary to the principles of the Treaty of Versailles.

Although Cardinal Bertram refers to special authority granted him by the Holy See, we believe that this statement does not correspond with the real state of affairs and that it is in contradiction with the actual intentions of the Holy See.

We, the Polish bishops, desirous of the benefit of the Church and anxious that the relationship between the Polish nation and the Holy See be that of the obedient son to the parent, and solicitous for the Polish nation that it be ensured the freedom which is its due, we confess before Thee, Holy Father, that the Polish nation has been greatly wronged. In defence of justice we implore Thee to avert by the dignity of the Holy See the evil done to us.

On behalf of all Polish bishops : Cardinal Dalbor, Archbishops Bilczewski, Teodoro-wicz, Przeździecki, Kakowski, Sapieha, Marian Fulman."

IV. Results of the 1921 Plebiscite according to *Upper Silesia*, edited by The Polish Research Centre, London, 1941 ; Statistical Table C.

County ( <i>Kreis</i> )	Per cent. of Polish votes of Permanent Residents	Total per cent. of Polish votes
Kluczborek ( <i>Kreuzburg</i> ) .. .. .	6.5	4.0
Oleśno ( <i>Rosenberg</i> ) .. .. .	42.0	31.8
Opole — town .. .. .	6.6	5.2
Opole — rural district .. .. .	38.8	30.5
Wielkie Strzelce ( <i>Gross Strehlitz</i> ) .. .. .	58.6	50.7
Lubliniec ( <i>Lublinitz</i> )* .. .. .	53.8	47.0
Gliwice — town .. .. .	23.1	21.1
Toszek-Gliwice ( <i>Tost-Gleiwitz</i> )* .. .. .	63.3	57.5
Tarnowskie Góry ( <i>Tarnowitz</i> )* .. .. .	67.2	61.1
Bytom — town ( <i>Beuthen</i> ) .. .. .	27.7	25.3
Królewska Huta ( <i>Königshütte</i> )* .. .. .	27.2	25.3
Bytom — rural district** .. .. .	62.9	59.1
Zabrze ( <i>Hindenburg</i> )* .. .. .	52.8	48.9
Katowice — town* .. .. .	15.3	14.6
Katowice — rural district* .. .. .	60.3	55.6
Pszczyna — ( <i>Pless</i> )* .. .. .	80.8	74.2
Rybnik** .. .. .	73.1	65.2
Raciborz — town ( <i>Ratibor</i> ) .. .. .	11.7	9.0
Raciborz — rural district** .. .. .	48.4	41.3
Koźle ( <i>Cosel</i> ) .. .. .	29.9	25.1
Głupczyce ( <i>Leobschütz</i> ) .. .. .	0.6	0.4
Prudnik ( <i>Neustadt</i> — Eastern part) .. .. .	16.7	11.9
TOTAL .. .. .	47.3	40.4

\*Counties entirely or—

\*\*partially incorporated into Poland by the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors on October 20, 1921.

V. L. Aubert, *The Reconstruction of Europe, Its Economic and Political Conditions*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1925 ; pp. 24-27.

"Upper Silesia . . . was the most southern of the three sub-provinces into which the province of Silesia under Prussian rule was divided. Its political importance is due to the fact that situated as it is at the door of Moravia, it controls the principal passage between the plains of Northern Europe and the valley of the Danube ; placed at the point of contact of the Germans, Czechs and Poles, it has belonged successively to Poland, Bohemia and Germany. Its economic importance is also exceptional. . . .

In June, 1919, England, in response to Germany's protests, had in spite of the resistance of the United States and France, caused it to be decided that the greater part of Upper Silesia should be disposed of by plebiscite, instead of being transferred to Poland as stipulated by the Treaty. . . .

The voting took place on March 20th, 1921. The number of registered votes was 1,220,514 : 707,606 votes were in favour of annexation to Germany and 479,359 in favour of annexation to Poland. The Interallied Commission of Oppeln did not agree about the line which ought to be developed, because they disagreed entirely as to the relative importance of the wishes of the population . . . on the one hand, and on the other of geographical and economic conditions. . . . The advocates of the political solution favourable to Poland maintained that the conditions of the plebiscite itself had been greatly to the advantage of Germany, in giving the right to vote to all persons born in the plebiscite area. This had assured the vote to all the sons of German officials who had no longer any ties in the country. In addition, ever since 1899, any influx of Poles coming from Russia or Austria having been forbidden in Silesia by German law, the Polish vote had received no reinforcement from outside for five or six years before 1904, the date after which a Silesian domicile did not give the right to vote.

Furthermore, since 1899 the number of Polish voters, instead of being increased through immigration, had decreased by emigration. As these emigrants could not go towards Polish Russia, coming as they did from a mining country, they flocked in great numbers toward the Ruhr. The Silesians who had emigrated to the Ruhr were prevented as much as possible by the Germans from going back to Silesia to take part in the plebiscite. The result of all this was that, of the 190,000 natives of Silesia who returned after the plebiscite, 80 per cent. were German and only 20 per cent. Polish."

VI. Ludwig Musiol, *Official Alteration of Place-Names in German Upper Silesia*, an article in: *Baltic and Scandinavian Countries*, Vol. III., No. 2, May, 1937, published by The Baltic Institute in Gdynia.

"In 1934, however, the systematic and radical Germanization of Polish place-names in German Upper Silesia was undertaken on a scale hitherto unknown. From that time hardly a week passed without some Polish name in the Oppeln (Opole) district being changed into German by decree of the *Oberpräsident* of Silesia. Since, however, such a method would have entailed the passage of years before the last Polish name disappeared from the official lists, from New Year, 1936, onwards recourse has been had to more drastic measures.

Names are now Germanized wholesale, an entire administrative circle being purged at once. German writers euphemistically call this process "*Die Bereinigung unserer Ortsnamen*." Thus, for example, under a regulation issued by the *Oberpräsident* of Silesia dated February 12, 1936, all the remaining Polish place-names of the administrative circle of Tost (Toszek)—Gleiwitz (Gliwice), 64 in number, were Germanized at one stroke. Between the beginning of 1933 and March 23, 1936, 133 names were completely Germanized. Since that time this wholesale process has been repeated several times, and the number of names thus forcibly altered during the year 1936 amounts to several hundred . . .

For the efforts which are being made to Germanize Silesia are closely connected with the emphasis which is now laid on the "Polish peril" (*die polnische Gefahr*); or, in other words, the anti-Polish measures are made harsher in proportion as the Polish population in German Silesia becomes more conscious of its national origin. The existence of the resurgent Polish State and the fact of the incorporation in Poland of a portion of Upper Silesia by the will of its Polish inhabitants, after a bloody struggle for freedom from Prussian domination, have given real significance to the old catchword of the "Polish peril."

And to this is added a further motive : the Third Reich has formally rejected the "old slogan of Germanization," putting in its place "the purity of the race"; it aims at uniting within its borders all the Germanic peoples, but has no desire to include foreign national elements. Yet rather than admit the fact that in German Upper Silesia (and not only in German Upper Silesia) there is a compact mass of Polish population living within the boundaries of the Reich, all external traces of the existence of that population must be obliterated. For it is easy to understand that no one will believe in the German character of an area studded with homogeneous Polish place-names. Such a state of affairs would render obvious the basic Polish character of the area. In German Upper Silesia there is the further fact that behind the Polish names exists a Polish population, and this to some extent explains the haste to Germanize those names."

## THE POLISH POPULATION IN UPPER SILESIA ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL CENSUS

County ( <i>Kreis</i> )	1861	1890	1900	1905	1910	1925
1. Oleśno ( <i>Rosenberg</i> )	87.9%	85.6%	83.2%	84.3%	80.7%	71.1%
2. Lubliniec ( <i>Lublinitz</i> )	89.7	82.8	80.1	62.8	79.3	74.5**
3. Wielkie Strzelce ( <i>Gross Strehlitz</i> )	88.5	81.5	78.7	82.1	79.2	73.8
4. Opole-rural ( <i>Oppeln</i> )	—	74.2	78.5	78.7	79.8	75.8
5. Opole-urban ( <i>Oppeln</i> )	—	—	18.1	19.3	20.1	15.8
6. Niemodlin ( <i>Falkenberg</i> )	11.1	9.6	9.6	10.7	10.2	9.2
7. Prudnik ( <i>Neustadt</i> )	49.4	47.1	44.6	46.4	44.9	44.5
8. Koźle ( <i>Cosel</i> )	84.0	80.8	73.7	76.8	75.0	63.7
9. Toszek-Gliwice ( <i>Tost-Gleiwitz</i> )	—	76.5	79.2	80.9	80.1	76.4
10. Gliwice town ( <i>Gleiwitz</i> )	—	—	15.3	25.5	21.6	14.7
11. Bytom-rural ( <i>Beuthen</i> )	—	78.1	79.8	73.1	73.1	62.8
12. Bytom-urban ( <i>Beuthen</i> )	—	—	47.2	37.5	37.6	33.1
13. Pszczyna ( <i>Pless</i> )	88.9	87.2	86.5	86.2	86.0	—
14. Rybnik	88.4	83.9	82.5	82.5	77.8	72.4**
15. Raciborz-rural ( <i>Ratibor</i> )	—	45.6	47.4	46.3	46.5	47.7
16. Raciborz-urban ( <i>Ratibor</i> )	—	—	34.7	35.4	36.3	30.0
17. Głupczyce ( <i>Leobschütz</i> )	2.3	5.3	3.6	5.3	6.3	3.6
18. Kluczborek ( <i>Kreuzburg</i> )	73.0	68.6	58.1	56.7	47.2	24.6
19. Grotków ( <i>Grottkau</i> )	—	0.5	0.6	1.3	2.0	—***
20. Nisa-rural ( <i>Neisse</i> )	—	0.4	0.5	1.1	1.1	—***
21. Nisa-urban ( <i>Neisse</i> )	—	6.0	2.6	3.6	3.7	—***
22. Tarnowskie Góry ( <i>Tarnowitz</i> )*	—	76.2	71.4	74.7	66.8	69.2**
23. Królewska Huta-town ( <i>Königshütte</i> )*	—	56.2	43.6	41.4	34.0	—
24. Zabrze ( <i>Hindenburg</i> )*	—	72.7	68.7	70.0	51.0	18.7**
25. Katowice-urban*	—	25.8	21.1	18.7	13.3	—
26. Katowice-rural*	—	74.2	70.7	71.2	64.8	—
Total number of inhabitants	1,126,270	1,577,731	1,868,146	2,033,651	2,207,981	1,377,830**
Total % of Poles	59.1	58.2	56.1	56.9	53.0	42.8**

\*The counties of Tarnowskie Góry, Królewska Huta, Zabrze and Katowice were previously parts of the counties of: Bytom, Pszczyna, Toszek-Gliwice and Lubliniec.

\*\*Referring to the part remaining in Germany after the plebiscite in 1921.

\*\*\*The source: W. Winkler, *Statistisches Handbuch für das gesamte Deutschland* (Berlin, 1927) does not mention the number of Poles in these counties.


\*\*\*\*It should be stressed that these data only show the results of the official census. The actual number of Poles in the periods mentioned above was higher and it is no overstatement to give it as well over 60 per cent. Some Polish statisticians estimated it even as over 70 per cent.






# UPPER SILESIA

GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS  
AFTER INCORPORATION  
OF POLISH AREAS



# DISTRIBUTION OF POLES IN OPOLE SILESIA



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