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Ideas–Contexts–Inspirations (I)

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On the Sources of Karol Wojtyła's *The Acting Person*

Abstract: The paper shows that the critical analysis of Max Scheler's and Immanuel Kant's concepts of moral philosophy was a starting point of Karol Wojtyła's own positive project of anthropology presented in the book *The Acting Person*. Its core lies in the recognition of the significance of human efficacy: human persons express and realize their full subjectivity through their actions. Wojtyła shows that genuine human actions are not motivated only by the emotional power with which particular values are given, but rather by the perception of their being true values. In the last analysis, Wojtyła's theory might be described as transphenomenology, that is, a synthesis of phenomenology and metaphysics. According to him, what is immediately given to the subject can be fully explained by categories that transcend direct experience. In this way Wojtyła incorporates his vision of anthropology into a broader metaphysics, at the same time showing that in philosophy one should move from phenomenon to foundation.

Keywords: ethics, experience, metaphysics, morality, phenomenology, person, value

The Acting Person penned by Karol Wojtyła is a book of a thinker. A contemporary scholar might be surprised while reading the first Polish edition of this book: there are no footnotes. It does not mean, however, that Wojtyła was not aware of the philosophical tradition proceeding him. His previous works, especially the so-called *The Lublin Lectures*, show that he studied very carefully great philosophers of the past and assimilated their heritage. Yet he tried to express it in his own synthesis and in his own language. In this paper, I try to identify the main sources of Wojtyła's philosophy and show their place in his own original synthesis.

Experience—The First Source of Wojtyła's Philosophy

To understand the philosophy of Karol Wojtyła, it is not enough to read some of his books. One has to make an effort to truly participate in the experiences that underlie his philosophy. Only in this way will we be able to follow the path that the philosopher pointed out to us. Perhaps it is worth recalling here the words that Jacques Maritain addressed to his friends Jerzy Kalinowski and Stefan Swieżawski, professors of the Catholic University of Lublin and authors of the book *La Philosophie A L'Heure Du Concile*.[1] In his letter Maritain wrote:

> The misfortune of ordinary scholastic teaching, and above all of textbooks, was the practical neglect of the essential element of intuition and its replacement by pseudo-dialectics of concepts and formulas. Nothing can be done until the intellect begins to see, until the philosopher or a disciple of a philosopher has acquired the intellectual intuition of being.[2]

I quoted the words of the great French thomist, because they introduce us directly to our subject, namely, the sources of Karol Wojtyła's philosophy. Usually, when we talk about the foundations of a philosophical theory of one or another thinker, we mean philosophers and philosophical trends that have influenced his philosophical system or his proper understanding of a particular fragment of reality. In the case of Karol Wojtyła, this fragment of reality is man himself, as Wojtyła does not build an all-encompassing philosophical system, but focuses on anthropology and ethics. In general, one can say that all his intellectual activity—philosophical, theological, and literary—is characterized by a deep desire to understand the human person. Wojtyła belongs to the great philosophical tradition at the beginning of which we meet the figure of Socrates with his call: know thyself (Gr. *gnothi te auton*). Thus, the first source of Wojtyła's philosophical thought is his contact with the object, its direct experience, and this object is man himself—both the subject and the object of the experience. At the beginning of *The Acting Person* Wojtyła reminds us that while experiencing anything beyond himself, the person experiences his own subjectivity. Hence subjective dimension of experience accompanies any other human experience. *The Acting*

[1] Cf. Jerzy Kalinowski and Stefan Swieżawski, *Filozofia w dobie Soboru*, trans. M. Gawryś and C. Gawryś (Warszawa: Biblioteka "Więzi," 1995). The book was first published in 1965. Jerzy Kalinowski and Stefan Świeżawski, *La Philosophie A L'Heure Du Concile* (Paris: Fayard, 1965).

[2] Jacques Maritain, "List do J. Kalinowskiego i S. Swieżawskiego," in *Filozofia w dobie Soboru*, 169.

Person is nothing but an attempt to describe and to philosophically explain the human person both in his subjective and objective dimension. On this path towards the theory, which later, as John Paul II, he will call the "adequate anthropology," Wojtyła encounters phenomenology, whose method he considers to be the best to unveil the human subjectivity.

An Encounter with Phenomenology

At the beginning of the 20th century, it was the phenomenological movement to defend the original character of experience, understood as direct contact with various types of objects. For a phenomenologist the object of experience is everything that is given directly, bodily given (German *leibhaft*), as they used to say. Therefore, there is not only the sensual experience (as claimed by sensualism), but also other types of experience: aesthetic, moral or religious. These last two types of experience were of particular interest to Wojtyła from the very beginning of his academic career. In his doctoral dissertation on the subject of faith in the writings of St. John of the Cross, Wojtyła studied religious experience, observing closely—through the analysis of the writings of one of the greatest mystics in the history of Christianity—how the value of sacrum is given directly in experience.[3] It is not surprising that he was also interested in phenomenology, especially the phenomenology of moral experience developed by Max Scheler.

How did Wojtyła encounter the philosophy of Scheler and what were the fruits of that meeting? First of all, we must remember that during his studies at the University of St. Thomas in Rome, Wojtyła gained a solid knowledge of the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas of Aquinas, which can be seen in the text of his doctoral dissertation. At the same time, however, his dissertation shows that its author is primarily focused on the subjective aspect of the experience of faith. It seems that at that time Wojtyła realized that fundamental metaphysical categories are a valuable tool for the interpretation of the objective dimension of faith, but he also noted that in such an interpretation its subjective dimension remains somewhat in the shadow. The same is the case with the whole subjective reality. In other words, St. Thomas shows that both God and man are persons, but in his philosophy we do not find any complete description of how one is a person, and how one lives his or her personality from within. Such a description can be given because man is the only being that we know not only from the outside, but also from the inside. Therefore, we can show that man is a subject (a person), but we can also develop categories in which we describe

[3] Cf. John Paul II, *Faith According to Saint John of the Cross*, trans. Jordan Aumann (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2009).

the way the human person experiences his or her subjectivity from within. In this context, it is worth noting that in his dissertation on God, Wojtyła does not want to use the term *object* (the choice that was criticized by one of the reviewers of his doctoral thesis, the famous thomist Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, OP), as he probably does not want to do so because, in his opinion, this term would not reveal the personal reality of God, but rather obscure it.

After having completed his studies in Rome, Wojtyła returned to Cracow, where he began his pastoral work. Soon, however, his bishop asked him to prepare his postdoctoral dissertation and to devote himself to the academic career. In this way Wojtyła meets with phenomenology, which had a profound influence on his original philosophy of the person, developed in the following years and presented above all in his main philosophical work *The Acting Person*.

According to some sources, the discussion of Scheler's ethical theory and its relation to the Christian ethics was suggested to Wojtyła by a professor of dogmatic theology at the Jagiellonian University, Fr. Ignacy Różycki. One of the main figures in the intellectual life of Cracow of those years was Roman Ingarden, a great disciple of Edmund Husserl, the father of phenomenology.

According to Husserl, the phenomenological method is used to describe what is directly given in consciousness, that is, phenomena. Phenomenology differs from psychology in that it tries to reduce phenomena to what is essential to them through the so-called eidetic reduction. This type of reduction requires the purification of phenomena from what is random, from influences of theories and traditions, and even the suspension of the spontaneous conviction of their real existence (i.e., the application of the so-called phenomenological *epoché*). However, the mere application of the phenomenological method does not yet determine the question of what the ontological status of the described phenomena is. I think that even *epoché* can be understood as a purely methodical procedure that can be used and then revoked. The ontological question is Husserl's next step, a justified step, since the phenomenological description itself leaves the ontological question open. As we know, this question ultimately led Husserl to a certain version of transcendental idealism, in which phenomena are considered to be the product of transcendental consciousness.

However, many of Husserl's eminent followers did not share this idealistic turn of their master. Among them were Roman Ingarden, Max Scheler, and Edith Stein (by the way, it is worth noting the parallelism of the philosophical paths of Wojtyła and Stein—in both cases there is a meeting of Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics with phenomenology, with the difference that the directions of their paths are opposite: Wojtyła starts from St. Thomas and goes towards phenomenology, whereas Stein commences with phenomenology and then discovers the metaphysics of St. Thomas).

In his research Ingarden was primarily interested in ontological, epistemological and aesthetic issues, although he devoted one of his most important

works to the phenomenon of responsibility (an analogy between the method of Wojtyła in *The Acting Person* and the method of Ingarden in his treatise *On Responsibility*[4] was analyzed by Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS[5]). During his academic career Ingarden also lectured three times on ethics: for the first time in the 1930s at the Jan Kazimierz University in Lviv, and twice after the war at the Jagiellonian University. It is interesting in the context of our deliberations that part of the lectures in Lviv was devoted to Scheler's concept of ethics. In the post-war years, despite strong pressure from Marxist ideology, the very presence of Ingarden, who never succumbed to this pressure and never embraced Marxism, was the point of reference for all those who were interested in phenomenology.

Wojtyła did not deal with Scheler's thought in all its aspects and did not follow all of its—sometimes radical—turns. The main subject of his studies was the work *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*.[6] As the title suggests, Scheler's work is dedicated to the discussion with Kant's ethical concept, although it also contains a positive ethical proposal based on a direct perception of values. We can describe the essence of Scheler's proposal in this way: Scheler contrasts the formal ethics of Kant with the ethics of "non-formal," "material" values. Let us recall that Kant's epistemological assumptions did not allow him to consider ethics as a discipline based on experience; nevertheless, he did not consider the field of morality to be an entirely subjective or arbitrary sphere. For Kant, the objectivity of ethics and its normative character are not derived from experience, but are guaranteed by the categorical imperative given a priori to every rational being (according to Kant, morality is the *Faktum der Vernunft*—the fact of reason which cannot be deduced from any empirical data[7]). On the other hand, moral norms are formulated according to the procedure of universalization of the maxim of action, which also has a strictly formal character: it is a kind of deduction of moral norms, whose starting point is not the content but the form of a moral norm. In this way the problem of normativity of ethics is completely detached from its empirical character. In the case of Kant's ethics—at least in the dimension of its justification, which we find in the *Critique of Practical Reason* and in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*—we are dealing with a normative ethics, but such an ethics is not of an empirical nature. Perhaps the evaluation of Kant's ethics would be somewhat

[4] Cf. Roman Ingarden, "O odpowiedzialności i jej podstawach ontycznych," in *Książeczka o człowieku* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1972), 71–169.

[5] Cf. Tadeusz Styczeń, "O metodzie antropologii filozoficznej," in *W drodze do etyki* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1984), 131–138.

[6] Cf. Max Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt Toward Foundation of Ethical Personalism* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

[7] Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 19228), 40–41.

different if we also considered his *Die Metaphysik der Sitten* [Metaphysics of Morality], a work which in Wojtyła's analysis is rather overshadowed (but then the problem of the relationship between Kant's theoretical philosophy and his practical philosophy arises, as well as the problem of the relationship between his general ethics and his applied ethics).

It was precisely this separation of ethics from experience in Kant's philosophy that caused Scheler's reaction and criticism. In a sense, Scheler's proposal can be described as the exact opposite of Kant's ethics. Scheler defends the empirical character of ethics, but rejects its normative character.[8] On the other hand, however, we can point to the element that connects Scheler's concept with Kant's concept. Although Scheler wants to base ethics on experience, he shares Kant's conviction, which David Hume formulated earlier in his own concise and captivating way of expressing the essence of things: reason is blind to values. If, however, this thesis is correct, can the empirical character of ethics be preserved? Scheler believes that this is possible because ethics is based on a different type of cognition than intellectual intuition. In his analyses, he tries to show that both values and their hierarchy are given in the experience of the emotional type. Scheler's phenomenological analysis shows that emotions are of intentional nature: thanks to them we come into direct contact with their proper objects, that is, values.

However, the consequence of defending the empirical character of ethics in this way was to deprive it of its normative character. In fact, emotions cannot be subjected to any norm, no one can be obliged to feel them. They appear in the subject spontaneously. Using the language of Wojtyła from *The Acting Person*, we can say that emotions belong to the sphere of what happens in the human being, and not to the sphere of his actions. In this way Scheler becomes convinced that in the field of moral experience, there is no place for what, according to Kant, was its very essence—the experience of moral obligation. In one of his articles on the comparison of the concept of Scheler's ethics with that of Kant, Wojtyła writes: "Scheler goes so far that he rejects duties in ethics at all as a fundamentally negative and destructive factor. Only the value as the subjective content of the experience has an ethical meaning."[9]

It is precisely because of this "emotional assumption" that Wojtyła believes that Scheler's ethical system cannot be an adequate tool for the scientific interpretation of the Christian ethics. We will not present in detail his arguments, which can be found in the book *Evaluation of the Possibility of Constructing*

[8] Cf. Tadeusz Styczeń, *Problem możliwości etyki jako empirycznie uprawomocnionej i ogólnie ważnej teorii moralności. Studium metaetyczne* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1972), 109–126.

[9] Cf. Karol Wojtyła, "Problem oderwania przeżycia od aktu w etyce na tle poglądów Kanta i Schelera," in *Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności*, ed. Tadeusz Styczeń, Jerzy W. Gałkowski, Adam Rodziński, and Andrzej Szostek (Lublin, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1991), 172.

a Christian Ethics on the Basis of the Assumptions of Max Scheler's System of Philosophy.[10] We are more interested here in the positive project of ethics (and finally also of anthropology), which Wojtyła starts from his discussion with Scheler. In fact, his assessment of Scheler's ethical system is not entirely negative. To the negative thesis we mentioned above, Wojtyła adds two positive theses in which he expresses his approval for the phenomenological method, and sees the source of the deficiencies of Scheler's system in its nonphenomenological assumptions. First of all, Scheler has definitely obliterated the normative character of ethical values in his system, which is an understandable consequence of the separation of these values from the causality of the person. This is all the more striking because the very act of conscience as an experience of the person is an object of phenomenological experience. When Scheler, the phenomenologist, does not reach the causal relationship between the person and ethical values through the analysis of an act of conscience, it must have some reasons beyond his phenomenology. These reasons lie in his emotional assumptions.[11] And second, "although the ethical system created by Max Scheler is not fundamentally suitable for the interpretation of the Christian ethics, it can help us in our scientific work on the Christian ethics. It makes easier for us to analyze ethical facts on the phenomenal and experimental level."[12]

As we can see, the assessment of the phenomenological method is unequivocally positive here. What is more, Wojtyła thinks that Scheler has gone too far in his dispute with Kant, neglecting the normative moment of the experience of morality, which can be described by means of the phenomenological method itself and which is available primarily in the phenomenon of conscience. Therefore, Wojtyła agrees with Scheler's fundamental postulate that ethics should be an empirical science. The defect of Scheler's concept is that he did not fully exploit the possibilities of the phenomenological method in the field of the analysis of moral phenomena. Wojtyła's project, whose first sketches we find in his studies on the ethical concepts of Kant and Scheler, can therefore be described as an attempt to preserve and integrate valid intuitions found in both Kant and Scheler. In this way the concept of both empirical and normative ethics is born, a concept which in the years to come was developed by Wojtyła and his students and which is known today as the personalistic ethics of the Lublin school.

It is worth noting here that some of the key concepts of Wojtyła's philosophy of the person, developed later in *The Acting Person*, appear already in his studies on Scheler's ethics. First of all, these are notions of causality and acting; the act will become for Wojtyła a kind of a window through which he will look at the interiority of the person. Through his or her acts, the person reveals who he

[10] Cf. Karol Wojtyła, "Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maxa Schelera," in *Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności*, 11–128.

[11] Ibid., 120–121.

[12] Ibid., 123.

or she is (as Wojtyła puts it—an act is an externalization of the person) and, at the same time, he or she realizes (or does not realize) what he or she is called to be as a person. In the language of the metaphysical tradition, we will say: through its acts a being realizes its potentialities. It is true that Scheler also speaks about the act of the person—in his opinion, the person is the center of acts—but he speaks about the intentional act, and not about the act understood as the realization of the inner capacity of the person. The intentional act presents us with an object that transcends our subjectivity—in the case of an emotional intentional act, this object is a value. The idea of the intentional act was a great achievement of phenomenology (which at this point, through Franz Brentano, was akin to medieval philosophy) in its polemics with subjectivism.

Wojtyła fully adopts the idea of the intentional act but, at the same time, he is convinced that in the field of ethics the understanding of the personal act cannot be limited to the act that is only cognitive. A moral act engages the whole person, not only his or her cognitive powers, but also emotions and, above all, the will. The culmination of moral deliberation is, as Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec perfectly shows, the decision. This was the moment where Scheler's concept lacked in what became the subject of Wojtyła's analysis in his monographic lecture entitled "The Act and Ethical Experience."[13] Scheler analyzes the way in which a person experiences values, but does not examine deeply enough how the person responds to them. What Scheler's ethics lacks is an adequate analysis of the person's causality. In face of value, the person is not only a subject of cognition, but also a subject of action. In fact, the person expresses and fully realizes his or her subjectivity when he or she acts, when he or she experiences himself/herself as the subject of his or her own acts. In addition to the experience of "something happens in me," in which we live ourselves rather as a "territory" for activating certain potentialities, there is also the experience of "I act," in which we live ourselves as the efficient cause of our own acts. Let us refer once again to the category of Aristotle: The transition from potency to act, provided that the appropriate conditions are met, is not spontaneous here, but is mediated by an act of the will, by a "yes, I want to act this way." By developing these analyses, however, Wojtyła tries to remain—at least at the starting point—in the area of phenomenology, that is, in the area of direct experience. For both the experience "something happens in me" and the experience "I perform an act" are the objects of direct experience and may become the object of phenomenological description. If in Scheler the second experience remains in the shadow, it results from his epistemological assumptions and not from the limitations of the phenomenological method itself. What is more, as Wojtyła's second thesis concerning Scheler's phenomenological method indicates, this method is an extremely useful tool for describing *how* (not only that) the human being is

[13] Cf. Karol Wojtyła, *Wykłady lubelskie* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1986), 19–73.

a person. This leads to a postulate to combine metaphysics with phenomenology, which is then implemented in Wojtyła's main philosophical work—in *The Acting Person*. By looking at metaphysics in the light of human experience Wojtyła can take advantage of the categories that have already been present in Aristotelian and Thomist metaphysics; however, these categories in Wojtyła gain a new, experiential dimension. In fact, it is one thing to claim that every act realizes a potency inherent in the nature of a given being, and another to describe this transition on the basis of one's own experience. The latter is possible because the person experiences this transition in his or her own interior. This is the only case in which we can, in a way, watch the metaphysical categories of act and potency in action, because the person—that is, my own self—is the only being that we experience from within (referring to Thomas Nagel's well-known article, we can say: We do not know what it is like to be a bat, but we know what it is like to be a human person[14]). The same thing that we said with regard to the categories of act and potency, we can repeat with regard to the notion of the cause. From the outside we see only a series of consecutive events; however, we know what it means to "be a cause," because we experience ourselves as efficient causes of our acts (Bertrand Russell, who belonged to a different philosophical tradition than Wojtyła, claimed that the concept of the cause only makes sense for us by analogy with our own experience: according to him, we understand what causality means, because we experience ourselves as causes of our actions).

The phenomenology applied in this way ceases to be a pure phenomenology and transforms into transphenomenology which, starting from what is directly given, leads us to discoveries that go beyond what is directly given but, at the same time, the realities discovered in this way adequately explain what we experience.

Let us return to Scheler's ethics in order to try, together with Wojtyła, to discover the moment in which normativity appears in moral experience. Our problem can be expressed in this way: While we can agree with Scheler that emotional experience refers us to values through intentional acts that are specific to that experience, at the same time we have to say that emotions do not yet tell us what attitude we should adopt towards values. It can happen, and in fact it happens many times in our lives, that in our emotional experience we are attracted by a value that for one reason or another we should not choose as a rule of our actions. Such a value does not cease to be an authentic value, and our experience does not cease to be an authentic experience of this value. However, it appears that the criterion of authenticity alone is not sufficient.

So what is the criterion that we follow, or at least we should follow, in our choices? In order to obtain a precise answer to this question, we refer to Wojtyła's analyses from the second part of *The Acting Person*, entitled "Tran-

[14] Cf. Thomas Nagel, "How It Is Like to Be a Bat?" *Philosophical Review* 83 (October 1974): 435–450.

scendence of the Person in Action." Of course, here we can only present a very brief summary of them. Wojtyła's analysis of moral experience shows that we do not make our decisions on the basis of the emotional impact which a given value makes on us, but on the basis of the belief that a value is true and right for us. The place where the translation of what is given into what is morally binding happens is the moral conscience. I feel obliged to be faithful to a value that I have recognized as true in a particular situation. According to Wojtyła, it is here that the normative dimension of ethics appears. Without taking into account the normative moment that flows from the knowledge and recognition of truth, our description of moral experience is incomplete and ultimately inadequate. Wojtyła says that this special coupling of truth with moral obligation is carried out in conscience, which manifests itself as the normative power of truth.[15] This *moment of truth* as a source of normativity of ethics was lacking in Scheler's concept. In his analysis, Wojtyła shows that normativity is not something that is imposed on the human person from the outside, but that it is born inside him, and it is a moment that, with all its objectivity, remains at the same time subjective. Thus, in Wojtyła moral obligation is not merely a "fact of reason," but turns out to be an experiential expression of man's dependence on truth. As it will be later expressed in a short formula by Tadeusz Styczeń: "I can't deny what I have experienced without denying my own self."[16]

Man is a person because he or she is not completely "integrated" into his/her nature: being a person means possessing one's own nature. Therefore, the person is free, that is, not determined by instincts, not dependent on the objects given to him/her in his/her intentional acts. However, personal freedom does not mean complete independence. The very dynamics of human freedom, the freedom of a being that is rationally free, is such that the person spontaneously, pre-reflectively, recognizes his/her dependence on truth. Therefore, if we try to deny something that we previously considered to be true, we see that in this way we introduce a contradiction, an inner division within ourselves: We try to deny something that at the same time we recognize. Of course, sometimes it happens that we actually do this, for example, when such a negation brings us a benefit. However, if we feel remorse afterwards, it means that we have already recognized our dependence on truth. In the language of the philosophical tradition we would say that the recognition of our dependence on truth happens in *actu exercito* (i.e., spontaneously, without an explicit reflection).

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[15] Cf. Karol Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn i inne studia antropologiczne* (Kraków: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2000), 205. Translated by the author of this article from the Polish edition of the book.

[16] Cf. Tadeusz Styczeń, "Etyka jako antropologia normatywna. W sprawie epistemologicznie zasadnego i metodologicznie poprawnego punktu wyjścia etyki, czyli od stwierdzenia: 'jest tak' – 'nie jest tak' do naczelnej zasady etycznej. Quaestio disputata," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 45–46 (1997–1998), no. 2, 5.

In this way, Wojtyła introduces a normative dimension to ethics, which was excluded from it by Scheler. However, this does not mean a return to Kant's a priori. Since the phenomenological method makes it possible to discover normativity within experience itself, the moral obligation ceases to be a form a priori of practical rationality and transforms itself, if we may say so, into a "material obligation." Thus, Wojtyła manages to avoid the one-sidedness of both Kant's and Scheler's concepts, while preserving what he thinks is right in both of these concepts.

Towards the Metaphysics of the Person

The problem of ethics leads us by its own logic to the problem of the human being, to which, according to Kant, all philosophical problems ultimately come down. Philosophy, Kant writes, can be reduced to the following questions: (1) What can I know? (2) What should I do? (3) What can I hope? (4) Who is the human being? The first question is answered by metaphysics, the second by ethics, the third by religion, and the fourth by anthropology. In fact, however, all these questions can be attributed to anthropology, because the first three problems boil down to the fourth.[17] Scheler posed the question of the human being in his famous book *The Human Place in the Cosmos*.[18] Wojtyła also saw the need to move from moral issues to anthropological issues, and he realized this move in a systematic way in *The Acting Person*. Of course, the responses of each of these three thinkers to the question of the human being are different. While Kant remains essentially within the framework of transcendental idealism, and Scheler advocates a kind of pantheism, for Wojtyła the problem of the human being is the starting point for the rediscovery of metaphysical categories. Indeed, the metaphysical problem does not usually appear as an abstract theoretical problem, but in its starting point it is identical with the anthropological question. The human being asks who he or she is and where he or she is going, so first he or she asks about his/her own being. However, in order to be able to answer this question adequately, he or she must pose a question about being as such, that is, he or she must pose the metaphysical question. Although none of his studies was directly devoted to metaphysics, both in *The Acting Person*, and even more so in the first part of the so-called *Theology of the Body* of

[17] Cf. Immanuel Kant, "Logik," in *Werke*, Akademie-Ausgabe, Bd. IX (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), 968.

[18] Cf. Max Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2008).

John Paul II, which is a commentary on the first chapters of Genesis and which was written even before Cardinal Wojtyła was elected pope, we find numerous comments clearly indicating the type of metaphysics that Wojtyła is referring to John Paul II writes:

> The first account of the creation of man, which, as we have observed, has a theological character, contains hidden in itself a powerful metaphysical content. One should not forget that precisely this text of Genesis has become the source of the deepest inspirations for the thinkers who have sought to understand 'being' and 'existing' […]. Despite some detailed and plastic expressions in this passage, man is defined in it primarily in the dimensions of being and existing (*'esse'*). He is defined in a more metaphysical than physical way.[19]

The words quoted above come from the theological work of John Paul II, which, due to its theological character, goes beyond the methodological framework of our reflection in the field of philosophy. This is undoubtedly the case from the point of view of context of justification, although not necessarily from the point of view of context of discovery. St. Thomas, as Étienne Gilson perfectly shows, made his greatest philosophical discovery under the influence of the book of Genesis; faith was instrumental in making a philosophical discovery. Similarly, in the case of Karol Wojtyła, we can reasonably suppose that his philosophy of the person would not be what it really is if its creator had not met the person of Jesus Christ in his life. I think that when speaking about the sources of Wojtyła's philosophy, we cannot ignore this meeting, although strictly speaking, its analysis does not belong to philosophy. As the Second Vatican Council states, Christ, by revealing the truth about God, also reveals the truth about the human being.[20] In fact, Christ's incarnation is nothing more than God's own act in relation to the human being, an act by which God reveals himself, his inner life, an act which, in this case, too, is a kind of a window through which we can know who its subject is. However, this act is also intended to convince the human being of his extraordinary dignity, a dignity so great that it justifies this kind of intervention by God himself. All these contents, which are the very center of the Christian faith, Wojtyła experienced in a particularly profound way. It is no coincidence that the first encyclical of John Paul II, called *Redemptor Hominis*, was considered by some as a manifesto of his theological anthropocentrism.

[19] John Paul II, *Man and Woman He Created Them. A Theology of the* Body, trans. Michael M. Waldstein (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2006), 136.

[20] "The truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light. For Adam, the first man, was a figure of Him Who was to come, namely Christ the Lord. Christ, the final Adam, by the revelation of the mystery of the Father and His love, fully reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme calling clear." Vatican Council II, *Pastoral Constitution "Gaudium et Spes" on the Church* (December 7, 1965), no. 22.

Nor is it by chance that on the front page of his philosophical work, *The Acting Person*, we find words taken from the Constitution *Gaudium et Spes* of the Second Vatican Council which speak of the Church as "a sign and a safeguard of the transcendent character of the human person."[21] A genuine Christian experience helps to understand human experience and leads to the final dimension of this understanding: it secures us against the temptation of skepticism that is widespread in today's world and convinces us of the need and necessity to move "from phenomenon to foundation."[22]

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[21] *Gaudiem et Spes*, no. 76.

[22] John Paul II, Encyclical Letter *Fides et Ratio* (September 14, 1998), no. 83.

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Jarosław Merecki

Sulla creazione della *Persona* e dell'*atto* di Karol Wojtyła

Sommario

L'articolo mostra che l'analisi critica dei concetti di filosofia morale di Max Scheler e di Immanuel Kant è stato il punto di partenza del progetto positivo dell'antropologia di Karol Wojtyła presentato nel libro *Persona e atto*. Il suo nucleo sta nel riconoscimento del significato dell'efficacia umana: gli esseri umani esprimono e realizzano la loro piena soggettività attraverso le proprie azioni. Wojtyła spiega che le azioni umane autentiche non sono motivate solo dalla forza emotiva con cui vengono dati particolari valori, ma piuttosto dalla loro verità. In ultima analisi, la teoria di Wojtyła potrebbe essere descritta come una transfenomenologia, cioè una sintesi della fenomenologia e della metafisica. Secondo lui, ciò che viene immediatamente dato al soggetto può essere pienamente spiegato da categorie che trascendono l'esperienza diretta. In questo modo, Wojtyła incorpora la sua visione dell'antropologia in una metafisica più ampia, mostrando allo stesso tempo che nella filosofia si deve passare dal fenomeno al fondamento.

Parole chiave: etica, esperienza, metafisica, morale, fenomenologia, persona, valore

Jarosław Merecki

A propos de la création de la *Personne* et de l'*acte* de Karol Wojtyła

Résumé

L'article montre que l'analyse critique des concepts de philosophie morale de Max Scheler et d'Emmanuel Kant a été le point de départ du projet d'anthropologie positive de Karol Wojtyła présenté dans le livre *Personne et Acte*. En substance, le livre réside dans la reconnaissance de la signification de l'efficacité humaine: les êtres humains expriment et réalisent leur pleine subjectivité à travers leurs actions. Wojtyła explique que les actions humaines authentiques sont motivées non seulement par la force émotionnelle avec laquelle des valeurs particulières sont données, mais plutôt par leur vérité. En définitive, la théorie de Wojtyła pourrait être décrite comme une transphénoménologie, c'est-à-dire une synthèse de la phénoménologie et de la mé-

taphysique. Selon lui, ce qui est immédiatement donné au sujet peut être pleinement expliqué par des catégories qui transcendent l'expérience directe. Ainsi, Wojtyła intègre sa vision de l'anthropologie dans une métaphysique plus large, montrant en même temps qu'en philosophie, il faut passer du phénomène au fondement.

Mots-clés: éthique, expérience, métaphysique, morale, phénoménologie, personne, valeur

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On Karol Wojtyła's Aristotelian Method Part I Aristotelian Induction (ἐπαγωγή) and Division (διαίρεσις)

Abstract: This is the first of a two-part study treating Karol Wojtyła's Aristotelian methodology. The study shows that Wojtyła's *inductive* and *reductive* methodology is identical with the Aristotelian method of proceeding from what is better-known to us in *experience* (ἐμπειρία/*empeiria*) to what is better-known to nature by way of induction (ἐπαγωγή/*epagoge*) and analysis (ἀνάλῡσις/*analusis*) or division (διαίρεσις/*diairesis*). By a rigorous presentation of this Aristotelian methodology here in Part I, the logical form and force of Wojtyła's method is properly disclosed and appreciated in Part II. Wojtyła's method utilizes the logical forms of *reductio ad impossibile* and reasoning on the *hypothesis* of the end, or effect-cause reasoning, which is special to the life sciences and the power-object model of definition. By this methodology, Wojtyła obtains definitive knowledge of the human person that is necessary and undeniable: he discloses the εἶδος (*eidos*) or *species* of the person in the Aristotelian, Thomistic, and Phenomenological sense of the term.

Keywords: Karol Wojtyła, method, induction, reduction, Aristotle, definition, division, person, act, philosophical anthropology

I. Introduction

In *The Acting Person*, Karol Wojtyła sets down and utilizes a twofold philosophical methodology that is the synthetic integration of Aristotelian and Thomistic (1) *induction* and (2) the *phenomenological method* of bracketting (ἔποχή/*epoche*) and *eidetic* analysis.[1] Commentators on *The Acting Person* have rightly noted the difficulty in understanding this twofold methodology, and its complexity is well shown in their exegetical presentations of the text.[2] One issue drawing a great deal of attention from Thomistic commentators has been the problem of the compatability and unity of the classical *realist*, Aristotelian-Thomistic methodology with the phenomenological method, that is, the ἔποχή/*epoche*, first forumulated by Edmund Husserl and, supposedly, equivalent to *idealism*. The compatability of these two methods has already been shown in that Husserl's ἔποχή and subsequent *eidetic* analysis are not an idealism and that phenomenology is fundamentally and historically realist in its origin.[3] The *Phenomenologi-*

[1] See, Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, tr. Andrezej Potocki, ed. by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, in *Analecta Husserliana* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publsihing Company, 1979), 10, 5–7, and, especially 13–18.

[2] See, for example, Kenneth L. Schmitz, *At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła /Pope John Paul II* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 61–62; and, Jameson Taylor, "The Acting Person in Purgatory: A Note for Readers of the English Text," in *Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture*, Volume 13, Number 3, Summer 2010, 77–104, on 78. For exegetical presentations of Wojtyła's methodology showing its complexity, see, again, Schmitz, *At the Center of the Human Drama*, 58–89; Rocco Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, tr. Paolo Guietti and Francesca Murphy (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), 117–128; Jarosław Kupczak, O.P., *Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 49–94; Peter Simpson, *On Karol Wojtyła* (Wadsworth, 2001), 10–18 and 23–45; Miguel Acosta and Adrian J. Reimers, *Karol Wojtyła's Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person and Act* (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016): Acosta generally treats Wojtyła's method at 32–40, while Reimers focuses on Wojtyła's method from "experience" at 41–48; finally, Rev. Grzegorz Hołub, Tadeusz Biesaga SDB, Jarosław Merecki SDS, and Marek Kostur, *The Polish Christian Philosophy in the 20th Century: Karol Wojtyła* (Krakow: Ignatianum University Press, 2019), 29–42.

[3] Showing that Husserl conceives phenomenology as an Aristotelian science presupposing the existence of its subject-genus, I have demonstrated that his method is not equivalent to idealism and that, in fact, as Husserl himself has stated, phenomenology is fundamentally realist. See, Daniel C. Wagner, "On the Foundational Compatibility of Phenomenology & Thomism," *Studia Gilsoniana*, vol. 10, no. 3 (July–September 2021): 579–607. ISSN 2300–0066 (print) ISSN 2577–0314 (online) DOI: 10.26385/SG.100323. My approach follows and is inspired by Robert Sokolowski, who has shown the way to the proper interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology as realist. See, Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), especially 21 and 216. As treated in the article, the following scholars have sought

cal fold of Wojtyła's method, thus, stands on firm realist ground and permits of the fertile synthesis with Aristotelian and Thomistic methodology that he has masterfully provided in *The Acting Person*.[4]

Another issue, which in comparison has received very little attention, pertains to the precise *logical* nature of Wojtyła's Aristotelian methodology, *induction* and *reduction*,[5] and its connection to the phenomenological method. To be sure, commentators have performed the service of reporting or presenting the order of Wojtyla's *exercise* of this methodology in *The Acting Person*, and some have given helpful descriptions of the method using traditional Aristotelian and Thomistic terminology.[6] However, a rigorous presentation of the Aristotelian logical methodology that Wojtyła calls *induction* and *reduction*, *per se*, is needed for proper understanding of the Polish Philosopher's *magnum opus*.

In accord with Aristotle's use of the term μέθοδος/*methodos*—meaning literally, *after* (μετά) a *road*/*path*/*way*/*via* (ὁδός)—to disclose a *method* is to exhibit in precise logical *form* the kind of intellectual activity and reasoning that, *after*

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to distance Wojtyła's phenomenological methodology from that of Husserl, which they interpret as equivalent to idealism, often, in effect, reducing it to a mere rhetorical device: Schmitz, *At the Center of the Human Drama*, 68; Kupczak, O.P., *Destined for Liberty*, 75; Williams, L.C., "What is Thomistic Personalism?" in *Alpha Omega*, VII, n. 2 (2004, 163–197), 170; and, Miguel Acosta and Adrian J. Reimers, *Karol Wojtyla's Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person and Act*, 21.

[4] Inspired by Sokolowski and Wojtyła, I have recently added to the tradition of synthesizing realist (Husserlian) phenomenology and Thomism in my "Penitential Method as Phenomenological: The Penitential ἐποχή," in *Studia Gilsoniana* 7, no. 3 (July–September 2018): 487–518.

[5] Wojtyła does not explicitly label reduction as Aristotelian in the Introduction to *AP*. The fact will be demonstrated in this study.

[6] Kenneth L. Schmitz, *At the Center of the Human* Drama, 65–89. Schmitz rightly identifies the method with "analysis" (65–66) and induction with concept formation (70). Buttiglione correctly identifies induction with concept formation in *Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, 124-125. At 69–74, Kupczak very well presents Wojtyła's method of induction as Aristotelian and Thomistic. He rightly identifies it as concept formation, and he directly ties it to Aristotle. Miguel Acosta and Adrian J. Reimers, *Karol Wojtyła's Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person and Act,* 32–40 and 41–48. As treated by Acosta at 32–35, see also, María José Franquet, *Persona, Acción y Libertad. Las claves de la antropología de Karol Wojtyla* [Person, Action and Freedom. Keys to Karol Wojtyła's anthropology] (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1996), 139–140, and Rodrigo Guerra López, *Volver a la persona. El método losó co de Karol Wojtyla* [Turn to the person. The philosophical method of Karol Wojtyła] (Madrid: Caparrós Editores, 2002), 301–309. Rev. Grzegorz Hołub, Tadeusz Biesaga SDB, Jarosław Merecki SDS, and Marek Kostur, *The Polish Christian Philosophy in the 20th Century: Karol Wojtyła*, 29–42. On 35, the authors well note that, "Wojtyła became an empiricist of the genetic Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy and modified his understanding in positivist and empirical trends." While they do not treat of the logical methodology *per se*, Grzegorz Holub and Piotr Stanislaw Mazur give an extremely helpful treatment of Wojtyła's *exercise* of inductive reasoning/division in *The Acting Person*, showing that the inner and outer dimension of personal experience are (i) irreducible to eachother, (i) co-dependent, (iii) and distinct. See, "The Experience of Human Being in the thought of Karol Wojtyla" in *Filosofija Sociologija* (2017), T. 28. Nr. 1, 73–83.

one exercises it, is the *way* into knowledge of principles or conclusions.[7] Unless such a reflective, logical account of the method being used is given, the logical force entailed in the exercise of the account will not be appreciated. This, of course, is why philosophy has traditionally commenced with the formal study of grammar and logic—a fact reflected in the very organization of the texts of Aristotle from antiquity.[8] In formulating a method to rigorously study a given subject, one must first be able to identify the modes of reasoning one is utilizing. Second, one must express the kind of certitude they obtain: probabilistic/dialectical, unqualified necessity, qualified necessity of constraint, or hypothetical/conditional necessity.[9] To begin, then, a clear account of Wojtyła's Aristotelian *inductive* and *reductive* method *per se* is needed so that its logical force can be properly appreciated. Further, precisely because a complete and clear account of Wojtyła's Aristotelian method is lacking, there is confusion and error regarding this methodology.[10] Some commentators miss the logical force of Wojtyła's

[7] See, especially, Aristotle's comments on method (μέθοδος) in *Nicomachean Ethics* at I.1 (1094a1-3), I.2 (1094b10-11), I.2 (1094a22-26), and again at V.1 (1129a3-6), in conjunction with his treatments of induction and division as the means by which the first principles of a science, that is, definitions, are obtained in *Posterior Analytics* I.3, 18 and II.1-14 and 19, which will be treated in detail presently.

[8] In his organization of the Aristotelian corpus in the 1st century B.C., Andronicus of Rhodes, thus, placed works of logic and grammar at the beginning (*Topics*, *Categories*, *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, *On Interpretation*, and *On Sophistical Refutation*). Since A.D. 200, beginning with the Peripatetic commentator, Alexander of Aphrodisias, this collection of texts has been referred to as the "Organon," as in 'instrument' for obtaining proper knowledge.

[9] These forms of necessity are from Aristotle's logic, as will be shown in this study, below. I use the phrase "qualified necessity of constraint" to refer to the kind of necessity that Aristotle attributes to non-middle termed, *reductio ad impossibile* argumentation.

[10] In *At the Center of the Human Drama* (65–67), Schmitz equates reduction with phenomenological analysis, failing to appreciate that it is also Aristotelian division and to explain it as such. He claims that reduction is an approach unique to Wojtyła to be discerned by looking to his own use of the method: "Moreover, his use of the terms "reduction" (*AP* 78, 82), "interpretation," and "understanding," take their meaning from his distinctive use of them in the analysis that follows (*AP* 15–18)." Schmitz also does not clearly explain the role and relation of judgement or "insight," (by which I take him to be referring to Aristotle's νοῦς/*nous*) to Aristotelian induction (see, 70). Finally, as a matter of textual method, he does not treat Wojtyla's exposition on induction and reduction in the Introduction of *AP*. In *Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, Buttiglione shows confusion regarding "Aristotelian-Thomistic induction," implying that it is usually taken to entail the error of abstraction (reduction/equation of the particulars to abstract universal meaning) while Wojtyła's method does not entail this error (125). St. Thomas explicitly rejects this error in *Summa Theologiae* I, qq. 84–85. As Buttiglione provides no textual sources, it is unclear to whom he is referring. Further, at 126, he contrasts reduction to induction in such a manner as to hold that the former is not Aristotelian and Thomistic (whereas, as will be shown below, it is): "As we have seen, the stabilization of the object of experience is obtained through induction. It is this which, in general, gives us the connection person/action or, better, gives us the person as subject of the action. This connection, however (*and here lies the difference from traditional Thomism*), needs to be further

account of the essence of the human person entirely, portraying it as though Wojtyła's intent was that we determine whether his account is true or false merely by "seeing" or judging it in relation to our own expereince.[11] If this is all the logical force of Wojtyła's account, it hardly seems necessary for him to describe his method in Aristotelian or phenomenological terms and it would be hard to take his work as philosophically serious. In order to fully appreciate the logical force of Wojtyła's accomplishment of disclosing the essence of the human person and avoid confusion and error, thus, this two-part study will show that Wojtyła's *induction* and *reduction* are the Aristotelian methods of induction (ἐπαγωγή/*epagoge*) and division (διαίρεσις/*diairesis*) or analysis (ἀνάλῦσις/*analusis*). Here, Part I, offers a careful and textually rigorous presentation of the Aristotelian methodology for obtaining definitions—itself often misunderstood and under-appreciated.[12] This presentation will provide the foundational Aris-

unveiled if we want to grasp the person in his dynamic essence. The Aristotelian-Thomist induction must be followed by a reduction (which is not exactly the same as the usual phenomenological reduction) if we want to do adequate justice to the existential depth of the person." Emphasis added. Finally, he does not define reduction in the terms of Wojtyła or Aristotle, which is needed for understanding.

[11] See, Rocco Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, 127: "The force of the conviction of reduction does not lie in the logical strength which compels assent, but in the exactness of the description of the fundamental structures of experience which give rise, in anyone who has lived it, to the recognition that the thing is exactly as it is described. The assent arises in this case from the recognition that one's own experience of life is adequately expressed by the phenomenological description, and in such a way as to be at the same time judged and corrected." Of course, Buttiglione has a point to the extent that it is true that proper understanding of another philosopher's accomplishments requires "mapping" the concepts, etc., onto one's own experience so that one can "see it for one's self," as it were. However, given that he is explicitly using Aristotelian induction and division (as will be shown, below), Wojtyła's accomplishments in defining the human person, in terms of intellectual assent of the audience capable of understanding, rise to the level of a necessity of constraint and/or hypothetical necessity, in accord with Aristotle's canons for the principles of a science at *Posterior Analytics* I.2.

[12] See, Daniel C. Wagner, φύσις καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν: *The Aristotelian Foundations of the Human Good* (Dissertation, available through ProQuest, 2018), Chapter 2, especially 118–126. Jonathan Barnes holds that Aristotelian works dealing with contingent matters, for example, *Physics*, *De Anima*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*, cannot constitute proper Aristotelian sciences. See, "Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration," *Phronesis* (1969), 14.2, 123–152; and, *Aristotle: A Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 38–39. Barnes arrives at this view partly by reducing Aristotelian science to the mathematical sciences, and partly because he interprets induction (following Hume), to be a fallacious form of generalization that could not, in principle, achieve knowledge of first principles in accord with the canon of *APo* I.2. See his *Commentary*, in *Posterior Analytics*, tr. by Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 271. Barnes interpretation has been widely influential. There is an older tradition going back to J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London: Methuen, 1900), which is also the source of much confusion. Burnet reduced Aristotle's method for obtaining knowledge of definitions or first principles to dialectic as set out in the *Topics*. As dialectic only produces probabilistic knowledge, it cannot be

totelian terms of methodology necessary for proper understanding of Wojtyła's method. This being accomplished, it will be shown in Part II that, in line with Aristotle's position that the source of proper knowledge in art (τέχνη/*techne*) and science (ἐπιστήμη/*episteme*) is the knowledge state of *experience* (ἐμπειρία/*empeiria*), Wojtyła commences *The Acting Person* by taking an experiential, better-known to us concept of the person, and then proceeds to use the Aristotelian logical method of division to obtain a refined, better known-to-nature conception of the essence of the human person, that is, the εἶδος/*eidos* or *species* in the Aristotelian, Thomistic, and Phenomenological sense of the term. As treated by Aristotle, and here in Part I, the logical method of division utilizes two forms of reasoning: (i) a *reductio ad impossibile* form that works by showing the necessity of assenting to a meaning on the ground that a contradiction will otherwise follow, and (ii) *hypothetical* form that works by showing that on the hypothesis or condition of some end or effect, some other attribute is necessary or fitting. The former form, in accord with *Posterior Analytics* II.13–14, is used for setting out generic and specific differences of all kinds, and it provides us with necessary knowledge of a factual experiential sort. Part II of this study will then discolose Wojtyła's use of this methodology. Wojtyła uses the first form where he seeks to establish the irreducibility of terms and their meaning in analysis of experience, for example, the *inner* and *outer experience* of the person. The latter form, in accord with Aristotle's accounts of division in *De Partibus Animalium* I–II.1 and *De Anima* I.1, also constitutes a form of causal explanation, and it is used by Wojtyła in his rigorous connection of the acts of the person, given in experience, to their dynamic powers, for example, consciousness. Both logical forms of reasoning, as will be shown, produce a necessity, requiring intellectual assent by any audience that understands the meanings of the terms. Simple *reductio* reasoning produces what will be called here a logical *necessity of constraint*, while division by the power-object model produces a *hypothetical* or *conditional necessity*.[13] By disclosing Wojtyła's Aristotelian methodology in this manner and clearly identifying the formal necessity it produces, his important contribution to perennial philosophy of integrating Aristotelian-Thomism and Phenomenology will be augmented and developed. This contribution is significant, as Wojtyła himself has given such brief and limited account of his method

the means by which the philosopher or scientist proceeds to grasping the first principles or premises with necessity. Burnet then assumes that Aristotle's method for obtaining primary definitions in works like the *Ethics* is dialectical, resulting in the view that there is no necessity in the account. As has been shown elsewhere, this is certainly not how Aristotle conceives of his method. See, chapter 5 of *The Aristotelian Foundations of the Good*.

[13] I am inspired to describe Aristotle's method for dividing animals into essentially different kinds as *the power-object model of division* by William A. Wallace. See, *The Modeling of Nature* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), especially pages 31, and 157–189.

in *The Acting Person*. Toward the end of his Introduction to *The Acting Person*, Wojtyła notes that "the reader himself will readily recognize all the influences and borrowings in this work."[14] Accordingly, this work is offered in service to those studying the thought of Wojtyła who have a need for a deeper understanding of the foundational Aristotelian methodology, to which Wojtyła is indebted.

II. Aristotle's method of Induction (ἐπαγωγή) and Division (διαίρεσις)[15]

Aristotle first gives a general account of induction (ἐπαγωγή/*epagoge*) and division (διαίρεσις/*diairesis*) in *Posterior Analytics*.[16] As the primary subject matter of the work is science (ἐπιστήμη/*episteme*) conducted *after analysis* and achieved through the demonstrative syllogism, that is, formally valid and sound deductive argument, and as he is clear that a logical method must be formulated in light of the particular subject-genus being studied (there is no "one size fits all" method, as it were, for the many fields of knowledge[17]), he spends little time on the topic of induction and division in *APo*—though what precious little he does say is of profound importance. He then provides additional comments on subject specific inductive methodology and division relevant to our inquiry in *Physics, De Partibus Animalium*, *De Anima,* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, that is, the particular sciences related to philosophical anthropology. Here, we will set out his conception of induction and division in these texts, in order to see clearly how Wojtyła appropriates them in *The Acting Person*.[18]

At the outset of *APo*, Aristotle divides reason (λόγος/*logos*) into two forms: (1) the syllogism (συλλογισμός/*sullogismos*) and (2) induction (ἐπαγωγή/*epagoge*). While the former is constituted by deductive reasoning from better-known

[14] *AP*, 22.

[15] Significant portions of the treatment of Aristotle on induction and division, here, are taken from chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5 *The Aristotelian Foundations of the Human Good*.

[16] Here after, the work is referred to as *APo*, for its Latin title, *Analytica posteriora*.

[17] On this point in Aristotle, see *De Anima* I.1 and *Nicomachean Ethics* I.1-3. A very helpful treatment of the topic is given by James G. Lennox in "Aristotle on the Norms of Inquiry," in *HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy*," vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 2011).

[18] Here, I offer a synthetic treatment of Aristotle's conceptions of induction and division ordered to understanding the method of Karol Wojtyła. For a comprehensive presentation and defense of the interpretation given here, by rigorous analysis and exegesis of the original Greek text, taking into account commentary literature, see Daniel Wagner, *The Aristotelian Foundations of the Human Good*, chapters 2–5.

premises to a conclusion, the latter, Aristotle tells us, works by "critically-exhibiting the universal (καθόλου/*katolou*) through that being manifest in particular."[19] Since the terms by which we define individual being or substance (οὐσία/*ousia*) in the world, that is, genus, species, and difference,[20] are universals, and since Aristotle says here that *induction* is said to constitute a type of reason which produces an apprehension of the universal from the particulars, it is clear that induction will be the method of reasoning by which we define beings or substances. We know, then, at the outset, that induction is a method for defining.

In the order of knowing on the way to obtaining definitions, Aristotle holds that understanding proceeds in two stages: (1) intellect begins with what is prior and better-known to us, which is constituted by the particular beings given in sense-perceptive experience and proceeds to (2) what is better-known to nature or without qualification, which is constituted in universal knowledge of scientific principles and conclusions.[21] Thus, after sense-perception of particular be-

[19] *Posterior Analytics*, I.1 (75a5-9): ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οἵ τε διὰ συλλογισμῶν καὶ οἱ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ διὰ προγινωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν, οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων, οἱ δὲ δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. Or, "It is the same [i.e., that instruction and learning are from prior knowledge,] concerning reasoning acts (λόγους), both those which are through syllogism and also those which are through induction (ἐπαγωγῆς), for both produce learning through what is priorly known, the former [by] assuming—as from those who agree [to accept premises]—and the latter [by] critically-exhibiting (δεικνύντες) the universal (καθόλου) through that being manifest in particular." Some translators and commentators have equated the *induction* Aristotle here refers to with dialectical reasoning as set out in the *Topics*. See, Hugh Tredennick, *Posterior Analytics*, in Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), footnote b, 24–25; and G.R.G. Mure, *Posterior Analtyics*, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 110, who actually adds "dialectical" into the text of his translation, though there is no form of διαλεκτικός/*dialectikos* in the Greek text. This is a serious error in interpretation. As will be shown, induction is the method by which the first principles of a science are known as necessarily true, while dialectic only produces a probabilistic certitude (*APo* I.2, 72a9). Thus, Aristotle does not take inductive processes of concept formation and division as dialectical. My translation and interpretation is in line with that of Apostle, who also has helpful comments on the topic. See, *Aristotle's Posterior Analytics*, tr. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Grinnel, IA: The Peripetetic Press, 1981), page 1 and the corresponding note 6, on page 77. For more on this issue, see also, *The Aristotelian Foundations of the Human Good*, 128 and footnote 118.

[20] See: *Categories*, 5.

[21] *Posterior Analytics*, I.2 (71b33-72a5). πρότερα δ' ἐστὶ καὶ γνωριμώτερα διχῶς· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν πρότερον τῇ φύσει καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον, οὐδὲ γνωριμώτερον καὶ ἡμῖν γνωριμώτερον. λέγω δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἁπλῶς δὲ πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ πορρώτερον. ἔστι δὲ πορρωτάτω μὲν τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα, ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα· Or, "There are two senses of 'prior' and 'better known.' For that which is prior by nature is not the same as that which is prior in relation to us, nor is that which is better known [by nature] the same as what is better known in relation to us. I mean by 'prior' and 'better known' in relation to us those things that are nearer to sense-perception (τὰ ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως), whereas by 'prior' and 'better known' in the unqualified sense (ἁπλῶς) I mean those things that are further [from it]. Those things which are most universal (καθόλου) are the fur-

ings in the world, human beings use an inductive process of reasoning to acquire proper, universal definitions. These definitions then serve as the premises of demonstrative syllogisms constituting the highest level of universal, scientific understanding. The definitions, which are the principles (ἀρχαί/*archai*) of scientific understanding, come in the form of *axioms*, and then the *hypothesis* and the *thesis*. An axiom is a principle necessary for any knowledge inquiry—so it generally assumed in all the sciences—as for example, the principle of non-contradiction. A *hypothesis* (ὑπόθεσις/*hupothesis*) is a statement including a definition and an existential claim. For example, 'There *is* a unit (i.e., something indivisible with respect to quantity).' A thesis (ὁρισμός/*horismos*), on the other hand, states a meaning or whatness (τί ἐστι/*ti esti*), but makes no existential claim, for example, 'A unit is what is indivisible with respect to quantity.'[22] These definitions provide the inquirer with the first principles or premises to be used in scientific demonstration.

Aristotle defines scientific knowledge as knowledge of the cause the fact that is necessary, that is, it cannot be otherwise than it is.[23] He explains that this kind of knowledge is acquired as a state from the reasoning act of a demonstrative, deductive syllogism, the paradigm of which is the middle-termed categorical syllogism.[24] Because of the fact that the only way in which the conclusion of the deductive syllogism will necessarily be true—so that the argument is both valid

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thest [from sense perception], whereas the particulars (καθ' ἕκαστα) are nearest [to it]." Cf., *Physics* I.1, which will also be treated below.

[22] *Posterior Analytics*, I.2 (72a18-24): θέσεως δ' ἡ μὲν ὁποτερονοῦν τῶν μορίων τῆς ἀντιφάσεως λαμβάνουσα, οἷον λέγω τὸ εἶναί τι ἢ τὸ μὴ εἶναί τι, ὑπόθεσις, ἡ δ' ἄνευ τούτου ὁρισμός. ὁ γὰρ ὁρισμὸς θέσις μέν ἐστι· τίθεται γὰρ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς μονάδα τὸ ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι κατὰ τὸ ποσόν· ὑπόθεσις δ' οὐκ ἔστι· τὸ γὰρ τί ἐστι μονὰς καὶ τὸ εἶναι μονάδα οὐ ταὐτόν. Or, "I call a thesis being taken as either part of contradictory statements, such as that something is the case or that it is not the case, a hypothesis, and that without reference to such [i.e., existence] a definition. For a definition is a thesis; for the mathematician sets down that a unit is what is indivisible with respect to quantity; but this is not a hypothesis, for what a unit is and that a unit exists are not the same thing." Below, to avoid confusion on account of the contemporary meaning of "hypothesis," I will refer to hypotheses and "definitions" as definitions.

[23] *Posterior Analytics*, I.2 (71b9-12): Ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθ' ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν σοφιστικὸν τρόπον τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅταν τήν τ' αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν. Or, "We think ourselves to know scientifically (Ἐπίστασθαι) a particular thing without qualification, and not in the sophistic manner according to accident, when we think we know the cause on account of which the thing is—*that it is its cause*—and that this cannot be otherwise."

[24] *Posterior Analytics*, I.2 (71b16-19): Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἕτερος ἔστι τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τρόπος, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, φαμὲν δὲ καὶ δι' ἀποδείξεως εἰδέναι. ἀπόδειξιν δὲ λέγω συλλογισμὸν ἐπιστημονικόν· ἐπιστημονικὸν δὲ λέγω καθ' ὃν τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἐπιστάμεθα. Or, "Now, whether there is another manner of knowing (ἐπίστασθαι), we will say later, but [for now] we say that knowledge (εἰδέναι) is through demonstration. With respect to 'demonstration,' I mean a scientific syllogism; and, with respect to 'scientific,' I mean precisely that by which the possession is itself scientific knowledge."

and sound—if the premises are known with necessity to be true, it becomes immediately clear that the primary premises of scientific demonstration must, *inter alia*, *necessarily* be true.[25] Further, and because all knowledge cannot be through the demonstrative syllogism, lest there be an infinite regress in understanding making scientific knowledge itself impossible, it is necessary that Aristotle set down another form of reasoning that is not in the form of the middle-termed syllogism, but is yet still productive of an understanding of first principles or definitions that is necessarily true.[26] This form or reasoning, Aristotle tells us, precisely, is induction, which proceeds from what is better-known to us, that is, the particulars of sense-perception, and is a qualified form of demonstration.[27] Primary definitions (ὅροι/*horoi*) are grasped as necessarily true, then, not by demonstration in the unqualified (ἁπλῶς/*haplos*) sense (i.e., through a middle termed demonstration), but through induction—the second type of reasoning act he had mentioned at the outset of *APo*—which is qualified, or as he says, "not without qualification" (οὐχ ἁπλῶς/*ouk haplos*). It "is impossible," so says Aristotle, "to seek theoretical knowledge (θεωρῆσαι) of the universal [i.e., the definition], except through induction (μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς)."[28]

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[25] *Posterior Analytics*, I.2 (71b20-23): "εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷον ἔθεμεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ' εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσονται καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ οἰκεῖαι τοῦ δεικνυμένου." Or, "Accordingly, if scientific knowledge (τὸ ἐπίστασθαι) is as we have stated, it is *necessary* (ἀνάγκη) that demonstrative science (τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην) be from principles that are *true*, primary, immediate, better known, prior to and also causative of the conclusion; for in this manner the principles (αἱ ἀρχαὶ) will be the proper belongings [i.e., essential attributes] of what is shown."

[26] See footnote 27, immediately below.

[27] *Posterior Analytics*, I.3 (72b25-32): "κύκλῳ τε ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἀποδείκνυσθαι ἁπλῶς, δῆλον, εἴπερ ἐκ προτέρων δεῖ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι καὶ γνωριμωτέρων· ἀδύνατον γάρ ἐστι τὰ αὐτὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἅμα πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸν ἕτερον τρόπον, οἷον τὰ μὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὰ δ' ἁπλῶς, ὅνπερ τρόπον ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ ποιεῖ γνώριμον. εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἁπλῶς εἰδέναι καλῶς ὡρισμένον, ἀλλὰ διττόν· ἢ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἡ ἑτέρα ἀπόδειξις, γινομένη γ' ἐκ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωριμωτέρων." Or, "It is clear that it is impossible to demonstrate in a circular manner, if it is required that demonstration be from premises that are better-known; for it is impossible that the same premises be at one and the same time both prior and posterior—unless there is another meaning [of prior and posterior], as in [the sense of] those things which are [prior] in relation to us as distinct from those which are prior and posterior without qualification, and indeed this [former] is the manner in which *induction* (ἐπαγωγὴ) produces knowledge (ποιεῖ γνώριμον). But, if this is so, then knowledge in the unqualified sense (τὸ ἁπλῶς εἰδέναι) has not been well defined, but it is twofold. Or, rather, the other form of demonstration is not without qualification (οὐχ ἁπλῶς), but [is qualified as it] comes to be from what is better-known in relation to us."

[28] *Posterior Analytics*, I.18 (81a38-81b9): "It is also manifest that if some sense-perception (τις αἴσθησις) has been lacking, then, necessarily, the particular [corresponding] science (ἐπιστήμην) would have also been lacking, because it could not have been established, since learning is either by induction (ἐπαγωγῇ) or demonstration (ἀποδείξει), and demonstration is from the universal, while induction is from the part, but it is impossible to seek theoretical knowledge

Aristotle describes the process of induction in general terms in his famous genetic accounts of knowledge at *APo* II.19 and *Metaphysics* I.1. The ultimate source of knowledge is an "inborn capacity (δύναμις/*dunamis*) of discernment (κρῐτῐκός/*kritikos*), which is called sense-perception (αἴσθησις/*aisthesis*)," and which all animals possess.[29] Along with sense-perception, some animals possess also the capacity of memory, that is, the retention (μονὴ/*mone*) of the perceived (τοῦ αἰσθήματος/*tou aisthematos*) in the soul.[30] After sense-perception and memory, Aristotle notes that a further "distinction arises that for some [animals], out of such remaining [perceptions/memories], there comes to be reason or a reasoned-account (λόγον/*logon*)."[31] Human beings, then, are different in kind from other animals as possessing the faculty of reason.[32]

(θεωρῆσαι) of the universal, except through induction (μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς) (and even those expressions from abstraction will be made known by induction, because some things belong to each genus, even though they are not separate, insofar as each is such and such a kind of thing), and it is impossible to have learned inductively (ἐπαχθῆναι) except in possessing sense-perception. For sense-perception is of particular things; though it is not possible to establish a science of them [i.e., the *particular qua particular*]; for neither [is there reasoning] from universals without induction, nor [are there universals] through induction without sense-perception." Or, Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἴ τις αἴσθησις ἐκλέλοιπεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐκλελοιπέναι, ἣν ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν, εἴπερ μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει, ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς (ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα ἔσται δι' ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα ποιεῖν, ὅτι ὑπάρχει ἑκάστῳ γένει ἔνια, καὶ εἰ μὴ χωριστά ἐστιν, ᾗ τοιονδὶ ἕκαστον), ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἴσθησιν ἀδύνατον. τῶν γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ αἴσθησις· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἄνευ ἐπαγωγῆς, οὔτε δι' ἐπαγωγῆς ἄνευ τῆς αἰσθήσεως.

[29] See *APo* II.19 (99b34-35): φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτό γε πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον τοῖς ζῴοις. ἔχει γὰρ δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικήν, ἣν καλοῦσιν αἴσθησιν· Or, "And it is manifest, indeed, that this [kind of capacity] belongs to all animals. For they possess an inborn capacity of discernment, which is called sense-perception."

[30] *Posterior Analytics* II.19 (99b36-37): ἐνούσης δ' αἰσθήσεως τοῖς μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἐγγίγνεται μονὴ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται. Or, "for some of the animals, however, the sense-perceptions having come to be, the perceived also comes to remain, and for others they do not come to remain."

[31] *Posterior Analytics*, II.19 (99b37-100a3): ὅσοις μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐγγίγνεται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ περὶ ἃ μὴ ἐγγίγνεται, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις γνῶσις ἔξω τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς δ' ἔνεστιν αἰσθομένοις ἔχειν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. πολλῶν δὲ τοιούτων γινομένων ἤδη διαφορά τις γίνεται, ὥστε τοῖς μὲν γίνεσθαι λόγον ἐκ τῆς τῶν τοιούτων μονῆς, τοῖς δὲ μή. Or, "And for those [animals] in which these [memories] do not come to be, either the whole or [at least] concerning those [memories] that do not come to be, there is no kind of knowledge outside of sense-perception; in those animals, however, in which the sense-perceptions remain, there is the possession of something else in the soul. And from many such [memories] having come to be, there immediately arises a certain distinction, that for some, out of such remaining [perceptions/memories], there comes to be a reasoned-account (λόγον), while for others this is not the case."

[32] That Aristotle holds that λόγος sets humans apart from other animals is clear from *Metaphysics* I.1, (980b25-8), where distinguishes humans from other animals that have but little of experience, as having λογισμός. Cf. David Bronstein, "The Origin and Aim of *Posterior Analytics* II.19" *Phronesis* 57 (2012), 29–62. 41.

Reason allows humans to form the knowledge state of *experience* (ἐμπειρία/*empeiria*):

> From sense-perception, then, comes to be memory, precisely as was said, and from many memories of the same thing comes to be experience (ἐμπειρία/*empeiria*); for the many memories (with respect to number) are one experience.[33]

Immediately, Aristotle conveys the proper meaning of *experience*, equating it with the apprehension of a universal, and he asserts that it is the source (ἀρχή/*arche*) of knowledge both in the arts and in science:

> And from experience or every universal being established in the soul—the one in relation to the many, which *one* would be the same in all the many particulars—[is] the principle of art (τεχνή) and science (ἐπιστήμη): if it concerns production, art [and], if it concerns being, science.[34]

In the parallel account at *Metaphysics* I.1, Aristotle is careful to qualify that experience (ἐμπειρία/*empeiria*) is not the same thing as science (ἐπιστήμη/*episteme*) and art (τεχνή/*techne*), "but rather, for human beings, science and art depart through experience."[35] Experience, he notes, is constituted when we know 'that something is the case,' or the fact' (τὸ ὅτι/*to hoti*) while art and science know also 'the account of why it is so' or the cause (τὸ διότι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν/*to dioti kai ten aitian*).[36] Between the *APo* II.19 and *Metaphysics* I.1 account, it is apparent that "experience" itself has two stages: (1) basic concept formation allowing for apprehension of particulars by a better-known meaning, and then (2)

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[33] *Posterior Analytics,* II.19 (100a3-6): Ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία μία ἐστίν. Animals possess something of experience, though it is not rational and proceeds by acts of calculative association. This topic is beyond our scope.

[34] *Posterior Analytics,* II.19 (100a6-9): ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἑνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.

[35] *Metaphysics*, I.1 (981a1-3): καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ἐμπειρία, ἀποβαίνει δ'

ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· Or, "And, roughly speaking, experience (ἐμπειρία) seems to be similar to science and art (ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη), but rather science and art take their point of departure for humans through experience."

[36] *Metaphysics*, I.1 (981a28-30): οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔμπειροι τὸ ὅτι μὲν ἴσασι, διότι δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν. Or, "Those with experience have grasped that something is the case, but not the account of why it so. But those [with science or art] know also the account of why it is so and the cause." For a similar reading—that those with art know the causes of their production, and are thus not to be equated with the man of mere experience, see Bronstein, "The Origin and Aim…," 48.

judgement of the fact that the particulars are in some manner with necessity.[37] As will be shown presently, this second stage requires induction as an active form of reasoning, as it was described in *APo* I.3. There is first a rise, then, from initial sensation of the particulars to the formation of universal concepts signifying the particulars, followed by the use of reason and the constitution of factual knowledge (*experience*) used in sense-perceptive judgements.[38] After the formation of such universals, which are principles, premises, and definitions, intellect is capable of using demonstrative reason to obtain knowledge of the cause. As we already know, the form of reason pertaining to the first stage is induction.[39] However, further reflections show that induction itself is a complex, multi-stage process, in need of special attention.

Like its Latinate translation, "induction" (*in* + *ducere*), "ἐπαγωγή/*epagoge*" literally means a 'leading-into.' The term indicates, thus, the sources or beginnings of knowledge—that is, the manner in which unqualified knowledge is 'lead-into.' The answer to the question, 'how is knowledge lead into?' for Aristotle, is complex.[40] In one sense, it is clear that sense-perceptive induction does not involve a reflective use of reasoning (though it does involve intellect). Rather, it is constituted by the intellect gathering up, as it were, a singular universal meaning from the particulars of sensation themselves. This sense of induction then means basic formation of concepts. In another sense, however, induction must be a form of reflective reasoning leading into necessary knowledge of definitions (*universals*) as the principles of scientific demonstration. This is induction as division, since it divides kinds as we have seen, in terms of genus, species, and differentia. Sound interpretation of induction, then, *requires* a distinction between two senses or orders of induction: (1) induction as sense-perceptive concept formation and (2) induction as division. Each order is characterized by an activity that 'leads into' the production of a 'universal.' That there are two senses of induction is confirmed and illucidated by Aristotle's comments on method in the opening lines of the *Physics*, where he describes the process of

[37] In order for experience to provide a premise that is a proper ἀρχή for scientific knowledge in accord with the canon of *APo* I.2, it must be the case that it constitutes necessary knowledge of the fact, which is, again, how we find Aristotle describing the state at *Metaphysics* I.1, in conjunction with the questions of scientific inquiry set down at *APo* II.1.

[38] Apostle's interpretation of this text is along the same lines. See, note 17 in his *Commentary*, 298.

[39] This point is further stated at *Posterior Analytics*, II.19 (100b3-5): "δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν τά πρῶτα ἐπαγογῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγχαῖον χαὶ γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις οὕτω τὸ χατόλου ἐμποῖει…" Or, "It is indeed clear that we must come to know the first principles by way of induction, for sense-perception also produces in us the universal in such a manner."

[40] W. D. Ross has sought a singular meaning of ἐπαγωγή in the *Analytics*, *Topics*, and *Rhetoric* without proclaiming success. See, *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 481–483. Ross sees as the only commonality between the various senses a move from particular judgment[s] to a general one, 305.

moving from what is better-known to us to what is better-known to nature in the study of nature. Here, he draws an explicit distinction between two senses of universal (καθολου/*katholou*), which then demands our corresponding distinction between two senses of induction. Aristotle indicates that, methodologically, we move from what is better known to us, which is the indistinctly grasped universal (καθολου/*katholou*) of sense-perception, through the process of dividing (διαιροῦσι/*diairousi*)[41] the principles (ἀρχαὶ) and elements (στοιχεῖα) of this whole to achieve proper knowledge:

> What is first manifest and clear to us, rather, are things taken together without distinction. Later, the elements and principles come to be known by the division of these. Therefore, it is necessary to advance from the universals (ἐκ τῶν καθόλου) to the particulars (ἐπὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα). For the whole (τὸ ὅλον) according to sense-perception (κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν) is better known (γνωριμώτερον), and the universal is a certain whole—for the universal embraces many things as its parts.[42]

Sense-perceptive induction leads to the production of a universal meaning that is basic concept formation: sensation of the particular and memory lead to an initial attaching by the intellect of universal meaning to a set of particulars.[43] On the other hand, the induction characteristic of division, leads to the apprehension of the universal better-known to nature with necessity through some type of formal reasoning (λόγος/*logos*). The reasoned account of induction as division must come to constitute a definition (ὁρισμος/*orismos*) which is an expression of universal characteristics and of the essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι/*to ti en einai*) of a perceived class of beings.

καθόλου/*katholou* here means, as Aristotle indicates, a universal that is given by sense-perception (184a25), but which, relatively speaking, constitutes a conceptual classification of a set of particulars in an indistinct, not fully divided manner. Aristotle gives the example of an initial better-known to us concept of what is circular or spherical, and the child's concept of all men as 'father' and

[41] διαιροῦσι, from the verb διαιρέω, means, literally, 'to take apart,' 'cleave/divide;' and so, for obvious reasons, it is also used to mean 'define.'

[42] *Physics* I.1 (184a21-26): ἔστι δ' ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δ' ἐκ τούτων γίγνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα. διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα δεῖ προϊέναι· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ὅλον τί ἐστι· πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου.

[43] For an account of the compatibility of Aristotle's claim that knowledge of nature begins with the sense-perceptive universal with his claim in *APo* I.2 and II.19 that knowledge begins with the particular, following Sts. Albert and Thomas Aquinas's commentary on the texts, see Daniel C. Wagner and John H. Boyer, "Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas on What is 'Better-Known' in Natural Science," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, vol. 93, 2019. In short, there is no contradiction because Aristotle uses 'universal' and 'particular,' as should be apparent here, in multiple senses. He is describing the rise to knowledge at different points.

all women as 'mother'. Having percieved particular circular/spherical objects, and having been taught the term referring to them, one can judge such objects in sense-perception to be circular/spherical and state the case—even while one is not capable of expressing a proper definition (one knows that it is curved and without corners, but cannot state that it is a figure with a limit equidistant from a single point). Similarly, recognizing what is masculine in his father and all men and what is feminine in his mother and all women, the child has a vague idea of the similarity, and calls them all by father and mother. Starting from these conceptions of experience, refinement in attainment of clear and accurate definitions is possible.[44] The question that must be answered now is, what is the form of reasoning utilized that constitutes induction after basic concept formation?

First, as simple concept formation and the perceptive judgement that follows on it, there is not a logical necessity to sense-perceptive induction. In this initial form, induction is not reasoning (so applying necessity would be a category error), but it is simply the judgement that some universal meaning belongs to the particular (and this could be accidental, a property, or essential). However, the intellect quickly moves by the use of *reductio ad impossibile* reasoning to establish the fact that a universal meaning is necessary with reference to the set of particulars it signifies. Aristotle provides as an example of this most basic form of inductive reason at *APo* I.1, describing a student who comes to know this triangle inscribed in this semi-circle as possessing the universal property of

[44] Commenting on these passages, St. Albert the Great has noted two senses of universal (καθόλου/*katholou*): that of (i) the unqualified universal expressed in the proper definition, and (ii) that of what is given of a subject through sense-perception (a range of attributes mixed together and undistinguished generically and specifically). Attributing the distinction between these two sense of universal to Avicenna, St. Albert utilizes it in his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* in order to solve the apparent contradiction between *APo* II.19 and *Physics* I.1. See, Albertus Magnus, *Posteriorum Analyticorum* I, tract 2., c. 3, p. 28: "uno scilicet modo prout confusum et mixtum in particulari: et hoc modo in signis citius sentitur universale, quam particulare per sensum: quia citius sentiuntur signa substantire, quam animalis: et citius signa animalis, quam hominis: et citius signa hominis, quam Socratis. Potest etiam accipi universale in sua puritate, in qua separatum est a particulari : et hoc modo non est nisi in intellectu, sicut in ante habitis dictum est, et est propinquum intellectui et longinquius a sensu, sicut hic dicitur." Or, "Indeed, in one manner [the universal] is considered just as indistinct and mixed in regard to the particular. And in this manner, what is universal is perceived in the appearances (*in signis*) more easily through sensation than what is particular: because the signs of substance are more readily perceived than those of animal; and the signs of animal are more readily perceived than those of man; and the signs of man are more readily perceived than those of Socrates. [In a second manner], the universal can also be taken in its purity according to which [manner] it has been separated from the particular. In this manner [the universal] does not exist except in the intellect, as has been said according to our prior considerations, and it is near to the intellect and further from sense perception, as has been said here." I translated this passage and treated St. Albert and St. Thomas Aquinas's solution to this puzzle with John H. Boyer in our "Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas on What is 'Better-Known' in Natural Science."

having internal angles equal to two right angles. Here, the student has already obtained knowledge of the universal characteristic in the basic sense, that is, his intellect has gathered the meaning of triangle through perception (this happened when he was taught). This universal is the potential for the student to be brought/led into (ἐπαγόμενος/*epagomenos*) knowledge *that* the sensed particular is in fact a triangle.[45] Aristotle, then, takes the perceptive and intellectual judgment that the particular belongs under the universal (*triangle*) as an inductive process.[46] On this account, then, *induction* would mean the recognition that a particular is such and such a kind through a priorly grasped universal. In this first clear notion of induction, then, it is closely linked to sensation of the particular—as we anticipated—and the perceptive knowledge that follows when the intellect understands the particular as belonging to a universal class. These factors together, that is, pre-existent knowledge of the universal and the perceptive judgment of the particular belonging to the universal, allow the student to draw the conclusion: "this triangle has internal angles equal to two right angels."[47] This process can be expressed in the following syllogism:

> P1: Every Triangle (a) has internal angles equal to two right angles (b).
> P2: This here (c) is (a) a triangle.
> Therefore, this triangle (c) possesses internal angles equal to two right angles (b).[48]

In this syllogism, the second premise is apprehended by an inductive process, which refers to the *judgment* of the intellect that 'this is a triangle,' which follows on prior knowledge of what a triangle is and the perception of the attributes immanent in the particular and captured by that universal meaning. This knowledge, along with the prior knowledge of the property 'internal angles equal to two right angles,' allows the student to draw the deductively valid conclusion. It is important to note at this point that it would not be reasonable,

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[45] *Posterior Analytics*, I.1 (71a19-21): ὅτι μὲν γὰρ πᾶν τρίγωνον ἔχει δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας, προῄδει· ὅτι δὲ τόδε τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμικυκλίῳ τρίγωνόν ἐστιν, ἅμα ἐπαγόμενος ἐγνώρισεν. Or, "For one knew beforehand *that* every triangle has angles equal to two right angles; but *that* this here in this semicircle is a triangle, the one being led to know (ἐπαγόμενος) came to know together [with his prior knowledge]."

[46] Here, he uses the participial form of the verb ἐπάγω, which is clearly close in its meaning ('a bringing on') to ἐπαγωγή. Cf., Richard McKirihan, "Aristotelian Epagoge in *Prior Analytics* 2.21 and *Posterior Analytics* I.I," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 21 (1983)5-9. As McKirihan points out, this account of induction maps on to Aristotle's comments at *Prior Analytics* II.21, where it is taken as the apprehension of a particular instantiation of a universal meaning.

[47] *Posterior Analytics*, I.1 (71a19-25).

[48] Cf., Richard McKirahan, Jr., "Aristotelian Epagoge in *Prior Analytics* 2.21 and *Posterior Analytics* I.I, 5.

in a sense, for the student to doubt knowledge that 'this is a triangle'—that, in fact, there is already a necessity involved in this claim, if the proper reasoning only be expressed. The necessity lies in the fact that the particular given in sense experience in fact possesses immanently the meaning of triangle, so that to deny the judgement of the student would constitute a contradiction in the very meaning or sense of experience. In its most basic sense, then, sense-perceptive induction after basic concept formation is a process of reasoning that attaches a meaning to a set of particulars by *reductio*. In one sense, the student does know with necessity by induction that this here is a triangle: he knows the definition of triangle and he knows this meaning as exhibited in this particular. Only an untenable and radical form of sense-perceptive skepticism—in violation of the principle of non-contradiction—would question the truth of this proposition (i.e., 'that this here is a triangle').[49] On the other hand, there is a legitimate question, of which Aristotle is aware, as to how the student knows that the definition of triangle presupposed is necessarily an accurate definition of the object triangle. How does he know that the definition itself is necessarily true, in the sense of capturing *per se* or *essential* attributes? It is one thing to show by *reductio* that a meaning belongs to a particular. On the other hand, it is another thing to show that a meaning properly defines and captures the essence of a particular. As Aristotle expresses at *APo* I.4, the whole point of scientific enquiry is move from better-known to us knowledge to refined or proper knowledge, precisely, by connecting the subject of inquiry to its essential attributes. Aristotle answers to how this is accomplished in his treatment of division, in the second book of *APo.*

Aristotle commences book II of *APo* by setting down four questions of scientific inquiry, which allow for the production of a completed science constituted by a subject-genus, principles, and conclusions.[50] These questions determine, along with the subject, the methodology of a science. The questions are as follows: regarding a particular subject of inquiry, we can inquire into (1) "the fact?" (τὸ ὅτι/*to hoti*) that it is in some manner, (2) "the reasoned fact?" (τὸ διότι/*to dihoti*), which is to say the causal explanation as to why it is in some manner, (3) "whether it exists?" (εἰ ἔστι/*ei esti*), as in such cases of a centaur

[49] For a defense of the sense-perceptive realism held by Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, and in Husserlian phenomenology, see Daniel C. Wagner, "The Logical Terms of Sense Realism: A Thomistic-Aristotelian & Phenomenological Defense," in *Reality*, issue 1, vol. 1, Spring 2020.

[50] *Posterior Analytics*, I.10 (76b11-16: "πᾶσα γὰρ ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τρία ἐστίν, ὅσα τε εἶναι τίθεται (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ γένος, οὗ τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ παθημάτων ἐστὶ θεωρητική), καὶ τὰ κοινὰ λεγόμενα ἀξιώματα, ἐξ ὧν πρώτων ἀποδείκνυσι, καὶ τρίτον τὰ πάθη, ὧν τί σημαίνει ἕκαστον λαμβάνει." Or, "For every demonstrative science is concerned with three things: (1) those things which it supposes to exist (and these are the genus, concerning which it inquires into the attributes belonging to it itself properly); (2) what are called the common axioms, from which primaries it demonstrates; and (3) third, the attributes (τὰ πάθη), the meaning (τί) of which signifying each it assumes."

or god, and (4) "what is it?" (τί ἐστιν), which is to say, the definition. We can already see the significance of the first question for our account of induction, as mentioned above, since one sense of experiential knowledge is constituted by knowledge of the fact. This is the principle of art and science. Achieving higher clarity regarding this question and question four, or the definition, will give us the foundational understanding of the method of division that we seek.[51]

Aristotle holds that the definition of the being in itself of something is immediate, that is, grasped without a middle term (ἄμεσος/*amesos*), and it is a principle (ἀρχή/*arche*) of a science.[52] On the way to giving an account of how this type of definition is to be obtained through division in chapters 13–14, Aristotle draws an important distinction in II.10 between the *nominal* and *proper* definition. This is a technical development allowing Aristotle to say more clearly what it is that is better known to us as the point of departure for obtaining knowledge of what is better known to nature. A nominal definition is constituted when a knower is able to apply a name to a class of individuals by knowing something of their properties, though he cannot yet express properly what the essence of the individuals unified by the term is.[53] The nominal definition is essential to Aristotle's conception of scientific discovery, and his empirical epistemological view that knowledge does not occur in an *a priori* vacuum. Knowledge begins where knowers already have a general, though less distinct, experiential grasp of some class of individuals in the world after basic concept formation. A name, given in a distinct language and culture, already signifies some beings in the world, for example, 'triangle,' 'circular,' or 'mother,' or 'father,' or 'nature,' etc., and a person participating in that culture and language can apprehend the name and its meaning via sense-perceptive induction. This is adequate to allow one engaged in rigorous scientific inquiry to point out members of the class that the name signifies, study them in detail through observation and experiment, and properly define them.[54] Through division of a less distinct, nominal conception, one can then arrive at a refined definition grasped with necessity.

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[51] Aside from following his standard practice of dealing with *aporiai*, Aristotle is also very concerned with the method by which we define causal events, like an eclipse, capturing not only the factual nature of the event, but also its cause (the discussion culminates in II.8). We leave this topic aside, here, as it is beyond our scope.

[52] See, *Posterior Analytics*, II.9 (93b22).

[53] *Posterior Analytics*, II.10 (93b29-32): (93b29-32): Ὁρισμὸς δ' ἐπειδὴ λέγεται εἶναι λόγος τοῦ τί ἐστι, φανερὸν ὅτι ὁ μέν τις ἔσται λόγος τοῦ τί σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα ἢ λόγος ἕτερος ὀνοματώδης, οἷον τί σημαίνει [τί ἐστι] τρίγωνον. Or, "Since we have said that the definition (Ὁρισμὸς) is an account (λόγος) of what it is (τοῦ τί ἐστι), it is apparent that one [meaning of definition] will be the account of what the name signifies or in another way the nominal account, such as some signification of what a triangle is."

[54] For an excellent treatment of the Aristotelian conception of discovery as the first stage of the scientific research program, see Michael W. Tkacz, "Albert the Great and the Revival of Aristotle's Zoological Research Program," *Vivarium* 45 (Brill, 2007), 30–68.

In *APo*, II.13 Aristotle explains how to properly obtain definitions of beings in themselves by moving from a better-know (nominal) definition to a proper definition: "Let us now set down the manner in which we must seek those things predicated in the definition (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι/*en to ti esiti*)."[55] In defining we seek those things that belong to a subject in terms of its genera and differentia until we come to the point of indivisibility where the particular *species* is captured through its specific differentia. Defining, then, first requires that we place the subject of study under one or more of the most generic conceptions, that is, categories. We must then seek the "primary commonalities," which are the attributes that specifically differentiate a number of individuals as a species. They are primary because they are most proximate to the individuals as universals—they cannot be divided any further.[56] Thus, Aristotle holds that divisions according to differentia are the most useful and the goal in and of defining.[57]

To show his meaning, Aristotle uses the example of the number three or the triad. The triad is defined as (1) a number, that is (2) odd, (3) prime in the sense that it lacks any factors (numbers that can be multiplied to produce it), and, finally, (4) prime in the sense that it is not composed of other numbers (Aristotle holds that one is not a number, but the principle or measure of number[58]).[59] Here, then, we have multiple differentia set down in order from the more generic to that which is most properly specific, setting the triad apart from other numbers, odds, and primes. Aristotle then expresses that the definition is grasped with necessity[60] and that it captures the being (οὐσία/*ousia*) of what is defined, in the

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[55] *Posterior Analytics*, II.13 (96a22-23): πῶς δὲ δεῖ θηρεύειν τὰ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενα, νῦν λέγωμεν.

[56] *Posterior Analytics*, II.13 (96b15-21): Χρὴ δέ, ὅταν ὅλον τι πραγματεύηταί τις, διελεῖν τὸ γένος εἰς τὰ ἄτομα τῷ εἴδει τὰ πρῶτα, οἷον ἀριθμὸν εἰς τριάδα καὶ δυάδα, εἶθ' οὕτως ἐκείνων ὁρισμοὺς πειρᾶσθαι λαμβάνειν, οἷον εὐθείας γραμμῆς καὶ κύκλου, καὶ ὀρθῆς γωνίας, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο λαβόντα τί τὸ γένος, οἷον πότερον τῶν ποσῶν ἢ τῶν ποιῶν, τὰ ἴδια πάθη θεωρεῖν διὰ τῶν κοινῶν πρώτων. Or, "It is necessary, whenever one is treating some whole (ὅλον), to divide the genus into the species which are the primary indivisibles, such as number into 3 and 2, and at once to attempt to set down the definitions of these in this manner, such as of the straight line, or the circle, or the right angle, and after having set down some genus, such as whether it is of quantity or quality, to seek to know the distinguishing attributes (τὰ ἴδια πάθη) through primary commonalities."

[57] *Posterior Analytics*, II.13 (96b25).

[58] Cf., *Metaphysics*, XIV.1 (1088a4).

[59] 96a24-96b1.

[60] *Posterior Analytics*, II.13 (96b1-5): ἐπεὶ δὲ δεδήλωται ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ἄνω ὅτι καθόλου μέν ἐστι τὰ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενα (τὰ καθόλου δὲ ἀναγκαῖα), τῇ δὲ τριάδι, καὶ ἐφ' οὗ ἄλλου οὕτω λαμβάνεται, ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τὰ λαμβανόμενα, οὕτως ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν ἂν εἴη τριὰς ταῦτα. Or, "Since it has been stated above for us regarding these things that the universal is [constituted through] those things that are predicated in the definition (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι) (and the universal is necessary), with respect to 3, and also of any other [subject] which we grasp in this manner, grasping those things in the definition (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι), therefore 3 will be these things from necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης)."

sense of its essence (το τί ἦν εἶναι/*to ti en einai*).[61] Most importantly, Aristotle utilizes, here, the *reductio ad impossibile* form of argument to show that the definition he has given necessarily captures the being and essence of the triad. If it did not, it would follow that it merely expressed a genus of the triad, and there would be other individuals with the same meaning that were not a triad. This, however, is impossible and, thus, false. There are no such other numbers *because* every prime after three is in principle composed of other numbers, so that a contradiction would follow were it held to be a prime in the manner of the triad. In this way, the final difference added to the higher genera, in fact, captures what it means essentially to be the triad, and the triad is adequately distinguished from other primes, odds, and numbers.[62] Connecting a defining feature to a subject of inquiry in this manner is demonstration of the fact (τὸ ὅτι/*to hoti*),[63] and a form of syllogistic reasoning, though it is not middle-termed.[64] Thus, in order to know a defining attribute as essentially connected to a subject of inquiry, we must employ the *reductio* method illustrated by the triad example above, and this constitutes a qualified (non-middle-termed) demonstration of the fact. This is an analytic and descriptive processes of reasoning, then, which nonetheless binds the intellect to accept the meaning (universal term/predicate) of the subject with necessity.[65] The Greek terms for necessity, ἀνάγκη/*ananke* and its adverbial form ἀναγκαῖως/*anankaios*, mean 'fate' and they literally pertain to being 'bound,' 'imprisoned,' or 'constrained.' Thus, we can see by this *reductio* reasoning that the intellect is *constrained* to assent in judgment

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[61] *Posterior Analytics*, II.13 (96b1-5): ὅτι δ' οὐσία, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἦν τριάδι εἶναι… Or, "and that this is the being [of three], is manifest from the following. For it is necessary, if this is not the essence of three"…, etc.

[62] *Posterior Analytics*, II.13 (96b3-12). Aristotle concludes, at 96b10-14, εἰ τοίνυν μηδενὶ ὑπάρχει ἄλλῳ ἢ ταῖς ἀτόμοις τριάσι, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ τριάδι εἶναι (ὑποκείσθω γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο, ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἑκάστου εἶναι ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτόμοις ἔσχατος τοιαύτη κατηγορία)· ὥστε ὁμοίως καὶ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν οὕτω δειχθέντων τὸ αὐτῷ εἶναι ἔσται. Or, "If this belongs to nothing other than the individual triads (ἢ ταῖς ἀτόμοις τριάσι), then this would be the essence (τὸ εἶναι) of three (for let this also be posited, that the being (ἡ οὐσία) of each thing is [obtained when] whatever lowest [differentia] is predicated of the individuals); thus, and similarly with any other such [subject] whatsoever—having been displayed in this manner—the essence (τὸ εἶναι) will be the same."

[63] Aristotle states this threefold mode of reasoning explicitly at *Posterior Analytics*, II.13 (97a23-26): Εἰς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν ὅρον διὰ τῶν διαιρέσεων τριῶν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, τοῦ λαβεῖν τὰ κατηγορούμενα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, καὶ ταῦτα τάξαι τί πρῶτον ἢ δεύτερον, καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα. Or, "In order to establish a definition through division three things must be aimed at, the first of which is to set down those things predicated as in some definition, and then to order these in terms of primary to secondary, and finally [to show] *that* (ὅτι) all of these [are true]."

[64] *Posterior Analytics*, II.13 (96b27-28): χρήσιμοι δ' ἂν εἶεν ὧδε μόνον πρὸς τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι τὸ τί ἐστιν. Or, "They [i.e., divisions from differentia] alone will be useful in this manner for proceeding from syllogistic reasoning (τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι) to the definition (τὸ τί ἐστιν)."

[65] In II.14, Aristotle focuses on the importance of dividing from the more generic to the more specific, all the way to the individuals defined. While important, this is beyond our immediate scope.

to the connection of the attribute to the subject ('the triad is…uncomposed, etc.'), which is also to say that it is known to belong *per se* or essentially. Here, then, we are given a clear and explicit idea of the kind of qualifed form of demonstrative syllogism that Aristotle had in mind in *APo*, I.3, when explaining that the first principles were known through induction as a form of qualified demonstration. By this form of inductive reasoning, Aristotle holds that the practitioner achieves the knowledge state of intellectual-judgment (νοῦς/*nous*). Intellectual-judgment knows first principles with necessity, as we can see, so that it provides the proper premises of demonstration in accord with canon set down at *APo* I.2.[66]

Aristotle uses the method division in various forms for establishing first principles or primary definitions in the particular sciences. Ultimately, as has been stated, all the forms involve *reductio ad impossibile* reasoning. The first and most fundamental form is that which applies to the case of the student from the example in *APo* I.1. There is a necessity to his judgment constituting the second premise of his syllogism, that 'this is a triangle,' because to deny this truth would result in the contradiction of the meaning of experience, namely, that this figure possess immanently this universal meaning. The second form, which we saw Aristotle use in the triad example, works by simply setting down a *definition* (*thesis or hypothesis*) and showing that, such and such principle or universal meaning is necessary, since an impossible contradiction follows otherwise. Let us illustrate, this method, again, by appeal to Aristotle's example of the better-known to us sense-perceptive grasp of what is circular, from *Physics* I.1. Beginning with an experiential concept of what is circular, and then by examining what is circular in relation to other shapes (triangles, squares, rectangles, ovals, etc.), the inquirer can divide what is circular by noting that, unlike other shapes, circular things have a limit that is equidistant from a center point. The necessity of this meaning is grasped by *reductio*: except for what is circular, it is impossible to construct a figure that has a limit equidistant from a center point (any deviation results in another shape), meaning that a figure would have to both be circular and not be circular at the same time to deny the truth of the defini-

[66] *Posterior Analytics,* II.19 (100b9-14): …αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ' ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστί, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔκ τε τούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. Or, "…[since] the principles are better-known than the demonstrations, and science altogether is following on the reasoned-account (μετὰ λόγου) [of the principles], and there could be no scientific knowledge of the principles, and since nothing other than intellectual-judgment (νοῦς) is able to be more true than scientific knowledge, by examination from these facts, it follows that intellectual-judgment (νοῦς) would be [the state of knowledge] of principles, so that a principle of demonstrations is not demonstrated, and so that there would not be scientific knowledge of the principles of science (ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη). On intellectual-judgement as the best rendering of νοῦς/*nous*, see *The Aristotelian Foundations of the Human Good*, Chapter 2, 160–161.

tion. Thus, the definition is necessarily true, though we have not shown this by middle-termed demonstration. Aristotle himself uses this form of the method to obtain intellectual-judgment into the first principles of the general science of nature in *Physics* I. Here, given the better-known fact of sense-perceptive experience that the meaning of *nature* generally includes motion,[67] Aristotle shows that the intelligibility of every natural being flows from the principles of *form* and *privation* (opposites), along with a *subject* (*Physics* I.5-7). On the hypothesis of motion, that is, the existential claim that things of nature exist with the feature of being mobile, the intellect is 'constrained' and 'bound' by necessity to accept these principles. Without a *formal* disposition, a *privation* of the formal disposition, and *subject* undergoing change, the movement of natural being would be impossible, contradicting our sense-perceptive knowledge of nature.

A second method Aristotle uses posterior to experiential concept formation works by demonstratively excluding those attributes that are not common to all the members of a perceived genus until all that remains are attributes which each member of the genus actually possesses and which, in fact, make them to be what they are as the members of that genus. This approach, which I will call *eliminative induction* or *division*, can be used to flesh out the example Aristotle uses at *APo*, I.1, of the student who comes to know this triangle as possessing angles equal to two right angles. In this form of reasoned account, those characteristics that are not generically universal, for example, 'equilateral,' can be demonstrated to be as such, since not all triangles, for example , isosceles and scalene, have three equal sides. The syllogisms follows a simple model: 'whatever does not belong to all triangles, is not universal/generic;' 'but feature x does not belong to all triangles (in virtue of such and such particulars);' therefore, feature x is not universal/generic.' This process of negative demonstration can be continued until only those characteristics that are immanently present or contained in every particular have been isolated and expressed, namely, that a 'triangle' is a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles. Again, the intellect is 'constrained' and 'bound' to assenting to the universal properties of the subject: once one has worked through all the possible attributes of 'triangle,' through each of the particulars, this definition of triangle cannot be denied—it must necessarily be given intellectual assent.[68] Presumably, this is the kind of knowledge, that is, a second act of intellectual-judgment after experience, that

[67] See, *Physics* I.2 (185a12-14): "ἡμῖν δ' ὑποκείσθω τὰ φύσει ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια κινούμενα εἶναι· δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς." Or, "In relation to us (ἡμῖν), however, it must be set down that the things that exist by nature, either all or some of them, are moving. And this is manifest from induction (ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς)."

[68] This process also involves a rational exercise of the imagination, which allows us to show 'all possible instances' of triangle. Treatment of this process is beyond our scope. Robert Sokolowski has extremely helpful insights into this topic in his treatment of eidetic intuition and the imagination, in his *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 177–184.

a master of geometry would need to have for the syllogism given at *APo* I.1, in the case of the student, to be materially demonstrative. To be sure, the student already knows with necessity that the perceived figure is a triangle, because it possesses immanently the attributes contained in the definition that he has been taught. However, it is another thing to answer as to how he knows with necessity that this is the meaning of triangle. Once the student has conducted the eliminative form of induction, in this manner, he would know both the definition of triangle and the property belonging to it as proper first principles in accord with the canons of *APo*, I.2. Here, intellectual-judgement (νοῦς/*nous*) is stacked on intellectual-judgement in the rise from sense-perceptive experience to scientific knowledge. Aristotle uses this eliminative form of induction, for example, to define nature properly in *Physics*, II.1, and the soul in *De Anima*, II.1.[69] Looking to those things that are said to exist by nature, namely, plants and animals and their parts, along with the elements, we can set aside all other attributes except that "…each of these possesses, in itself, a principle of motion and rest."[70] Again, in the *De Anima*, and having shown the principles of nature to be (i) matter, (ii) form, or the (iii) complex of the two in natural being or substance, Aristotle can show that the soul must be the *form* (i) of the living being, etc., by eliminative induction or division.[71] Working from the more generic to the more specific (in line with *APo* II.13-14), living beings with soul as a principle of life, fall under the genera of *natural* and then *bodily* beings, and then they are divided in terms of their intrinsic principles into matter and form.[72] Because matter exists as a part and as a whole without life (i.e., there are non-living matter-form complexes or substances), we know the fact that body in either sense could not be soul—it is not sufficient for being living—but rather that it is the subject.[73] It is necessary by this eliminative induction, thus, that the soul as the principle

[69] Aristotle utilizes this second form of reasoned induction in many locations. Other examples of this form of ἐπαγωγή appear in *Physics*, II.8, in establishing the necessity of final cause as nature, V.4, in the definition of place, and at V.11, in the definition of time. Aristotle also uses inductive methods in the definitions of happiness (εὐδαιμονία) at *Nicomachean Ethics* I.4-7, and in his treatment of choice (προαίρεσις) and deliberation (βούλευσις) at III.3.

[70] *Physics*, II.1 (192b13-15).

[71] *De Anima*, II.1 (412a3-6): Τὰ μὲν δὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυχῆς εἰρήσθω· πάλιν δ' ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἐπανίωμεν, πειρώμενοι διορίσαι τί ἐστι ψυχὴ καὶ τίς ἂν εἴη κοινότατος λόγος αὐτῆς. Or, "Let those things having been handed down by our predecessors concerning the soul be sufficiently stated; and, let us return again, as it were, from a fresh beginning, attempting to divide (διορίσαι) the definition of the soul (τί ἐστι ψυχὴ) and what would be the most common reasoned-account or definition (λόγος) of it."

[72] *De Anima*, II.1 (412a11-16).

[73] *De Anima*, II.1 (412a16-19): ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ σῶμα καὶ τοιόνδε, ζωὴν γὰρ ἔχον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη σῶμα ἡ ψυχή· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῶν καθ' ὑποκειμένου τὸ σῶμα, μᾶλλον δ' ὡς ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλη. Or, "And since it is both a body *and* also of such and such a kind, i.e., as possessing life, the body could not be the soul; for the body does not belong to those things according to [or predicated of] a subject, but rather it is as the subject and the matter."

of being alive be the form (ii) of the body in potential to life—*form* being the only possible principle remaining.[74]

Figure 1. Induction (ἐπαγωγή) in *Posterior Analytics* II.19 and *Physics* I.1[75]



[74] *De Anima*, II.1 (412a19-22): ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. ἡ δ' οὐσία ἐντελέχεια· τοιούτου ἄρα σώματος ἐντελέχεια. Or, "It is necessary (ἀναγκαῖον), therefore, that the soul be being (οὐσίαν) as the form (εἶδος) of a natural body possessing life in potential. And the being is the actual-fulfillment (ἐντελέχεια); therefore, it [i.e., the soul] is the actual-fulfillment (ἐντελέχεια) of such a kind of body [i.e., one in potential to being alive].

[75] I am most thankful to Mathew Lance for creatively digitizing this pictorial diagram.

At this point, we now have an understanding of Aristotelian sense-perceptive induction and division as it pertains to the necessary apprehension of attributes connected to particulars being studied in the constitution of universal meanings or definitions. We know that we ascertain essential features (generic, specific, and differential) by *reductio* style reasoning. The rise from sense-perception of the particular to the proper knowledge of universal definition set out by Aristotle in *APo* II.19 and *Physics* I.1 is expressed in Figure 1.

It turns out that, in order to classify and define living beings another distinct form of division is required: division by expression of the power-object relation. As we will be shown in the following part, Wojtyła champions this Aristotelian approach to division, to which we turn now.

Aristotelian Inductive Division in the Life Sciences: *De Anima, De Partibus Animalium*

In *De Partibus Animalium*, Aristotle builds on the account of division he had set out at *APo* II.13-14, expanding the method for the sake of the study of living, animal beings. Further, he connects the account of division to his general account of causal demonstration in natural science in the *Physics*. Following Aristotle, it is helpful to begin with the presentation of causal explanation in the study of animals, as division is ordered toward such explanation.

At *Physics* II.9, Aristotle has already explained the kind of demonstration and demonstrative necessity that belongs to the natural sciences in general. Special attention to this issue was needed there, precisely because, unlike purely abstract sciences such as mathematics, which work, *a priori*, from *definitions* as prior principles and obtain unqualifed or simple demonstrative necessity through their demonstrations, we cannot know the movements of nature as necessary without qualification because we are aware that there is real contingency in nature—which is to say, we are aware that those *movements* that are by nature may be obstructed.[76] Accordingly, and having shown by *reductio ad impossibile* that nature is necessarily teleological in *Physics* II.8, Aristotle distinguishes, in II.9, between the simple or unqualified necessity (ἁπλῶς) characteristic of mathematics, and necessity from a *hypothesis*, *supposition*, or *condition* (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως/*ex hupotheseos*), which is proper to our understanding of natural movement.[77] We cannot, for example, demonstrate *a priori* that given the materials of a house

[76] This is clear, already, from the treatment of fortune and chance in *Physics* II.4-6 and the defense of final cause as nature in II.8.

[77] *Physics*, II.9 (199b34-35): Τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης πότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὑπάρχει ἢ καὶ ἁπλῶς; Or, And it must be asked whether what is from necessity belongs to [natural] things from a hypothesis (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) or also without qualification (ἁπλῶς)?"

or the seed of the olive tree, or the conception of a human being, there will be, of necessity, a perfected or completed house, tree, or human being. We know such is not necessary without qualification as intervening chance causes could obstruct the movement of the house builder, preventing the house from coming to be, or the ontogenetic movement of the seed or conceptus, preventing the tree or human from achieving the fullness of expression of their essential being.[78] However, we are capable of demonstrating, *a posteriori*, those causes (material, formal, and agent) that are necessary on the *hypothesis*, *supposition*, or *condition* that the house, the tree, or a human being is to be as it is by definition (λόγος/*logos*) and as the end (τέλος/*telos*) of the natural production.[79]

[78] See, *Physics*, II.9 (200b4-8): ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἔστιν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. ὁρισαμένῳ γὰρ τὸ ἔργον τοῦ πρίειν ὅτι διαίρεσις τοιαδί, αὕτη γ' οὐκ ἔσται, εἰ μὴ ἕξει ὀδόντας τοιουσδί· οὗτοι δ' οὔ, εἰ μὴ σιδηροῦς. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἕνια μόρια ὡς ὕλη τοῦ λόγου. Or, "And the necessity (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον) is equally in the reasoned-account (ἐν τῷ λόγῳ) [or definition of the form]. For, by having defined the functional-act (τὸ ἔργον) of sawing as division such as this, this will not be [i.e., the functional act] unless it possesses teeth such as these; and these will not be, unless they are made of iron. For also, in the reasoned-account or definition (ἐν τῷ λόγῳ), there are some parts precisely as the matter of the definition."

[79] My interpretation follows that of St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas, and William A. Wallace. See, Wallace, "Albertus Magnus on Suppositional Necessity," in *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays*, ed. James A. Weisheipl, O.P. (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1980), 103-128. In explaining these senses of necessity in his *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics*, St. Thomas Aquinas uses the phrases *a priori* and *a posteriori* in this manner. See, *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle*, lib. 1, lect. 42 (87b19-88a17), (Leon. 1.310) "Nam in disciplinis est necessitas *a priori*; in naturalibus autem a posteriori (quod tamen est prius secundum naturalam), scilicet a fine et forma." Or, "For in the [mathematical] disciplines, there is necessity from what is prior (*a priori*), in the sciences of natural things, however, the necessity is from what follows (*a posteriori*) (which, nevertheless, is prior according to nature), namely, from the end and form." The example of the olive tree is also barrowed from St. Thomas Aquinas' *Commentary on the Posterior Analyitics of Aristotle*, lib. 1, lect. 42 (87b19-88a17) (Leon. 1.310): "Unde sic docet ibi Aristoteles ostendere *propter quid*, ut si hoc debeat esse, puta quod oliva generetur, necesse est hoc praeexistere, scilicet semen olivae; non autem ex semine loivae generatur aliva ex necessitate, quia potest impediri generatio per aliquam corruptionem. Unde si fiat demonstratio ex eo quod est prius in generatione, non concludet ex necessitate; nisi forte accipiamus hoc ipsum ess necessarium, seman olivae ut frequenter ess generativum alivae, quia hoc facit secundum proprietem suae naturae, nisi impediatur." Or, "Whence, Aristotle shows there that to demonstrate the reasoned-fact (ostendere propter quid), such as if this is to be, for example if an olive tree is to be generated, it is necessary for this to pre-exist [or be presupposed], namely, the seed of the olive tree; however, the olive tree is not generated from the olive seed from necessity, because impediments of the generative process are possible through some form of corruption. Whence, if demonstration would be made from that which is prior in generation, it would not conclude with necessity; unless, perhaps, we admit that the same be necessary, as the seed of the olive tree frequently is generative of the olive tree, because it produces it according to what belongs to it by nature, unless it is impeded." Finally, Thomas uses the phrase "ex conditione," referring to natural

In *De Partibus Animalium*,[80] Aristotle reiterates that the necessity proper to natural science is that on the hypothesis of the end,[81] and that it is by knowing the essence and the definition of the subject taken as the end that the natural philosopher obtains scientific knowledge. In the productions of the arts, and so also in natural becomings, the pre-defined end allows us to say what is necessary on the hypothesis, that is, a definition coupled with the existential claim (*APo*, I.2), that the end is to be as it is.[82] Aristotle uses the example of the ontogenesis of the human being to make his point:

> Therefore, one must state precisely thus, that since this is *what it was to be* or the essence (τὸ ἦν εἶναι) for the human being, on account of this it possesses this; for it is not possible for it to be without these parts. If not in this way, one must state what is next best, either that generally it cannot be otherwise or, at least, that it is fittingly-good (καλῶς) that it is as such. And these things follow. And since it is in this way, the generation necessarily happens in this manner and it is in this way. Therefore [moreover], this comes to be first of the parts, and then this. And one must speak in this manner similarly about all the things being constituted by nature.[83]

necessity, at *Summa Theologiae*, 1a2ae, q. 13, a. 6, ad. 2, whence I take "conditional" as a synomym for hypothetical.

[80] In my treatment of *De Partibus Animalium*, I am indebted James G. Lennox for his fine translation of *On the Parts of Animals* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001) and for his helpful commentary.

[81] *De Partibus Animalium*, I.1 (639b21-26): Τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ὁμοίως, εἰς ὃ πειρῶνται πάντες σχεδὸν τοὺς λόγους ἀνάγειν, οὐ διελόμενοι ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Ὑπάρχει δὲ τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς τοῖς ἀϊδίοις, τὸ δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ τοῖς ἐν γενέσει πᾶσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τεχναστοῖς, οἷον οἰκίᾳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτῳοῦν τῶν τοιούτων. Or, "What is from necessity does not belong to all things pertaining to nature in the same manner, though almost everyone attempts to bring back their accounts to it, while not having distinguished in how many ways 'necessary' is said.' That [which is necessary] belongs without qualification (ἁπλῶς) to eternal things, while that [which is necessary] from a hypothesis (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) belongs also to all those things in the process of becoming, as in the productions of art, such as a house or any other such kind of things."

[82] *De Partibus Animalium*, I.1 (639b26-30) Ἀνάγκη δὲ τοιάνδε τὴν ὕλην ὑπάρξαι, εἰ ἔσται οἰκία ἢ ἄλλο τι τέλος· καὶ γενέσθαι τε καὶ κινηθῆναι δεῖ τόδε πρῶτον, εἶτα τόδε, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐφεξῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα γίνεται ἕκαστον καὶ ἔστιν. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις. Or, "It is necessary that matter such as this has been present, if the house is to be or any other such end (τέλος), and this must both have come to be and have been moved first, then this, and so on in this manner continuously up to the end (τοῦ τέλους) and that for the sake of which (οὗ ἕνεκα) each thing comes to be and is. It is the same also in those things that come to be by nature."

[83] *De Partibus Animalium*, I.1 (640a33-b3): Διὸ μάλιστα μὲν λεκτέον ὡς ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ' ἦν τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτ' ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ τῶν μορίων τούτων. Εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτου, καὶ ἢ ὅλως (ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἄλλως) ἢ καλῶς γε οὕτως. Ταῦτα δ' ἑπεται. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τὴν γένεσιν ὠδὶ καὶ τοιαύτην συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον. Διὸ γίνεται πρῶτον τῶν μορίων τόδε, εἶτα τόδε. Καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν φύσει συνισταμένων.

Rejecting the reductive materialism of his predecessors (namely, Democritus), Aristotle is clear that in the case of animals, it is the soul that constitutes the essence of the being, so that the natural philosopher must define in terms of the soul of the animal and its acts.[84] The goal of the natural philosopher is to set down the specific differences of the animal being studied, which are given through sense-perceptive induction and division, and then to explain them in terms of formal and final cause.[85]

As Michael W. Tkacz has shown, St. Albert the Great brilliantly expresses that Aristotle applied the two stage research program we have seen set out in *APo*, moving from division to demonstration, to the study of animals.[86] First, there is the analytic, descriptive—*narratio*—process, wherein essential morphological attributes are connected to their subjects and divided to obtain generic and specific knowledge. The second stage of the research program then consists in the demonstrative expression of the causes of the connection of *per se* attributes to their subject—the stage of *assignatum causarum* (*Questiones de Animalibus*). At *PA*, IV.12, for example, Aristotle explains various (priorly collected and assigned) differentia in birds, which are apprehendable through the birds' activities in connection with their morphological features, as ordered

[84] *De Partibus Animalium*, I.1 (641a14-27): Εἰ δὴ τοῦτό ἐστι ψυχὴ ἢ ψυχῆς μέρος ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς […] εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως, τοῦ φυσικοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς ἂν εἴη λέγειν καὶ εἰδέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ πάσης, κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο καθ' ὃ τοιοῦτο τὸ ζῷον, καὶ τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον, καὶ περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αὐτῆς οὐσίαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς φύσεως διχῶς λεγομένης καὶ οὔσης τῆς μὲν ὡς ὕλης τῆς δ' ὡς οὐσίας. Καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη καὶ ὡς ἡ κινοῦσα καὶ ὡς τὸ τέλος. Τοιοῦτον δὲ τοῦ ζῴου ἤτοι πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ μέρος τι αὐτῆς. Or, If this is the soul [i.e., what is being studied], or a part of the soul, or what cannot exist with out the soul […] then, if this is so, it would belong to the natural philosopher to speak and know what concerns the soul—if not the whole, then concerning that itself by which the animal is such a kind, and [he will speak of and know] the definition of the soul (τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή), or [what] the part itself is, and concerning those attributes belonging to it by which it is such a kind of being (κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν), especially [since] nature is spoken of as being in two ways, i.e., as matter and as being [in the sense of essence]. And this latter is both as what is moving and as the end. And, with respect to the case of the animal, certainly, this is either all the soul or some part of it."

[85] Aristotle makes this same point at *History of Animals*, I.6 (491a7-11). Cf., Lennox's commentary on *PA*, I.5, p 175. On essence being the principle of demonstration in biology, see also, Allen Gotthelf, "First Principles in Aristotle's Parts of Animals," in *Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology*, 167-198.

[86] See Michael W.Tkacz, "Albert the Great and the Revival of Aristotle's Zoological Research Program," *Vivarium* 45 (Brill, 2007). As Tkacz also explains, the reason St. Albert is the first to appreciate the Aristotelian conception of natural scientific research is that he is the first to fully grasp Aristotle's rejection of the Platonic notion of the forms as separated. Rather, the forms are immanent in the subject being studied. Since they are only grasped confusedly in relation to us, however, scientific methodology must consist in disclosing them as better-known to nature in themselves. This is accomplished through the two fold research process here described and clearly seen in *PA*. On this latter point, see Tkacz's "Albertus Magnus and the Recovery of Aristotelian Form," *The Review of Metaphysics,* Volume 64, Issue 4, June 2011.

to their distinct ends. After dividing birds which are web-footed from those that have talons (using division by simple *reductio*), Aristotle gives the causal explanation of the former:[87]

> Thus, these things occur from necessity on account of these causes, as it is on account of what is better that they possess these kind of feet for the sake of the life they live, because they are living in the water, and wings being of little use [there], they may possess feet useful for swimming.[88]

Aristotle then divides long-legged birds, and gives the causal explanation of this morphological feature, noting that the organs of animals are for the sake of their end-directed functional-acts, and not vice versa:

> Some of the birds are long-legged. The cause of this is that their mode of life is marsh-dwelling. For nature produces the organs for the sake of the functional-act (τὸ ἔργον), but the functional-act is not for the sake of the organs. Thus, because they are not swimmers, they are not web-footed, and it is on account of their mode of living, in residing [in the marsh], that they are long-legged and long-toed, and many of them possess many joints in their toes.[89]

Here, we can see Aristotle explaining why the morphological feature arises in the animal on the *hypothesis* of the end, which is the ἔργον/*ergon*—that is, the deed, act, or as I will say here, the functional-act.[90] It is necessary that nature operate as an internal teleological principle and cause of animal develop-

[87] Aristotle makes this point, here in *PA* I.1, using respiration as an example. See, *De Partibus Animalium*, I.1 (642a31-32): Δεικτέον δ' οὕτως, οἷον ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἡ ἀναπνοὴ τουδὶ χάριν, τοῦτο δὲ γίγνεται διὰ τάδε ἐξ ἀνάγκης. "One must demonstrate the cause in this manner, for example, showing that breathing exists for the sake of this, and that this comes to be on account of these things from necessity."

[88] *De Partibus Animalium*, I.1 (694b5-9): Ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν οὖν ταῦτα συμβαίνει διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας· ὡς δὲ διὰ τὸ βέλτιον ἔχουσι τοιούτους τοὺς πόδας τοῦ βίου χάριν, ἵνα ζῶντες ἐν ὑγρῷ καὶ τῶν πτερῶν ἀχρείων ὄντων τοὺς πόδας χρησίμους ἔχωσι πρὸς τὴν νεῦσιν. Cf., G.E.R. Lloyd's "Empirical Research in Aristotle's Biology," in *Philosophical Issues and Aristotle's Biology*, ed. by Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

[89] *De Partibus Animalium*, IV.12 (649b11-17): Ἔνιοι δὲ μακροσκελεῖς τῶν ὀρνίθων εἰσίν. Αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ βίος τῶν τοιούτων ἕλειος· τὰ γὰρ ὄργανα πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ἔργον πρὸς τὰ ὄργανα. Διὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ μὴ πλωτὰ εἶναι οὐ στεγανόποδά ἐστι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ὑπείκοντι εἶναι τὸν βίον μακροσκελῆ καὶ μακροδάκτυλα, καὶ τὰς καμπὰς ἔχουσι πλείους ἐν τοῖς δακτύλοις οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν.

[90] See also, *De Partibus Animalium*, I.5 (645a23-26): Τὸ γὰρ μὴ τυχόντως ἀλλ' ἕνεκά τινος ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις ἐστὶ καὶ μάλιστα· οὗ δ' ἕνεκα συνέστηκεν ἢ γέγονε τέλους, τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ χώραν εἴληφεν. Or, "For not what is by chance, but *that for the sake of which* (ἕνεκά) exists most of all in the functional-acts (ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις) of nature; and where [animals] have been constituted or come to be for the sake of the end, it has taken the place of the fitting-good (τοῦ καλοῦ) or what is best."

ment in this manner because of the regular or normative observed fact of the ontogenesis of animal species.[91] Accordingly, and beginning with our experience of such animals (birds, here), we know normative functional-activities or life practices of the animals (we would say "behaviors" now), for example, that they are marsh-dwelling or aquatic swimmers, and the distinguishing morphological features by observation, for example, long-legged and claw-toed or short-legged with webbed feet. In the study of animals, then, we begin by collecting this information (i.e., life activities and morphology), and then we conclude by demonstration of what organic matter and form are necessary on the hypothesis of these same activities. The first stage requires the first *reductio* style induction as division, establishing necessary knowledge of the fact of distinguishing morphological features, which cannot be denied as they are normatively perceived features of the particular members of the species. The second stage then moves to provide causal explanation of these distinguishing morphological features by demonstration *on the hypothesis of the end*. The better-known to us conception of activities and morphology is constituted primarily by these features normative presence in the subject of study. The better-known to nature conception of these animals and their activities is constituted through causal demonstration showing that the dividing morphological features are necessary on the supposition of the life activities of subject. Thus, we can see that explanation of animals proceeds from the necessity of constraint, proper to inductive division, to hypothetical/conditional/suppositional causal explanation. In our coming to know of natural animal beings our grasp of the animal's functional-act or ἔργον (*ergon*) becomes more rich and refined as we go from the better-known to us experience, through division and causal explanation to better-known to nature understanding. Initially, the animal ἔργον (*ergon*) is given to us simply as the normative life actions of the subject of study. After division and explanation on the hypothesis of the end, these life actions are apprehended as the functional perfection of the organism, given the capacities it possesses through its morphology.

The two stage method of division in the study of animals that Aristotle has set out, here, can well be called the *power-object model of division*. As Aristotle explains, what is to be defined with respect to its kind or genus (τῷ γένει) is defined in terms of its receptive power, capacity, or potentiality (δύνᾰμις/*dunamis*), and the actual object to which it is ordered. He further tells us that, "What *is* is acted upon in [its] potential by what is actual, so that both the former one and the latter one are the same with respect to genus."[92] Power and its object,

[91] Cf., *Physics* II.8.

[92] *De Partibus Animalium*, II.1 (647a8-9): Πάσχει δὲ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος, ὥστε ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ γένει καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἓν καὶ τοῦτο ἕν. While Aristotle rejects the dichotomous for of division displayed by Plato in the *Sophist*, he is actually developing the functional-account of definition that first arises in Plato. See, *Phaedrus*, 270b: "Ἐν ἀμφοτέραις δεῖ διελέσθαι φύσιν, σώματος μὲν ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, ψυχῆς δὲ ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳs." Or, "In both cases [i.e., medicine and dialec-

then, are coupled together and we must disclose both to understand the being being defined. Accordingly, animals are defined through the identification of their functional-acts, which is a matter of analyzing a power in relation to its proper object/act.[93] These are first grasped through their expression in the animal's observable activities. The activities follow on what the animals are in their parts and through the whole. The form of the animal expressed by its essential attributes is apprehended as a capacity receptive of a distinct object—whether this consists in the webbed-feet of a duck for the sake of swimming, long legs and claw-toes for the sake of marsh-dwelling, or the form of the eye for the sake of awareness of color and shape.

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tic], one must define nature (φύσιν), the body in the case of the one and the soul in the case of the other." And then, *Phaedrus*, 270c9-d7. Τὸ τοίνυν περὶ φύσεως σκόπει τί ποτε λέγει Ἱπποκράτης τε καὶ ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος. ἆρ' οὐχ ὧδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ὁτουοῦν φύσεως· πρῶτον μέν, ἁπλοῦν ἢ πολυειδές ἐστιν οὗ πέρι βουλησόμεθα εἶναι αὐτοὶ τεχνικοὶ καὶ ἄλλον δυνατοὶ ποιεῖν, ἔπειτα δέ, ἂν μὲν ἁπλοῦν ᾖ, σκοπεῖν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν εἰς τὸ δρᾶν ἔχον ἢ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ, ἐὰν δὲ πλείω εἴδη ἔχῃ, ταῦτα ἀριθμησάμενον, ὅπερ ἐφ' ἑνός, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἐφ' ἑκάστου, τῷ τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἢ τῷ τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ; Or, "That is well then, and consider at length what both Hippocrates and true reason (ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος) say concering nature (περὶ φύσεως). For, concerning the nature of anything whatsoever, must we not reason (διανοεῖσθαι) in this manner: first, concerning that which we ourselves wish to be technically knowledgable of and to be able to make another as such, [we must answer as to] whether it is simple or multiform (ἁπλοῦν ἢ πολυειδές), and then, if it is simple, examine its capacity (δύναμιν), what it is naturally productive of in relation to the act it holds, or what it is in relation to the affecting thing that acts upon it, and if it has many forms, these being numbered, as we said regarding one, to see these and say of each of them, what is the act (τί ποιεῖν) for which it has naturally come to be, or what is the affection (τί παθεῖν) for which it is naturally, and what acts upon it." For a more expansive account of Plato's seminal contribution to the power-object model of division, see *The Aristotelian Foundations of the Human Good*, chapter 1.

[93] In case one is not convinced of this point through this treatment of *PA* I.1-II.1, here are several other texts, to make the point emphatically. At *Politics* I.2 (1253a23), he notes: …πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει… Or, "And everything is defined by its functional-act (τῷ ἔργῳ) and capacity (τῇ δυνάμει)." Also, at *De Caelo*, II.3 (286a8-9), Aristotle notes that Ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὧν ἐστιν ἔργον, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔργου. Or, "Each thing that exists, of which there is a function, is for the sake of the function." And, the author of the *Meteorology*, at IV.12 (390a10-13), notes: ἅπαντα δ' ἐστὶν ὡρισμένα τῷ ἔργῳ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενα ποιεῖν τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀληθῶς ἐστιν ἕκαστον, οἷον ὀφθαλμὸς εἰ ὁρᾷ, τὸ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενον ὁμωνύμως, οἷον ὁ τεθνεὼς ἢ ὁ λίθινος· Or, "Everything is defined by its functional act (τῷ ἔργῳ); for the objects (δυνάμενα) of the capacities produce their functional-acts which is what each thing truly is; for example, if it were the eye, it would be the act of seeing, and when there is no capacity the thing is only called what it is equivocally, as when the body dies or in the case of the stone body." Reeve has helpfully collected these texts. See, C.D.C. Reeve, *Action, Contemplation, and Happiness: An Essay on Aristotle* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2012), 239.

Reasoning on the Hypothesis of the End as Effect-Cause Reasoning

In the *De Anima* Aristotle expresses this form of reasoning on the hypothesis of the end is also a matter reasoning from attributes (functional-actions) taken as effects back to essential capacities as the cause of the attributes or effects.[94] Again, this makes sense in terms of the movement from what is better-known to us to what is better-known to nature. On the power-object model of division, we begin with factual knowledge pertaining to the animals functional-acts and morphology, and then we reason hypothetically to obtain proper causal understanding disclosing the essence of the being.[95]

Having defined the soul (ψυχή/*psuche*) generically at *De Anima* II.1 as "the primary actual-fulfillment of a natural body in potential (δυνάμει) to possessing life,"[96] by way of the eliminative form of division, Aristotle then proceeds to divide the species by way of the power-object model of division:

> 'Living' being said in many ways, we say something is living even if it possesses only some one of these things: intellect (νοῦς), sense-perception (αἴσθησις), motion and rest in accord with place, and also motion in accord with nourishment, and both perishing and growth.[97]

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[94] *De Anima*, I.1 (402b16-25): ἔοικε δ' οὐ μόνον τὸ τί ἐστι γνῶναι χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν συμβεβηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις (ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι τί τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον, ἢ τί γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον, πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν πόσαις ὀρθαῖς αἱ τοῦ τριγώνου γωνίαι ἴσαι), ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμβάλλεται μέγα μέρος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ τί ἐστιν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, τότε καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἕξομεν λέγειν κάλλιστα· Or, "It seems that not only is the knowledge of the definition useful for the inquiry into the causes of the attributes properly belonging to beings (ταῖς οὐσίαις) (as in mathematics [knowing] what the straight and the curved, and the line and the plane are, is for discerning that the angles of the triangle are equal to such a number of right angles), but also, conversely, the proper attributes (τὰ συμβεβηκότα) contribute in great part to the knowledge of the definition (τὸ τί ἐστιν); For whenever we are able to render an account in accord with what appears concerning proper attributes (περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων), either all or as many as possible, then also we are able to speak well concerning the being [in the sense of essence] (περὶ τῆς οὐσίας);"

[95] See, *De Anima*, I.1 (402b14-16): εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον, πάλιν ἄν τις ἀπορήσειεν εἰ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρότερον τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ νοῦ. Or, "If the functional-acts (τὰ ἔργα) are first, it might be considered again whether one must first inquire into the corresponding objects, such as what is sensed in the act of sense-perception, and what is known in the act of knowing." And, again, see *De Anima*, I.1 (403b11-12): …ἀλλ' ὁ φυσικὸς περὶ ἅπανθ' ὅσα τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ὕλης ἔργα καὶ πάθη… Or, "… but the scientist of nature is he who is concerned with the whole precisely in the functional-acts and affective objects of a body such as this and of matter of such a disposition…"

[96] *De Anima*, II.1 (412a22-28):

[97] *De Anima*, II.2 (413a22-25): πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου, κἂν ἕν τι τούτων ἐνυπάρχῃ μόνον, ζῆν αὐτό φαμεν, οἷον νοῦς, αἴσθησις, κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον, ἔτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τροφὴν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξησις.

To begin, we know these species of soul as distinct in terms of act:

> But that (ὅτι) these are distinct with respect to reasoned-account or definition (τῷ λόγῳ), is manifest; for there is a difference with respect to sense-perception (αἰσθητικῷ) and forming beliefs (δοξαστικῷ), if the act of sensation is really other than that of forming beliefs, and similarly concerning each of the others [i.e., capacities] having been stated. Further, all of these [capacities] belong to some of the animals, and some of them to some, and to others only one (and this produces the difference among animals);[98]

Finally, Aristotle explains how we move to complete better-known to nature apprehension of the definitions of the species of soul:

> It is necessary—to make an inquiry into what follows concerning these [species of soul]—to set down the particular definition (τί ἐστιν) of each, in this manner, at once, concerning the things belonging [to it] and concerning the things that are other [than it]. And, it is necessary, if one is to state what each of these is, such as what thinking, or sensation, or nourishment is, that one must first already state what the act of thinking (τὸ νοεῖν) is and what the act of sense-perception (τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι) is, etc.; for the functional-operations (αἱ ἐνέργειαι) and the ordered-activities (αἱ πράξεις) are prior according to reasoned-account (κατὰ τὸν λόγον). And if this is so, it is in turn necessary to have examined first the corresponding-objects of these [functional-operations and activities], and it would be necessary to have divided concerning each of these things first the cause (αἰτίαν) on account of which it is, as for example concerning what nourishes (τροφῆς), and the sensible-object (αἰσθητοῦ), and the object of thought (νοητοῦ).[99]

Aristotle expresses the need, then, to fully define each species of the soul and the attributes belonging to them by identifying the act of the capacity in relation to the object or end that *causally* affects it. A summary showing Aristotle's accomplishments in the *De Anima* along these lines will be helpful our purposes.[100]

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[98] *De Anima*, II.2 (413b29-414a1): τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ὅτι ἕτερα, φανερόν· αἰσθητικῷ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ δοξαστικῷ ἕτερον, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ δοξάζειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων. ἔτι δ' ἐνίοις μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, τισὶ δὲ τινὰ τούτων, ἑτέροις δὲ ἓν μόνον (τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ διαφορὰν τῶν ζῴων)·

[99] *De Anima*, II.4 (415a14-22): Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων σκέψιν ποιεῖσθαι λαβεῖν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τί ἐστιν, εἶθ' οὕτως περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιζητεῖν. εἰ δὲ χρὴ λέγειν τί ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον τί τὸ νοητικὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ θρεπτικόν, πρότερον ἔτι λεκτέον τί τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι· πρότεραι γάρ εἰσι τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις κατὰ τὸν λόγον. εἰ δ' οὕτως, τούτων δ' ἔτι πρότερα τὰ ἀντικείμενα δεῖ τεθεωρηκέναι, περὶ ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἂν δέοι διορίσαι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, οἷον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ.

[100] For a very helpful treatment of the capacities of the soul in Aristotle, see C.D.C. Reeve, *Action, Contemplation, and Happiness.*

The nutritive capacity is one that is the source of the preservation of the living being to the extent that it is such a kind of being, and food is its object or end, which is whatever is bodily *and* digestible for the organism, providing the material cause necessary for growth and preservation. 'Preservation' is extended beyond the individual to include the species, so that reproduction is an essential aspect of the nutritive capacity, its end being the production of a new individual member of the species.[101] Of the sensitive capacity, there are five types: (i) touch, (ii) sight, (iii) hearing, (iv) smell, and (v) taste. Each of these has a bodily organ with a corresponding object, which is its end and the cause of the act of sensation: (i) the animal body, in general, corresponds to tangible bodies; (ii) the eye to color; (iii) the ear to sound or what is hearable; (iv) the nose to what is smelled; and, (v) the tongue or mouth to what is tasted.[102] All of the senses also share in common that they are receptive, through impression, of the forms of any sensually perceived and or known being.[103] Over the five senses, with their organs and proper objects, Aristotle shows the necessity of another faculty, the common-sense, which constitutes a singular act of awareness of the acts of sense-perception of the particular through the organs, and in this way alone allows the animal to judge of what is sensed simultaneously.

[101] *De Anima*, II.4 (416b10-29). In contemporary biology, the study of the nutritive capacities of the animal soul have advanced to that of (i) metabolism, which seeks explanation in terms of the chemical processes and controls which provide energy to sustain the life of the organism, (ii) homeostasis, which explains the formal mechanisms by which an organism maintains its own biological stability while compensating for environmental conditions in a manner optimal for its survival and wellbeing, and (iii) biological reproduction, which explains how species are sustained from the simplest to the most complex forms from cell replication through mitosis up to sexual reproduction by the genetic model. See, Wallace, *The Modeling of Nature*, 81–92.

[102] See, *De Anima*, II.5-11. For a helpful summary of Aristotle's conception of sensation and sense-perception, see Jonathan Lear, *Aristotle: The Desire to Understand*, 101–116. For an excellent analysis of the sense-perceptive faculties in the Phenomenological tradition, see Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 66–76. See also, Hans Jonas sixth essay, in *The Phenomenon of Life*, "The Nobility of Sight: A Study in the Phenomenology of the Senses," 135–156.

[103] See, *De Anima*, II.12 (424a17-24): Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ τὸ χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ' ᾗ τοιονδί, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. Or, "It is universally necessary to hold, concerning every sensitive capacity, that the sense-perceptive capacity (αἴσθησίς) is what is receptive of the forms (εἰδῶν) of the sensed objects without the matter, as the wax is able to receive the sign of the signet-ring without the iron or the gold, holding the gold or the bronze sign, but not *qua* gold or bronze; and similarly, the sensation of each is affected by that possessing color, or taste, or sound, but this is not said to the extent that each is of the [whole] thing, but to the extent that it is such as this [i.e., formally], and according to definition (κατὰ τὸν λόγον)." The necessity of the claim follows from the fact that it is impossible for individuated matter to pass into the organ and cognition.

Since we are capable of judging the difference between, for example, 'sweet' and 'white' in the same object, and since the acts of sensation through the tongue and the eyes are not capable of this discriminatory act in themselves, it is necessary that the common-sense exist over and above them, unifying their acts in awareness and allowing for such discrimination in the sensitive animal.[104] With sensation, as has already been mentioned, come also the related capacities of desire and imagination.[105] Finally, the intellective capacity (νοῦς) has as its object the essence (τί ἦν εἶναι)[106] which makes the particular thing known to be what it is, and this is also the species or definition (εἶδος)[107] of the known thing, which the intellect being actually exercised is capable of apprehending separately from matter (in the particular being known and the phantasm of sensation).[108] The soul of the human being, of course, presents a special case, since analysis of its acts shows it to possess with necessity a differentiating capability and act that does not occur through a bodily organ, namely, in the intellect. The main point of interest, for the current study, is simply to see that the method Aristotle sets out will work by reasoning from given life activities to what is necessary on the supposition that they are to be as they are. On the supposition of the intellectual acts of the soul of apprehending the universal taken as end/effect, it is necessary to set down the differentiating and essential capacity of intellect. In fact, Aristotle uses this model at *APo* II.19 in giving his genetic account of human knowledge, as we presented it above. The diagram below expresses this use of the power-object model of division,

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[104] See, *De Anima*, III. 2 (426b20-23).

[105] Aristotle also distinguishes a power of discrimination or estimative faculty in animals, which allows them to perform imperfect or non-intellective voluntary acts, as when they act for desired objects of sense-perceptive awareness. Further, he distinguishes the faculty of memory and treats it in a separate book (*De Memoria et Reminiscentia*), without which, as we have seen in the treatment of *APo*, II.19, experience and knowledge are impossible.

[106] *De Anima*, III.4 (429b10-19). Here, Aristotle distinguishes the intellective capacity from that of sensation by appealing, precisely, to essence as its object. Since there is a difference between a magnitude and the essence of magnitude, that is, what it is, and so with water and all other knowable things, and since the sensitive faculties have as their objects the particular things sensed, there must be another faculty in the case of humans capable of receiving and actively knowing essence.

[107] See *De Anima* III.8. At 432a1-3, Aristotle uses a brilliant analogy to express that the intellect in act, which is a form itself, is also the actual form of the thing known: ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν. Or, "The soul is as the hand; for as the hand is the instrument of instruments, so also intellect is the form of forms and sensation the form of the sensed-object."

[108] For an excellent treatment of Aristotle's conception of sensation and sense and intellectual knowledge, synthesizing it with the achievements of modern biology and cognitive science, see Wallace, *The Modeling of Nature*, 114–156. For a helpful treatment of Aristotle's conception of the capacity of intellect (νοῦς), see again, Jonathan Lear, *Aristotle: The Desire to Understand*, 116–151.

providing clarity and distinct knowledge of human knowing itself, dividing capacities in relation to their objects and the corresponding habits produced by their acts:[109]

Figure 2. The Power-Object Model of Division in Posterior Analytics II.19



Division as Providing Principle of Philosophical Anthropology in Aristotle's *Ethics*

A final point relevant to the study of Wojtyła's Aristotelian method is that Aristotle himself appeals to the method of division, as we have seen him set it down in *APo*, *Physics*, *De Partibus Animalium*, and *De Anima*, in his own account

[109] Because intellectual-judgement and science are also acts of reason (what follows *reductio* and the proper syllogism), and because of the close connection between experience and intellectual-judgment, properly capturing the relationship between the states of concept formation, experience, intellectual-judgement and science is difficult, if not impossible, in such a diagram. In line with the *Metaphysics* I.1 text, we know that experience entails knowledge of the fact, which means, in turn, that it involves an act of intellectual-judgement. First principles, for which we cannot use middle-termed syllogisms, are established as necessary facts in division by *reductio*, as has been shown above. In a real sense, then, experience as knowledge of the fact already requires or is intellectual-judgment after such reasoning. Further, even concept formation involves the faculty reason for human beings, which is shown by the fact that the human concept, as soon as it is formed, can be applied in an act of judgment to the particular. The diagram is imperfect, but helpful in its way, nonetheless, for displaying the power-object model of division.

of the human good, in *Nicomachean Ethics.* As this is clearly one of Wojtyła's *inspiring* and *barrowed* sources, let us set down the key text for consideration. Having stated his intention to obtain a precise definition of the human good, Aristotle indicates the method he will use, which is the power object model:

> And this could be accomplished presently, if we could apprehend the functional-act (τὸ ἔργον) of the human being (τοῦ ἀνθρώπου). For, as in the case of the flute player and the sculptor and every art-practitioner, and generally where there is some functional-act (ἔργον) and activity (πρᾶξις), the good (τἀγαθὸν) is thought to be in the functional-act (ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ) and the well-doing (τὸ εὖ), in this manner it should be expected also for the human being (ἀνθρώπῳ), if indeed there is some functional-act that belongs to him.[110]

He continues:

> Is there some set of functional-acts (ἔργα) and activities (πράξεις) of the carpenter and the shoe-maker, while no such thing belongs to the human being, being brought into being by nature (πέφυκεν) as functionless (ἀργὸν)? Or, just as in the case of the eye, and the hand, and the foot, and generally, of each of the parts, some functional-act (ἔργον) presents itself, in this manner also would one not set down some functional-act of the human being apart from all these? What, therefore, could this possibly be?[111]

In what follows, of course, Aristotle proceeds to set out the definition of the human soul in relation to the organic body that he had already set out with the rigor of division as we have presented it here *De Anima* and to utilize this definition to disclose the human good. This, of course, is the topic of another essay, in general. However, it is worth this small look, as it were, since one reading *The Acting Person* will see that the approach of the Stagyrite is manifestly the inspiration for Wojtyła's philosophical anthropology as a foundation for ethics proper.[112]

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[110] *EN*, I.7 (1097b24-28): τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ', εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ.

[111] *EN*, I.7 (1097b28-33): πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἀργὸν πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἑκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεταί τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἄν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ;

[112] Aristotle's use of the term ἔργον (*ergon*) is nuanced, and its varied meanings are important for understanding the relation of Wojtyła's method to that of the Stagyrite. The term means, basically "act" or "deed," and this is the sense in which its content provides the point of departure for the study of natural living beings. As we have seen, ἔργον (*ergon*) also indicates the functional-act of a living being, which is its perfection in the expression of its teleologically ordered form. Aristotle intends this second meaning of ἔργον (*ergon*) in his use of the term in these

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texts of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. However, he is using the definition of the human being that he has already established in the *De Anima* (it is a subalternating principle of a science), so that, on his approach, this meaning presupposes acts of division already accomplished.

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Daniel C. Wagner

Sul Metodo Aristotelico di Karol Wojtyła
Parte I
Induzione aristotelica (ἐπαγωγή) e divisione (διαίρεσις)

Sommario

Il presente articolo è la prima parte dell'analisi dedicata al metodo aristotelico di Karol Wojtyła. Si mostra che la metodologia di *induzione* e di *riduzione* di Wojtyła è identica al metodo aristotelico di passare da ciò che ci è più noto dall'*esperienza* (ἐμπειρία / *empeiria)* a ciò che è meglio conosciuto dalla natura attraverso l'induzione (ἐπαγωγή / *epagoge*) e l'analisi (ἀνάλῡσις / *analusis*) o la divisione (διαίρεσις / *diairesis*). La descrizione dettagliata del metodo aristotelico nella Parte I conduce ad una presentazione e ad un apprezzamento della forma logica e dell'impulso del metodo di Wojtyła. Wojtyła utilizza le forme logiche della *reductio ad impossibile* e dell'inferenza derivante dall'*ipotesi finale*, ovvero l'inferenza risultato-causale, caratteristica delle scienze naturali, e il modello della definizione del tipo potenza-oggetto. Grazie a questa metodologia, Wojtyła ottiene una conoscenza decisiva della persona umana, conoscenza necessaria e innegabile: essa rivela *εἶδος (eidos)* o *tipi* di persone nel senso aristotelico, tomista e fenomenologico del concetto.

Parole chiave: Karol Wojtyła, metodo, induzione, riduzione, Aristotele, definizione, divisione, persona, atto, antropologia filosofica.

Daniel C. Wagner

Sur la méthode Aristotélicienne de Karol Wojtyła
Partie I
Induction aristotélicienne (ἐπαγωγή) et division (διαίρεσις)

Résumé

Le présent article est la première partie de l'analyse consacrée à la méthode aristotélicienne de Karol Wojtyła. On y montre que la méthodologie inductive et réductive de Wojtyła est identique à la méthode aristotélicienne consistant à passer de ce qui nous est mieux connu de l'expérience (ἐμπειρία / *empeiria)* à ce qui est mieux connu de la nature à travers l'induction (ἐπαγωγή / *epagoge*) et l'analyse (ἀνάλῡσις / *analusis*) ou division (διαίρεσις / *diairesis).* La description détaillée de la méthode aristotélicienne dans la Partie I conduit à une présentation et à une appréciation de la forme logique et de l'élan de la méthode de Wojtyła. Il utilise les formes logiques de *reductio ad impossible* et d'inférence provenant de l'hypothèse finale, ou l'inférence résultat-cause, caractéristique des sciences naturelles, et le modèle de la définition du type puissance-objet. Grâce à cette méthodologie, Wojtyła obtient une connaissance décisive de l'être humain, connaissance nécessaire et indéniable : elle révèle les *εἶδος (eidos)* ou *types* de personnes au sens aristotélicien, thomiste et phénoménologique du concept.

Mots-clés : Karol Wojtyła, méthode, induction, réduction, Aristote, définition, division, personne, acte, anthropologie philosophique.

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The Acting Person and "Inactivity": Sociological Attractiveness of Realism in Constructivist Times

Abstract: The article presents the analysis of some chosen arguments from Karol Wojtyła's *The Acting Person* in consideration of the opposition between the realist and constructivist theoretical standpoints. It ponders the attractiveness of the realist position both for the social and personal dimension of human existence by considering such issues as freedom, autonomy, alienation, truth, receptivity, and community. Finally, it points to the ecological problem of the rightly understood "inactivity," which is contrasted with the late modern hyperactivity of social constructivism.

Keywords: "inactivity," participation, alienation, realism, constructivism, social theories

Sociology is nowadays widely perceived as dealing with the social creation of reality. While it may not rightly describe the outlook of the early sociologists (or the outlook of all sociologists even today), it is, nevertheless, now widely accepted that Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann's book (*The Social Construction of Reality*)[1] correctly expressed the core of contemporary sociological stance towards the social world. The phenomenologically inspired sociological standpoints like ethnomethodology, social interactionism, or social constructivism presented the view of reality as socially constructed, that is, *constructed* rather than *given*. The philosophical expression of the social constructivism was

[1] Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1966).

provided by such authors as John Austin, John Searle, or Richard Rorty, to name just a few of the most important and most famous contributors to this trend. When one looks for the earlier predecessors or rather the roots of the socio-philosophical constructivist standpoint, one may go back to Karl Marx's definition of the individual as the totality of social relations or, to delve deeper in the history of early modernity, to Descartes or even Ockham's emphasis put on free will. However, it was Descartes who deeply reoriented the modern thinking, far before phenomenology, towards the importance of the human consciousness.

Karol Wojtyła appreciated the advantages of discovering the value of human consciousness and the unique personal experience. He esteemed and contributed to the modern attempts at complementing the philosophy of being with the philosophy of consciousness. He also accurately diagnosed the essence of this paradigm transformation of thinking undertaken long time ago in his papal reflections *Memory and Identity*:

> The *cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am) radically changed the way of doing philosophy. In the pre-Cartesian period, philosophy, that is to say the *cogito*, or rather the *cognosco*, was subordinate to *esse*, which was considered prior. To Descartes, however, the *esse* seemed secondary, and he judged the *cogito* to be prior. […] After Descartes, philosophy became a science of pure thought: all *esse*—both the created world and the Creator—remained within the ambit of the *cogito* as the content of human consciousness. Philosophy now concerned itself with beings *qua* content of consciousness and not *qua* existing independently of it.[2]

In a sense, Wojtyła also appealed for the need to notice a vital link between the old and new tradition of perceiving the reality. In his book *The Acting Person*,[3] Wojtyła showed how strongly and indispensably a person expresses oneself in acts. He thus introduced the Christian philosophical and socio-philosophical alternative to (and the *answer* to) the Marxist treatment of the problem of alienation of the human being within the process of production. After all, if the expression in the act is possible, as Wojtyła claimed, the acting person cannot be totally alienated… Does this mean that Marx was incorrect? Speaking briefly and bravely, one may venture the opinion that he was not correct *enough*… It seems that not only the particular (e.g., capitalistic) production system causes alienation (from the production process and from the community of workers) but a variety of factors contribute to the multifaceted alienation. Within

[2] John Paul II, *Memory and Identity. Conversations at the Dawn of a Millennium* (New York: Rizzoli, 2005), 8–9.

[3] Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *Analecta Husserliana*, vol. X (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979).

the theological perspective the primary root of the problem is constituted by the self-alienation from the community with God, while within the social and historical dimension, it is both the alienation and self-alienation from the human/social community, that is, from the area of participation.

One may thus say that as long as a person expresses oneself in acts, he or she is not (totally) alienated. However, alienation need not be caused by others or by the social structures like the production system. It may also be the effect of the self-alienating act of the person. Thus, the act may express the personal will of self-exclusion from some kind of community relations. The exemplary case in mind is the theological description of the primary self-alienation of Adam and Eve in the Book of Genesis. What it represents is the self-alienation from the area of the logic of the gift. The human being doubts the good will of God who establishes norms. Adam and Eve question these norms and, therefore, they question the good will of the Giver of creation, nature, and norms. By questioning this, they alienate themselves from this given perspective.[4] But they have the power to do this because they are persons, that is, beings who have inner lives, and who can thus decide about themselves, determine themselves, and transcend themselves in acts.

However, the person acts freely, independently from the objects of decisions, only because he or she *is dependent on the truth*, which *is independent* of the person and its objects of choice. The person is free and transcends oneself only when he or she chooses the truth (including the truth about oneself). Only then does the person avoid alienation or self-alienation. Even more can be said concerning this issue, according to Wojtyła: "The transcendence of the person in the action is thus ultimately constituted as the 'transgressing of oneself in truth' rather than 'toward truth.'"[5] The act is not only free when it remains within the area of truth; it is *constituted* as free and thus truly human by being true. As Wojtyła claims, the act of the person is constituted by the moment of truth about the good.[6] Therefore, we may deduce that one needs to open oneself to accepting truth as given in order to be able to do anything, to express oneself in the act. This opening and acceptance seems to be more than just acceptance of "activations,"[7] which happen in us by themselves, as they are described by Wojtyła, though accepting the truth as the foundation of one's acts probably includes also accepting these "activations." After all, the definition of the person also includes the human body, as John Paul II explains in his theology of the body.[8] Already in *The Acting Person* Wojtyła explains that the statement

[4] More on this can be found in: John Paul II, *Man and Woman He Created Them. A Theology of the Body*, trans. Michael Waldstein (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2006), 236–240.

[5] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 310 (footnote 48).

[6] Ibid., 146.

[7] Ibid., 69.

[8] John Paul II, *Man and Woman He Created Them.*

"man *is not* the body, he only has it" is "the consequence of the belief that man 'is' his own self (i.e., the person) only insofar as he possesses himself; and, in the same sense, if he *has* his body."[9] So, the body is personal, as the person expresses oneself through the body. The so-called theology of the body developed by John Paul II (referred to in footnote 4) is the development of the deep meaning of human sexual body as containing the natural message of humans as social beings, as beings destined to relations of love. It seems that in contemporary times this meaning of the human body is particularly needed to be rediscovered. The acceptance of the social message written down in the very nature of human bodies seems to me as the grossly needed "inactivity" nowadays, when we live in the time of the often misdirected genetic experiments, artistic transformation ventures with the human body or attempts of achieving the transhumanistic "morphological freedom," "abandoning" the body and creating the so-called artificial intelligence. Roughly speaking, there may be good or bad acts, just as there may be good or bad inactivity. The "inactivity" I have in mind in this analysis is definitely not laziness, idleness, or sloth. However, it may mean passivity in the positive way of understanding it as keeping oneself from unnecessary or destructive activity. So, it really is connected with the *affirmation of being*. That is why I use inverted commas with the word "inactivity"—it is not just the opposition to being active; it is rather a *different type of activity*: what is common for both the good act and the good "inactivity" is the *acceptance of being, of reality as a gift and as the basis for acts*. In order to act properly (or to act in general, to be exact), one needs to open oneself up to reality. Is cognition an example of active or passive attitude? Wojtyła writes as follows:

> When judging, when formulating judgments, the ego has the experience of himself as the agent—the one who acts—of the act itself of cognizing. But we may also cognitively experience directly the value of the object of cognition. The subject—the ego—then remains as if absorbing this value, 'contemplating' it and passive rather than active. It remains then in the passive role of the subject more than in that of the agent. These occasions are of extreme importance: they are creative and rich in consequences for cognition of human reality.[10]

It seems to me that Wojtyła precisely notices the moment of combination of activity and passivity, which I call "inactivity," and which seems so much needed for being truly active. It concerns the recognition of the value of the given reality by the subject/agent. This cognition process has very practical effects because of the status of reality: "The person's transcendence in the action seems

[9] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 314 (footnote 65).
[10] Ibid., 147.

much more connected with the praxis—that is, the truth of the objective reality, in which man continuously strives to make right choices and decisions—than with the intellectual function of judging."[11] The free agent is not free beyond the framework of truth, as "the human person has the 'right' to freedom, not in the sense of unconditioned existential independence, but insofar as freedom is the core of a person's self-reliance that essentially relates to the surrender to 'truth.'"[12] However, freedom is not limited or annihilated by truth: "Far from abolishing freedom, truth liberates it. The tension arising between the objective order of norms and the inner freedom of the subject-person is relieved by truth, by the conviction of the truthfulness of good."[13] The final quote from this collection of citations concerning the reality of truth and its link with freedom expresses a very strong conviction: "There can be no doubt that man has the freedom of acting; he has the right of action, but he has not the right to do wrong."[14] Thus the future pope may be understood as expressing his realistic standpoint. Hereby he indirectly criticized all social systems based on relativistic assumptions of human autonomy understood as the liberty to construct values according to one's will rather than discover and accept them as given. The constructivist autonomy (linked with relativism) can be identified as the basis of both liberalism and collectivism, provided that both of them accept such meaning of autonomy (of an individual or collectivity) which is related with relativism of values stemming from either the denial of the pre-existent reality or its non-existence. The assumed void of pre-existent values is then perceived as calling for their social creation (or individual creations, for that matter). I realize that it is not commonly agreed that liberalism needs to be based on relativism of values or on the autonomous creation of values stemming from basic skepticism. However, I follow my assumptions and argumentation from the book published earlier, which was devoted to this topic.[15]

No matter if there is or is not a consensus on the link between liberalism, collectivism, and autonomy based on relativism, the perspective of socially (or, to be exact, humanly) created values is nowadays definitely predominant. What needs to be noticed is also the fact that the socially (or individually) constructed values are not based on participation within the community of truth which is given. (Truth as socially created may always be changed, so it cannot provide a stable basis of community.) Participation was defined by Wojtyła as "that essential of the person which enables him to exist and act 'together with

[11] Ibid., 148.

[12] Ibid., 154–155.

[13] Ibid., 166.

[14] Ibid., 276.

[15] Aneta Gawkowska, *Taking Community Seriously? Communitarian Critiques of Liberalism* (Warsaw: Warsaw University Press, 2011).

others' and thus to reach his own fulfillment."[16] Participation is the basis of community, which "develops […] if the *I* and the *thou* abide in a mutual affirmation of the transcendent value of the person […] and confirm this by their acts,"[17] as Wojtyła claimed in his essay "The Person: Subject and Community." If the value of the person is transcendent, then it abides within the given reality of truth beyond the area constructed by humans (both individually or socially). It seems to me that if this value is shared because it is recognized as given and independent of individual or social decisions, then it is both safeguarded and forming the solid basis of the real community and real participation.

Wojtyła criticized both individualism and anti-individualism, claiming that both of them have the same concept of the person, which is anticommunitarian and antipersonalistic. As such, this concept constitutes a denial of participation[18] and becomes the source of alienation. "Alienation basically means the negation of participation, for it renders participation difficult or even impossible. It devastates the *I-other* relationship, weakens the ability to experience another human being as another *I*, and inhibits the possibility of friendship and the spontaneous powers of community (communio personarum)"[19]—as Wojtyła stated in his essay entitled "Participation or Alienation?". In the Polish version of his article, he expressly claimed: "Both individualism and totalism are sources of alienation."[20] Interestingly enough, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński also criticized the two economic systems based on the above-mentioned ideologies, explaining that both capitalism and collectivism are individualistic doctrines, which just sometimes use social concepts, while in fact they lack the element of community or the common good.[21] It may seem questionable at first sight, but it can actually be understandable if it relies on the link between truth as given and the common good: without accepting such concept of truth we lack the basis of any real and solid community, while totalism is then just the artificially created conglomerate of individuals.

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[16] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 276.

[17] Karol Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," in Karol Wojtyła, *Person and Community. Selected Essays*, trans. Theresa Sandok, OSM [Series: Catholic Thought from Lublin, Andrew N. Woznicki, General Editor], vol. 4 (New York–Berlin–Bern–Frankfurt/M.–Paris–Wien: Peter Lang, 1993), 246.

[18] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 272–276.

[19] Karol Wojtyła, "Participation or Alienation?" in Wojtyła, *Person and Community. Selected Essays*, 206.

[20] Karol Wojtyła, "Uczestnictwo czy alienacja?" in Karol Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne* [Series: Człowiek i moralność, vol. IV, Tadeusz Styczeń et al. ed.], (Lublin: TN KUL, 2000), 459. I use the Polish publication as a source here because the English version of the article "Participation or Alienation?" comes from a different paper by Wojtyła and as such does not include this quote [trans. A.G.].

[21] Card. Stefan Wyszyński, "Nasze dezyderaty. Do profesorów katolickiej nauki społecznej," Jasna Góra 22.01.1963, in Stefan kardynał Wyszyński, Prymas Polski, *Nauczanie społeczne 1946–1981* (Warszawa: Ośrodek Dokumentacji i Studiów Społecznych, 1990), 197–198.

One may thus conclude that alienation is not only the inability to act (freely) but it also is the inability to participate in a community, that is, the inability to be linked with others in the relations of personal giving and receiving, in other words, the inability to love and be loved. Such a case of alienation is actually the autoalienation from the interpersonal area which forms the basis for being able to be free and act freely (including, of course, loving), because it is the alienation from truth about oneself and others as beings endowed with independent dignity, freedom, reason, and nature fulfilled by loving. Alienation is thus the effect of an individualistic concept of the human being and such autonomy which necessarily results in constructivism.

We may ask if it is at all possible to construct values, reality, or create oneself? Is it not more adequate to speak of one's free acts on the basis of creation independent from us? Whatever we create, we are rather *re-creators*, fulfilling ourselves by free acts of creating anything on the basis of what we receive from others, mostly from earlier generations, especially our very being… Being the receivers of the world and our very existence, we naturally need some dose of "inactivity" before we actively join the creative process of humanity and its development. It seems we need to recognize that within "inactivity," there is also a decent portion of our humanity or personhood. The contemporary hyperactive times are even more in need of this "inactivity" which is based on accepting nature, including human nature, rather than fighting nature. We are in need of such ecology as was described by John Paul II and has recently been taken up and developed by Pope Francis in his encyclical *Laudato Si'*:

> Men and women have constantly intervened in nature, but for a long time this meant being in tune with and respecting the possibilities offered by the things themselves. It was a matter of receiving what nature itself allowed, as if from its own hand. Now, by contrast, we are the ones to lay our hands on things, attempting to extract everything possible from them while frequently ignoring or forgetting the reality in front of us. Human beings and material objects no longer extend a friendly hand to one another; the relationship has become confrontational. (*Laudato Si'*, n. 106)

A lot of popular ecological voices now express this malaise of modern times either without providing a good diagnosis of this situation or by criticizing the human activity altogether. The pope does not join the radical critics of the human progress but only the critics of the human pride: "Nobody is suggesting a return to the Stone Age, but we do need to slow down and look at reality in a different way, to appropriate the positive and sustainable progress which has been made, but also to recover the values and the great goals swept away by our unrestrained delusions of grandeur" (*Laudato Si'*, n. 114).

What could the pope mean by the "unrestrained delusions of grandeur"? Could he mean the constructivist ambitions of humanity believing in its ability to create its own rules of running the world? In his ecological teaching Pope Francis often refers to John Paul II, who in 1991 wrote as follows:

> At the root of the senseless destruction of the natural environment lies an anthropological error, which unfortunately is widespread in our day. Man, who discovers his capacity to transform and in a certain sense create the world through his own work, forgets that this is always based on God's prior and original gift of the things that are. Man thinks that he can make arbitrary use of the earth, subjecting it without restraint to his will, as though it did not have its own requisites and a prior God-given purpose, which man can indeed develop but must not betray. Instead of carrying out his role as a co-operator with God in the work of creation, man sets himself up in place of God and thus ends up provoking a rebellion on the part of nature, which is more tyrannized than governed by him. In all this, one notes first the poverty or narrowness of man's outlook, motivated as he is by a desire to possess things rather than to relate them to the truth, and lacking that disinterested, unselfish and aesthetic attitude that is born of wonder in the presence of being and of the beauty which enables one to see in visible things the message of the invisible God who created them. (*Centesimus Annus*, n. 37)

Human arbitrary activity, disrespectful of nature and truth about reality as given, represents the wrong constructivist activity. Its wrongfulness comes precisely from not being based on the "inactive" reception of reality as given.

The primacy of being before acting (*operari sequitur esse*) is ignored because the receptive and passive part of our existence is not considered valuable. Only activity is recognized as deserving respect and confirming our autonomy. Accepting one's nature and status of being human seems degrading and opposite to freedom from being determined. Cartesian and post-Cartesian humanity undervalues receptivity and it has lost the right proportion of receptivity and productivity. The autonomous human is skeptical about anything coming from outside himself/herself, even if this comes as a gift of one's nature. Accepting the gift seems too risky and too degrading. Interestingly enough, Cartesian attitude has negative consequences for… femininity, and later on, for humanity in general. Why? Because woman by nature more clearly represents receptivity: her body invites the male to be active inside her and it invites the new human being to be created and developed also within herself. Yet, this receptivity is just clearly represented by women, while in fact it is present in all humans, both male and female. We experience the reality (both material and immaterial) by receiving and giving, by accepting and recreating. It is just that we tend to undervalue whatever we do not produce ourselves. However, the female receptivity in Catholic tradition is upgraded to the highest position because the most praised

"purely human" activity was the female (Mary's) reception of God's gift of Annunciation. The reception of God within the female body represented the female decision which perfectly reconciled activity and passivity, perfect "inactivity" and perfect activity, or in other words, the most free (and active!) reception. In a sense, then, it is the woman who shows the man how to be receptive, how to live in the perspective of the gift, before one is able to respond by giving oneself. This dynamic of difference and similarity between men and women is not restricted to the intimate relations. In his apostolic letter devoted to women, John Paul II states:

> When we say that the woman is the one who receives love in order to love in return, this refers not only or above all to the specific spousal relationship of marriage. It means something more universal, based on the very fact of her being a woman within all the interpersonal relationships which, in the most varied ways, shape society and structure the interaction between all persons—men and women. (*Mulieris Dignitatem*, n. 29)

Reception is a kind of act but it is an act presupposing the reality given before the act takes place. Hence it is based on the acceptance of a balanced view of activity and "inactivity." This highly ecological standpoint (in a broad sense of the word "ecological") seems very attractive nowadays, because it is respectful of what is given and puts necessary limits on the hyperactive social trends which stem from the vision of unbridled individual autonomy and social constructivism. Starting from the early modernity and developed later by Immanuel Kant, autonomy became the most cherished value understood as the license to create one's own norms. Servais Pinckaers, O.P., and W. Norris Clarke, S.J., described the misguided route of modern thinking which wanted to be self-sufficient and ended up being concentrated on human productivity while ignoring the primary aspect of receptivity and inspiration by the goods which exist independently of the human activity.[22] This led to undervaluing women, as Fr. Francis Martin claimed: "Since women literally embody receptivity, a loss of esteem for this dimension of humanity as a whole led to a loss of esteem for women."[23] Pia Francesca de Solenni analogically argued: "Prior to Descartes' radical break from the passive intellect, there were both the active and the passive powers working together to understand, to know. With Descartes' split, not only does woman lose her identification with the mind, but man also loses

[22] Cf. Servais Pinckaers, O.P., *The Sources of Christian Ethics*, 3rd ed., (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995); Gerald McCool (ed.), *The Universe as Journey: Conversations with W. Norris Clarke, S.J.* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988).

[23] Francis Martin, *The Feminist Question. Feminist Theology in the Light of Christian Tradition* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), 197.

the identity with the receptive which is necessary for advance in knowledge."[24] Modernity thus brought the radical break from the body, the given, and the receptive. It pushed for overvaluing activity and productivity of the so-called self-made men. Maybe that is why it is the women who now call for a forgotten value. Of course not all women and with a great support from men. Some of the women I have in mind are the Catholic new feminists like Michele Schumacher. She suggests to reverse the trend of the dominant productivity by somehow compensating the long ignored side: "Great is the challenge of developing a new feminist ethic […] [M]ore practical concerns […] are, however, best discerned in a properly contemplative fashion, which is to say that priority is awarded to receptivity over activity […]."[25]

Receptivity is necessary for a proper productivity. That is why, although receptivity requires the *active acceptance* of the reality, it may be closer to what I call "inactivity" because it is deprived of the hubris of the autonomous creation of the world from nothing and exclusively by oneself. Along this line goes the argumentation of Pope Benedict XVI in his encyclical letter *Caritas in Veritate* from 2009:

> Truth, and the love which it reveals, cannot be produced: they can only be received as a gift. Their ultimate source is not, and cannot be, mankind, but only God, who is himself Truth and Love. This principle is extremely important for society and for development, since neither can be a purely human product; the vocation to development on the part of individuals and peoples is not based simply on human choice, but is an intrinsic part of a plan that is prior to us and constitutes for all of us a duty to be freely accepted. That which is prior to us and constitutes us—subsistent Love and Truth—shows us what goodness is, and in what our true happiness consists. *It shows us the road to true development*. (*Caritas in Veritate*, n. 52)

Accepting one's status as a creature who is loved is not degrading but rather energizing for it empowers the subject for the ensuing activity based on gratitude. In fact, this may actually be the only solid condition for healthy and fully integrated human activity, as some well-known psychiatrists claim.[26]

Receptivity is not only needed for a balanced or sustainable growth. It is also necessary for relationality and community, as it was argued earlier that

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[24] Pia Francesca de Solenni, *A Hermeneutic of Aquinas's Mens Through a Sexually Differentiated Epistemology. Towards and Understanding of Woman as Imago Dei* (Romae: Pontificia Universitas Sanctae Crucis, 2000), 159.

[25] Michele M. Schumacher, "An Introduction to a New Feminism," in *Women in Christ. Toward a New Feminism*, ed. Michele M. Schumacher (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), xvi.

[26] Cf. Anna A. Terruwe and Conrad W. Baars, *Loving and Curing the Neurotic: A New Look at Emotional Illness* (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1972); Anna A. Terruwe and Conrad W. Baars, *Psychic Wholeness and Healing* (Staten Island, NY: Alba House, 1981).

the given context of truth independent from individuals is needed as the basis to be accepted by particular community members. Community needs to have a certain *given* component of what is shared and independent by not having been constructed. Mary Rousseau, a new feminist author, claimed that the basis of community is located in our objective relation to the common standard of Truth, while our personal recognition of its existence is the condition of conscious building of association (which in sociology is traditionally called society). The common recognition of the existence of Truth as a standard obliges everyone to be sincere in trying to discover its content (which turns out to be love itself) and live according to it in interpersonal relations.[27] Karol Wojtyła earlier argued that man is not dominated by the realistic standpoint but rather that "by virtue of the reference to truth, by virtue of the conscience in which this reference is expressed and made concrete, the man as person achieves a peculiar domination over his action, his choosing and his willing. He takes his position as it were 'above them.'"[28] Instead of being deprived of freedom within the paradigm of the given, the human being safeguards his/her freedom as being independent from the arbitrary will of others, protected from being constructed(!) and safeguarded as being real.

The properly understood "inactivity" is an act of accepting truth as given and thus the conscious constituting of the area of personal and social freedom rather than slavery. This seems to be the greatest value of the content of *The Acting Person* for contemporary societies, where the constant efforts to safeguard individual and social freedom are most often located in the autonomous constructivist enterprises, while the lack of recognition of what is given (also given from other human beings) deprives the modern people of the ability to be thankful, satisfied, and solidaristic. The words of John Paul II from his encyclical *Evangelium Vitae* ring true better than ever by stating that

> we need first of all to foster, in ourselves and in others, a contemplative outlook. […] It is the outlook of those who do not presume to take possession of reality but instead accept it as a gift, discovering in all things the reflection of the Creator and seeing in every person his living image (cf. Gen 1:27; Ps 8:5). This outlook does not give in to discouragement when confronted by those who are sick, suffering, outcast or at death's door. Instead, in all these situations it feels challenged to find meaning, and precisely in these circumstances it is open to perceiving in the face of every person a call to encounter, dialogue and solidarity. (*Evangelium Vitae*, n. 83)

[27] Mary F. Rousseau, *Community. The Tie That Binds* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1991), 90–93, 102, 111–112, 153–156.

[28] Karol Wojtyła, "The Transcendence of the Person in Action and Man's Self-Teleology," *Analecta Husserliana*, vol. IX (1979): 207–208.

Our activity, even when it is best intentioned and turned towards helping others, may be counterproductive, if it does not stem from the receptive contemplation of what is given, including nature itself. It may even bring our self-destruction, if we do not respect in others or in ourselves the need for a proper amount of rest. Very instructive in this context is the Apostolic letter devoted to celebrating Sunday, where John Paul II suggested that

> rest is something 'sacred,' because it is man's way of withdrawing from the sometimes excessively demanding cycle of earthly tasks in order to renew his awareness that everything is the work of God. There is a risk that the prodigious power over creation which God gives to man can lead him to forget that God is the Creator upon whom everything depends. It is all the more urgent to recognize this dependence in our own time, when science and technology have so incredibly increased the power which man exercises through his work. (*Dies Domini*, n. 65)

In contemporary times we often delude ourselves by our hyperactivity which is supposed to bring us more and more control over nature. The truth is that such level of control is illusory because we too often experience the negative effects of our constructivist efforts like the uncontrolled viruses spreading danger on a global scale unknown to us before. The acceptance of the realist standpoint seems now to be the highly needed ecological attitude, which links in a balanced way activity and inactivity, work and rest, contemplation and action. This balance may produce the longed for dynamic harmony of our personal and social existence. Realism seems now to be the solution to the problems created by the social constructivism of all modernity (including the late modern or postmodern phase of humanity). If we abandon the perspective of realism, of human beings as creatures having nature which is given, we fall into the trap of relativism or autonomous individualistic or collectivistic creation of definitions of what is good or bad. Such an attitude was responsible for post-Enlightenment ideologies, according to John Paul II. He suggested as follows:

> If we wish to speak rationally about good and evil, we have to return to Saint Thomas Aquinas, that is, to the philosophy of being. With the phenomenological method, for example, we can study experiences of morality, religion, or simply what it is to be human, and draw from them a significant enrichment of our knowledge. Yet we must not forget that all these analyses implicitly presuppose the reality of the Absolute Being and also the reality of being human, that is, being a creature. If we do not set out from such "realist" presuppositions, we end up in a vacuum.[29]

[29] John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 12.

In all our ventures, both personal and societal, we want to be winners, not losers. But when we lose after being hyperactive, we may agree with John Paul II, who thus gave the prescription for victory: "Who will win? The one who welcomes the gift" (*Dominum et Vivificantem*, n. 55).

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Aneta Gawkowska

Persona, azione e «inazione»: l'attrattiva sociologica del realismo nei tempi di costruttivismo

Sommario

L'articolo presenta un'analisi di argomenti selezionati da *Persona e atto* di Karol Wojtyła nel contesto dell'opposizione tra le posizioni realistica e costruttivista. L'autore considera l'attrattiva del realismo sia per la dimensione sociale che per quella personale dell'esistenza umana, analizzando questioni come libertà, autonomia, alienazione, verità, ricettività e comunità. Indica anche il problema ecologico dell'«inazione» correttamente inteso che contrasta con l'iperattività tardo moderna del costruttivismo sociale.

Parole chiave: «inazione», partecipazione, alienazione, realismo, costruttivismo, teorie sociali

Aneta Gawkowska

Personne, action et « inaction » : l'attractivité sociologique du réalisme à l'heure du constructivisme

Résumé

L'article présente une analyse d'arguments sélectionnés de *Personne et Acte* de Karol Wojtyła dans le contexte de l'opposition entre les positions réaliste et constructiviste. En analy-

sant des questions, telles que la liberté, l'autonomie, l'aliénation, la vérité, la réceptivité et la communauté, l'auteur considère l'intérêt du réalisme pour les dimensions sociales et personnelles de l'existence humaine. Elle pointe également la question écologique de l'« inaction » bien comprise qui contraste avec l'hyperactivité moderne tardive du constructivisme social.

Mots-clés : « inaction », participation, aliénation, réalisme, constructivisme, théories sociales

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Wojtyła's Category of Participation and the Question of Common Good

Abstract: The author presents Wojtyła's views on participation and its connections to the common good. The analysis consists of two parts. The first part outlines the concept of participation (coexistence and action together with other people in relation to the common good) and its various forms (solidarity and opposition, conformism and evasion). The second part presents views of the nature of common good found not only in liberal thought (common good as the expression of deliberation and the rights of the individual), and personalist thought (common good as the development of the person and its natural potentialities), but primarily in the work of Wojtyła himself (common good as personal self-fulfilment through coexistence and cooperation with others in relation to the conscience-discerned truth, elected in a free act). His reference point was also personalism, which stresses the inalienable dignity of the person in both the private and the social spheres of life.

Keywords: person, participation, authentic and inauthentic forms, common good, communion

Introduction

One of the key phenomena in current social life is atomism—a view which regards society as a collection of unattached, isolated, and rationally acting individuals, who enter relations with other individuals in pursuit of their own interests. The consequences of atomism are, inter alia, the atrophy of social bonds and a lack of participation in socio-political life.

In contrast, the important role of participation in the fulfilment of personal existence of a human being is brought up by Karol Wojtyła (1920–2005). Before

becoming the bishop of Cracow, Poland, and subsequently pope of the Roman Catholic Church, Wojtyła was a lecturer of ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin. He also pioneered a school of philosophical thought which finds its adherents to this day (e.g., Tadeusz Styczeń and Andrzej Szostek).

Wojtyła's philosophy is known as personalism. Its central value is the good and the development of the human person as a free entity acting in the world. His reflection rests on direct human experience through action, subsuming both anthropological and ethical aspects in its subject matter. A person's direct experience is also a moral experience, connected with the duty of affirming the person due to his or her dignity. Wojtyła analyses this experience, and on this basis he constructs an ontology and an axiology of the human person.[1] Wojtyła's personalism is the antithesis of individualism and collectivism. It is expressed in the axioms of the primacy of spirit over matter, of "to be" over "to have," and of person over thing.[2] There are those who call it ethical personalism, since it combines a phenomenological description of the human person with its metaphysical explanation, which directs the norms of morality regarding the person. It draws inspiration from Max Scheler and Roman Ingarden's realist phenomenology and from Thomas Aquinas's metaphysical realism.[3]

The present paper aims to present Wojtyła's views on participation and its relation to the common good. The analysis consists of two parts: (1) a definition of participation, and (2) the nature of the common good. The main point of reference will be Wojtyła's body of work from the academic period of his life, but also the publications of other personalists, whose views will serve as background to the discussion.

What Is Participation?

To begin with, it should be stressed that Wojtyła's concept of participation involves the relational concept of the human being, in which he does, nevertheless, assume the substantial character of the person.[4] The human subject is thus

[1] Wojciech Chudy, "Filozofia personalistyczna Jana Pawła II (Karola Wojtyły)," *Teologia Polityczna* 3 (2005–2006): 233–235.

[2] Robert Skrzypczak, "Personalizm Karola Wojtyły na tle współczesnej myśli polskiej," *Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne* 1 (2011): 68.

[3] Tadeusz Biesaga, "Personalizm etyczny Wojtyły," in *Encyklopedia Filozofii Polskiej*, vol. 2, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2011), 328.

[4] Karol Wojtyła, "Osoba i czyn," in *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, ed. Karol Wojtyła (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2000), 134; Karol Wojtyła, "Podmiotowość

different in Wojtyła's view, not only from Husserl's transcendental "ego," but also from Buber's dialogical "I," who sees relations as primary. For Wojtyła, the basic and strongest reality is the substantial, personal subject, which secondarily enters relations with others. Such a relation is nevertheless important, since it strengthens, crystallizes, and establishes personal subjectivity.[5] One can say, then, that for Wojtyła the person has two significant dimensions: the metaphysical one (ontic structure) and the moral one (the engagement of the person in relations).[6] On the one hand, it is a static, absolute, synchronic entity, on the other—an entity which is dynamic, changeable, and diachronic.[7]

Wojtyła also differentiates participation from acting "together with others." By participation a human being does not merely act "together with others," but also "cooperates," thereby finding fulfillment in the act. This is because the act leaves a mark in the human being, thanks to which he or she fulfils himself/herself as a person. Therefore, acting "together with others" highlights the objective aspect of the act, while participation accentuates its subjective moment.[8]

What, then, is participation? Following Wojtyła's intuition, one could say it is a certain form of human action, taken together with other people, which is the result of earlier co-existence with others. Participation, according to Wojtyła, is important not only due to the fact of joint existence and action, but also because it allows one to realize the personalistic value of one's act, that is, to realize oneself as a person through the integration of oneself and one's action in relation to another human being. Participation is thus an internal property of a human being, which allows him to relate to other persons.[9] Consequently, two perspectives on participation can be discerned. First, it is a property of a human being realized in the ability to give a personal dimension to one's existence and action through existence and action together with others. Second, it consists in a positive relation to another, individual, unique human person.[10]

As noted by Jerzy Gałkowski, a student and promoter of Wojtyła's thought, the concept of participation strongly highlights the requirement for a person's self-fulfillment. The self-fulfilment of a personal entity is crucial, since that entity is primary to the society, which is evident on the metaphysical, moral,

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i 'to, co nieredukowalne' w człowieku," in *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, ed. Karol Wojtyła (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2000), 441.

[5] Jan Galarowicz, *Imię własne człowieka. Klucz do myśli i nauczania Karola Wojtyły – Jana Pawła II* (Kraków: Papieska Akademia Teologiczna, 1996), 167.

[6] Chudy, "Filozofia personalistyczna Jana Pawła II (Karola Wojtyły)," 238, 240.

[7] Skrzypczak, "Personalizm Karola Wojtyły na tle współczesnej myśli polskiej," 69–70.

[8] Wojtyła, "Osoba i czyn," 301–311, 319.

[9] Ibid., 16, 301–303, 307–311.

[10] Karol Wojtyła, "Osoba: podmiot i wspólnota," in *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, ed. Karol Wojtyła (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2000), 406.

and methodological level.[11] In turn, Paweł Tarasiewicz notes that participation results in the life and development of the human as a person. This is because the human being enters the world imbued with potential and develops their natural dispositions through action. Participation allows the human being to develop both in the ontic and moral dimension.[12] This moment of self-fulfillment and development of the human being is important also in the context of the common good, which shall be discussed in due course of this discussion.

Participation can occur in two forms, which can be described by Buber's words "I–you" and "we." The first character is interpersonal, while the second is social. In the first one, a reference to humanity is important, while in the second one, it is the common good that needs emphasis.

Participation, therefore, as the first potentiality of the human being, makes relations with every human being possible. It opens the way to the experience of "another self." Therefore, when the human being participates in the humanity of another, he or she experiences him/her as a person. He maximally approaches what constitutes the other's individual and unique reality.[13] When the experience is reciprocated and the "I–you" relation is established, it results in a revelation of personal subjectivities and their mutual affirmation. "I" affirms the truth of "you" as it refers to possessing personal subjectivity and dignity, while, simultaneously, "you" affirms the truth of "I" for it also holds personal subjectivity and dignity. The relation "I–you" thus becomes an authentic interpersonal communion. If "I" and "you" maintain mutual affirmation of their subjectivity and dignity, which is confirmed by their actions, this establishes a communion of persons—*communio personarum*.[14]

The basic disposition of the human being is thus participation in the humanity of another human person, who appears primarily as a "neighbor." Existing in a communion presupposes the fact of being neighbors, and this concept points to humanity as the value of a person. The expression "member of the communion" refers to the belonging of a human being to the given community. Participation in humanity is therefore the root of all other forms of participation and the condition for the personalistic value of coexistence and action.[15] What is more, participating in the humanity of others is a task which should find itself at the basis of moral order.[16]

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[11] Jerzy Gałkowski, "Osoba i wspólnota. Szkic o antropologii kard. Karola Wojtyły," *Roczniki Nauk Społecznych* 8 (1980): 65–66.

[12] Paweł Tarasiewicz, "Uczestnictwo jako podstawa życia społecznego w ujęciu Karola Wojtyły," in *Wokół antropologii Karola Wojtyły*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Paulina Sulenta, and Tomasz Duma (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2016), 427–428.

[13] Karol Wojtyła, "Uczestnictwo czy alienacja?" in *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, ed. Karol Wojtyła (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2000), 451–452.

[14] Wojtyła, "Osoba: podmiot i wspólnota," 402.

[15] Wojtyła, "Osoba i czyn," 329–333.

[16] Wojtyła, "Uczestnictwo czy alienacja?" 455.

On the other hand, according to Wojtyła, participation in the social aspect and in relation to the common good can take various forms. Some of them are authentic, while others are inauthentic. Let us now discuss both forms, which can appear both in the interpersonal and social dimensions of human life. The second form sheds light on their link to the common good, which is of interest in the present discussion.

Properly understood participation is expressed, according to Wojtyła, primarily in two authentic attitudes—solidarity and opposition. These relate not only to the joint existence and action, but also to the common good. The attitude of solidarity is the natural consequence of human participation. It denotes a constant readiness to accept and discharge the part that is one's share on the account of being a member of the given community. In solidarity, a human being not only fulfils what is his or her to do because of being a member of the community but does so for the common good. An awareness of the common good sometimes makes the human being go beyond what is his or her due. However, taking on a part of the duties which are not one's own, although required under certain circumstances, runs against participation. This is because the actions of one individual complement the activities of other persons in the given community, and thereby that individual finds self-fulfilment.[17]

However, solidarity does not preclude opposition. A person expressing opposition does not abandon participation or the common good but confirms them. Opposition is only aimed at the way common good is defined and pursued. An individual searches for a better definition of the common good in order to better participate in the community, since its good is close to his or her heart. Opposition is thus a function of individual perspective on the community, its good, and the vivid need to participate. It is a constructive disposition, which has the right to exist in any human community. In this context, the common good must be understood in dynamic, not static terms. Interpersonal dialogue may be helpful in defining it, since it enables extracting that which is true and right. Opposition as a stance is, therefore, intrinsically personalistic, as it is expressed in the relation of the human being to the truth, and thereby in the self-fulfillment of the person.[18]

Keeping the above authentic forms of participation in mind, we can reach the conclusion that a person finds fitting conditions for development only in a communion. For a community to be the environment for personal human development, it must become a communion. If it does not become a communion, it cannot provide the requisite conditions. It does, however, remain a community. The difference between a communion and a community consists in first treating the common good at once as having a subjective and objective dimension, while

[17] Wojtyła, "Osoba i czyn," 322–324.
[18] Ibid., 324–326.

in the second case common good has only objective character.[19] Hence, a member of a communion aims not only for the attainment of certain goods, which are defined in interpersonal dialogue but, above all, for the realization of his or her humanity and self-fulfillment as a person. What constitutes such fulfilment? This will be characterized in more detail as we discuss Wojtyła's take on the nature of the common good. The hallmark of a society which lacks the character of a communion are inauthentic forms of participation, among which are conformism and evasion. Conformism consists in becoming similar to others, while simultaneously lacking both solidarity and opposition. The similarity to others is exclusively external and perfunctory, lacking internal conviction, determination, or choice. It makes the human being a mere subject of "happening" instead of being the author of his or her actions. Such an individual no longer co-creates a communion, but only submits to the community and therefore does not fulfil himself/herself as a person, making only a show of participation without the necessary dedication. Furthermore, this makes a person become indifferent to the common good and, instead, start to treat the community as a threat. Evasion, on the other hand, consists in avoiding conformism. It is a backing out of the communion and the common good. Occasionally, it can be consciously chosen and thus gain a personalistic character. Nevertheless, the rationale justifying evasion is a form of indictment of the community and its poor organization. The human gives up on self-fulfillment in cooperation with others, believing that the community robs him or her of himself/herself. In response, he or she tries to take himself/herself away from the community and, thereby, participation as a way of fulfilling oneself through being and acting with others is extinguished.[20]

According to the ethicist Zdzisław Pawlak, inauthentic attitudes stand in denial of human participation in a communion. They are merely an external pretense of affirmation and acceptance towards other persons and the common good. They lack commitment and responsibility, but are instead a form of escape, a deceptive mask to hide under and retreat. Since an individual does not wish to engage with another person in the form of dialogue or confrontation, at their base inauthentic attitudes rest on falsehood.[21]

The consequence of inauthentic dispositions is human alienation. When discussing it, it is worth considering the personal subject, as well as two dimensions of communion: "I–you" and "we." In both of these dimensions, the participation of the subject is tied to the transcendence of the human being and his or her self-fulfillment in interpersonal relations (the "I" experiencing the

[19] Tarasiewicz, "Uczestnictwo jako podstawa życia społecznego w ujęciu Karola Wojtyły," 428–429.

[20] Wojtyła, "Osoba i czyn," 327–329.

[21] Zdzisław Pawlak, "Formy uczestnictwa człowieka we wspólnocie według Karola Wojtyły," *Studia Włocławskie* 9 (2006): 57–58.

personal subjectivity of "you," expressed through acts of self-determination and transcendence) and in social relations (i.e., existing and acting together with other people in relation to the common good—"we"). Interpersonal and social relations intersect and mutually condition each other. They also both involve opening up to other people and to the common good. Alienation would involve an inability for human self-fulfillment in interpersonal or social communion. The human being cannot realize his or her nature while cut off from another "you," whose subjectivity and personal value is indiscernible. He or she cannot also fulfill himself/herself in the social dimension, since they do not perceive themselves as a subject of social life, which goes on, so to say, beyond them.[22]

As the communion, that is, the social bond and unity consciously perceived and experienced by individual subjects, undergoes deterioration, the social relations in the given society can devolve into a source of alienation because communion is something essential from the perspective of personal subjectivity of all the society's members.[23]

Alienation can thus be said to be the weakening or questioning of the possibility to experience another individual as a personal subject, or the lack of human self-fulfillment in a social structure in which a human exists and acts with others. The consequences of alienation are, in turn, the destruction of both interpersonal and social relations. According to Wojtyła, its sources can be found in individualism, as well as totalism.[24]

Individualism and totalism rely on a lack of participation stemming either from the person or from the society's laws. Individualism highlights the good of the individual, to which society is subordinated. The person becomes isolated from the community as an individual focused exclusively on his/her own good, which is isolated from the good of other people and from the common good as well. Existing and acting with others in such conditions becomes a necessity which must be satisfied, rather than something which carries any positive value. The task of the community is only to secure the good of the given individual. In totalism, on the other hand, the individual is subordinated to the society, which seeks to secure itself against the individual as a threat to the community and the common good. Common good is thus created by limiting the good of the individual, so it cannot be autonomously desired and chosen by the individual. Its accomplishment is rather enforced from the individual by various means. Both individualism and totalism are, in Wojtyła's view, anti-personalistic, since they eliminate the conviction of a person's intrinsic ability to participate, which deserves actualization, shaping, and education.[25]

[22] Wojtyła, "Osoba: podmiot i wspólnota," 391–413.

[23] Ibid., 395.

[24] Wojtyła, "Uczestnictwo czy alienacja?" 451–460.

[25] Wojtyła, "Osoba i czyn," 311–315.

So far, the concept of the common good has been mentioned numerous times in this discussion. It was used as a reference point in describing both participation itself and its authentic and inauthentic forms, as well as their consequence in the form of alienation. The proper time has come, then, to take a closer look at the question of common good in Wojtyła's philosophy. For this purpose, an understanding of the common good in contemporary liberal and personalistic thought will be outlined first, followed by Wojtyła's view.

The Problem of Common Good

It seems that the dominant state system is currently liberal democracy. It highlights the role of the individual and accentuates its good, its rights, and its interests. Society is often reduced to the role of the guardian for the rights of individuals.[26] Liberal democracy is often accused of indifference or negation of the common good. However, classical liberals had no doubt that the common good exists, yet they subscribe it to its broader definition.[27] Contemporary liberals treat the common good as something dangerous, but its rejection threatens the sustainability of the state's democratic system. It results in people being separated from the community, while the life of the state begins to lose its cohesion. Procedural liberal democracy is insufficient for the creation of an authentic communion, since that necessitates acceptance of non-economic values. The convergence of economic interests, on which liberalism rests, is not a sufficient foundation for the state.[28]

However, according to the Polish political philosopher Andrzej Szahaj, there is no contradiction between liberalism and the common good. The problem is only how we define that good and who has the right to define what it is. This is because the common good is not evident in itself. In a liberal democracy, anybody can join the process of defining and interpreting the common good. It should be guarded by the state and its laws. Defining the common good, on the other hand, is, in Szahaj's view, entrusted to the civil society and to the private sphere of human life. In contrast, the state itself does not grant absolute status to any idea of good which exists in the life of the civil society, since that would

[26] Pawlak, "Formy uczestnictwa człowieka we wspólnocie według Karola Wojtyły," 51.

[27] Stephen Holmes, *Anatomia antyliberalizmu*, trans. Jerzy Szacki (Kraków: Znak, 1998), 268–271.

[28] Stanisław Kowalczyk, *Zarys filozofii polityki* (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 2008), 138.

lead to the use of violence in order to cause others to adopt it.[29] The common good should thus be the result of deliberation conducted in civil society and consensus among its participants. In this take, the common good is also changeable, depending on the specific historical, social, and economic situation.

American political scientist, philosopher, and theologian Michael Novak points out that the liberal tradition carries its own take on the common good, which it views as the rights and duties of the individual, as well as its safety.[30] Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka adds that in a liberal society the common good conforms to the structure of individual preferences and concepts of good. Liberals define this good in terms of political and economic processes which allow individual preferences to be realized.[31] It seems, therefore, that common good in liberal democracy is identified as the rights and good of the individual. All state structures and institutions are supposed to serve their protection.

The question of the common good is regarded slightly differently in the personalistic concept of the state community, at whose foundation lies the idea of not so much the individual, but the human person. We will look below at the three main representatives of Polish personalism, which includes Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Stanisław Kowalczyk, and Karol Wojtyła. A common feature of their work is a reference to the thought of Thomas Aquinas. However, they differ in the way it is interpreted and inspired by the views of other thinkers (e.g., Augustine of Hippo, Max Scheler, Roman Ingarden). Their common feature is also the recognition of the human person's value and the desire to affirm it.

In Wojtyła's philosophy, a person denotes a particular fullness of existence. For this reason, it should always be the purpose of action and no one is entitled to use it as a means for some other purpose. A human being is, in essence, always "someone," who makes him or her exceptional among other entities, which are in essence "something." Consequently, according to Wojtyła, the human being has dignity which constitutes a personalistic moral norm and determines the proper behavior towards him or her. This behavior rests on love as the only proper and fully worthy relationship. Only through love can the value of the human person be affirmed as more-than-a-thing and requiring more than consumption.[32]

In this perspective, according to the Polish philosopher Innocenty Bocheński, the state community is a collection of persons with a common goal, which is

[29] Andrzej Szahaj, "O fundamentalizmie i nie tylko," *Etyka* 31 (1998): 71–72.

[30] Michael Novak, *Wolne osoby i dobro wspólne*, trans. Grzegorz Łuczkiewicz (Kraków: Znak, 1998), 11.

[31] Will Kymlicka, *Współczesna filozofia polityczna*, trans. Andrzej Pawelec (Kraków: Znak, 1998), 230.

[32] Karol Wojtyła, *Miłość i odpowiedzialność* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2001), 22, 24, 29–30, 43.

the common good. These persons are bound together by real relations. Each of them, as an individual spiritual substance, is a social being on account of its spiritual nature. It cannot live and develop outside of society. It is connected to its given community and to coexistence and cooperation with other people.[33]

However, a human being is not just an individual gaining value only in communion, but is a person, that is, someone who has value in oneself, in one's rational and free nature. Personalism thus subscribes to the primacy of the value and dignity of the person. A correctly formed society is not merely a collection of individuals, but a communion of persons. Its beginning is a consciously and freely accepted common good.[34] The foundation of the personalist vision is thus the distinction between a person and an individual. A personal entity's innate dignity, the spiritual and transcendent dimension of its existence, and the character exceeding that of mere things and usefulness are accentuated in this philosophy. The individual is thus regarded in the horizontal dimension of various social relationship networks and economic conditions.

In personalism the goal of society is the common good, which creates conditions for development of every person. It is tied to the spiritual and material good of each human person. The purpose of society is thus providing each of its members the best possible conditions for life and development. The human person is its main focus. The society can demand cooperation or even sacrifice for its benefit, but certain areas of life exist where the human being supersedes the society and is independent of it (e.g., protection of life, freedom of conscience).[35] A human being is subject to the state, but not in all aspects of life. In the realm of personal good the human remains free and not in service to the state, but rather being served by it. Subjection to the state exists only in the realm of material good.[36]

Polish tomist Mieczysław A. Krąpiec points out that personalism adopts a finalistic conception of good as the goal of action. Action is primarily the realization of inclinations defined by the natural way of being of the given entity. Goodness is the object of inclination and the rationale for pursuing it. The existence of an entity is understood as the final actualization of all the potentialities of that entity which belong to its nature. The human seeks to develop his or her biological and rational aspects. The good of the human being is an ever-fuller actualization of his or her potentialities, to which natural inclinations drive him, which can be achieved through acts of intellect and will, proportionally for every human being. Such a good is thus fit to become the common good, analo-

[33] Innocenty Bocheński, *ABC tomizmu* (Londyn: Katolicki Ośrodek Wydawniczy „Veritas," 1950), 67–69.

[34] Pawlak, "Formy uczestnictwa człowieka we wspólnocie według Karola Wojtyły," 51.

[35] Bocheński, *ABC tomizmu*, 69–71.

[36] Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, *Człowiek i prawo naturalne* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1975), 190–191.

gously realized. Krąpiec stresses that an increase of the good of a given person is always an increase of the whole society's good. Actualizing the personal good also requires material goods as means to achieve the goal.[37]

As the Polish ethicist and personalist Wojciech Chudy points out, the common good is therefore tied to two essential qualities of the personal entity: contingency and potentiality. A human being is not a complete entity, for he or she enters the world as a potential being, whose life can be viewed as a process of actualizing traits whose seeds he or she is endowed with to develop from the moment of conception and birth.[38]

Elsewhere, Krąpiec differentiates the personalistic and the objective common good. The personalistic common good is about human self-improvement, realization of basic natural inclinations, and actualization of one's own potentialities in the areas of cognition, freedom and love. Personal development is thus the rationale for the community's existence. Only a good defined in these terms can become the common property of all people. No material goods can be considered a common good in the proper sense, nor can they be understood as a sufficient rationale for establishing a social order. Material goods can only be regarded as means connected with an essential human good. Objective common goods, on the other hand, are the objects of personal actions, for example, truth, goodness, and beauty. In their personal life, human beings are supposed to discern truth, goodness, and beauty and subsequently realize them according to their best understanding. The common good, thus understood, is the goal of human activity and a motivation for action.[39]

Polish personalist Stanisław Kowalczyk distinguishes two essential dimensions of the common good: the internal and the external one. The first one is ontological and axiological in character and it consists in the development of the human person in relation to a set of indispensable values (vital, material, cognitive, moral, aesthetic, religious). The other, which is social and institutional, relates to certain structures, institutions, economic and social conditions (law, government, education, organization of labor). It is worth noting that those structures and institutions have only an instrumental character relative to the personalistic common good. A community should thus cooperate in favor of the common good, which should be understood dynamically. It should primarily pursue the development of human persons as such, that is, their achievement of a fuller humanity. Second, the common good is the development of economic conditions and social structures. Furthermore, the common good as an attitude of a human communion can be understood, according to Kowalczyk, in its ob-

[37] Krąpiec, *Człowiek i prawo naturalne*, 180–186.

[38] Chudy, "Filozofia personalistyczna Jana Pawła II (Karola Wojtyły)," 249.

[39] Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, "Dobro wspólne," in *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, vol. 2, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2001), 631–633.

jective or subjective aspect. The earliest one, although it is insufficient, often identifies the common good with a goal being pursued by the given community. The latter one understands it as that which conditions and inspires participation in the cooperating persons. The good in the subjective sense is thus participation itself, understood as a property of a person who, by coexistence and cooperation with other people, fulfils himself/herself.[40]

Kowalczyk's subjective take on the common good leads us to Wojtyła's concept, for whom the common good is the good of the communion. It can be identified with the goal which that communion is pursuing, but, according to Wojtyła, such an identification is superficial, since the goal of cooperation defined objectively does not constitute the fullness of the common good. What is needed is the foregrounding of the subjective aspect. The common good is therefore not only the goal of cooperation but, above all, that which conditions and inspires participation among the cooperating persons. Subjective meaning is connected to cooperation as a characteristic of the person. The common good is the principle of correct participation, which lets the person act authentically and thereby fulfil himself/herself in cooperation with others. The common good reaches not so much into the realm of action, but rather into coexistence with others. Its goal is thus personal self-fulfillment.[41]

In Wojtyła's view, personal self-fulfillment is accomplished through authentic action performed by the person. What is authentic action? It is an action which is morally good, through which the person becomes morally good. A fundamental role in this view is played by conscience, which reveals dependence on truth. The structure of an act is therefore teleological, since the human being sets out towards truth. This in turn reveals transcendence of the person and accentuates its subjectivity. Human self-fulfillment is therefore accomplished in obedience to the truth in one's conscience and in freely choosing it. Wojtyła especially strongly accentuates the role of conscience, which serves to discern true good and to shape proper obligation towards it. For Wojtyła, conscience is the norm of action and the condition of personal self-fulfillment in it. Still, it must be noted that conscience is not the lawgiver, as it does not create norms by itself but finds them in the objective order of morality. What happens in conscience is the experience of a given norm's truth, the conviction of its rightfulness and of the obligation to act.[42] Wojtyła powerfully stresses, once more, that human self-fulfillment is possible only through relating to truth in conscience.[43]

Wojtyła notes that thanks to conscience the human being experiences also his or her own transcendence in the act. It manifests itself in acts of cognizing the

[40] Stanisław Kowalczyk, *Człowiek a społeczność. Zarys filozofii społecznej* (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 2005), 234–237, 258.

[41] Wojtyła, "Osoba i czyn," 319–322.

[42] Ibid., 181, 194–210; Wojtyła, "Osoba: podmiot i wspólnota," 385.

[43] Ibid., 181, 185; Wojtyła, "Podmiotowość i „to, co nieredukowalne" w człowieku," 441.

truth and experiencing freedom. Freedom is identical with acts of self-determination. It is expressed in agency which, in turn, entails responsibility. The sense of responsibility also reveals subjection to truth and human dependence on it.[44] Of course, the nature of this truth remains an open question. It may seem to be merely subjective truth. Wojtyła, however, as mentioned above, is a cognitive optimist. Following Aquinas, he posits that in conscience the human being has access to the objective moral order and may thereby learn objective and ontic truth not only about himself/herself, but also all of reality. On the other hand, Wojtyła emphasizes that when we discover truth in conscience, we approach it in stages. Therefore, truth has also an approximate character in the aspect of knowledge.

In the context of common good, Wojtyła, like Krąpiec, stresses that his concept is analogical, since it differs depending on the subject and on the kind of community. However, it always entails development and self-fulfillment of the human person and the transcendence of existence as foundational to the creation of a communion.[45]

It seems that the analogical concept of the common good stems from individual human conscience. This is because the self-fulfillment of a given person depends on free action consistent with truth discerned in the conscience, in its specific existential situation. The consequence of discerning truth is the experience of obligation to act. Individual persons fulfill themselves not only through performing the given act but, most importantly, through coexisting with other people in relation to the truth discerned.

It can therefore be said that the common good is a value which conditions and inspires personal participation, understood as the ability to realize, through acting, the personalistic value which contributes to the building of oneself and other persons. A great role is played by freedom directed by truth, which enables human self-determination. Human discernment of truth as the objective norm of moral law enables the realization of freedom, and thereby human self-fulfillment as a person.[46]

Conclusion

The discussion presented above was an attempt to present Wojtyła's views on participation and its connections to the common good. The analysis consisted of two parts. The first one outlined the concept of participation and its various

[44] Ibid., 188, 222–223; Ibid., 440.

[45] Wojtyła, "Osoba: podmiot i wspólnota," 406.

[46] Chudy, "Filozofia personalistyczna Jana Pawła II (Karola Wojtyły)," 237, 247.

forms. The second endeavored to present views on the nature of common good found not only in liberal thought, but primarily in the work of Wojtyła himself. His reference point was also personalism, which stresses the inalienable dignity of the person in both the private and the social sphere of life.

In Wojtyła's view, the ability to participate is a crucial aspect of the person's participation, which involves coexistence and cooperation with other unique personal entities. The reciprocation of these relations leads to the creation of a communion of persons. Participation can take authentic or inauthentic forms. Their expression is, on the one hand, solidarity with the life of the communion and the common good it realizes, as well as opposition which regards the definition and realization of that good. On the other hand, conformism tends to express itself in superficial adaptation to it and uses evasion as rejection of the communion and of the realization of its common good. What is the common good? For personalists, it is the development of the person and its natural potentialities. For Wojtyła, it is the fulfilment of the human being through coexisting and acting according to conscience-discerned truth, which is subsequently chosen and realized in a free act. Coexistence and acting are always done in communion with other persons, who are not self-contained monads, but entities living in various relations and communions (participation). It should be noted that for each person, before the common good becomes action consistent with the truth, it should first become being in truth. Therefore, its main character is subjective, not objective. Man, however, may have a different relation to the common good: to commit himself/herself to the fulfillment of his or her being (solidarity) or to seek a new form of its implementation (opposition), superficial inclusion in self-fulfillment (conformism) or complete resignation from fulfilling himself/herself in action together with others (evasion). It is worth stressing that common good is always realized proportionally to the abilities of the given person. In turn, the goal of the state community, for which the common good is the foundation, should be the creation of such conditions in which the human being is capable of discerning and choosing truth as well as living and acting in accordance with it, in communion with others, and thereby has the chance for self-fulfillment as a person.

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Karol Jasiński

Categoria di partecipazione di Wojtyła e questione del bene comune

Sommario

L'autore presenta le opinioni di Wojtyła sulla partecipazione e sul suo rapporto con il bene comune. Le analisi consistono di due parti. Nella prima parte si presenta la concezione della

partecipazione (coesistenza e attività insieme ad altre persone in relazione al bene comune) e anche le sue varie forme (solidarietà e obiezione, conformismo ed evitamento). Nella seconda parte, l'autore si concentra sulla questione del bene comune, concetto che appare non solo nel pensiero liberale (bene comune in quanto espressione della deliberazione e dei diritti di un individuo) e nel pensiero personalista (bene comune in quanto lo sviluppo di un individuo e delle sue possibilità naturali), ma soprattutto nel lavoro stesso di Wojtyła (bene comune in quanto forma di auto-realizzazione personale attraverso la convivenza e la cooperazione con gli altri in relazione alla verità riconosciuta dalla coscienza, scelta in un atto gratuito). Il punto di riferimento di Wojtyła era anche il personalismo, con cui si sottolinea la dignità inerente della persona sia nella sfera privata che sociale.

Parole chiave: Persona, partecipazione, forme autentiche e non autentiche di partecipazione, bene comune, comunità

Karol Jasiński

La catégorie de participation de Wojtyła et la question du bien commun

Résumé

L'auteur présente le point de vue de Wojtyła sur la participation et sa relation avec le bien commun. Les analyses se composent de deux parties. La première partie présente la conception de la participation (coexistence et activité avec d'autres personnes en relation avec le bien commun) ainsi que ses différentes formes (solidarité et objection, conformité et évitement). Dans la seconde partie, l'auteur s'intéresse à la question du bien commun, dont la notion n'apparaît pas seulement dans la pensée libérale (le bien commun comme expression de la délibération et des droits d'un individu) et dans la pensée personnaliste (le bien commune comme développement d'un individu et de ses possibilités naturelles), mais surtout dans l'œuvre même de Wojtyła (le bien commun comme forme d'autoréalisation personnelle par la coexistence et la coopération avec les autres en rapport avec la vérité reconnue par la conscience, choisie dans un acte gratuit). Le point de repère de Wojtyła était également le personnalisme, qui met l'accent sur la dignité inhérente de la personne dans les sphères privées et sociales.

Mots-clés : Personne, participation, formes de participation authentiques et non authentiques, bien commun, communauté

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Subjectivity vs. Agency: The Meaning of Karol Wojtyla's *The Acting Person*[1]

Abstract: Karol Wojtyła's *Osoba i czyn* (in English translation known as *The Acting Person*) is certainly an extraordinary book having considerable significance for contemporary human philosophy. And because the philosophical or quasi-philosophical concept of the human person, consciously or not, explicitly or implicitly, is always at the root of any sociological, psychological, pedagogical or even economic theory, the importance of this work is even greater. It involves both the humanities and social sciences. The purpose of this article is to point out the benefits of this groundbreaking book. In particular, it allows us to rethink the paradigmatic foundations of these sciences. At the same time, it attempts to show how necessary is a critical revision of their own paradigmatic basis.

I would also like to consider the essence of the human concept, especially from the perspective of critical realism. Especially, I deal with the issue of subjectivity and justification for the choice of this concept as the key to understanding individual agency. I am convinced that agency is only one dimension of subjectivity and does not allow us to understand the whole problem of autonomy, human freedom, and the meaning of humanity. Wojtyła's *The Acting Person* seems to provide extremely important arguments in favor of my thesis. It also helps, I think, to understand the essence of individual subjectivity, issues of fundamental importance in our time, peculiarly, in the broadly understood human sciences.

Keywords: Karol Wojtyła, person, act, subjectivity, agency

[1] Karol Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn* (Kraków: Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne, 1969); Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, trans. Andrzej Potocki, https://www.scribd.com/doc/57487848/The-Acting-Person, accessed October 28, 2020.

Let us start with Karol Wojtyła's remarks on the significance of the phenomenalist experience of oneself and the world as a valuable clue in the study of the essence of the human person and humanity in general. We read: "Man's experience of anything outside of himself is always associated with the experience of himself, and he never experiences anything external without having at the same time the experience of Himself."[2] Therefore, it can be said that we get to know ourselves by exploring the world, but also the world reveals the man in experiencing of what is what, in a sense, the world?—is transcendent to us, which illustrates an argument for phenomenological cognition. At least when it comes to the subject's self-knowledge.

However, Wojtyła noticed a certain weakness in building knowledge about the human person on the analysis of the cognitive act. He wrote:

> The phenomenalistic standpoint seems to overlook the essential unity of the distinctive experiences and to attribute the unitary nature of experience to its allegedly being composed of a set of sensations or emotions, which are subsequently ordered by the mind. Undoubtedly, every experience is a single event, and its every occurrence is unique and unrepeatable, but even so there is something that, because of a whole sequence of empirical moments, may be called the "experience of man." The object of experience is the man emerging from all the moments and, at the same time, present in every one of them (we disregard here all other objects) […].[3]

The above quotation indicates that the later Holy Father overtook the position of critical realism, which indicates the reality of being, including the subject. It cannot be reduced to occasional impressions, but the mentioned experience indicates the subject as something (someone) relatively stable, autonomous, emergent—as it could be said—identical with each other, discovering at different times. This allegation, of course, refers to phenomenology to a lesser extent, especially its realistic variant.

However, in these cognitive acts, as Wojtyła suggests, not only the subject but also the human person in general emerges. We read: "But men other than myself are also the objects of my experience."[4] In fact, it also means something more. Although each experience is separate and unique—as has just been mentioned—in this diversity and variability the human experience emerges in general, as such. We read: "The experience of oneself, however, is still the experience of man; it does not extend beyond the limits of an experience that includes all humans, that is, man himself."[5] Thus, we experience ourselves as

[2] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 5.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid., 6.
[5] Ibid., 7.

a separate, unique phenomenon, but we also experience ourselves as a human being, part of the human species. Although I experience myself "from the inside" ("inner experience"[6]), and other people as "external experience,"[7] then "other human beings in relation to myself are but the 'outerness,' which means they are in opposition to my 'innerness'; in the totality of cognition these aspects complement and compensate each other, while experience itself in both its inner and outer forms tends to strengthen and not to weaken this complementary and compensating effect."[8]

In *The Acting Person*, phenomenalism and phenomenology are carefully separated. This distinction is of particular importance when the Author moves on to the ontology and epistemology of the eponymous act. He wrote: "Thus, in every human experience, there is also a certain measure of understanding of what is experienced. This standpoint seems contrary to phenomenalism, but fits very well with phenomenology."[9] Here is how Wojtyła describes the act in a phenomenological way, namely, "action serves as a particular moment of apprehending—that is, of experiencing—the person. […] The datum 'man-acts,' with its full experiential content, now opens itself for exfoliation as a person's action."[10]

From the perspective of critical realism, one could probably say that the act connects the subject with reality. It is also an act of creation of both the subject and the world of that subject. The process of creation by deed can lead the subject to the ontic state of a person—to use the language of Wojtyła (and personalists, in general). Actually, an act requires and creates a person. The later pope wrote: "Action is not a single event but a processlike sequence of acting; and this corresponds to different agents. The kind of acting that is an action, however, can be assigned to no other agent than a person. In other words, an action presupposes a person,"[11] or—as we read elsewhere—"action reveals the person."[12] In Wojtyła's ontology, deed is a basic category. But it also has both fundamental epistemic significance (it is about the act of getting to know oneself and the world by man) and epistemological, that is, "it lies in the nature of the correlation inherent in experience, in the very nature of man's acting, that action constitutes the specific moment whereby the person is revealed. Action gives us the best insight into the inherent essence of the person and allows us to understand the person most fully. We experience man as a person, and we are

[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid., 8.
[9] Ibid., 10.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.

convinced of it because he performs actions."[13] As a sidenote, it is also worth noting the subtle dialectic of ontology and epistemology in this work. This is another reason to claim that the Author was a precursor of critical realism in the version of Roy Bhaskar and Margaret S. Archer.[14]

What is more, the act reveals not only the ontic and epistemic dimension of humanity, but also the moral one. If we accept that the paradigm defines theory or scientific orientation in three dimensions: ontological, epistemological, and ethical, it becomes clear that Wojtyła proposed a new and extremely important paradigm of the philosophy of the human person, which creates a new paradigmatic perspective for sociology, psychology, anthropology, and economics, and in fact, for most of the humanities. We read: "Our experience and also our intellectual apprehension of the person in and through his actions are derived in particular from the fact that actions have a moral value: they are morally good or morally bad."[15]

Time may try to present the essence of Wojtyła's view of what an act is. He wrote:

> "Action," in the sense it is used here, is equivalent to the acting of man as a person. While "human act" shows such action as a specific manner of becoming based on the potentiality of the personal subject, the terms *act* or *action* themselves tell us nothing about it. They seem to denote the same dynamic reality but, in a way, only as a phenomenon or manifestation rather than as an ontic structure. It does not mean, however, that they prevent us from gaining access to this structure. On the contrary, both action and conscious acting tell us of the dynamism proper to man as a person. It is owing to this intrinsic content that they comprise all that is meant by "human act"[…].[16]

Here we come to the extremely important question of the ontical nature of man, which—as Wojtyla understood it—leads us directly to the essence of subjectivity. He wrote:

> By "action" is meant acting consciously. When we say "conscious acting" we implicitly refer to the kind of acting that is related to and characteristic of the will. Thus the phrase to some extent corresponds to the *actus voluntarius* of Scholastic philosophy, since any acting pertaining to the human will must also be conscious. We can now see even more vividly how condensed is the meaning of "action" or of the corresponding "conscious acting" of everyday speech. In it are contained the ontological meanings, which belong to the human act,

[13] Ibid.

[14] Nb., Margaret S. Archer was invited by John Paul II into Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences.

[15] Ibid., 10.

[16] Ibid., 20.

> as well as the psychological meanings, which are traceable in such attributives as the Latin voluntarius or the English conscious.[17]

This reasoning led the author to "the total, overall conception of the man-person."[18] So the subject becomes an act of our own consciousness—therein lies a key transformation of "what" into "who." Nonetheless, this does not happen beyond act. As we read: "Man owes to consciousness the subjectivation of the objective. Subjectivation is to some extent identifiable with experiencing; at least, it is in experience that we become aware of it."[19]

The attribute of consciousness makes the subject reflective and reflexive. Let us explain the extremely important differences between these two concepts. The then cardinal, bishop of Cracow, wrote:

> Reflexivity of consciousness means its natural turn towards the subject as such. Reflexivity is something other than reflectivity, inherent in the human mind and its acts. Reflexivity presupposes the intentionality of acts of thinking, i.e. their return to the object. Thinking becomes reflective when we turn to an act previously accomplished, to grasp its objective content more fully, or its character or structure. Reflective thinking is an important element in the creation of all understanding, all knowledge, including self-knowledge, which is self-knowledge. It directly serves consciousness and its development in man, […] however, awareness does not constitute thinking. The mental turn towards the subject as such is constitutive for her— consciousness is reflexive, not reflective."[20]

The subtlety with which Wojtyla understands the subject appears in the following passage:

> In reflection, the subject is still included as an object. The reflexive turn means that this object, which ontologically is the subject, experiences itself not as the subject—which means he experiences his own "I." It is something new and something different from all previous categories: it is something else to be the subject, something else—to be known (objectified) as the subject, also in the reflection of consciousness—and the subject's subjective experience is something else. Man is the subject of his existence and action, he is the subject as a being of a specific nature, which has its consequences in action. This

[17] Ibid., 21.

[18] Ibid., 30. I prefer to translate this as "an integral concept of man as a person"—K.W.

[19] Ibid., 31. My suggestion on how to translate this passage is the following: "It is thanks to consciousness that what is object becomes subjective. The person himself becomes the subject, as well as activities in mutual relations, everything that constitutes the intentional 'world of persons' also becomes subjective"—K.W.

[20] Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, 46; translation mine—K.W.

> entity of existence and action, which is man, ontology defines the expression of a suppositum.[21]

Here we come across another motif of the similarity of Wojtyła's theory to critical realism, and, in particular, the concept of the human person, which Margaret S. Archer developed in *Being Human*[22] and then in *Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation*[23] or in *The Reflexive Imperative in Late Modernity*,[24] where she wrote that we live today in a time of "reflective imperative," a multitude of new previously unknown situations in which only on the path of reflectiveness can one reconcile one's own concerns with the social context. In this process, the identity and personality of the human person are constituted. Archer also pointed to the importance of this process, which she calls emotional commentary. Wojtyła wrote:

> While emotions themselves occur or happen in man, he is aware of them, and owing to this awareness he can in a way control them. The control of emotions by consciousness has a tremendous significance for the inner integration of man. Obviously, the sway consciousness exerts over emotion is not achieved outside the sphere of the will and without its cooperation. Hence it is only against the background of such control that we can form moral values. We are thus faced with the fact of interpenetration of consciousness and the will; the control of consciousness over the spontaneous emotive dynamism conditioning the exercise of the free will—the proper function of the will—is simultaneously conditioned by the will.[25]

Literature in the field of human sciences distinguishes two basic orientations of fundamental theoretical importance. Some of them treat man as a product of society, culture, and nature. Others emphasize human independence, creativity, ambitions, and abilities to influence the world and co-create it. The latter are referred to as subjective. On their fundamental basis, agency seems to be the issue, that is, the effective fulfillment of the will of the subject. One of the more popular orientations of this kind in sociology is interactionism, with its clearly constructivist foundation. We ask here not so much about how the world creates man, but how man creates the world. The answer is that this happens in interactions. In these relationships among themselves, people construct society,

[21] Ibid., 46–47; translation mine—K.W.

[22] Margaret S. Archer, *Being Human: The Problem of Agency* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[23] Margaret S. Archer, *Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[24] Margaret S. Archer, *The Reflexive Imperative in Late Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 68.

[25] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 38.

culture and themselves, guided by rational choice or negotiating among themselves. The third way among social theories is Margaret S. Archer's concept of central conflation, which rejects such one-sided assumptions and even attempts to reconcile them mechanically (e.g., Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu). She believes that in reality we are dealing with separate, real and emergent entities: culture, society, and human beings, which enter into complicated and mutual relationships. As a result, structures are formed, but also the identity of reflective entities develops.[26]

As for me, I am in favor of a subjective position, but I raise two fundamental reservations about it. The first concerns the narrowing of the concept of subjectivity to subjective action. I believe that this is only one important dimension. The second doubt concerns the effectiveness of action as a defining feature of subjectivity. I claim that for an action to be subjective, its effectiveness is not necessary. Especially if you understood it as the ability to meet your own needs, wants or interests in isolation from subjective values. I wrote a lot about the danger of the so-called instrumental reason, here I will not develop this thread. It is important for our reasoning that I firmly separate the concept and phenomenon of subjectivity (subjectivity, and in Wojtyła's translation into English by Father Andrzej Potocki—subjectiveness) vs. agency (and in translation—efficacy). I find support in Karol Wojtyła's *The Acting Person* who wrote that

> we reach the conclusion that within the integral experience of man, especially with reference to its inner aspect, we can trace a differentiation and even something like a contrast of subjectiveness and efficacy. Man has the experience of himself as the subject when something is happening in him; when, on the other hand, he is acting, he has the experience of himself as the "actor." To such experiences corresponds a fully experiential reality. Subjectiveness is seen as structurally related to what happens in man, and efficacy as structurally related to his acting.[27]

We have clearly marked the difference in the meanings of a fundamental nature. I have mentioned the issue of moral values, which determine when we decide whether a given act is subjective. However, at the same time, as Wojtyła wrote, action necessarily introduces us to ethics:

> It is by means of the moral value which man crystallizes through actions as enhancing his own being that these actions, or man's conscious acting, are

[26] I refer here to the author's works mentioned earlier, I write more about it in: Krzysztof Wielecki, "Sociology at a Crossroads: The Significance of Margaret S. Archer's Theory," in *Cricital Realism and Humanity in the Social Sciences*, ed. Klaudia Śledzińska and Krzysztof Wielecki [Archerian Studies, vol. 1] (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego, 2016), 27–45.

[27] Ibid., 51.

> brought down to the exercise of the moment of freedom. This freedom is best visualized by the human being in the experience aptly epitomized in the phrase, "I may but I need not." It is not so much a matter of the content of consciousness alone as of a manifestation and actualization of the dynamism proper to a man. This dynamism is in the line of acting, and it is along this line that it becomes part of the efficacy of the personal ego but remains distinct from all that only happens in man. The manifestation and actualization of the dynamism proper to man must have its correlate in the potentiality of the man-subject. We call the correlate the *will*. Between the "I may" on the one hand and, on the other, the "I need not," the human "I want" is formed, and it constitutes the dynamism proper to the will. The will is what in man allows him to want.[28]

We now get a more complete picture of the concept of man outlined in *The Acting Person*. Indeed, the ontic nature of man arises and reveals himself as a free being and entangled in value. As we read:

> When we search deep into the integral structure of moral conduct and becoming, into the integral structure of man's becoming morally good or morally bad, we find in it the proper moment of freedom. It is in the structure of man's becoming, through his actions, morally good or bad, that freedom manifests itself—most appropriately. Here, however, freedom is not only a moment; it also forms a real and inherent component of the structure, indeed, a component that is decisive for the entire structure of moral becoming: freedom constitutes the root factor of man's becoming good or bad by his actions; it is the root factor of the becoming as such of human morality. It also takes place in efficacy and thus plays a decisive role in man's acting. By being interwoven with efficacy, freedom and efficacy together determine not only acting or action itself, which are performed by the personal ego, but their moral goodness or badness, that is to say, the becoming of man morally good or bad as man.[29]

Thus, the entanglement of an act in values means a moment of freedom, that is, freedom of choice of an ethical nature. It is a definitional feature of the human being: "The discovery of freedom at the root of the efficacy of the person allows us to reach an even more fundamental understanding of man as the dynamic subject."[30] But freedom is not necessarily related to the effectiveness of actings for what one wants. An act transcends man, and it also opens him or her to transcendence. Because beyond the deed, in the very essence of human,

[28] Ibid., 70.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.

> what happens only in man has no dynamic source; it lacks the element of freedom and the experience of "I may but I need not." In the perspective of the person and of his proper dynamism, that is, as dynamized by action, everything that happens in man is seen to be dynamized out of inner necessity without the participation of the moral becoming of man free from constraints, in this dynamism; the moment of the dynamic transcendence is lacking; however, the moment of freedom is immanent to the conditions of man's moral becoming and connected with the causation by nature. Action proper, on the other hand, exhibits—owing to the causation by the person—the transcending feature that passes into the immanence of the acting process itself: for acting also consists in the dynamization of the subject.[31]

Thus, freedom is a subjective property, but only when we understand it as the freedom of making an act dependent on subjective values—sometimes it also involves independence from what someone wants:

> A complete description of the will cannot refer simply to the moment of "willing" alone, neither to the exercise nor to the experience of "I will," in which is contained the moment of freedom identifiable with the experience of "I may but I need not." Although these experiences are an essential element of the action—as well as of morality—the will and the inner freedom of man have still another experiential dimension. In it the will manifests itself as an essential of the person, whose ability to perform actions derives directly from the possession of this essential rather than from some inherent feature of the action performed by the person.[32]

Now it is only at this moment of our reasoning that we come to the point where Wojtyła's other concept of self-determination becomes necessary. He wrote: "Every action confirms and at the same time makes more concrete the relation, in which the will manifests itself as a feature of the person and the person manifests himself as a reality with regard to his dynamism that is properly constituted by the will. It is this relation that we call 'self-determination.'"[33]

A satisfactory summary of the theory of Wojtyła's human person cannot be presented in a short text. This is not my goal anyway. Rather, I tried to point to Wojtyła's strong arguments in opposing the notion of subjectivity and agency. To close the threads that I have touched upon here, I will present one more quote from the work of Wojtyła. He wrote:

> Any adequate image of the person's integration in the action has to include the principle of complementarity; integration complements the transcendence

[31] Ibid., 70–71.
[32] Ibid., 72.
[33] Ibid.

> of the person, which is realized through self-determination and efficacy. In this dimension human action is a conscious response through choice or decision to a value. But also this response has always to make use in one way or another of somatic and psychical dynamisms. The integration of the person in the action indicates a very concrete and, each time, a unique and unrepeatable introduction of somatic reactivity and psychical emotivity into the unity of the action—into the unity with the transcendence of the person expressed by efficacious self-determination that is simultaneously a conscious response to values. But the inclusion of the conscious response to values in the human action takes place in a specific way, that is, through the integration of the whole psychoemotivity of man which is, moreover, indicative of a specific sensibility to values.[34]

In sociology, at one time the so-called equation of Piotr Sztompka's subjectivity was well known. He has presented the following formula: "be the subject = want to act + be able to act." Perhaps this is the equation of agency, but not subjectivity. This, as we already know from the work *The Acting Person* is more complicated. It contains the aforementioned factor—"I don't have to." In this first proposal, man is free in the sense of being able to do what he wants. He may, however, be free from his inclinations. Therefore, instead of Sztompka's equation, one could propose a Wojtyła's equation: To be the subject = I want + I can + I don't have to. Here, however, the question arises, namely, why should I not do something if I want and can? It seems that Wojtyła would refer to this doubt in the following manner: because sometimes I should not. This "I can" can mean: I can, which means that there are not enough obstacles to my agency. But sometimes I cannot because my values do not let me. So I could but I cannot because of the freedom to choose moral values. As I understand it, yet another aspect of subjectivity emerges from Wojtyła's considerations. I mean a situation where: I don't want to do something + I might not do something, but I should do it. The duty results from moral values which I accepted as a free being. If I can only reduce it to the absence of external obstacles to take action, then internal obstacles for the subject remain. They can have the character of values and desires. But they may also require instrumental skills, by which I mean the characteristics of the subject, such as intelligence, the ability to think abstractly, or immunity from illnesses, no allergies, etc. The type of action and possible external obstacles require specific properties.

To my mind, subjectivity has at least three basic dimensions: subjective values, subjective properties and—finally—subjective action, that is, agency.

[34] Ibid., 152.

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Krzysztof Wielecki

Soggettivismo e efficacia – L'importanza della *Persona e atto* di Karol Wojtyła

Sommario

Il libro « Persona e atto » di Karol Wojtyła è certamente un libro straordinario di grande importanza per la contemporanea filosofia dell'uomo. Poiché la concezione filosofica o quasi filosofica dell'uomo, consapevolmente o meno, esplicitamente o implicitamente, è sempre all'origine di ogni teoria sociologica, psicologica, pedagogica e anche economica, questo lavoro è ancora più importante. La sua pertinenza si estende anche sulle discipline umanistiche, comprese le scienze sociali. Lo scopo del presente testo è mostrare i vantaggi dello studio di questo libro rivoluzionario, a mio parere, in queste scienze e in particolare, di ripensare i suoi fondamenti paradigmatici. Allo stesso tempo, si vuole mostrare quanto sia necessario rivedere criticamente le proprie basi paradigmatiche.

Vorrei anche considerare qui l'essenza della concezione dell'uomo, specialmente dal punto di vista del realismo critico. In particolare, mi occupo qui della questione della soggettività e della giustificazione della scelta di questo concetto inteso come chiave per capire l'efficacia individuale e quella collettiva. Sono convinto che l'efficacia sia solo una delle dimensioni della soggettività e non ci permetta di comprendere l'intero problema dell'autonomia, della libertà umana e dell'importanza dell'umanità. «Persona e atto» di Wojtyła sembra fornire argomenti estremamente pertinenti per la mia tesi. Aiuta anche, credo, a comprendere l'essenza della soggettività individuale e collettiva, questione fondamentale nei nostri tempi. In particolare, nelle scienze ampiamente focalizzate sull'uomo.

Parole chiave: Karol Wojtyła, persona, atto, soggettività, efficacia

Krzysztof Wielecki

Subjectivisme et efficacité – L'importance de *Personne et acte* de Karol Wojtyła

Résumé

« Personne et acte » de Karol Wojtyła est certainement un livre extraordinaire d'une grande importance pour la philosophie contemporaine de l'homme. Puisque la conception philosophique ou quasi-philosophique de l'homme, que ce soit consciemment ou non, explicitement ou implicitement, est toujours à la base de toute théorie sociologique, psychologique, pédagogique et même économique, ce travail est encore plus important. Il recouvre également les sciences humaines, y compris les sciences sociales. Le but de ce texte est de montrer les avantages de l'étude de ce livre révolutionnaire, à mon avis, dans ces sciences et de repenser leurs fondements paradigmatiques. En même temps, cela permet de revoir à quel point il est nécessaire de réviser de manière critique ses propres fondements paradigmatiques.

Je voudrais également considérer l'essence de la conception de l'homme, en particulier du point de vue du réalisme critique. Surtout, je traite ici de la question de la subjectivité et de la justification du choix de ce concept comme clé pour comprendre l'efficacité individuelle et celle collective. Je suis convaincu que l'efficacité n'est qu'une des dimensions de la subjectivité et ne permet pas de comprendre tout le problème de l'autonomie, de la liberté de l'homme et de l'importance de l'humanité. « Personne et acte » de Wojtyła semble fournir des arguments extrêmement pertinents pour ma thèse. Cela aide aussi, je crois, à comprendre l'essence de la subjectivité individuelle et collective, une question fondamentale à notre époque. Particulièrement, dans les sciences focalisées sur l'homme.

Mots-clés: Karol Wojtyła, personne, acte, subjectivité, efficacité

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Karol Wojtyła's Conception of Personhood from the Perspective of Cognitive Sciences

Abstract: We use the term "person" when we want to point out that human existence is unrepeatable and unique. The assumption that man is a person constitutes a basis for the belief in the dignity, efficacy, and responsibility of the human individual. Karol Wojtyla built his conception of the person in the context of theological and philosophical discussions. Even though Wojtyła's conception has been given a great deal of scholarly attention, it is worthwhile to juxtapose it with contemporary anthropological theories that derive from cognitive sciences. Cognitivists usually base their theories on biological and sociological premises. Some conclusions arrived at in the area of the cognitive sciences lead to mind-brain reductionism, a theory in which the human being is regarded as a body endowed with the function of the brain and as an entity whose individual traits are shaped by its social and cultural environment. This position undermines the ideas of free will and the substantial singularity of the human person. However, debates with this position have worked out a non-reductionist alternative, a theory known as emergentism. This theory treats the human mind as a distinct faculty, one which emerges as a phase in the brain's development. Emergentists base their reasoning on the assumptions that the body is a unity and that the mind is not identical with it. It is my belief that emergentism can be fruitfully applied to the dynamic understanding of the person put forward by Wojtyła in the middle of the 20th century.

Keywords: Karol Wojtyła, person, human nature, free will, cognitive sciences

Introduction

The idea of personhood has ontological and ethical aspects, such as: (1) the concept of the person points to the unique character of human existence in the world; (2) it underscores the individual aspect of human experience; (3) it emphasises the wholeness of the person, which, in the traditional formulation, is a unity of body and soul; (4) it points to the necessity of showing the respect that is due to every human being; the person ought not to be treated instrumentally, as a means to a goal, but always as a goal in itself. These aspects allow us to link other ideas to that of "the person," such as that of "personal dignity"; and then, too, we point to the special value of the person in relation to the real world of things as well as to social and political institutions.

The idea of "the person" is defined in a number of ways, and it is not my aim in this article to discuss these definitions, but to present the tension between the personalist and cognitivist outlook on man. The recognition of the value of the human person is inherent as a basic principle in Western culture, which is built on a grid of concepts derived from Greek philosophy and made permanent by Christian thought. The distinctness of the human person is, in this respect, to be regarded in a normative sense. This by no means ought to prevent us from using the idea of personhood in the context of Eastern cultures. According to anthropologists, in the East it is common to believe in a strong interdependence between an individual and the community within which he or she functions. Assumptions concerning an individual person's relations with a community constitute a point of departure for cultural studies and also, recently, for cultural neuroscience, which combines the methods of social and cultural psychology.[1] Yet this problem falls beyond the remit of this article.

Cognitivism is a relatively new discipline which combines various areas of knowledge concerned with the principles of the functioning of the brain in relation to the body, as well as to the natural and human environment. The different subdisciplines of cognitivism derive from a number of particular sciences: from formal ones like logic, mathematics, information technology through natural sciences, such as biology; social sciences, such as psychology[2]; and from the humanities, such as philosophy. This manner of combining subdisciplines does

[1] See Shihiu Han, Georg Northoff, Kai Vogeley, Bruce E. Wexler, Shinobu Kitayama, and Michael E. W. Varnum, "A Cultural Neuroscience Approach to the Biosocial Nature of the Humane Brain," *Annual Review of Psychology*, vol. 64, (2013), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-071112-054629. The article contains a copious list of publications concerned with cultural neuroscience.

[2] See Urszula Żegleń, "Znaczenie filozofii dla kognitywistyki [The Meaning of Philosophy for Cognitivism]," in: *Przewodnik po kognitywistyce* [Cognitivism: A Guidebook] ed. Józef Bremer (Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, 2016), 39–78.

not prevent collisions, as demonstrated, for instance, by all the diverse ways of understanding human nature. In recent years, cognitive science has drawn ever closer to neuroscience—including neurobiology—which studies the anatomy and physiology of the brain. Cognitivism may belong among the humanities and social sciences, and yet cognitivists readily employ empirical research and computer-assisted imaging techniques (MRI, FMRI, PET, and others). Emerging from a combination of different disciplines and the conceptions they have developed, cognitivism has not yet produced a central, unifying theory. In a narrower sense, the goal of cognitivism is to analyze man's cognitive abilities and to examine the conditions necessary for their operation; in a broader sense, its goal is to describe and explain the principles of cognition in living organisms, and to define the rules determining the acquisition of the knowledge of the surrounding physical world and of the knowing subject, on the basis of empirical research. Cognitivist anthropology, which studies biological systems and the influence of artificial intelligence on human life, is distinguished from cognitive anthropology, which has for its object the rules that govern the ways in which culture influences the human brain. The latter discipline studies language, cultural narratives, interpersonal relations, and man's conduct as a social being.[3] Polish researchers who work within the field of cognitive anthropology have taken up the topic of personhood in several substantial studies and texts.[4]

In this article I undertake an analysis of Karol Wojtyła's conception of personhood, which I want to juxtapose with the cognitive view on man. Wojtyła's main work in the field of human anthropology, *The Acting Person* (In Polish known as *Osoba i czyn*), was written in the late 1960s; it has since been a subject of creative interpretations and polemics. Wojtyła's tract is devoted to man and to man's relation to his biological and social environment. As far as his method is concerned, Wojtyła uses two basic sources: (1) the tradition of Thomistic realism: the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas and his 20th-century interpreters, Reginald Gerrigou-Lagrange, Etienne Gilson, Stefan Świeżawski, and oth-

[3] See Roy D'Andradde, *The Development of Cognitive Anthropology* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), XIV–XV.

[4] See Józef Bremer, *Osoba – fikcja czy rzeczywistość* [Person – Fiction or Reality]/ (Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, 2008); Józef Bremer, *Neoronaukowcy i potoczny obraz osoby w kognitywistyce* [Neuroscientists and the Common Image of the Person in Cognitivism]. (Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, 2016); Józef Bremer, *Problem osoby w świetle neuronauk. Czy osoba to jedynie użyteczna metafora*? [The Problem of Personhood in Light of Neurosciences: Is the Person Anything But a Useful Metaphor?]. STD, nr 4 (2018), https://doi.org/10.15290/std., 11–27. Włodzisław Duch wrote in a slightly different sense about the issues and responsibility in the context of cognitive research See: Włodzisław Duch, "Czy jesteśmy automatami? Mózgi, wolna wola i odpowiedzialność" [Are We Automatons? Brains, Free Will and Responsibility?], in *Na ścieżkach neuronauki* [On the Paths of Neuroscience], ed. Piotr Francuz (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2010), 219–264.

ers; (2) phenomenology, known from his study of the thought of Maks Scheler,[5] in Wojtyła's critical reinterpretation. The moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant was also a major inspiration for Wojtyła's ethical deliberations. My aim in this article is to focus on those aspects of Wojtyła's conception of personhood which allow it to enter into dialogue with the conception of man accepted by chosen cognitivists.[6]

Nature and the Person

Wojtyła's conception of personhood is based on three types of premises: metaphysical, religious, and cultural. As it would be difficult to discuss all the aspects of *The Acting Person* in this article, I have decided to focus on the following elements: human nature, the dynamics of becoming a person, the psychosomatic unity of the soul and the body, and personal freedom.

Human nature can be understood in three different ways: (1) as a substance: the nature in question determines the belonging of an entity to a species; possessing a nature means that a person differs from other entities (animals, plants, and inanimate beings, all of which are deprived of the feature of rationality); (2) normatively: possessing a particular nature means that man has to perform particular tasks; it defines obligations (which determine what man ought to do due to the good that is in accord with human nature). Normative understanding also delineates limitations for human actions, the violation of which entails the infringement of an essential good; (3) as an entity belonging to nature: as when we point out that the human being possesses a body and belongs to the sensory realm. The term "to possess" refers to a relational situation, which means that there is in us something that controls the operation of the body. Here clearly appears the suggestion that outside the body, there is a decision-making center that controls the body, that is, the soul or the mind.

In medieval philosophy, to which Wojtyła is indebted in the context of the problem of personhood, a major role was played by the principle of individuali-

[5] Karol Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera* [An Appraisal of the Possibility of Building Christian Ethics on the Principles of Maks Scheler's System], in *Człowiek i moralność II: Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności* [Man and Morality II: The Problem of the Moral Subject], ed. Tadeusz Styczeń, Jerzy W. Gałkowski, Adam Rodziński, and Andrzej Szostek (Lublin: TN KUL), 11–129.

[6] In the linguistic context, the author of this article refered to a text by Jameson Taylor, "Beyond Nature: Karol Wojtyla's Development of the Traditional Definition of Personhood." *The Review of Metaphisics*, vol. 63, no. 2 (2009): 415–454. Taylor cites and analyzes extensively from Wojtyła's book *The Acting Person*.

zation, that is, the problem of to what we owe the fact that we are distinct entities. This is the principle thanks to which a person acquires his or her individuality. It follows from Boethius's classic definition according to which the person is "an individual substance of a rational nature" (*persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia*).[7] In order to be a person, a being needs to be a rational entity, a substance made up of matter and form. "Person" is not a general designation but refers to an entity that exists in reality. Boethius's definition captures the essence of personhood in a static manner, while the contemporary ways to understand human nature underscore the dynamics of becoming a person. This makes Wojtyła's conception relevant.

The aspect of a person's individual existence was of interest to, among other philosophers, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. Thomas defined the person as the thing, in all of the natural world, that is the most perfect (*persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota rerum natura*). In this sense, the wholeness and uniqueness of a person consists in its being a value which must not be modified or changed. In order to protect the entirety of a person's existence, no constituent part of the person should be altered. In Thomas Aquinas's anthropology, the human soul is not a complete dimension of the person; it is the body that endows a person with the particularity of individual existence. The human being is an inseparable unity of the soul and the body, a unity of elements which together form the whole that is the *compositum humanum*.[8] John Duns Scotus wrote about the principle of individualization in a different sense. He used the untranslatable term *haecceitas*, which refers, not to matter, but to the essence which endows an entity with individuality, bestowing distinct properties on things and people, and thus rendering them singular. *Haecceitas* influences the properties that belong to and determine an individual entity and it is thanks to *haecceitas* that a human being has the features of indivisibility, identity, actuality, and singularity. A multiplication of individuals representing the same species means greater perfection in the world, as different from a multiplication of the species as such.[9]

One of the consequences following from the thought of John Duns Scotus is the linking of the individual person with the soul (the mind) rather than the body, as is the case in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Human souls are individual due to singular personal characteristics which cannot be reduced to

[7] Ancius M. S. Boethius, *Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy*, trans. Hugh F. Steward, Edward K. Rand and Jim Tester (Oxford: The Project Gutenberg, 2004), 33.

[8] See: Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Basic Writings*, ed. Anton C. Pegis, vol. 2: *Man and the Conduct of Life* (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 688–690.

["Person" signifies what is most perfect in all nature—that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 29, a. 3].

[9] See: Richard Swinburne, *The Evolution of the Soul* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 330–335.

sensory or formal aspects. In this sense, *haecceitas* goes beyond common nature, and the individual itself is more perfect than the nature that determines its structure as a representative of a species.[10] John Duns Scotus's conception of *haecceitas* had a greater impact on modern philosophy than Thomas Aquinas's conception of the integral unity of the soul and the body.[11] For Descartes, man's individual properties relate to the soul (the mind), which exists independently of the body. The soul determines the identity of the individual and ensures the unity of the sensory perception of the world. Thanks to the soul, a person can connect his or her own external and internal experiences to make them into a whole, into a unique perception of events. The body, on the other hand, is like a machine actuated by life energy that has its source in the activity of the soul. In Descartes's philosophy, a person's mental distinctiveness has its source in the thinking soul (*ego cogito*), thanks to which man gains the awareness of "I," that is, an individual's volitional and emotional subjectivity. If it is the soul (the mind) that safeguards the subject's mental unity, then it is the soul—and not the body, or the unity of the body and the soul—that safeguards an individual's personal identity, and its singularity and distinctness. Wojtyła did not accept Descartes's conception in the just outlined mind-body problem; he embraced that of Thomas Aquinas and pointed to the psychosomatic unity of the soul and the body. The mentioning of Descartes is not accidental in this context. References to Cartesianism (rather than to Descartes) occur quite often in the context of mind-body debates. In the realm of cognitive sciences, scholars accept the naturalistic thesis that suggests a link between the mind and the brain, and which rejects the Cartesian proposition concerning the substantive difference and separation between the body and the soul. In addition, cognitivists consistently question the existence of a will that is independent of the body, functioning independently of the brain and responsible for a person's free decisions. The mind-body relation constitutes an important issue in attempts to explain the singularity of a person. Cognitivists, such as Daniel Dennett, reject Descartes's dualistic thesis concerning the substantive difference between the mind and the body, but they also disregard the Aristotelian-Thomistic thesis about the psychosomatic unity of the mind and the body in one personal entity, precisely the thesis which Wojtyła found convincing.

But let us turn to the problem of human nature. According to Woltyła, this term denotes everything that is essentially human. However, "nature" and "essence" seem to have different referents. "Nature" does not denote a concrete

[10] See: John Boler, "Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the Two Affections of the Will," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 67 (1993), 109–126.

[11] In this article it is not possible to discuss in detail the links between the philosophy of John Duns Scotus and modern conceptions of man. See: *Reforging the Great Chain of Being, Studies of the History of Modal Theories*, ed. Simo Knuuttila, Synthese Historical Library 20 (Dordrechet: Springer Netherlands 1981).

existing and acting subject. When we speak of human nature, we point to what inheres in a person in a physical sense. We can consider human nature in the abstract, as something detached from concrete individuals, but, in reality, it is always connected with particular entities. Human nature directly indicates what essentially characterizes all people. Moreover, human nature is oriented towards agency, towards dynamism. The first act of dynamism is human nature; from human nature follow all activities. Birth is the initial moment of this dynamism.[12] The dynamism which presupposes potentiality constitutes a basic aspect of human nature; it is found in the human being's readiness to act. This readiness is pre-given to the person; it has been prepared in its substantive dynamic structure. Human nature does not determine this dynamism in its entirety, but it does accurately determine its moment of change. Human nature manifests itself in the ability to act (*modus*), but the actions themselves are manifestations of the human being as a distinct person. We are talking here about the kind of agency which allows for a transition from what is owed to human nature to what belongs to the dimension of personal existence. The actions of a person contain agency, which brings to manifestation a particular "I" and allows this "I" to become aware of itself. This means transcending the state of nature in the biological sense, not through the rejection of one's nature, but through its integration with the mind. The entirety of a person is expressed in human experience, where a synthesis takes place, in a person, of the actualizations of those aspects of human nature upon which the person has no influence, with actions that result from the person's choices. An action or a deed (the *actus humanus*) is a manifestation of an individual's distinct consciousness. As the cause of all its deeds and, moreover, conscious of this status, a person is capable of capturing and describing this moment. The integration of human nature within a person—*suppositum*—makes it possible to attain and experience the unity of the two aspects: potentiality and actuality.

According to Wojtyła, human nature in its metaphysical sense is man's essence; it constitutes the humanity in man. On the one hand, a person is "individualized" humanity; on the other, a person makes itself present in its actions and hence the integration of human nature and humanity takes place in a person and through a person and involves the integration of all the dynamism which is proper to man. This connection with metaphysical nature does not deprive the person of freedom. Man's potentiality is linked with his nature in situations in which he as the subject discovers "he can do something but does not have to." Wojtyła points to two dimensions of transcendence—vertical and horizontal. The former is basic and finds its expression in free activity, in a person's con-

[12] Karol Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*, ed. Anna T. Tymieniecka, translated from the Polish by A. Potocki, *Analecta Husserliana*, vol. X (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 126.

scious efficacy and not just through an [act of] intentionally directing the will or desires towards a goal. Becoming a person means moving from a state of dependency on one's environment to dependency on the "I," that is, on one's self. Being a person involves transcending nature towards the actualization of man's potentiality in personal existence.[13]

In his or her action a person defines himself/herself by self-possession, self-governance, self-determination, and self-consciousness. A person is a being that owns oneself; at the same time, it is a being that is exclusively owned by itself. This kind of argumentation presupposes the existence of free will in man, which makes possible the taking of decisions. Thanks to self-determination, man has control over himself as well as power over himself and his actions. A person's freedom manifests itself as a personal attribute which relates to free will and the ability to decide and act freely.[14]

When discussing Wojtyła's conception, we need to take into account the aspect of going beyond (transcending) biological nature. Self-determination allows us to distinguish between dynamism on the level of human nature and dynamism on the level of the person. In the former, there is no self-determination but rather "actualizations," or the type of activity with no influence from the individual will; in the latter, however, we acknowledge the dependence of the will on the activity of a person's own "I." In the dynamism on the level of human nature, the individual is, as it were, owned by the potentiality of its own subject, which determines the direction and the character of the dynamics of personal life. The experience that comes with the discovery that "I am an agent" distinguishes it from the manifestations of the dynamism of man's activity which lack the moment of "I"-agency.[15] There is a difference here between the one who performs an action and the one who is an action's conscious originator. This latter occurs when a person acts out his or her own choices, rather than being compelled by an instinct or a biological impulse. The justification of the ability to make free choices is important insofar as it constitutes man as a substantially distinct person.

The idea of a conscious and free "I" lies at the foundation of Wojtyła's conception of legal and moral responsibility. A refusal to acknowledge personal agency undermines the essence of that responsibility. A person's independence is constituted, not through its lack of dependence on external factors, but through an unhampered subjection of the will to the directives of reason. Independence is not at issue but the finding of appropriate arguments to support the idea of self-dependence. Freedom manifests itself not through the lifting of

[13] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 131–134.

[14] Karol Wojtyła, The Transcendence of the Person in Action and Man's Self-Teleology, *Analecta Husserlina*, vol. IX: *The Teleologies in Husserlian Phenomenology*, ed. Anna T. Tymieniecka (Dordrechet: D. Reidel Publishing Company), 203–212.

[15] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 163–167.

barriers, but through a person's ability to accept internal and external circumstances and conditions that determine acting. The rationality of a person's moral choices comes from the fact that proper conduct is a consequence of his or her discovery of its righteousness; it does not come from fear of punishment or an expectation of being rewarded by other people.[16]

This brief reconstruction of Karol Wojtyla's conception of personhood has hopefully put into relief the problematics of the person, conscious choice, free will, and the theories of man implied by cognitive studies.

The Person from the Cognitive Perspective

Philosophical and cognitive models of understanding man differ significantly in their premises and methodological perspectives. Wojtyła accepted realistic principles governing the existence of the human person and was also aware of the benefits of the phenomenological analysis of human consciousness and of man's inner experiences. Wojtyła's conception of personhood represents the tradition of the substantive understanding of the person as an entity that guarantees the continuous identity of the self throughout a person's life. In contradistinction to this position is the a non-substantive one, according to which personal identity depends on the permanence of a person's memory of his or her past states and experiences. According to theorists who represent the non-substantive conception of personhood, while people forget certain past acts or minds modify the events they store, it can become difficult to speak of a person's "permanent identity." As a consequence, changing consciousness is a vehicle for changing personal identity. John Locke, the classic British empiricist, was among the proponents of this theory; Derek Parfit is a contemporary one. Conceptions worked out in the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of the mind support the dynamic theory of the development of the conscious "I" and call into doubt substantive solutions.[17] In this school of thought, the term "individual entity" is preferred to that of a "person."[18]

[16] See Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphsics of Morals: A German-English Edition*, edited and translated by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 54–57.

[17] See: John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Roger WoolHouse (London: Publishing Books Ltd., 1997), 472; Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 248–252.

[18] One of the interesting exceptions is the metaphysical theory of individual entities put forth by Peter S. Strawson. See his *Individuals. An Essay in Desciriptive Mataphisics* (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1987, 1959). Strawson combines metaphysical analyses

In a general sense, the cognitive sciences are not concerned with man's subjective experiences, but provide descriptions of objective and general phenomena occurring in the human brain. Their main purpose is to explain the process whereby multiple neuronic impulses give rise to an individual human consciousness, in which, at some point, the awareness of a distinct "I" manifests itself.[19] In a sense, cognitivism brings a broadening of the scope of research represented by the philosophy of the mind which has closer affinities with John Locke's conception of man than with that of Descartes. Thomas Nagel, among other scholars, believed that the individual consciousness of one's "I" (of personhood) is not connected with any additional dimension of human life beyond its biological and social ones. A man is his brain, and what matters most to him is the maximal prolongation of the brain's existence.[20] This type of belief is called reductionism, and is often accepted by cognitivists.

Daniel Dennett is a brain reductionist who debates Descartes's view on the substantive difference between the spiritual and somatic spheres in man. In his argumentation, Dennett cites research done by neuroscientists Wolf Joachim Singer and Gerhard Roth. Dennett has expressed the view that "the conscious spirit" is an illusion of our thought. A reductionist holds that human mental states can be elucidated in terms of physical-cerebral processes. Dennett claims that the individual consciousness is a postulated, theoretical, cultural, and social fiction which has determined our inner preferences and our general attitudes to the world.[21] Similar conclusions can be found in the work of other neurologists; for instance, Gerhard Roth regards free will and the awareness of our own distinct "I" as cultural illusion. According to Roth, philosophers are wrong in ascribing to the conscious subject abilities which should be linked exclusively to the activity of the brain. Freedom of the will is the result of an overlapping of neural processes; the brain makes a person predisposed towards survival and adjustment to the conditions of the environment, and not towards making conscious and responsible decisions.[22]

The negation of free will undermines the essence of an agent's responsibility. The advocates of the reductionist position commonly cite experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet and repeated by Evelyn Keller and Heinz Heck-

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with the philosophy of language. In his research, he goes beyond reductionist and naturalist approaches.

[19] See: David J. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind: In Search of Fundamental Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 4–5.

[20] See: Thomas Nagel, "The Limits Objectivity," in *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1979), 78–80.

[21] See: Daniel C. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1993), 237–239.

[22] See: Józef Bremer, *Neuronaukowy i potoczny obraz osoby w kognitywistyce* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, 2016), 39–44.

hausen, and later by Patrick Haggard and Michel Emmer. In a series of experiments, Libet asked participants to concentrate on their willingness to act while observing the position of the clock's hand and to record the time by pressing a button. The researchers observed that the gap between the awareness of the intention to act and the pressing of the button lasted 200 ms, with the margin of error smaller than 50 ms. Libet's experiment showed that conscious decision was preceded by an unconscious activity of the brain. An external observer could see, on the display of his measuring devices, impulses manifesting the activity of the brain before the participant made a conscious decision to act. However, the results obtained in subsequent experiments were less unambiguous. What matters to us are the philosophical conclusions that can be drawn from the experiment.

Citing Libet's experiment, brain reductionists opt for the determinist hypothesis, which allows them to reject the idea of free will and espouse the idea that the will depends on biological and social factors. Among other like-minded scientists, Michael Gazzaniga regarded the conscious "I" as an illusion. In his view, the brains of individual people resemble automata which take decisions by following complex and intricate rules. Moral and legal responsibility are the result of a social contract entered into by brain automata in the context of social debate.[23] This type of solution is not wholly hostile to the idea of conscious efficacy and self-government advocated by Wojtyła. We have to point out, however, that cognitive studies broaden our knowledge of brain disfunctions, in particular when it comes to cases where we want to discover causes of limited liability in persons with an impaired ability to make independent decisions and to understand complex legal and moral situations.[24]

However, the rejection of radical brain determinism does not need to lead to the acceptance of the opposite theory, or that of voluntarist indeterminism. A reasonable solution seems to lie in the acceptance of moderate determinism, also referred to as emergentizm, or—in more general terms—the emergentist conception of personhood. This position is represented, among other scholars, by Roger W. Sperry and Colwyn Trevarthen, and in Poland by Józef Bremer. According to this conception, the biological structure, having attained a certain

[23] See Michael Gazzaniga, *The Law and Neuroscience Project*, www.lawandneuroscience-proect.org.

[24] Besides the reductionist position, there is also a non-reductionist one represented by John Eccles, in which the assumption is that the nonmaterial mind influences the functioning of the biological brain. Many processes occur in the brain and only some of them are reflected in cerebral stimulations. Eccles explains the origin of human consciousness by using the principles of quantum mechanics. According to his hypothesis, the mind influences the functioning of the brain by modifying similar stimulations of neurons on the quantum level. This conception has found no confirmation in subsequent empirical studies. See: Karl Popper and John Eccles, *The Self and Its Brain*. *An Argument for Interactionism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1977), 355–376.

level of development and complexity, has caused the human brain to produce new mental and volitional properties (those of the understanding and the will). Thanks to this type of cerebral abilities, man can control his conduct and the processes occurring in the nervous system. In this sense, the conscious mind is capable of self-organization, self-awareness, self-control, and the control of a person's behaviors, and thus of self-dependence. These capabilities are related to the development of language competence, to the building of interpersonal relations, and to the creation of narratives about oneself and linking a self-narrative with narratives shared by the community. On the one hand, a person takes decisions based on intuition, and he or she may not be aware of their causes. On the other, there are conscious, purposeful, and rational actions over which we have a degree of control.

Advocates of the emergentist conception of personhood assume that personal differences have their primary sources in society and culture. Simultaneously, they accept the idea of human free will in its moderate version, a position that can be called compatibilism. According to this idea, the human subject can make choices which are free to a certain degree, biological and social limitations notwithstanding. Sperry and Trevarthen have based their research on free will on stochastic models. Their studies do not explain how the intention to act originates in the brain; they are good at showing the full complexity of the decision-making process and its outcome. They recognize the role of the brain's spontaneous activity, of external signals, and those that can be related to "the will" and individual "beliefs."[25] It seems that the mind cannot be regarded merely as a function of the biological brain. From the point of view of empirical research, however, it is difficult to study the functioning of the mind as an object disconnected from the brain. Yet it is possible to observe states of the brain and relations occurring between them, and to describe them on the basis of the rules governing human behavior. Still, this mechanistic model will never depict the subjective state of the mind; this is as much to say that the conception of the person as an entity that is conscious and capable of voluntary acceptance of responsibility cannot be inferred from the idea of the body-brain.[26] The brain constitutes a material basis for mental states, but it does not account for their complexity.

Roger Sperry admits that subjective mental phenomena regulate the movement in nerve cells, which takes place thanks to emergent properties. In this sense, we can say that the mind emerges from the brain; changes occurring in the brain lead to new interactions between neurons, which finally leads to the emergence of a new, distinct quality: the conscious, individual "I." It is

[25] See: Józef Bremer, *Neuronaukowy i potoczny obraz osoby w kognitywistyce* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, 2013), 47–52.

[26] See: Włodzisław Duch, *Czy jesteśmy automatami? Mózgi, wolna wola i odpowiedzialność*, 229–230.

impossible to detect the emergence of individual consciousness on the basis of empirical analysis. We observe the effect of this process, but we do not know how it occurs.[27] The principles which govern the reconfiguration of the complex elements of the brain system that make possible the emergence of a singular and conscious "I" are for us impossible to elucidate. A suitable material organization within the brain is essential for the emergence of the thought process, but it does not explain everything. This process is more complex and goes beyond biological causes. Experiences related to free will are given to us only from the internal perspective, while the external perspective points to the limitations of free choice.

We know that neurons in the brain react to the stimuli that reach them from the outside world. Large groups of neurons form mesoscopic networks, which in turn make up larger areas that process data supplied by the senses. In this way, the brain builds the sensory image of an object.[28] There are also emotion and motion maps which allow us to locate the stimuli that enable the control of muscles. We know much less about the higher cognitive abilities, those related to decision making, thinking, reasoning, and planning.

In conclusion, we can state that the emergentist conception of the mind can be reconciled with Karol Wojtyła's dynamic conception of personhood. In both we find premises affirming the psychosomatic unity of body and mind, despite the fact that this unity is construed differently. Woltyła proposes a philosophical and theological conception of personhood supported by phenomenological analyses; in cognitive sciences, knowledge related to man is based on empirical research, subsequently validated by philosophical reflection. Individual consciousness—the consciousness of a person, we may add after Wojtyła—is the product of a dynamic change occurring in man's body and mind. This dynamism is the consequence of a combination of complex structures which condition man's life and development in both their biological and social dimensions. The free will in man does not emerge from independence of biological and social circumstances, but rather from a person's concession to accept them; this autonomy is of course limited, as are the powers of concession. Personal freedom does not mean that man can ignore limitations resulting from the physical structure of the world or from the biological factors responsible for the functioning of the brain.

[27] See: Roger Sperry, "A Modified Concept of Consciousness," *Psychological Review*, vol. 76, no. 6 (1969): 532–536. Józef Bremer arrives at similar conclusions: Bremer, *Osoba – fikcja czy rzeczywistość*, 362–387.

[28] See: Włodzisław Duch, "Czy jesteśmy automatami? Mózgi, wolna wola i odpowiedzialność," in *Na ścieżkach neuronauki*, ed. Piotr Francuz (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL), 219–264.

Conclusions

Brain sciences fulfil a very important role in advancing our knowledge about man; their unquestionable achievements cannot be ignored. At present, we are still at an early stage of our exploration of the complex structure of the human mind. Subsequent discoveries may turn out to be ground-breaking, and hence, from the perspective of philosophical anthropology, we need to keep a close watch on the findings that these sciences yield. It is not possible to prove the existence of the person empirically. We can examine bodies, we can analyze the subjective states of human consciousness, and we can study the functioning of man in different various social relations. We can observe the states of the human brain and capture in schemata the operations of the body; however, this mechanistic and biological model is not capable of accounting for the emergence of the consciousness of an individual human being. We may have no direct influence on a great number of cerebral phenomena, but we can modify the course of our thoughts. The conscious "I" is capable of adjusting to the conditions of the environment, but also of altering those conditions.

The sum total of a multiplicity of relations and connections gives shape to the human person, by which we mean the singular and unique individual with an unrepeatable record of inner experiences and reflections: the conscious human "I" capable of making free choices. In this idea of personhood, our belief is grounded in individual value and dignity. In this sense, the conception of personhood constitutes a basis not only for personalist ethics, but for every system of ethics which posits the value of the singularity of human life and individual agency. The premise concerning the singularity of existence and consciousness relates to the principles of self-consciousness, self-determination, and self-possession propagated by Wojtyła. The values of freedom and the value of the person are integrally linked to each other. The negation of freedom, which is a consequence of some cognitive theories, leads to the making void of an individual's autonomy of action. In this case, the prefix "self-" becomes an illusion, and an individual's actions are regarded as resulting from electric impulses in the brain, or from the influence of environmental factors. If we accepted the reductionist premises about man, then logic would compel us to admit that normative ethics is a province of neurocybernetics, by which we understand a theory of controlling and modelling group behavior, or that of social engineering, based on algorithms of socially accepted norms of correct behavior. Regardless of how we evaluate the strength of Woltyła's argumentation in his book *The Acting Person*, the assumption concerning free will constitutes an essential premise of any ethical theory which accepts the idea of the conscious "I." However, we need to keep up with the developments in the field of cognitive studies, because

cognitivism provides important contributions to our knowledge of man. The consequences of new discoveries in this field ought to become objects of philosophical, theological, and legal studies.

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Mariusz Wojewoda

Il concetto di persona nel pensiero di Karol Wojtyła nella prospettiva delle scienze cognitive

Sommario

Usiamo il termine di persona, quando vogliamo indicare l'unicità e l'eccezionalità dell'esistenza umana. Il presupposto che l'uomo è una persona è la base per credere nella dignità, nell'efficacia e nella responsabilità di un individuo. La concezione di Wojtyła è stata sviluppata nel contesto delle discussioni teologiche e filosofiche. Se ne è parlato molte volte, ma vale la pena confrontarla con le teorie antropologiche contemporanee derivate dalle scienze cognitive. I rappresentanti di queste scienze di solito si basano su premesse biologiche e sociali. Alcune soluzioni sviluppate nell'ambito delle scienze cognitive portano al riduzionismo cerebrale, in cui una persona viene trattata come un corpo con funzione cerebrale e le sue caratteristiche individuali sono determinate dall'ambiente sociale e culturale. Questa posizione spinge a mettere in discussione l'idea del libero arbitrio e della sostanziale separatezza delle persone. Simultaneamente con la posizione riduzionista si è sviluppata anche una posizione non riduzionista, nota come emergentismo, secondo cui, la mente è un'abilità distinta in una persona che si manifesta a un certo stadio dello sviluppo del cervello. Gli emergentisti argomentano a favore del presupposto dell'unità del corpo e della mente non identica ad esso. Secondo l'autore dell'articolo, questo può essere applicato con successo alla comprensione dinamica della persona sviluppata a metà del XX secolo da Karol Wojtyła.

Parole chiave: Karol Wojtyła, persona, natura umana, libero arbitrio, scienze cognitive

Mariusz Wojewoda

Le concept de personne dans la pensée de Karol Wojtyła dans la perspective des sciences cognitives

Résumé

Nous utilisons le terme de personne; lorsque nous voulons indiquer l'unicité et l'exceptionnalité de l'existence humaine. L'hypothèse que l'homme est une personne est le fondement pour croire en la dignité, l'efficacité et la responsabilité d'un individu. La conception de Wojtyła a été développée dans un contexte de discussions théologiques et philosophiques. Elle a été maintes fois discutée, mais il vaut la peine de la confronter aux théories anthropologiques contemporaines issues des sciences cognitives. Les représentants de ces sciences s'appuient généralement sur des prémisses biologiques et sociales. Certaines solutions développées au sein des sciences cognitives conduisent au réductionnisme cérébral, dans lequel une personne est traitée comme un corps doté d'une fonction cérébrale, et ses caractéristiques individuelles sont déterminées par l'environnement social et culturel. Cette position conduit à remettre en cause l'idée du libre arbitre et de la séparation substantielle des personnes. Simultanément à la position réductionniste s'est développée une position non réductionniste, connue sous le nom d'émergentisme, selon laquelle, l'esprit est une capacité distincte dans l'homme e qui se manifeste à un certain stade du développement du cerveau. Les émergentistes argumentent pour la thèse de l'unité du corps et de l'esprit qui ne sont pas identiques. Selon l'auteur de l'article, cela peut être appliqué avec succès à la compréhension dynamique de la personne développée au milieu du XX^{ème} siècle par Karol Wojtyła.

Mots-clés: Karol Wojtyła, personne, nature humaine, libre arbitre, sciences cognitives

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Contemporary Reflection on Participation as an Essential Dimension of Philosophy of Education in the Context of *The Acting Person*

Abstract: This article considers the problem of the idea of participation as an essential dimension of philosophy of education in the context of Karol Wojtyła's teachings. It proceeds through the concepts of the person and participation. The paper reflects the need for discussion on philosophy of education due to the treatment of individual freedom in an extremely individualistic way. Wojtyła draws on the philosophies of consciousness and the philosophies of being in order to consider the constitution of our ideas in a manner relevant to the education for being together with all people and creatures, with the universe, with the whole world which gives us our own place.

Keywords: individualism, person, participation, solidarity, education

Introduction

At the beginning of the paper I will briefly outline the need for discussion on participation in light of the philosophy of education. Then, I will proceed to Karol Wojtyła's reflexion of man and, in the end, I will introduce participation as *communio personarum*.

If I were asked why it is important to talk about participation in the philosophy of education, I would quote the report published 16 years ago in

The Economist. The British magazine wondered whether American business schools that educate future managers in fact harmed the business. The magazine paraphrased the view of Professor Sumantra Ghoshal of the London Business School: Students from these schools learn that managers need not to be trusted—that is, when they become managers themselves, their behavior is untrustworthy. Students were liberated from any sense of moral responsibility. This results in scandals like in Enron, where prominent managers were graduates from such schools.[1] Truth is that some business schools really seem to be training managers who lack ethics and neglect the social dimension of their job.

Education crisis can be considered in various aspects and many of its causes can be found. A harmful impact of relativism on the educational system is introduced, among others, by teachers' identity disorder, reducing all education subjects to the unilateral dimension of *homo oeconomicus*, promoting self-care and self-interest to the rank of a moral principle, treating individual freedom in an extremely individualistic way.[2] According to Czech philosopher of education Radim Palouš,[3] affectionate being together is important because being together with all creatures, with the universe, with the whole world provides us our own place.[4] Philosopher Charles Taylor describes the degrading of contemporary culture and today's society, pointing to, among other causes, individualism. The consequence of individualism is the emergence of a permissive society, a generation of narcissistic egoists, enclosed in a circle of their own loneliness, the disappearance of the community dimension of life, social horizons of action, common goals and moral responsibility. Individualism, according to Taylor, through the degeneration of moral horizons has led to a situation where everyone has their own morality, in which social rites and norms are limited to their purely instrumental role, any social hierarchies have been discredited, and people have thus lost a sense of a higher purpose, a broader vision of reality, remaining, instead, focused on their own individual lives.[5] Taylor proposed that we view worrying aspects of modernity, like peoples' obsessive quest for self-

[1] "Bad for business?" *The Economist*, February 19, 2005, https://www.economist.com/business/2005/02/17/bad-for-business.

[2] Michal Valčo, "Veda vs. scientizmus: kritické postrehy," in *Disputationes Quodlibetales XXII. Racionalita a viera,* ed. Pavol Dancák and Radovan Šoltés (Prešov: Gréckokatolícka teologická fakulta, 2019), 19–33.

[3] Radim Palouš (1924–2015) was a Czech dissident, a philosopher of education, and former spokesman for Charter 77, and from 1990 to 1994, he was the rector of Charles University in Prague. Palouš was a member of Pontifical Council for Culture. He published over 300 works: the books included *The School of the Old Age*, *Time for Education*, *Age of the World*, *Letters to the Godson*, *The Czech Experience*, *Persona and Communication*, *Totalitarianism and Holism*, *Ars Docendi*, etc.

[4] Radim Palouš, *K filozofii výchovy* (Praha: SPN, 1991), 10.

[5] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

fulfillment, in a different context, namely, not as a forgetfulness of morality but as a degeneration of a genuine moral ideal.[6]

Wojtyła says that individualism sees in the individual the supreme and fundamental good, to which all interests of the community or the society have to be subordinated. Individualism isolates the person from others as an individual who concentrates on himself and on his own goods.[7] As priority is given to individual goods, individualism also considers community goods as a threat to the individual. Other people are sources of limitation and ultimately present a conflict. Individualism is merely focused on individuals who are acting on their own. In this setup, there is no sense of fulfillment to be found in forming a community where people can experience themselves by acting together with others. People are described to be egoistic because their only concern is their own good. The community is not there to help them out but, rather, it is only there to get in the way of what an individual being wants. The individualist mindset has a narrow and short perspective on the world and on oneself.

Individualism isolates the person from the community and conceives the person solely as the one who concentrates on the pursuit of his own good. Primary individual goods include self-preservation and self-defense from others. Wojtyła adds that from the point of view of individualism, to act "together with others," just as to exist "together with others," is a necessity that the individual must submit to, a necessity that corresponds to none of his very own features or positive properties; neither does the acting and existing with others serve or develop any individual's positive and essential constituents.[8]

One of the problems addressed by Wojtyła is that of *alienation*. Drawn from the Marxist paradigm, alienation refers to the separation of things that naturally belong together.[9] In ordinary terms, alienation means being separated from something that one rightfully has ownership of. For example, a person may be alienated from his private property by the virtue of some law or some event. For Wojtyła, alienation is a problem and a hindrance to a person's fulfillment through his actions. Alienation is not a threat to man as a human being but it is a threat to him as a person.

Wojtyła's answer to the problem of alienation is his theory of *participation*—described as a property of the person as well as an ability to share in the humanity of others. This affirms the fact that man exists and acts together

[6] Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

[7] Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, trans. by Andrej Potocki (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 271.

[8] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 272.

[9] Jarosław Merecki, *Osoba i dobro. Szkice o filozofii i teologii osoby Karola Wojtyły – Jana Pavla II* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2019), 68.

with others. He is a member of a community in the form of an "I-you" and a "we" relationship. It consequently means that the constant challenge to seek and to find answers to the issues regarding one's personhood and one's world is a task common to each person that can also be taken as a task of the entire community.

Man—The Person in Action

Philosophical way of Karol Wojtyła is based on two streams within European philosophy which have different approaches towards reality. The first direction is classical philosophy in the Aristotle-Tomistic understanding or the philosophy of being, (i.e., realistic and objective). The second direction of the European philosophy is the philosophy of modern times (i.e., post-Cartesian), the philosophy of consciousness and subject which follows the Socratic and Augustinian tradition. In his study, Wojtyła uses a phenomenological method but he modifies Husserl's famous motto on returning to things into returning to man as a person. Wojtyła accepts that the traditional, non-phenomenological point of departure of anthropology objectifies man; his own point of departure is a phenomenological description of experience. While Wojtyła objects the cosmological point of departure as inadequate in anthropology, he does not limit anthropology to phenomenology and thus points to a transphenomenological approach to a complete anthropology. Wojtyła rejects Husserl's idealistic turn, which leads to a subjectivist reflection and absolutization of consciousness.[10] Thanks to phenomenology, we can come to better understanding of the human being as a personal subject and a "somebody" rather than "something." Wojtyła realizes this modification with an intention to objectivize a problem of the subjectivity of man,[11] so he wants to look at man as a subject capable of knowing, free acting and loving, that is, who lives in participation.

We can see many definitions of man throughout the history of philosophy. Classic definition put forth by Aristotle says that man is *anima rationale* (a rational animal), where animal stands for what is common and rationale

[10] Rocco Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1997), 331. Cf. Hans Köchler, "The Phenomenology of Karol Wojtyła. On the Problem of the Phenomenological Foundation of Anthropology," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 42 (1982): 326–334.

[11] Karol Wojtyła, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man," in *Analecta Husserliana. The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research*, vol. VII, 1978, edited by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Reidel Publ., 107.

for what is different. Wojtyła observes that although this definition answers the Aristotelian definition of kind, species, and species difference, he emphasizes that this definition tacitly assumes reducing a man to a mere part of the world and does not take into consideration what is "irreducible" in man. In this way, man has become predominantly an object and hence one of the many objects of this world where we belong in, visibly and physically. This definition was convenient to classical philosophy which was arising from metaphysics and cosmology; however, Wojtyła points out that man is a subject, that he or she is more than what is expressed in Aristotle's definition. Man cannot be reduced in his own essence or be explained without the rest through kind, species, or species differences. The thing that is irreducible is subjectivity.[12] Wojtyła tries to look at subjectivity of man objectively in order to avoid subjectivism and thus makes references to a definition by Boethius who defined person as *rationalis naturae individua substantia*. There, man is perceived as an individual substantial being that has rational nature and in this definition Wojtyła sees something like "metaphysical ground;" in other words, the dimension of being in which man's personal subjectivity is fulfilled.[13] This metaphysical anchor enables the self to *subsist* through all the tempests on the sea of experience.[14] Wojtyła presents a view of the human person that is very much person-centered and based upon individual experiences of self, while maintaining that being (the suppositum) of the person pre-exists any experience.

According to Karol Wojtyła, my "I" confronting your "you" does not aim at possessing "you." "I" treats "you" as a value so that "I" is opening to "you" in order to accept and enrich it, as it concerns the affirmation of man due to the fact that he is man.[15] The attitude of John Paul II concerning the I-you relation is different from Husserl's and dialogic attitude […]. According to the philosophers of dialogue, Buber in particular, the first is the relation between "I" and "you." However, according to Wojtyła, existentially the strongest are the personal entities in a basic reality. The I-you relation is secondary towards them, despite the fact that it is significant for them because it strengthens them and participates in the crystallization of their personal entity.[16]

[12] Both the metaphysical-cosmological and the personal-phenomenological methods are necessary to take into account the full richness of the human person. Angela Franz Franks, "Thinking the Embodied Person with Karol Wojtyła," *Nova et Vetera*, English Edition, vol. 16, no. 1 (2018): 156.

[13] Wojtyła, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man," 110.

[14] Franks, "Thinking the Embodied Person," 151.

[15] Jove Jim S. Aguas, "Karol Wojtyła: On Person and Subjectivity," *Ad Veritatem*, vol. 8, no. 2 (2009): 430. Cf. Alfred Wilder, "Community of Person in the Thought of Karol Wojtyła," *Angelicum*, vol. 56 (1979): 222–223.

[16] Sylwia Górzna, "Martin Buber: Father of the Philosophy of Dialogue," *European Journal of Science and Theology*, vol. 10, no. 5 (2014): 50.

Karol Wojtyła chooses experience of man to be the premise for his philosophical interest,[17] whereas he considers the experience of acting to be the fundamental experience, as far as man expresses himself as man in an act, and so the reflection of an act is, according to him, the key to know the truth about man.[18] Acts form a special moment of revelation and experience of a person. In a certain way they represent the most suitable point of departure in order to understand its dynamic essence.

In the analysis of mans' subjectivity which reveals itself in an action, Wojtyła draws on the experience of man with himself. Experience is always an experience of something (an object), in this case, it is a man. But a man, who has such experience, is subject as well. A man who experiences himself is a subject and an object at the same time.[19] In experience man has with himself, Wojtyła differentiates active and passive form (*agere* and *pati*), that is, he sees a difference in what man does and what happens to him. Active dynamism includes all deliberate and free acts of man. He claims that classical philosophy of Aristotle differentiates between these two kinds of dynamism, but in spite of this, it does not express the dynamics of being in a precise way, because if man acts (*agere*), at the same time, something happens inside him, so it does not take into consideration subjectivity.[20]

Classical philosophy saw the nature of man not only in *animal rationale* but it also took social character of man into account. Wojtyła takes over this motif as well, but he also makes a correction, as for him, man is not an inhabitant of polis in the first place, but it is the person who is building relationships with *you* and *we* by his acts. According to Wojtyła, to be social means to be open to each other. Personal "I" was defined as a subject which—is capable of realizing himself and as far as he disposes his own will he is able to decide for himself; and so it emphasizes that personal "I" owns itself. It is evident that "I" cannot have the experience of realizing oneself, auto- determination and owning oneself, as they are qualities that are typical of "you," that is, of somebody else. The impossibility of such experience does not mean that it is impossible to understand.[21] It follows that the scheme "I-the other one" is not general and abstract, but "the other one" always represents real, individual, and irreproducible person.

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[17] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 3.

[18] Tadeusz Styczeń, "Być sobą to przekraczać siebie. O antropologii Karola Wojtyły," in *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1994), 493.

[19] Karol Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," in *The Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 33, no. 2 (December 1979): 273–308.

[20] Karol Wojtyła, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man," in *Analecta Husserliana. The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research*, 110.

[21] Karol Wojtyła, "Participation or Alienation?" in *Analecta Husserliana. The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research*, vol. 6, 1977, Springer, Dordrecht. Edited by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3463-9_6.

In Wojtyła's view, the person always transcends political and social institutions even as he needs them for the sake of his own fulfillment because only the individual subject freely acting through himself in authentic community can achieve self-possession and genuine transcendence. The person is a whole being with self-dominion, who belongs to himself (sui iuris), and who can never be reduced to a moment of the absolute totality. On the other hand, Wojtyła's philosophy conserves individuality and personal selfhood, while it simultaneously recognizes the need for universality in the form of community. Essential to Wojtyła's notion of the rational state is every individual's right to pursue happiness, always grounded in the *bonum honestum*, in his or her own way.[22]

Participation—Communio Personarum

For Wojtyła, to be social in nature means that man exists and acts "together with others."[23] In his thoughts, he does not focus on society but on community. A community means something essential for its members. It is reality for getting along and common activity of people. People in a community live in mutual relationships, which enables them to differentiate between two levels of relationships: one level represents interpersonal relationships which are characterized by the "I-you" symbol and another one represents social relationships which are characterized by the "we" symbol. Both levels are parts of man's experience.

The experience with "you" is very important for "I" because on its basis "I" has richer experience of personal subjectivity. Besides, one cannot forget that "I" is "you" for another "I" which is my "you" at the same time. There are two subjects in the relationship of "I-you" with the same structure. For this reason, we use "you" and not "he." If we called the other one "he," we would take it for an object. The name "you" expresses a subject. In interpersonal relationships, there is an origin for realizing that it is not only "I" who wants to realize myself but "you" as well. There arises a duty of respect and compassion but also responsibility for another "you."[24] If one understands interpersonal relationships in this way, one can talk about *communio personarum*.

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[22] Richard A. Spinello, "The Enduring Relevance of Karol Wojtyła's Philosophy," *Logos. A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture*, vol. 17, no. 3 (2014): 44.

[23] This issue is discussed in chapter VII in *The Acting Person*.

[24] This issue is discussed in *Love and Responsibility.*

Every community of people is created through dialogue, which can take many forms. Nowadays, however, we see that the sense for dialogue is disappearing. This is reflected in the extremely high number of people who feel lonely, but also in the increase in superficial interpersonal contacts. Closely related to this is the disinterest of people about social life, which is reflected, among other things, in a lack of interest in publicly elected positions. Dialogue requires activity and humility before the truth, however, what we are witnessing is passivity as well as arrogant enforcement of selfish demands. This situation is a great challenge for education and requires an urgent solution, especially in economically developed countries, which are most affected by this social dystrophy. The loss of a sense for dialogue is based on two antagonistic anthropological concepts. On the one hand, it is individualism that closes a person to himself, and on the other hand, it is collectivism that reduces a person to an element of social structure (state, class, party, etc.).

Karol Wojtyła looks for a way out of this situation, he wants to lead out, that is, to rear up when he analyzes the problem of relationship among people and, generally, in society philosophically, while taking the person and an act fundamentally.[25] He considers the experience of acting with other people to be a source of knowing this dimension of man, which he calls participation (*participatio*).[26] He tries to find foundations for this fact and clarify it. In a certain sense, participation is a certain kind of dimension of a human being and his certain quality. Without this quality, man would not realize himself as a full person. Wojtyła discussed the term "communio personarum" in *Gaudium et Spes* (24), where he expresses interpersonal relationships between people and God and among people themselves.[27] "Communio personarum" expresses a way of being and acting of people living in a community, people who are affirmed as individuals through common being and acting. Thanks to such a quality man exists and acts together with other people, whereas he loses nothing from his

[25] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 262.

[26] Ibid., 269.

[27] According to Gregory R. Beabout, *The Acting Person* can be interpreted as a meditation on human action inspired by the Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et Spes*, which was promulgated by Paul VI as an official document of the Second Vatican Council (1965). Gregory R. Beabout, "Review Essay: Challenging the Modern World: John Paul II/Karol Wojtyła and the Development of Catholic Social Teaching by Samuel Gregg," *Journal of Markets & Morality*, vol. 4, no. 2 (2001): 359, 356–362. Interestingly, this interpretation is confirmed by Wojtyła's own brief reference to the circumstances under which the book was written. He confides that while writing *The Acting Person*, he attended the Second Vatican Council, and recalls that his participation in the proceedings "stimulated and inspired his thinking about the person." Hans Kochler, "Karol Wojtyła's Notion of the Irreducible in Man and the Quest for a Just World Order," in *Karol Wojtyła's Philosophical Legacy*, ed. Nancy Mardas Billias, Agnes B. Curry, and George F. McLean (Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2008), 174.

own way of being, that is, he does not stop being a person. Participation is such a quality of the person that it realizes itself only when the person enters certain relationships with other individuals and in common good.[28]

Interpersonal and social relationships express what is clear to man because there are two ways by which man can realize himself and, at the same time, they emphasize the fact that man is essentially open to others, he participates in their existence. According to Wojtyła, participation must be seen as a quality of man, corresponding with his subjectivity.[29] A man acting *together with others*, that is, participating, reveals new dimension of self as a person.[30] With his being and acting together with others, he exists and acts as a person. By participating in a community, he does not stop being himself and he also does not stop fulfilling himself. Common acting without participation leaves the actions of person without their personalistic value.[31]

Karol Wojtyła introduces a term of personalistic norm or standard. A man is not an island[32] but he realizes himself among other people without whom he would not be able to realize himself, he would not be able to realize love. Everyone forms a part of other peoples' lives. What concerns me, concerns the other as well.[33] Personalistic norm relates not only to relationships with others but also to my relationship with myself and that is connected with dignity. A man cannot treat himself as a thing, he cannot subordinate higher good to lower one and live according to lower good. The first line of defense of the dignity of the person is the teaching of the whole truth about man and the appeal to the search for the full truth. For the dignity of man is in knowing and living the truth about the human good.[34]

Participation must be updated, it is necessary to form and shape. A man not only exists and acts with others, but he achieves his own maturity in acting and existing with others. In a certain way, a person and a community belong to each other, they are not strange to each other or antagonistic, but they form a substantial subject of existence and acting even though re-

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[28] Ladislav Csontos, *Základná antropologická línia v encyklikách Jána Pavla II* (Trnava: Dobrá kniha, 1996), 70.

[29] Wojtyła, "Osoba: podmiot i wspólnota," 419.

[30] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 263.

[31] Ibid., 273.

[32] John Donne, "Meditation XVII, No Man is an Island," in *Devotions upon Emergent Occasions* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[33] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 274. Cf. Marek Rembierz, "Osoba ludzka w centrum dociekań filozoficznych i teologicznych Jana Pawła," in *Człowiek w refleksji Karola Wojtyły – Jana Pawła II (wybrane aspekty adekwatnej antropologii)*, ed. Anna Różyło and Mariusz Sztaba (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe KUL, 2014), 77–82.

[34] John P. Hittinger: "John Paul II on *Humanae Vitae* and the Priority of Ethics over Technology," *Philosophy and Canon Law*, vol. 5 (2019): 35–67.

alized together with others, it is a man—person.[35] Participation clarifies the term *neighbour.* We are invited to appreciate what is absolute in man. The term *neighbour* is connected to a man and a value of person alone, regardless the relationship with this or that community. It reflects humankind which belongs to every "other" man as well as "I" alone.[36] The ability of every man to participate in humankind is conditioned by personalistic value of each act and by living *with others*.[37] A man becomes a man through the deepest community.

For Wojtyła, the problem of the personal subject's relationship to the community is resolved through participation, a property or capability of the person that enables the person to engage with others without being absorbed by the social interplay and thus conditioned. If the person loses himself among others, he will be unable to freely and fully achieve himself.[38] Through participation the person is able to preserve the personalistic value of actions carried out with others. This means that the human person, while being a member of different communities, can still freely determine and fulfil himself in his actions. The person chooses what is chosen by others because their choice represents a value consonant with his own values. In authentic participation, the person does not sacrifice his transcendence or suppress his personality. On the contrary, it is a neuralgic point of education.

Conclusion

Self-giving expresses a special distinguishing feature of personal existence, nature of a person. When God says that it is not good for man to be alone (cf. Gn 2,18), he confirms that the man *alone* does not realize this being fully. He realizes it only when he lives with *somebody*, and deeper and ideally, if he lives for *somebody.* This law for existence of a person is given as a sign of creation by the meaning of two words, *alone* and *help*, which emphasize how important a community of people for man is. Community of people means to be here for each other, in a relationship of mutual self-giving.

The man was given rule over the earth, and as *God's image*, he is a person able to act in a reasonable and planned manner, able to decide about himself and focus on self-realization. From the beginning, the man is called to "work."

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[35] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 276.

[36] Ibid., 294.

[37] Ibid., 295.

[38] Spinello, "The Enduring Relevance of Karol Wojtyła's Philosophy," 40.

By work, he is different from other creations. Only a man is able to work and only the man fulfils his existence on Earth by his work. In that way, work was marked by a special seal of man and humankind, the seal of a person acting in a community of people. And this seal reveals inner value and, in a certain sense, establishes its naturalness.[39]

Work is an occupation of each person because it belongs to a person and it completely belongs to a person who carries it out and who it is beneficial to. A man develops and fulfils himself at work and he participates in the plan of creation. John Paul II prefers subjective meaning of work to objective one. The first foundation of man's work value is a man himself —its subject.[40] Although man was born to work, in the first place, work is *for man* and not man *for work*. The pope emphasises dignity of love. "Man cannot live without love. To himself, man remains an incomprehensible being and his life lacks meaning if Love is not revealed to him, if he does not meet Love."[41] A call for learning to be human in global times is a challenge to recover from love which acts not through available helping means, but through the ability to empathize and be compassionate and to give solidarity to those who suffer in such a way that this helping gesture is not perceived as humbling alms, but as brotherly concern.[42]

The community for Wojtyła must be an acting *together-with-others* and not acting only for the sake of self-serving ends. Hence, Wojtyła requires that a person in a community must have the *attitude of solidarity* and the *attitude of opposition* that paves the way for the *sense of dialogue*. Through these authentic attitudes, the person can participate in a community and prevent alienation. These attitudes are attainable only by a person who is *receptive* and humble.[43] For John Paul II, solidarity was about the transmission of ideas and thus was educational.

[39] John Paul II, *Laborem Exercens*, no. 4, http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091981_laborem-exercens.html, accessed November 10, 2020.

[40] John Paul II, *Laborem Exercens*, no. 17.

[41] John Paul II, *Redemptor Hominis*, no. 10, https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_04031979_redemptor-hominis.html, accessed November 10, 2020.

[42] John Paul II, Apostolic Letter *Novo Millenio Ineunte*, 10.

[43] Blaise D. Ringor, "Educational Receptivity: Karol Wojtyła's Philosophy of Community as a Means Towards Embracing Differences." The European Conference on Education 2020 Official Conference Proceedings (2020): accessed November 30, 2020, http://papers.iafor.org/wp-content/uploads/papers/ece2020/ECE2020_57552.pdf.

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Pavol Dancák

Riflessione contemporanea sulla partecipazione come dimensione essenziale della filosofia dell'educazione nel contesto di *Persona e atto*

Sommario

L'articolo affronta il tema dell'idea di partecipazione come dimensione essenziale della filosofia dell'educazione nel contesto del pensiero di Karol Wojtyła. L'autore presenta i concetti di persona e di partecipazione e incoraggia una discussione sulla filosofia dell'educazione, perché nota che la libertà dell'individuo è trattata in modo estremamente individualistico. Wojtyła si riferisce alla filosofia della coscienza e alla filosofia dell'essere per considerare la costituzione delle nostre idee in modo appropriato per educarci a stare insieme con tutte le persone e le creature, con l'intero universo, il che di fatto, ci dà un senso del proprio posto.

Parole chiave: individualismo, persona, partecipazione, solidarietà, educazione

Pavol Dancák

Réflexion contemporaine sur la participation comme dimension essentielle de la philosophie de l'éducation dans le cadre de *Personne et acte*

Résumé

L'article aborde la question de l'idée de participation comme dimension essentielle de la philosophie de l'éducation dans le contexte de la pensée de Karol Wojtyła. L'auteur présente les concepts de personne et de participation et encourage une discussion sur la philosophie de l'éducation, car il constate que la liberté de l'individu est traitée de manière extrêmement individualiste. Wojtyła fait référence à la philosophie de la conscience et à la philosophie de l'être pour considérer la constitution de nos idées d'une manière appropriée pour nous éduquer à être ensemble avec toutes les personnes et toutes les créatures, avec l'univers entier, ce qui nous donne en fait un sens de notre propre place.

Mots-clés: individualisme, personne, participation, solidarité, éducation

Part Two

Reviews

Philosophy and Canon Law 2021, vol. 7(1) p. 1/4
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Janusz Mariański, *Godność ludzka—wartość doceniona czy puste słowo? Studium socjopedagogiczne*. Warszawa: Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Socjologiczne, 2019, pp. 338

With respectable consequence, Rev. Prof. Janusz Mariański—distinguished sociologist of morality, sociologist of religion and spirituality, recently granted with the dignity of doctor honoris causa of the University of Silesia—leads an orderly and multilateral sociological contemplation of the issue of human dignity. Currently, in his fourth book, he has thoroughly prepared and submitted for discussion the results of analyses concerning various aspects of the issue of human dignity, which are of a significant cognitive value.

Janusz Mariański presents an insightful and multilateral analysis of the issue of dignity. He includes the leading theme in the title, which constitutes an aptly formulated, rhetorically sophisticated and provoking in-depth, reflective question about dignity—"an appreciated value or an empty word?", also concentrating on the issue of education to dignity.

By realizing a research program that focuses on the issue of dignity and developing, we might say, sociology of dignity, Mariański follows the path of high intellectual demands set by Maria Ossowska (1896–1974), an outstanding expert in the theory and history of morality. In his subsequent monographs on dignity, Mariański approvingly refers to Ossowska's analyses and theses. From the point of view of the interests of the sociology of morality, she used to pay close attention to the cognitively interesting and practically significant issue of dignity. A proper approach to these issues requires the researcher to demonstrate a high level of humanistic culture within the area of research and reflection on morality. Humanistic culture of such a quality is presented by the author of the monograph. The book *Godność ludzka—wartość doceniona czy puste*

słowo? Studium socjopedagogiczne [Human Dignity—An Appreciated Value or an Empty Word? Socioeducational Study] not only pursues a research program focused on the issue of dignity, but also constitutes a program of research aimed at the promotion of human dignity, especially in education.

In the Introduction, Mariański presents the research idea in a systematized form. He emphasizes the need and legitimacy of sociological research concerning dignity. At the same time, he notices that "the authors of the concept of 'dignity' in the *Catholic Encyclopedia* emphasize that it can be considered in psychological, philosophical, religious, and legal aspects, but do not mention sociological aspects" (p. 15). Not only does Mariański postulate such research, but he himself consistently studies these aspects. He draws attention to the omissions in sociological research: "Human dignity as a value is rarely subject to sociological analysis. Sociologists' fears […] result from the fact that dignity and the phenomena associated with this concept cannot be easily empirically verified, they are connected with the ethical and religious context, unjustified valuing and even moralizing in this field are very easy. Undertaking sociological research on human dignity, we are aware of all these dangers, but we try to focus, above all, on a reliable analysis of what is understood by the notion of human dignity in the contemporary Polish society, what environmental differences exist and what are the perceived manifestations of promoting or destroying this dignity in social life" (p. 24). As one of the inspirations for such targeted research, Mariański refers to the book *The Dignity of the Human Person as a Basis of Human Rights*, in which Franciszek Janusz Mazurek presents his own lecture on this subject.

Janusz Mariański is aware that in relation to the notion of dignity we are facing an undesirable phenomenon of *concept inflation*—as Andrzej Bronk claims—and the word dignity, has become ambiguous in each of the many fields of its use: theology, philosophy, anthropology, ethics, psychology, sociology, pedagogy, and legal sciences.

> In its ideological function, the concept of the dignity of man is invoked by various political parties, which otherwise differ in all other aspects, as a popular media slogan and a tool of political struggle. If the political left and right, conservatives and liberals, believers and non-believers, invoke the dignity of man, they cannot have the same thing in mind. Something else must be proclaimed by those who claim that man has an inalienable dignity which he owes to God, and something else must be proclaimed by those who, seeing man purely biologically as an evolutionary creature of nature, consider his dignity to be a value that derives from a cultural or social (institutional) giving (Andrzej Bronk) (p. 16).

Mariański also quotes the over-optimistic, even naive and even harmful, conviction that dignity "belongs to those notions which the whole world understands

without the need to define" (p. 17). In various cultural and ideological contexts, the issue of human dignity is not an obvious one, and even the value of human dignity is denied and depreciated systematically.

Janusz Mariański's research is guided by the assumption that was aptly expressed by Ija Lazari-Pawłowska: "Our moral intuitions dictate that we must give the intrinsic value to every human individual, take into account his autonomous good in action; no man in his existence should be downgraded to a thing" (p. 20). In quoting this ethical assumption, Mariański expresses his solidarity with its message and concluding the Introduction he formulates an explicit appeal: "Let us save, realize and strengthen it [human dignity] as a fundamental value in building a successful individual life and a decent and good society" (p. 27).

The book under review has a well-prepared and transparent structure. The titles of the chapters and paragraphs were properly defined. Chapter I, Personal, Personality and Private Dignity, includes an analysis and various aspects of the concept (i.e., theological, philosophical, psychosociological, and social situations that threaten dignity). Chapter II, The Concept of Human Dignity and the Ways in Which It Is Justified, contains the following subchapters: 1. The sources and dimensions of human dignity; 2. Justification of human dignity; and 3. Assessment of own sense of dignity. Chapter III, Individual and Social Situations Threatening Human Dignity, contains: 1. Situations that threaten human dignity, according to the teaching of the Catholic Church; 2. Individual situations that threaten human dignity; 3. Social situations that threaten human dignity. Chapter IV, Education for Dignity Values, contains: 1. The concept of moral education; 2. Human dignity is the basis of moral education; 3. Pro-dignity education in practice. It is complemented by a rich Bibliography, a testimony of an excellent erudition.

The book *Godność ludzka—wartość doceniona czy puste słowo? Studium socjopedagogiczne* [Human Dignity—An Appreciated Value or an Empty Word? Socioeducational Study], whose author is also a Roman Catholic cleric, should be addressed as an obligatory book for priests and preachers, since the issue of dignity is at the center of their mission, the ministry of prophesying. The issue of dignity and its dangers in pastoral and preaching activity is well known to Rev. Józef Tischner. He juxtaposes two different approaches to human dignity, that is, depreciating or affirmative, which are present in the preaching narratives. The first one depreciating dignity looks as follows: "[…] a priest goes to the pulpit, has a crowd of people in front of him, in this crowd he can see above all sinners. Just like a tailor who walks down the street and sees mostly badly sewn clothes, or the dentist who looks at a man's smile and sees mostly holes in his teeth, so does the priest, looking at people, sees above all sin. […] the scene of the crucifixion becomes […] a motive to humiliate man. That was very often the case" (p. 344). By humiliating man's dignity the preacher in-

strumentalizes and depreciates what, from the point of view of his religion, is meant to be a particular kind of holiness The right approach to the scene of the crucifixion, according to Rev. Tischner, is to see that there is an act of affirmation of human dignity: "We look at the crucifix and say: people look, look at how precious you are, […] since the Son of God died on the cross for you. It is possible to approach the same scene either by humiliating the dignity of man, or by emphasizing that dignity" (p. 344). Following Rev. Tischner's thought: "It is better for a preacher not to go to the pulpit if he does not read with understanding and familiarize himself with the content of Rev. Mariański's book about the value of human dignity. Within this context, we may ask to what extent the motivation to write this socioeducational study, strongly exposing the value of human dignity, was a result of coming across such pastoral and preaching activity which humiliates human dignity instead of, as, among others, Ossowska, Lazari-Pawłowska, WojtyłaTischner, and Mariański unanimously agree, properly emphasizing it.

The book is recommended as an almost obligatory reading for a wide range of people interested in the issue of human dignity. I recommend it as an original and important voice of the distinguished sociologist and humanist in the debate on understanding human dignity.

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Karol Jasiński, *Relacja między religią i sferą publiczną w filozofii społecznej i politycznej Charlesa Taylora*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego, Olsztyn 2017, 372 pp.

Religion proved to be one of the most powerful forces that have ever dominated the human history, although often paradoxically. Religion has unified tribes and races into nations, but it has also broken that integrity. Religion has built and destroyed empires. Religion has started wars, but it could also compel to peace. Religion has given birth to rich cultures and has built a spiritual barrier against the totalitarian claims of matter. It has aroused dramatic struggle in souls, but it has been a source of peace and restlessness, too. Religion has made a poor man happy. Religion has also shown the hedonists that they are the paupers. Religion has enriched the poverty of the humble and it has revealed the poverty in the hearts of the rich. And whenever any nation exterminated the religious spirit, it felled, at the same time, the roots of its own culture and life. And for these reasons, the study of the relationship between religion and the public sphere is highly topical.

The author of this work has set two main objectives: the first is to present Charles Taylor's concept of society and religion, the second is to highlight the need for presence of religion in the public sphere in relation to Taylor's concept of mankind. In view of the above objectives, three main hypotheses are posed, with the appropriate arguments brought up to support them. First, Taylor distances himself from the liberal model of society and leans toward republican solutions. Second, the Canadian philosopher shows the development of religion into individualized forms of religion, but also underlines the significance of

traditional religious ties based on rituals and practices. Third, the presence of religion in the public sphere seems to be, in Taylor's writings, related to specific qualities of the human being, who is an active participant of this sphere. The above theses were, therefore, the reference points for the various chapter this work.

Karol Jasiński draws attention to the controversy between Charles Taylor and William James. In Taylor's approach to the issue of religion, one should emphasize the need for cultural conditioning of the concept of "transcendence" and apophatism in the description of God. Taylor develops his own concept of religion in a polemic with William James, according to whom religion has its source in the feelings and experience of individual. The Canadian philosopher criticizes this individual dimension of religion, and the individualism, emotivism, and expressivism associated with it, and emphasizes its community dimension—religion is in fact a way of experiencing ties of community. The significance of the religious community is high, because certain individual experiences, including religious one, become more intensive when shared with other people. At the same time, it is very important that every person, however, must independently find and articulate a certain spiritual horizon.

Charles Taylor tried to provide a deeper philosophical explanation of why groups within Western societies were increasingly making claims for public acknowledgment of their particular identities. In Taylor's opinion we can search for sources of identity in naturalism, expressionism, and theism. Taylor seems to suggest that humans necessarily have some orientation toward what he calls "transcendence"—some yearning for meaning that goes above and beyond the merely human. He emphasizes the existence of God as an essential spiritual horizon and foundation of good. Some people recognize God because He is the best principle explaining their lives and beliefs. God should, therefore, be restored to the process of shaping personal identity because He is currently a "dormant" but still living source. In Taylor's opinion, religion, especially Christianity, thus serves an important role in defining the identity and giving sense to the life of not only people but also society. It provides for a solid spiritual horizon. Taylor thus encourages the exploration of its potential, the private and public spheres, as has been done for centuries.

This work is very much needed. It engages in the most important debates of contemporary political philosophy and makes a valuable contribution to the study of Charles Taylor's thought and to the analysis of the public sphere and the place of religion in it. It is written in clear language, with a deeply humanistic take on and concern for the quality of the public sphere. Taylor's social philosophy has been thoroughly analyzed, set in the context of contemporary social theory and shown as one of the leading philosophical concepts of the public sphere. The author revealed himself as an accomplished researcher of the Canadian philosopher's thoughts and a competent researcher in the field of

political philosophy. He tries to combine philosophical analysis with in-depth sociological hermeneutics, which is especially valuable considering the fact that the present day needs more and more solid foundations for its existence. The broadness of his horizons and his erudition should be appreciated.

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Mariusz Henryk Sztaba, *Etyczno-moralne postawy życia społecznego w świetle nauczania Karola Wojtyły—św. Jana Pawła II. Wybrane aspekty*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wyższego Instytutu Teologicznego w Częstochowie, Częstochowa 2019, 301 pp.

John Paul II is a mystery to many of his contemporaries, who have received their intellectual formation from the Western liberal tradition. On the one hand, he is an ardent supporter of the religious, political, and economic freedoms championed by liberal democracies, and a vigorous opponent of communism and socialism. On the other hand, many liberals see John Paul as a reactionary figure. There are many differences, including contrasting assessments of current forms of capitalism and of economic globalization, as well as differing views concerning economic democracy, economic rights, consumerism, the significance of structural injustice as a cause of poverty, the proper economic role of the state, the importance of lifestyle simplification, and the urgency of ecological issues. Nowhere is this perceived tension more evident than in regard to his treatment of biomedical questions and related human life issues. George Weigel took hold of the position of John Paul II well, when he recalled his performance at the Second Vatican Council. Archbishop Wojtyła, as one of the proponents of a new *Declaration on Religious Freedom*, spoke in the first days of the debate, sharpening the point he had made in the third session of Vatican II on the relationship between freedom and truth. It was not sufficient, he argued, to say simply, "I am free." Rather, it is necessary to say "I am responsible."

Responsibility is the necessary culmination and fulfillment of freedom in Wojtyła's philosophical point of view. His conviction about the essential relationship between freedom and responsibility was emphasized, among other his papers, in his treatise *Love and Responsibility.* Anyone who wants to comment on the ethical reflection of Karol Wojtyła must take into account his emphasis on responsibility.

The treatise *Etyczno-moralne podstawy życia społecznego w świetle nauczania Karola Wojtyły – św. Jana Pawła II. Wybrane aspekty* [Ethical and Moral Principles of Social Life in the Light of the Teachings of Karol Wojtyła—St. John Paul II. Selected Aspects] is divided into three parts. 1. *Realistyczne i integralne doświadczenie etyczne u podstaw doświadczenia osoby oraz wspólnoty.* [A Realistic and Integral Ethical Experience Underpinning the Experience of the Person and the Community]. 2. *Prymat moralności w życiu społecznym* [The Primacy of Morality in Social Life] *3. Wychowanie moralne w służbie autentycznego życia społecznego* [Moral Education at the Service of Authentic Social Life]. The treatise is an attempt to systematize the main foundations of social life in an ethical and moral framework, drawn not only from the pastoral experience of Cardinal Karol Wojtyła-John Paul II, but also from scientific reflection.

The author of this peer-reviewed study, Mariusz Sztaba does it in a multifaceted and, at the same time, insightful and orderly, as well as logical and comprehensive manner, which undoubtedly reflects his competence. A valuable asset of the book is its catechetical dimension, the aspect of conscience formation, showing educational ideals, personal models and authorities, as well as interpersonal and social relations. The presented work is theoretical. It is part of the problems constituting the research area of social sciences and humanities.

The underlying principles that provide coherence to John Paul's thought on democracy and morality can be found in his particular synthesis of phenomenology, philosophical personalism, and Thomistic ethics, especially his "law of the gift," which stresses that human subjectivity is fundamentally relational. Wojtyła's philosophical research oscillates around the human conception of the person he presented in the work *The Acting Person*. Based on Boethius, St. Thomas Aquinas and phenomenological philosophy, Wojtyła described a person as having self-awareness and freedom of choice. He distinguishes two-sided human dynamism: active and passive. Passive human dynamism describes somatic and physiological processes and is at the level of the biological nature of a person who at most registers that something is happening to him/her. Active human dynamism is associated with a person as an actor. Due to the reflexive nature of consciousness, one experiences his/her deed and himself/herself as the originator of acting. Through consciousness, he or she experiences the morality of his/her acts. Consciousness comes before, during, and after the act. The act

leaves its trace in consciousness. After performing the act, the consciousness still reflects it—one is then conscious of his/her actions in the next act—but it no longer accompanies him/her.

The aim of the study was to present a philosophical and theological analysis of the moral foundations of social life with regard to dialogue as an important and fundamental contribution to the solution of serious social problems. The problem of man in the context of social life, with all its richness and multifaceted nature, makes one experience the specific requirements related to research of person more and more. With this specific research requirements of the author, the study presents not only multidisciplinary but also interdisciplinary issues of the human person and its functioning in various areas of social life.

Being respectful of man as a person creates a precondition for peace between people and between nations and which can lead to eradication or at least alleviation of certain social conflicts. The requirement of education is a moral challenge for all to work with those who are disadvantaged in any way. Education as an expression of belonging is not only aid, but also responsibility for the whole, for the community, for the world, for the Earth. We feel that responsible education can benefit the development of all those involved.

The study as a whole is an interesting material. The content of the study was written at a very high level. The author presents a wide spectrum of issues concerning the ethical and moral foundations of social life in the light of the teaching of Karol Wojtyła-John Paul II in an original way.

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Logical Terms of Sense Realism: A Thomistic-Aristotelian & Phenomenological Defense" (*Reality*, Issue 1, vol. 1, Spring 2020); "On the Foundational Compatibility of Phenomenology & Thomism" (*Studia Gilsoniana*, vol. 10, no. 3, September, 2021); The Intelligibility of Nature: The Wallace Reader, Co-Editor with John P. Hittinger and Michael W. Tkacz (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2021); and, φύσις καί τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν: The Aristotelian Foundations of the Human Good (Dissertation Available through Proquest, written under John P. Hittinger).

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