


2440.

98 1524

*Note
Regarding the Plebiscite
in Upper Silesia
(March 20, 1921)*


**Biblioteka
Wojewódzka
w Katowicach**



B 1524

BZ 15892

641 358 II



Biblioteka
Wojewódzka
w Katowicach

NOTE

Regarding the Plebiscite in Upper Silesia

(March 20, 1921)

I.

According to official German sources it may be established that the Polish population of Upper Silesia amounted in 1920 to about 1 260 000.

In the plebiscite vote 479 559 voters declared themselves in favour of Poland. According to calculations presented in Annex I, these 479 559 voters represent 1 022 000 inhabitants of the plebiscite territory.

Doubt had been raised as to whether the 1 260 000 Poles above mentioned desired to be united with Poland and the plebiscite was intended precisely to settle this question. As regards more than a million of them no doubt is longer possible and it is evident that they wish to be joined to Poland.

It would be easy to demonstrate that the number of votes for Poland would have been still larger, if the Polish population had not been submitted to strong economic and moral pressure on the part of the administration of Upper Silesia which remains Prussian until the present time, and if the Germans had not resorted to all sorts of abuses and frauds (see Annex no. 2).

It follows from an examination of the results of the vote that an agglomeration of Polish majorities exists towards the East while the German majorities are found towards the West. A line of division is dictated.

This line, separating the region of the German majority from those with a Polish majority, is as follows: It commences at Bogumin (Oderberg) and follows the Oder leaving to Poland those parts of

the districts of Raciborz (Ratibor) and of Kozle (Cosel) on the right bank of the river. On the left bank it would embrace a number of communes which declared themselves for Poland. From there it would follow the boundary of the district of Strzelce (Gross Strehlitz), as far as Groszowice (Groschowitz), whence it would turn toward the East as far as Vossowska and then toward the North to Chobie and Knieja (Kneja). Then it would traverse the district of Olesno (Rosenberg) to the Polish frontier.

The following are the data with regard to the majority of communes, votes and population in each of these two parts of the plebiscite territory (Polish block and German block).

In the part where the Polish majorities are found (6 450 km²) :

	Number of votes	Number of inhabitants represented by these votes.	Number of communes and manors.
For Poland	455 260	929 000	673
For Germany	409 618	619 000	230

In the part where the German majorities are found (4 500 sq. klm.) :

For Germany	297 987	402 000	563
For Poland	44 099	93 000	23

II

Germany, recognising that the result of the plebiscite is not favourable for her, raises various objections against the proposed solution and, first of all, proclaims the principle of the indivisibility of Upper Silesia.

It is not difficult to prove that this thesis is ill founded. The Treaty of Versailles speaks in explicit terms in Article 88, as well as in Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Annex to that Article, of a division of the plebiscite territory and of a boundary line to be traced.

The thesis of indivisibility should be rejected also because this province is already in fact divided, the districts of Grottkau, Neisse, Falkenberg and in part that of Neustadt, having been assigned to Germany before the plebiscite while as a part of the district of Ratibor which was allotted to Czecho-Slovakia.

Germany declares that economic grounds likewise oppose the separation of Upper Silesia from the Empire, the economic relations between it and Upper Silesia being so close that the two countries form but one from the point of view of production, and that it would not be possible to detach them from one another without destroying the mechanism which assures the success of production.

This argument is entirely without foundation. The pretended unity of Germany and Upper Silesia was no closer than is necessarily the case where two countries are surrounded by the same tariff boundary. As we show in a special study (See Annex 4), the bonds which existed between Germany and Upper Silesia were merely artificial and constituted even a hindrance to the development of Upper Silesian industry. In fact, the importance of the coal industry, and still more that of the metallurgical industry of Upper Silesia for the economic life of Germany was diminishing from year to year as the consequence of the geographical situation of Upper Silesia, far removed from the body of the Empire, and of the constantly increasing competition of the Western coal basins, better situated with respect to German markets and privileged by the railroad tariff policy and by the customs tariff policy of the German Government (See Annex 4). On the other hand the industry of Upper Silesia cannot get along without the raw materials originating in Poland and it finds its natural markets in the countries of the East. In this manner Poland and Upper Silesia complement one another : the industrial region of Upper Silesia as centre of production, Poland as source of raw materials and as one of the most important markets for that production.

Germany urges also that she would be menaced in her existence and condemned to economic ruin if she should lose Upper Silesia. This statement does not correspond to the facts, since Upper Silesia played only a secondary role in the economic life of Germany. There is no doubt that it constituted a source of enrichment for Germany, but this was accomplished with a detriment to the population of the country.

Upper Silesia has been treated up to the present day as a colony and as such always exploited. The German policy in this respect was not limited to drawing profit from the natural riches of the soil of Upper Silesia and those beneath its surface; it consisted

also of the exploitation of the local population. Nowhere else in the Empire were the wages of labour so low; nowhere else was the labour of women and children so exploited as in Upper Silesia, where children figured regularly among the underground workers.

The cities of the industrial district, which gave strong German majorities in the plebiscite, play in the economic organism of Upper Silesia only the role of administrative centres directing this exploitation of the country. We devote a special annex to the examination of the conditions of labour and of the system of exploitation in Upper Silesia and to the role played by the cities (See annex 5).

By leaving to Germany the power to continue as in the past to exploit the Polish working classes of Upper Silesia, who are impatiently awaiting the hour of deliverance, the European Powers would help to create a centre of incessant troubles in the heart of Europe.

Not less ill founded are the German assertions to the effect that Poland would dispose within its present frontiers of more than sufficient coal resources and would possess such great unexploited reserves that she could dispense with those of Silesia.

On the contrary, it is a demonstrated fact that Poland lacks coal and this fact is explained in the following manner.

The mines of that part of the Polish coal basin which is situated in former Congress Poland (Dombrowa basin) and which contains coal strata easily accessible to extraction (Sattelfloetze), develop up to the same level of advancement as the mines of the industrial district of Upper Silesia. The exploitation of these Polish coal strata is highly advanced. This part of the Polish coal territory, however, is very limited in area and its coal reserves belonging to the " Sattelfloetze " group do not amount to more than 1/12 as much as the coal reserves of the same group in the central basin of Upper Silesia. The reserves of the Southern part of the Polish basin (Galicia and the Polish part of Teschen), where the exploitation is comparatively little advanced, are, according to geological researches, especially those of German experts, very inferior to those of the central district of Upper Silesia in all respects: quality of coal, thickness of veins and accessibility. The profitable exploitation of the coal deposits of this part of the Polish basin, as well as that of the coal reserves of the district of Pless (Pszczyna)

in the Upper Silesian basin, will be possible on a large scale only after the mines of the central Upper Silesian basin shall be on the point of exhaustion (see Annex 4).

III.

On the other hand, it is certain (as is proved by Annex 4) that Germany without the Upper Silesian coal, and even after the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar district, could not only cover its own coal requirements but even dispose of a surplus for export, and the more so because, by virtue of Article 90 of the Treaty of Versailles, Poland would be obliged to authorize the exportation of products of the Upper Silesian mines to Germany in case Upper Silesia should be detached from the Empire.

The coal of Upper Silesia, and in fact all its other products, are, however, for the regions toward the East, the vital condition of their industrial development, just as the artificial fertilisers of Upper Silesia are indispensable for their agricultural development. Upper Silesia, by its geographical situation as well as by its ethnographic character, is therefore destined to contribute to the normal development of the countries of the East.

Moreover, it is evident that Germany, if she controlled Upper Silesia, would remain mistress of the development of these countries. She would hold them in economic dependence to herself just as she has done hitherto and, according to the needs of her policy, she would paralyse their natural evolution. This economic dependence would necessarily involve a political dependence which would have as a consequence the rebirth of the conception of Mittel Europa under German hegemony, a conception whose realization has been hindered by the victory of the Allies but which is arising anew, as is proved by the recent events in the Tyrol.

Poland of pre-war days affords a striking example of the dangers which menace peoples who do not possess economic independence and who are thereby deprived of all possibility of industrialization. Bound down in her normal economic development, she was obliged to send to America in the year 1915 alone no less than 500 000 emigrants, and also to send in search of temporary labour beyond her frontiers, especially in Germany, about 500 000 persons

annually, who furnished to Germany an underpaid labour force. On the other hand, the German Empire, despite an annual increase of 700 000 inhabitants, had an emigration of only 50 000 or 40 000 persons yearly.

It is evident therefore that both the economic development of Upper Silesia itself and the establishment in Central Europe of an equilibrium of productive forces and of normal conditions of existence for the various peoples, are opposed to a solution of the Upper Silesian problem different from that which we have set forth.

This solution, conforming to the Treaty of Versailles as well as to the results of the plebiscite, would attribute to Poland that part of Upper Silesia which declared itself Polish by a strong majority of communes as well as of inhabitants.

DELEGATION FOR THE AFFAIRS OF UPPER SILESIA

President : (—) *Dr. K. RAKOWSKI*,

DELEGATE OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR THE AFFAIRS OF UPPER SILESIA.

Members of the Polish Plebiscite Committee :

(—) *Eng. Jozef KIEDRON.*

(—) *Dr. Jozef POTYKA.*

(—) *Dr. Jan GORSKI.*

Experts :

(—) *Eug. ROMER.*

(—) *Jerzy KRAMSZTYK.*

(—) *Eng. Sz. RUDOWSKI.*

(—) *Eng. St. GRABIANOWSKI.*

Paris, May 18, 1921.

ANNEXE 4

Analysis of the results of the plebiscite

THE POLISH AND GERMAN BLOCKS

In the Polish block 675 communes and manors (Gutsbezirke) voted for Poland and only 250 for Germany. Moreover this number of 250 includes only a few large cities; the remainder is composed almost exclusively of small population manors, which are under the domination of rich German proprietors who possess every facility for influencing the vote.

Approximatively three quarters of the area of this Polish block consist of communes which gave a majority for Poland. On the other hand the region situated to the West of the partition line indicated in the Note gave an almost solid majority for Germany. In the Polish block as a whole there were 455,260 votes for Poland and 409,618 for Germany. In the German block 297,987 votes were cast for Germany and 44,099 for Poland.

In order to appreciate correctly the results of the vote, one must bear in mind the conditions in which the two contending parties stood. Above all, one must not lose sight of the fact that when the Peace Conference, by its first decision, assigned Upper Silesia to Poland directly and without restriction, it based the delimitation of territory not merely on ethnographic considerations but also on strategic and economic grounds. It was thus that the district of Namyslow (Namslau) was allotted to Poland in order to rectify the frontier, and the district of Glupeczyce (Leobschutz) on account of the enclave between Troppau, Katscher and Oderberg, which latter was to be assigned to the Czecho-Slovaks. In reality the results of the vote in these districts ought not to be taken into account, since the plebiscite ought to decide only concerning the lot of territories whose ethnographic character was contested.

Consequently, in examining the results of the vote, these two districts must necessarily be excluded.

Vote of the Local Population. — It is impossible to know exactly how many émigrés voted altogether. The official figure of the number of émigrés registered is 192,496. Among the total of voters the abstentions were only 2.1 %; but this proportion was without doubt a little higher for the émigrés. Estimating it at 5.5 %, we arrive at 186,000 as the number of émigrés who actually voted.

In the Polish block, 94,065 émigrés were registered and in the German block 98,431. Applying the percentage of abstentions above indicated, we obtain a figure of about 90,500 émigrés voting in the Polish block and 95,000 in the German block.

No one knows, of course, exactly how the émigrés voted. Nevertheless certain facts indicate clearly how the great majority of them voted. As a matter of fact, no Upper Silesian settled in America could possibly return to vote. The only other country where a large number of émigrés from Upper Silesia have settled is Germany, and 95 ¹⁰/₁₀₀ of the émigrés who voted came from that country. In Germany they have been subject to powerful germanizing influences. Moreover, the Upper Silesians living in Germany, who wished to return to Upper Silesia in order to vote for Poland, found infinitely less facility to do so than those who could be counted upon to vote for Germany.

Taking account of all these conditions, we cannot suppose that more than 10 % of the émigrés, or in round numbers 19,000 persons, voted for Poland. The actual number is doubtless much less. Moreover, it is certain that the greater part of the émigrés who voted for Poland cast their ballots in the Polish block. We believe that in the German block there were no more than 2,000 émigrés who gave their votes for Poland, i. e. there remain at the maximum 17,000 such émigrés in the Polish block.

Assuming the above figures as regards the vote of the émigrés, the vote of the local population appears in round numbers as follows :

Total Vote	Polish Block	German Block	Total
For Poland.	435,500	44,100	479,600
For Germany.	409,600	298,000	707,600
<i>Vote of émigrés.</i>			
For Poland.	17,000	2,000	19,000
For Germany.	74,000	95,000	167,000
<i>Vote of the inhabitants of the Plebiscite territory (by subtraction).</i>			
For Poland.	418,000	42,000	460,000
For Germany.	536,000	205,000	541,000

POPULATION REPRESENTED BY THE VOTE OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE PLEBISCITE TERRITORY IN THE POLISH BLOCK

It is clearly specified in the Treaty of Versailles that the partition of Upper Silesia *should be in conformity with the desire expressed by the "inhabitants", and not merely with the desire of the voters* (article 88. Paragraph 5 of the Annex).

For that matter, even if this point had not been specified, it would obviously be only just to take into consideration the interest of the children represented by the voters and the variations in the size of families among the different categories of voters.

The attribution of Upper Silesia to Germany or to Poland affects the lot of the present younger generation, to say nothing of future generations, at least as much as it does that of persons at present of an age to take part in the vote. The Polish voters have much larger families than the German voters. According to the last census — that of 1910 — about 45 % of the inhabitants among the Upper Silesian population of Polish mother-tongue have passed the age of 20 years, while among the German population the corresponding proportion is much higher amounting approximately to 56 %. It is probable that as a result of the war, which brought about a diminution of the birth rate, and for other reasons, the two proportions are today a little higher and one may reasonably suppose that the change which has taken place has been such as to strengthen the Polish argument. We have however based our calculation only upon age distribution identical with that of 1910.

On this basis, we may conclude that to 1.000 Poles above 20 years of age there corresponds a total Polish population of all ages of 2.220 (1.000 : 0,45), and that the corresponding figure for the German population is approximately 1.790 (1.000 : 0,56). In other words, one may say that the votes for Poland have more weight than the votes for Germany by reason of the facts which we have just shown.

POPULATION REPRESENTED BY THE VOTES IN THE POLISH BLOCK

Assuming that in the Polish block all votes of the resident population in favour of Poland were cast by Poles, it follows in that the population

represented by the votes for Poland (without taking account of the small number of abstentions) must correspond with the number of votes of the Polish residents indicated above, namely 418.000, multiplied by 2.22, i. e. about 929.000.

Even in the Polish block a certain number of Polish votes were doubtless cast for Germany. We believe that to fix this number at 10 % of the total votes for Germany in this block, or in round numbers at 41.000, is to make an over-estimate. However, on this hypothesis the votes of the residents cast for Germany in the Polish block would appear as follows:

41.000 Poles (multiplied by 2.22) representing . . .	91.000	persons.
295.000 Germans (— — 1.79) — . . .	528.000	—
Total.	619.000	—

The mere comparison of these two figures, 619.000 and 929.000, the former representing the total of the inhabitants who in the Polish block are favourable to Germany, and the second that of the population in this block which is pro-Polish in sentiment, brings out clearly the numerical superiority of the latter which exceeds the former by 50 %. We consider that it is these figures of the population represented by the resident votes which, in conformity with Section 5 of the Annex to Article 88 of the Treaty of Versailles, ought to be taken into consideration in judging the results of the plebiscite.

The vote of the émigrés exercised an undeniable influence in determining the majority in the different communes, and thus in fixing the boundaries of the German and Polish blocks. Having used and abused this influence, the émigrés have returned to Germany. For this reason in our opinion their votes should not offset the importance and the significance of the Polish majority in the Polish block.

For that matter section 5 of the Annex to Article 88 states specifically that the Interallied High Commission will report “ as to the line which ought to be adopted as the frontier of Germany in Upper Silesia. In this recommendation regard will be paid to the wishes of the inhabitants as shown by the vote, and to the geographical and economic conditions of the locality ”.

If, however, one should insist on taking account of the émigrés in the calculation of the population represented by the vote, it is perfectly clear that their votes ought to have much less weight than those of the resident population. The children and families of the émigrés live outside the boundaries of Upper Silesia. While each resident voter represents at the same time his family which constitutes part of the

local population, the same weight cannot be attached to the vote of the émigrés.

Adding the number of the émigrés to that of the local population represented by the resident voters, we obtain for the Polish block the following figures :

For Poland.

Population represented by the resident voters.	929,000
Emigrés who voted for Poland.	17,000
Total.	<u>946,000</u>

For Germany.

Population represented by the resident voters.	
Polish.	91,000
German	528,000
Emigrés who voted for Germany.	74,000
Total.	<u>693,000</u>

The total in favour of Poland thus obtained is still 40 % higher than that in favour of Germany, and that after^a having made, in each case where estimates were necessary, hypotheses the most favourable to the German case.

SITUATION OF THE CITIES WITH GERMAN MAJORITY IN THE POLISH BLOCK

The most striking fact with regard to the plebiscite vote in the Polish block is that a large fraction of the votes for Germany were concentrated in four cities of the industrial district. These cities are situated almost at the very frontier of the present Polish territory and consequently far distant from the German block. They are surrounded by the densely populated mining territory of the industrial district, which gave a strong majority for Poland; further away they are encircled by a vast agricultural zone which likewise gave the majority of its votes for Poland. In the analysis of the results of the plebiscite therefore, one must clearly distinguish these cities of the industrial district from the rest of the Polish block.

The cities thus taken into consideration are Katowice (Kattowitz), Bytom (Beuthen), Krolewska Huta (Koenigshütte) and Gliwice (Gleiwitz).

In the attached table we have made other territorial distinctions and have shown separately the vote for :

1° The four cities above mentioned ; 2° The remainder of the industrial region comprising the districts of Katowice (Kattowitz), Bytom (Beuthen) and Zabrze; 3° Rybnik and Pszczyna (Pless); 4° The remainder of the Polish block including the districts of Tarnowskie-Gory (Tarnowitz), Gliwice (Gleiwitz), Strzelce (Gross-Strehlitz) and Lubliniec (Lublinitz), with part of the districts of Raciborz (Ratibor), Kozle (Cosel), Opole (Oppeln) and Olesno (Rosenberg).

As regards each of these four zones, we have made calculations similar to those presented above for the Polish block as a whole. In each case it has been assumed that about 3.5 % of the émigrés registered for the vote abstained from voting and that about 20 % of the émigrés voted for Poland. In each case it has been estimated that 1,000 Polish resident voters represent 2,220 persons and 1,000 resident German voters 1,790 persons. This table shows clearly the Polish majority outside the four cities of the industrial district. Deducting the vote of those cities the vote in the Polish block was in round numbers :

For Poland	402,000 votes
For Germany	295,000 —

The vote of the resident population alone appears as follows :

For Poland	589,000 votes
For Germany	235,000 —

If all the votes of the resident population in favour of Poland were cast by Polish voters, the number of inhabitants whose desires these votes express amounts, in the Polish block, outside of the four cities of the industrial district, to 863,000. Assuming that 10 % of the total number of votes for Germany were cast by Polish residents, the population favouring Germany amounts to only 433,000 persons or 50 % of the population favouring Poland. If to these latter figures we add the number of émigrés who voted respectively for Poland and for Germany, we obtain for the Polish block, outside of the four cities above mentioned, the following figures :

For Poland	876,000 persons
For Germany	491,000 —

It will be observed that, moreover, in each of the three groups of territory indicated above, outside the four large cities, there was a large majority for Poland; that in each group this majority is still greater if only the vote of the resident population is considered, and that the dis-

proportion becomes still more striking if one considers the greater size of the Polish families and calculates the number of the population represented by the votes. It is true that the Polish majorities are greater in the districts of Rybnik and Pszczyna (Pless), than anywhere else, but they are also marked in the industrial region outside of the cities and in that part of the agricultural region outside of the districts of Rybnik and Pszczyna (Pless).

It was to be expected that the four cities above named would give strong majorities for Germany since (as is more fully set forth in Annex 5) they were centres by means of which Germany exercised her domination over the Polish population and conducted her germanizing propaganda.

Vote in the German Block

It is unnecessary to analyse the vote in the German block with the same minuteness as that in the Polish block. Certain points, however, deserve attention.

The number of émigrés registered to vote was relatively greater in the German block than in the Polish block. In certain districts, there are manifest indications that part of the vote of the émigrés was based on fraud. The presence of a great number of émigrés not merely augmented directly the German majority but it also served to exercise a powerful moral influence on the Polish voters.

If we apply respectively to the Polish votes and to the German votes the same factors which we have used above, we may establish approximately the following table as showing the significance of the vote in the German block.

	For Poland.	For Germany.
Total number of votes including . . .	44,000	298,000
Emigrés	2,000	95,000
Polish residents	42,000	80,000
German —	negligeable	125,000

Population represented by the votes :

Of the Polish residents	95,000	178,000
— German —		224,000
Total	95,000	402,000

After adding the number of émigrés the total becomes	95,000	495,000
---	--------	---------

**Analysis of the vote in different sections
of the Polish block and of the population represented
by the vote.**

(In thousands).

	REMAINDER OF POLISH BLOCK.					
	Total Polish block	4 cities of in- dustrial district.	Total.	Ind. Distr. outside cities.	Rybnik and Pless.	Remainder
<i>Actual Vote :</i>						
1. FOR POLAND.	435,3	53,3	401,9	172,4	105,7	123,8
2. FOR GERMANY.	409,6	116,6	293,0	141,7	46,6	104,7
<i>Emigrés :</i>						
3. Number registered .	94,1	19,9	74,0	26,8	16,7	50,5
4. Less abstentions (5 1/2 %).	90,5	19,2	71,5	25,8	16,1	29,4
<i>Estimated as voting for :</i>						
5. POLAND 20 %	17,0	3,7	15,3	5,0	3,0	5,3
6. GERMANY 80 %	73,5	15,5	58,0	20,8	13,1	24,1
<i>Resident votes (deducting émigrés) for :</i>						
7. (1-5) POLAND	418,5	29,6	383,6	167,4	102,7	118,5
8. (2-6) GERMANY.	556,1	101,1	255,0	120,9	53,5	80,6
9. If all resident votes for Poland had been cast by Poles they would represent (multiplying line 7 by 2.22) the following number of inhabitants.	929	66	863	572	228	265
10. If of the total vote for Germany 10 per cent (of line 2) was cast by Poles viz	41,0	11,7	29,3	14,2	4,7	10,4
11. Leaving as the vote of resident Germans for Germany (8-11).	295,1	89,4	205,7	106,7	28,8	70,2
12. Then the Polish re- sident vote for Germany would represent (line 10 × 2.22) a popula- tion of	91	26	65	52	10	25

(In thousands).

	REMAINDER OF POLISH BLOCK.					Remainder —
	Total Polish block.	4 cities of in- dustrial district.	Total.	Ind. Distr. outside cities.	Rybnik and Pleiss.	
13. And the German re- sident vote (line 11 × 1.79) a population of	528	160	568	191	52	125
14. Making the total po- pulation represented by the resident vote for Germany	619	186	455	225	62	148
Adding the émigrés to the population repre- sented by the resident vote we have.						
15. For POLAND (9 + 5).	946	70	876	577	251	268
16. For GERMANY (14 + 6)	693	201	491	244	75	172


**Table serving as a base for calculating the number
of Polish and German inhabitants represented
by the number of Polish and German votes**

Names of the Districts of the Regierungsbezirk of Oppeln.	Per cent of Poles, Official census 1910.	Per cent of inhabitants above 21 years. 1910.
1. Pszczyzna (Pless)	86.7	45.1
2. Lubliniec	85.2	44.7
3. Olesno (Rosenberg)	83.6	45.5
4. Strzelce (Gr. Streblitz)	81.6	46.7
5. Rybnik	80.7	44.7
6. Gliwice (Gleiwitz) district	79.5	46.2
7. Kozle (Cosel) —	79.5	48.7
8. Opole (Oppeln) —	78.4	46.8
9. Tarnowskie Gory (Tarnowitz)	75.0	45.1
10. Bytom (Beuthen) district	68.8	44.6
11. Katowice —	68.2	45.5
12. Zabrze	59.8	45.7
13. Kluczborek (Kreuzburg)	55.1	47.5
14. Raciborz (Ratibor) district	48.7	47.0
15. Prudnik (Neustadt)	47.4	51.4
16. Huta Krol. (Königshütte)	45.1	46.7

Names of the Districts of the Regierungsbezirk of Oppeln.	Per cent of Poles, Official census 1910.	Per cent of inhabitants above 21 years. 1910.
17. Raciborz city.	40.2	52.0
18. Bytom —	38.6	50.2
19. Gliwice —	26.5	50.2
20. Opole —	21.0	55.6
21. Katowice —	14.2	52.8
22. Niemodlin (Falkenberg)	11.1	52.6
23. Glupczyce (Leobschütz)	7.7	52.9
24. Nissa (Neisse) city	4.6	59.6
25. Grotkow.	2.4	54.2
26. Nissa (Neisse) district.	1.5	54.1

The diagram which follows gives detailed explanations.

Relation between the percentage of Poles in the population of each district and the percentage of inhabitants above 21 years.



The points 1-26 correspond to the districts of Regierungsbezirk Oppeln. The line which connects symmetrically the individual points shows that there are :

Among the Poles (right end of the line), about 45 1/2% of inhabitants above 21 years.

Among the Germans (left end of the line), about 54 1/2 % of inhabitants above 21 years.

If one assumes the proportion of persons between 20 and 21 years of age to be 1.6 % of the total population in round numbers both for the Germans and for the Poles, the percentage of persons having the right to vote (i. e. over 20 years of age) amounts for the Poles to 45 % and for the Germans to 56 % of the total population of the plebiscite territory.

Taking these figures as a basis, it follows that :

1000 Polish votes represent 2220 inhabitants.

1000 German votes represent 1790 inhabitants.

ANNEX 2

Abuses committed by the Germans in the course of the plebiscite.

Abuses. — The Polish population had against it the entire German administrative and judicial apparatus and, moreover, was subject to strong economic pressure exercised by the heads of business enterprises and by the German landed proprietors, who held in their hands many of the Polish voters. The clergy also, largely composed of Germans, was often the most active auxiliary in the German propaganda, and even did this from the pulpit.

Thousands of émigrés came to help in this propaganda and organized demonstrations despite the prohibition thereof by the interallied authorities. In addition, the Germans employed still other methods prohibited by the plebiscite regulations as constituting direct and illicit practices for influencing the voters, namely :

1. They corrupted the voters by buying their votes individually or collectively. Often this corruption was concealed under the form of subsidies or gifts but these were always offered on condition of voting for Germany.

2. They threatened the work people and employees with discharge if they voted for Poland. They were given positions only on condition of casting their votes for Germany.

5. Numerous abuses of power were committed by German members of the voting bureaux and joint election committees. The Polish voters were furnished only with two German ballots instead of one German and one Polish ballot, and in the voting place itself they were solicited to give their votes for Germany.

4. Numerous Germans voted several times by use of false documents so that in certain communes the number of persons who voted was greater than the number authorized to vote. On the other hand Poles were taken off from the voting lists.

5. The Germans even went so far as to counterfeit the " Catholic ", a Polish organ of wide circulation, especially in the country districts. This

periodical has always pleaded the cause of Poland. All at once, two days before the plebiscite, the people read in it propaganda articles in favour of Germany. The number was counterfeit. It was distributed by thousands throughout the entire extent of Upper Silesia : the postal employees, in complicity with the Germans, sent it to the local subscribers in place of the authentic " Catholic ".

Influence of the Prussian administration. — It appears to us not superfluous to recall the fact that the Commission which was to determine the conditions of the plebiscite judged it indispensable that the plebiscite should take place only after three years in order that by total change in administration the Polish population might be guaranteed the possibility of free expression.

This commission, by the unanimous action of the representatives of all the Powers, even considered that it would be absolutely necessary to remove from the country during the period of the plebiscite the great landed proprietors and the heads of large industries, whose influence might weigh heavily on the freedom of vote of the Poles by reason of the economic dependance in which they stood with relation to their employers. Nothing of the sort was done ; not only were the great landed proprietors and the representatives of large industries not sent out of the country, but they even tried to influence and intimidate the population by a proclamation issued jointly and published in all the newspapers before the vote.

Emigrés. — It is worth while to give special consideration to the role played during the plebiscite by the émigrés who came from Germany, as is generally known, to the number of 190,000, while Poland furnished to the plebiscite not more than 4,000 such voters.

In the industrial region outside the cities the total number of émigrés was about 10 % of the number of voters resident in the district. In the urban districts of the industrial region it was a little higher and amounted to 15 %. In the agricultural districts the number was much larger and in fact attained as a general rule 20 to 30 % of the number of resident voters. In the districts of Neustadt, Leobschuetz and Kluczborek (Kreuzburg) on the other hand, it amounted respectively to 45.5 %, 52.7 % and even 70.5 %.

There is no reason which can explain why agricultural districts which are subject to similar social and economic conditions should show such a difference among themselves as regards the number of émigrés, unless it be the circumstance that it is here, in these three agricultural districts, where the Polish national consciousness was not

sufficiently aroused, that, with the cooperation of the Prussian administration, it was most easy fraudulently to cause to vote persons who were in no way authorized.

The systematic and premeditated inflow of émigrés into the region above mentioned indicates that their vote was exploited by the Germans for well determined objects. This mass of émigrés appears to have been directed to the left bank of the Oder, to the outlying part of the plebiscite territory and to the district of Kluczbork, a region particularly important for Poland — not merely in order to make the balance there incline in favour of Germany, but also in order to create at the same time a situation which would render a division of Upper-Silesia more difficult.

Again, the émigrés voting in the district of Leobschuetz were equal to 69 % of the total number of emigrants from this district between 1870 and 1905. a figure to say the least improbable. In the district of Kluczbork this proportion amounts to 111 %, which is entirely fantastic since this figure exceeds greatly the total number of persons who emigrated during the period 1870-1905.

It is here that the fraud becomes striking and that the violation of the will of the people of Upper-Silesia, of which the plebiscite was to furnish an expression, can be demonstrated.

The vote of the émigrés constitutes in more than one way a particularly suggestive page of the history of the plebiscite. Not only did the Germans carefully organize this inflow of emigrants into Upper Silesia, but they also persecuted and abused all those whom they might suspect of having Polish sentiments. They, moreover, accumulated all sorts of obstacles to prevent the Polish émigrés living in Germany from returning to Upper Silesia to give their vote. The number of émigrés thus prevented from coming to vote amounted to many thousands and materially diminished the number of votes given for Poland.

The injury caused to Poland by the vote of the émigrés may not merely be shown by absolute numbers, but we may also call attention to numerous communes where the Germans obtained their majority solely thanks to the vote of the émigrés. The following table lists the communes in question.

**The communes of the Polish block which gave
a German majority
solely by virtue of the émigrés.**

District	Communes	Number of votes		
		Polish	German	Emigrés
Bytom (Beuthen) . . .	Miechowice, Gb ¹	58	62	4
— —	Swietochlowice	5.874	6.325	1.019
Katowice (Kattowitz) .	Wirek (Antonienhütte)	2.654	2.850	694
— —	Chorzow	3.059	3.500	549
— —	Myslowice	4.519	5.827	1.862
Gliwice (Gleiwitz) . . .	Wilkowiczki (Wilkowitz Kl.)	76	86	16
— —	Brynek	149	152	33
— —	Oracze	70	95	33
— —	Poniszowice	239	244	75
— —	Tworog	596	439	160
Kozle (Cosel)	Lichynia	165	195	52
— —	Laki (Lenkau)	216	224	62
— —	Brzezce (Brzezetz)	255	305	61
— —	Stara Kuznia (Kl. Altham)	114	122	45
— —	Kotlarnia (Jakobswalde)	26	95	79
— —	Libiszow	143	172	38
Lubliniec (Lublinitz) .	Brusiek, Gb	69	85	17
— —	Bziniec St.	112	154	48
— —	Cieszowa	84	89	32
— —	Drotarnia (Drahthammer)	120	121	20
— —	Dzielna	38	47	22
— —	Ligota Dobrozienska (Ellguth- Guttentag)	142	144	58
— —	Gwozdziany, Gb.	29	48	30
— —	Lisow (Lissau)	124	169	65
— —	Pawonkow	147	159	56
— —	Sierakow (Schierokau)	178	217	71
Olesno (Rosenberg) . . .	Pruskow	80	95	19
— —	Osiecko	54	65	15
— —	Szywald, Gb	69	125	82
— —	Borki Wielkie (Gr. Borek)	56	45	18
— —	Kucoby	74	89	29
— —	Sternalice	174	516	142
Opole (Oppeln)	Groszowice	757	904	179
Pszczyna (Pless)	Siedlice (Schaedlitz)	108	142	71
— —	Mikolow (Nikolai)	2.434	5.051	855

1. Gb (Gutsbezirk) = manor.

District	Gommunes	Number of votes		
		Polish	German	Émigrés
Raciborz (Ratibor) . . .	Babice	435	495	124
— —	Markowice	578	585	106
— —	Bukow, Gb.	21	24	16
— —	Brzeznicza, Gb.	25	55	27
Rybnik	Czerwionka	292	555	65
—	Jankowice Rudz. (Jankowitz- Rauden).	98	105	11
—	Radoszowy Gorne	182	246	112
—	Kolonja Renerowska (Renners- dorf)	65	85	20
Strzelce (Gr. Strehlitz).	Borowin	148	166	52
— —	Chorule	54	77	25
— —	Zdzieszowice (Deschowitz) . .	449	458	140
— —	Gogolin	955	1.262	560
— —	Gorazdze	115	156	98
— —	Kamionek (Klein Stein)	29	51	11
— —	Krasowa	70	84	22
— —	Malnie	175	178	17
— —	Ligota Dolna	56	68	14
— —	Poremba	129	149	28
— —	Zakrzow, Gb. (Sakrau)	90	120	40
— —	Czarnosin, Gb. (Scharnosin) . .	45	64	19
— —	Szymiszow	168	227	59
— —	Zyrowa	125	140	41
Zabrze	Biskupice, Gb.	257	255	19

ANNEX 5

A. Recapitulation of territory with Polish majority (Polish block)

Districts	Number of votes		Communes		Emigrés registered on the lists
	Polish	German	Polish	German	
Gliwice (Gleiwitz) city	8.558	32.029		1	6.120
— — district	27.198	20.098	88	15	5.159
Strzelce (Gross-Strehlitz)	23.046	22.415	80	51	7.599
Lubliniec (Lublinitz)	15.679	15.454	51	47	4.571
Tarnowskie Gory (Tarnowitz)	27.513	17.078	45	9	4.407
Zabrze (Hindenburg)	45.256	45.212	14	4	8.008
Bytom (Beuthen) city	10.101	29.890		1	5.512
— — district	63.021	45.677	21	6	7.822
Krolewska Huta (Koenigshütte)	10.764	31.864		1	4.738
Katowice (Kattowitz) city	3.900	22.774		1	3.568
— — district	66.119	52.852	29	8	10.973
Pszczyna (Pless)	53.378	18.675	122	11	6.696
Rybnik (Rybnik)	52.347	27.918	124	16	10.058
Raciborz (Ratibor) r. bank Oder	12.188	9.721	31	11	3.430
— — left bank	1.354	890	8	4	278
Kozle (Cosel) right bank	5.612	9.325	11	24	2.070
— — left bank	2.470	1.357	9	5	426
Opole (Oppeln) right bank	4.005	3.028	11	3	748
— — left bank	1.113	831	5	1	207
Olesno (Rosenberg)	5.640	4.552	26	11	1.875
Total	435.260	409.618	675	250	94.065
	51,5 %	48,5 %	74,5 %	25,5 %	

Population represented by the votes of inhabitants of the plebiscite area.

1) For Poland	929.000
2) For Germany	619.000

B. Recapitulation of territory with German majority (German block)

	Number of votes		Communes		Emigrés registered on the lists
	Polish	German	Polish	German	
	44.099	297.987	23	563	98.431
	12,9 %	87,1 %	3,9 %	96,1 %	

Population represented by the votes of inhabitants of the plebiscite area.

1) For Poland	93.000
2) For Germany	402.000

ANNEX 4

Economic relations between Upper Silesia and Poland

THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND PRODUCTION IN UPPER SILESIA

The industry of Upper Silesia has been able to develop chiefly thanks to the natural riches of the country, such as its coal mines which profit from peculiarly favourable conditions of extraction, its deposits of iron ore, zinc ore and lead ore, its limestone deposits, the presence of dolomites beneath its surface etc., and thanks also to the low wages of labour.

This industry would have been able to make much further progress still had it not been for the unfavourable conditions for the marketing of its products and for the importation of raw materials — consequences of the incorporation of Upper Silesia in Germany and of the barrier which separates it from the Eastern (Polish) markets, as well as of the policy of the German Government which above all favoured the industry of its western provinces.

Forming a long and narrow enclave between the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, Upper Silesia had no natural hinterland.

Czarist Russia and the former Austro-Hungarian Government had raised between their territories and Upper Silesia a tariff barrier¹ and the distance which separated this province from the nearest German markets

1. Tariff duties before the war (in German gold marks).

Articles	In Russia	In Austria
Coal	2 Marks per ton	—
Coke	5 » »	—
Pig iron	59.50 » »	12.80
Steel sheets and tubes . . .	536. 90 »	121.60

of importance burdened its products with far too high cost of transportation.

“ By reason of the situation at the South-East confines of the Empire, the Upper Silesia industrial district has always had to struggle with great difficulties as regards the marketing of its products. If Upper Silesia has been retarded in its development, the fact is due solely to its unfavourable geographical situation.” (Memoire of the Oppeln Chamber of Commerce 1915 and 1917).

The union of Upper Silesia with the German Empire deprived it of the possibility of gaining the entire advantage which it should from the natural riches of its soil. To-day when Posen and West Prussia have been detached from Germany, the situation of Upper Silesia as a part of the Empire would be still more precarious.

Its separation from the great bulk of the Polish territory has paralysed the growth of its entire industry, in view of the fact that “ for the economic evolution of Upper Silesia, so badly situated from the geographical point of view, Poland constitutes always an extremely important factor, one may even say an almost indispensable factor. If Upper Silesia is unable to make use of Poland permanently, the development of the industry of this province will be fatally compromised which will materially diminish its importance for the reconstruction of the Empire and for its ultimate development as well as for the defence of the country.” (Memoire of the Chamber of Commerce of the Regency of Oppeln, July 1917).

“ The examination of the political and tariff considerations as a whole leads to the conclusion that not only has the tariff and commercial policy of Germany not favoured the interest of the Upper Silesian mining industry but that that policy has even been very harmful. It has in particular cut off this industry almost entirely from its most important markets, notably the Russian and Austrian markets (Kingdom of Poland and Galicia). ” (Manual of the Upper Silesian industrial district, Kattowitz 1915, page 294).

The union of Upper Silesia with Germany was based primarily on the fact that it was subject to the same tariff system. This common tariff constituted the mortar which bound together the two organisms. Therefore the displacement of the frontier, and consequently of the tariff boundary, cannot be for Upper Silesia (nor for Germany) a cause of serious economic disturbance (as has been proved already by analogous cases, notably that of Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig etc.).

The allotment of Upper Silesia (particularly its industrial districts) to Poland will immediately open a natural market for the products of the industry of this province, a market whose capacity of absorption

will increase from year to year with the development of the economic life of Poland and which will recoup Upper Silesian industry entirely for the partial loss of German markets. Today, in the midst of a grave economic crisis, it gives to Upper Silesia the possibility to meet this crisis with comparative ease. In this way will be realised the desire of the leaders of Upper Silesian industry to escape the "economic strangulation" of this province "resulting from its geographical and political situation which is the essential cause of the complaints of the industrial district." (Memoire of the Chamber of Commerce of the Regency of Oppeln. September 1916).

COAL

In 1913, the total production of coal in Upper Silesia, excluding the mines of Hultschin assigned to Czecho-Slovakia by the Treaty of Versailles, amounted to 43.170.000 tons, or after deducting the consumption of the mines themselves, 39.555.000 tons. Of this total Upper-Silesia consumed 13.800.000 tons; the rest was exported beyond its boundaries.

Of the coal and coke of Upper-Silesia 7.850.000 tons was exported during that year to the territories which now constitute the Polish State, this quantity amounting to more than 40 % of the total consumption of Poland (18.500.000 tons). To the territory now belonging to Germany there was exported from Upper-Silesia 12.500.000 tons, or less than 9 % of its total consumption (140.000.000 tons). The mere comparison of these figures shows the great importance of the role played by Upper-Silesian coal in the coal balance of Poland while it occupies a much more modest place in the balance of Germany.

The annual production of the coal basins at present belonging to Poland may amount, if pre-war figures are restored, to 9.000.000 tons; it will thus cover less than 50 % of the pre-war consumption of the present Poland (18.000.000 tons). Germany, on the other hand, even though deprived of the basins of the Saar, of Alsace-Lorraine and of Upper-Silesia, will still be in a position, if her production is brought back to the pre-war figure, not merely to cover entirely her own coal requirements, but also to dispose of a considerable surplus for exportation. The German production of coal and of lignite reduced to terms of coal amounted before the war, without the three basins above mentioned, to 156.000.000 tons against a consumption of 140,000.000 tons.



Furthermore, according to the terms of Article 90 of the Treaty of Versailles, Poland is obliged, in case Upper-Silesia is assigned to her, to authorise, for a period of 15 years, the exportation of all mine products to Germany, which would increase materially the surplus of coal of which the latter would dispose after having covered all her requirements. During this period of time Germany could, besides, increase by a considerable ratio the production of her own collieries. The rapid increase of the production of the Ruhr basin (at the rate of 10.000.000 tons per year on an average) and of the production of lignite (at the rate of 5.000.000 tons per year) offer a striking example of such progress in German coal exploitation.

For that matter the importance of Upper Silesian coal for the interior German market was diminishing from year to year as the result of the competition of the coal of Westphalia and of England and of German lignite.

Between 1890 and 1913, the share of Upper Silesian coal in the consumption of Berlin fell from 72,6 % to 57 %. The same phenomenon may be observed as regards the nearer German markets, notably as regards the regencies of Breslau and of Lignitz, Pomerania etc.

On the other hand, the exportation of Upper Silesian coal outside the former Germany was taking on a constantly increasing importance.

From 1887 to 1913, this exportation increased 515 %, rising from 2.100.000. to 13.100.000 tons, while the shipments by railroad to the interior of Germany in its pre-war boundaries increased during this period only 204 %, rising from 6.600.000 tons to 20.100.000 tons.

It was the Polish territories which contributed particularly to the increase of the exportation of Upper Silesian coal. The shipment of such coal to Galicia for example increased from 182.000 tons in 1887 to 2.023.000 tons in 1913 (an increase of 1012 %), and the shipments to Russia (almost exclusively to the Polish provinces) rose from 191.000 tons to 1.884.000 tons (or 886 %).

It follows from the above that the Polish territories offer the most natural market for Upper Silesian coal. The industrial managers of Upper Silesia recognised this thoroughly when they wrote in the "Handbook of the Upper Silesian industrial district (Handbuch des Oberschlesischen Industriebezirks), page 551, that "the future of the coal industry of Upper Silesia lies in the marketing of its products abroad", by which they meant particularly exportation into territories at present Polish.

The difficulties which the exportation of coal encountered before the war had an unfavourable influence on the development of the coal pro-



duction of Upper Silesia which increased less rapidly than that of Westphalia as shown by the following table :

Production of Upper Silesia in thousands of tons in- cluding the Hultschin colliery	Index Number	Production of Ruhr basin in thousands of tons.	Index Number
6.532	100	12.715	100
17.750	271	37.402	294
56.623	561	91.529	718
43.801	670	110.722	871

It may be seen from the above that from the point of view of the coal industry the interests of Upper Silesia are not bound up with the interests of Germany, but quite to the contrary with those of the countries which border her to the East. It should be noted, moreover, that the coal basins at present belonging to Poland produce no coking coal, that even deep borings have nowhere revealed any traces of it, and that this circumstance adds still further to the importance for Poland of the possession of Upper Silesia.

This importance appears still greater if one takes into consideration not merely the present needs of Poland but also her coal situation in the future.

The coal bearing lands which, in the present state of mining technique, lend themselves to exploitation and which constitute that part of the Moravian-Polish-Silesian coal basin belonging at present to Poland (the basins of Dombrowa, that of Krakow and a small sector of the Teschen basin) occupy, according to the most careful estimates, an extent of 1.800 square kilometers and constitute consequently 32.7 % of the total area of that basin. Upper Silesia (without the Hultschin colliery) comprises 2750 square kilometers of coal lands or 50 % of the entire basin. Finally, that part of the coal bearing territory of this basin which has been assigned to Czecho-Slovakia amounts to 950 sq. kilometers or 17,5 % of the total area.

These estimates agree in a general manner with those given by the well-known German expert, Professor Michael, in his "Geology of the Upper-Silesian Coal Basin", and in the article which he contributes to the joint work of the geological congress of Toronto published under the title "The Coal Resources of the World".

He estimates that the former Russian Poland possesses, with the coal basin of Dombrowa, 440 sq. klm. or 7.9 % of the total area of the Moravian-Polish-Silesian basin; Austria (Galicia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia) 2.517 s. klm. or 43.5 % of the basin; Upper Silesia 2.500 sq. klm. or 48,6 %.

While the coal bearing lands of Poland, as at present constituted, represent, from the point of view of surface area, an important fraction of the Moravian-Silesian-Polish basin, they really contain only very modest quantities of coal, infinitely smaller in proportion to the surface area than the deposits of the coal basin of Upper-Silesia and even of that of Karwin. This situation is due to the particularly favorable geological conditions of the Upper Silesian basin and especially of its central region comprising Zabrze, Beuthen and Kattowitz; while the further one moves towards the East or the South, the worse become the conditions.

In the coal formation of the Moravian-Polish-Silesian basin there are distinguished, according to terminology generally agreed to by geologists, three groups of strata — the most recent strata called “ Muldenfloeze ”, the middle strata “ Sattelfloeze ”, and the deep strata forming the oldest group from the point of view of time “ Randgruppe ”.

The upper deposits and the deep deposits (Muldenfloeze and Randgruppe) are composed of a relatively large number of thin strata of from 0,5 to 2 metres in thickness alternating with rather thick strata of sandstones and of schists. While the Randgruppe furnishes an excellent coal often convertible into coke, the coal of the “ Muldengruppe ”, of inferior caloric value, cannot in general be transformed into coke. The great mineral wealth however consists of the “ Sattelfloeze ” which form the thickest veins, lying the closest to one another, easy to exploit and giving, especially in the West part of the central Upper-Silesian region, and notably in the neighbourhood of Zabrze, a coal of excellent quality.

The groups above mentioned are not distributed in an uniform manner over the entire Moravian-Polish-Silesian basin. As a result of geological transformations certain strata, and even entire groups of strata, have completely disappeared over relatively extensive areas while the lower strata are here found much nearer the surface. In other places the entire coal bearing formation plunges down suddenly to a depth where it is no longer possible to undertake mining operations.

These geological movements explain the fact that in the central region of the Upper Silesian basin the “ Sattelfloeze ” are found almost at the surface and are consequently very easily accessible. They form here a group of 6 or 8 veins with a total thickness of from 25-40 metres lying regularly so that they are easy to exploit, and containing no explosive gases. Thanks to these favourable conditions the central region forms, and will for a long time still form, the centre of gravity of all the coal production, consequently also of the iron and zinc industries.

Further to the South, in the districts of Pless and Rybnik, the middle

layers, " Sattelfloetze ", as can be determined from borings carried out in this region, generally plunge downward to a depth inaccessible in the present conditions of mining technique. In the Krakow basin borings carried to a depth of 1200 metres have not even revealed the presence of these strata. The mines in these districts work in the strata of the " Muldengruppe ", the exploitation of which, as follows from what has been said, is much more difficult.

Outside of the central industrial region of the Upper Silesian basin the so called " Sattelfloetze " strata are found at accessible depth only in the Dombrowa basin lying in the former Congress Kingdom of Poland. It must however be noted that the coal formation there is materially reduced and that the " Sattelfloetze " of Upper Silesia give place here to a single vein attaining a thickness of 12 meters and furnishing a coal of inferior quality over an area of comparatively little magnitude.

It results from this brief geological expose that it is the central region of the Upper Silesian basin which combines the most favourable geological and technical conditions. Consequently, it furnished the bulk of the coal production, namely 36.4 million tons in 1915.

The best expert with regard to the Upper Silesian basin, Professor Michael, describes as follows the importance of the " Sattelfloetze " in his work " The Geology of the Upper Silesian coal district ", 1915, pages 46-47 :

" Upper Silesia has an exceptional importance thanks to the coal strata called " Sattelfloetze " and that on account of their characteristics and their strength, unique in kind.... In a certain group of veins more than 40 % of the entire formation of which these deposits form a part consists of fuel lending itself to exploitation. This condition is found especially upon a strip of territory from 7 to 12 km. wide and stretching from West to East. These veins, thanks to the local uplift of the coal bearing formation, often reach the surface. The " Sattelfloetze " assure for all time to Upper Silesia a capital importance in comparison with the districts of the Silesian basin which fall to the share of neighbouring countries, Russia and Austria. *Upper Silesia alone possesses very important " Sattelfloetze "*. The strength and the number of veins of this group diminish as one moves toward the East. Thus in Poland we find only a single thick vein of this group. In the basin of Western Galicia (basin of Krakow) certain veins situated above the " Randgruppe " and which, from the stratigraphic point of view, correspond to the " Sattelfloetze " have only a local importance. "

Just as the " Sattelfloetze " constitute the basis of coal production in Upper Silesia, so the " Reden " vein belonging to this group furnishes, in the Dombrowa basin of Congress Poland, the most important fraction of

the coal production of Poland. In view of the fact, however, that it there occupies only a limited area and that its exploitation has already been carried very far, it is entirely impossible that the proportion of this vein should materially increase. Such an increase would be the more difficult since already all this territory is covered by a close network of coal mines whose technical management is in no way inferior to that of the Upper-Silesian collieries.

In his works which we have just cited, professor Michael places the "actual" reserves and the "probable" reserves of the Dombrowa basin at 1.591,000,000 tons. He adds however, that the Russian part of the Dombrowa basin "will probably be still further reduced later". (The Coal Resources, p. 908; Geology of the Upper-Silesian Coal District, p. 47).

As regards the coal reserves of Galicia, the exploration of the territory there has not been carried so far relatively as in the other basins. Polish geologists estimate the probable and actual reserves of Galicia at 8,000,000,000 tons. We must call attention however to the fact that it is necessary to accept the estimates of the mineral wealth of this province with great reserve, since the latest borings made in the South part of this basin prove that the coal bearing formation plunges rapidly under the Carpathians which renders it incapable of mining exploitation.

Thus is fully confirmed the opinion of Professor Michael who objected very energetically to the overestimation of the reserves of the Krakow basin and warned against too hasty optimistic conclusions (See Michael, "The Coal Resources of the World", page 908; "The Geology of the Upper Silesian Basin", pages 48, 61 and 63).

In the sector of Teschen allotted to Poland the reserves of coal are estimated at 500,000,000 tons to a depth of 1,000 meters.

Thus the actual and probable coal reserves of Poland may be estimated at 10 billion tons. They are thus relatively insignificant and new researches and mining explorations in Galicia may reduce the total still further, since present figures are based chiefly on theoretical estimates. In order to appreciate the practical importance of the Polish coal reserves from the point of view of actual possibilities of development of colliery exploitation, the geological conditions set forth above must be taken into consideration. As a result of these circumstances, the collieries of the Krakow basin and those of the South Eastern districts of Upper Silesia are compelled to work under much more unfavourable

1. These reserves belong to the group "Muddenfloetze" and in general are found at a depth of more than 800 meters.

conditions and their profitable exploitation on a big scale can take place, in view of the competition of the central Upper Silesian region, only when the reserves of that region are about to be exhausted. All these facts bring out the more clearly the importance which the coal resources of Upper Silesia, and more particularly those of its central mining region, possess for Poland.

On the other hand Germany, even without Upper Silesia, is one of the richest countries of the European Continent from the point of view of coal reserves, since she remains in possession of Westphalia and of very important deposits of lignite. According to the German geologists Germany will be completely independent of her neighbours for her coal supply even after the loss of Upper Silesia (A. Schmidt : " Coal in Upper Silesia and in the Saar " (Die Steinkohlen in Oberschlesien und an der Saar), Stuttgart, 1919. p. 38-40). Thus to leave to Germany Upper Silesia would be not only to make Poland dependant on her, but also to create the danger of her hegemony over the coal market of Europe. Her aim to achieve this hegemony is set forth clearly in the works of her scientists. Professor Doctor Frech says in so many words in his work : " Die Kohlenvorrathe der Welt " (The Coal Reserves of the World), Stuttgart, 1917, page 51 : " In two or at the most three centuries England will have mined her last bit of coal. Germany, as Jules Wolf declares, (and a good half of its supply will come from Upper Silesia), will form then the economic pivot of our hemisphere while the industrial power of England will be crushed. "

METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY

It is the metallurgical industry of Upper Silesia which has felt most its unfavourable situation within the surroundings of the economic life of Germany.

This industry had to struggle with great difficulties :

1. To find markets for its products.
2. To supply itself with raw materials and especially with iron ore.

The situation of this province, far removed from the centre of the Empire, as well as the difficulties connected with the transport of its products (lack of waterways), rendered difficult for it the conquest of the interior German markets. Moreover, the industry of Upper Silesia could compete only upon a very limited territory with the metallurgical industry of Western Germany. On the other hand, the tariff boundary which separated it from the Eastern markets hindered the expansion of Upper Silesian industry in that direction.

The comparison of the metallurgical industries of Germany in general and Upper Silesia separately brings these difficulties more clearly to light.

In Upper Silesia the production of pig iron increased between 1871 and 1913 from 252,000 tons to 995,000 tons, or by 529 %; while the production of Germany as a whole in this field increased during the same period of time from 1,564,000 tons to 19,276,000 tons, that is by 1132 %. In 1871, the pig iron furnished by Upper Silesia constituted 14.8 % of the total production of Germany; in 1913 it constituted only 5.16 % of the total.

As regards the marketing of this pig iron outside the boundaries of Upper Silesia, that region, as late as 1884, exported 12.4 % of its production; in 1913, it exported only 5.1 %. This relative diminution of its exportation keeps pace with the diminution in its shipments into the Polish territories which constituted the former Russian Poland, and shows that the Upper Silesian pig iron has at present only a purely local importance so long as prohibitive custom tariffs close the markets of these territories to her.

It is the same as regards the fabricated products of the metallurgical industry, the exportation of which to foreign countries constituted in 1884, 16.1 % of the total shipments from this province while in 1913 exports figured in the total only for 8.4 %. Here again the institution of a customs barrier between Upper Silesia and the markets of the territories which constituted the former Russian and Austrian Poland had fatal consequences for Upper Silesia.

The figures which follow and which indicate the share of Upper Silesian iron (bars, rails, tubes etc.) in the supply of the nearest German provinces, prove furthermore that the metallurgical industry of Upper Silesia was more and more being eliminated from the interior German markets. The coefficient of this participation appeared as follows :

Silesia without the Regency of Oppeln.	Berlin	Brandenburg	Saxony.
1884 65.7 %	19.7 %	15.6 %	16.6 %
1911 55.2 %	14.5 %	12.8 %	12.2 %

The leaders of Upper Silesian industry, in the "Handbuch des Oberschlesischen Industriebezirks" (Handbook of the Upper Silesian Industrial District), describes as follows the grievous situation of the metallurgical industry of this province : "In a general manner it is impossible not to recognise that the situation of the Upper Silesian metallurgical industry at this moment is very grave.... In fact it is not merely the various industrial enterprises and the working people employed in

this industry who suffer from the bad conditions of marketing and of profitableness in which the industry at present finds itself; it is not merely the numerous communities and cities of Upper Silesia within whose boundaries the iron and steel works are found; the situation is felt also in many other fields of economic life and particularly in the mining industry. ”

In comparison with the industrial districts of Western Germany, Upper Silesia was in an unfavourable situation from the point of view of its coke supply. That which it itself furnishes, usually too soft, scarcely lends itself to the requirements of the iron industry. Thus the average annual production of a blast furnace in Upper Silesia is only 31,082 tons while in Dusseldorf it amounts to 71,361 tons.

We may point out here a particularly interesting detail. Despite the immediate neighbourhood of Lower Silesia which produces excellent grades of coke for blast furnaces, Upper Silesia made very little use of this coke or of Lower Silesian coal. The importation of Lower Silesian coke into Upper Silesia for the requirements of the metallurgical industry amounted, during the period immediately preceding the war, to approximately 10,000 tons annually which constitutes less than 1 % of the total coke consumption of this industry. One may call attention also to the fact that the very small quantities of Lower Silesian coal imported into Upper Silesia (approximately 20,000 tons per year) were not converted into coke. In case this source of supply should be cut off from Upper Silesia, it could easily replace the Lower Silesian coke by that of the Ostrau-Karwin basin to which the Upper Silesian metallurgical industry always had recourse before the war.

As regards its supply of iron ore the metallurgical industry of Upper Silesia was becoming more and more dependent on foreign ores. In 1891, Upper Silesia itself still furnished to this industry 709,000 tons of iron ore or 81.3 % of the consumption. In 1911, her share in the supply of ore was only 252,000 tons or 22.5 % of the total consumption of iron ore. In 1919, she furnished only 71,000 tons of ore or 11 % of her consumption. To cover its requirements the metallurgical industry imports chiefly foreign ores. The quantities imported from Germany, half of which for that matter was furnished by Posen, constituted during the last years before the war only 10 % of the total consumption. At present, after Germany has lost the rich ore deposits of Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg, Upper Silesia can no longer count at all upon Germany for its supply of this raw material. “The iron industry in Germany”, says K. Flegel, “will be in the future almost entirely dependent on the importation of foreign ore”. (*Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Montanindustrie Russlands und Polens*, Leipzig, 1920, page 68).

The union of Upper Silesia with Poland will lead to a fundamental betterment of the position of its metallurgical industry.

The large scale metallurgical industry in Poland is found only in the territory of the former Congress Kingdom and that industry is at present obliged to supply also the requirements of Galicia and of the former Prussian provinces. It is absolutely not capable of meeting this task, the more so that it has been in large measure intentionally ruined by the German occupation, and because the requirements of the country are at present increasing materially. It is enough to say that the pre-war production of the Polish blast furnaces was only about 400,000 tons of pig iron per year, which, with a population of about 28 million, gives a consumption of only 14 kg per inhabitant, while the consumption before the war amounted in Posen to 96 kg., in West Prussia to 62 kg. and even in the former Congress Kingdom of Poland it was 19.4 kg.

By way of comparison the figures attained by pig iron consumption in different countries of Europe are presented below, following the work of Dr. K. Eiegel: "Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Montanindustrie Russlands u. Polens", Leipzig, 1920.

Belgium	173 kg.
Germany	136 »
France	106 »
Austria-Hungary	44 »

In view of the necessities connected with the reconstruction of the country, one may assume that the annual demand for the products of the metallurgical industry in Poland will be not less than 40 to 50 kg. per capita and that Poland will thus easily consume within its own territory both its own production and that of Upper Silesia.

As regards the supply of iron ore, it may be said that the union of Upper Silesia to Poland would afford to the blast furnaces of the latter province the happiest solution of the difficulties with which they are contending as the result of the lack of ore.

Note what the "Memoire of the Chamber of Commerce of Oppeln" (Nov. 1915) says on this subject:

"For the future of the Upper Silesian industry it is of capital importance that the deposits of argillaceous iron ore, which extend along the frontier of Upper Silesia, should be annexed to Germany. But the deposits of ore in the Governments of Radom and Kielce (in former Congress Kingdom) are likewise of great value and since Germany suffers from lack of manganese, it would be very important that the ferro-manganese of the region of Radom and Kielce should also be put at the disposition of Upper Silesian blast furnaces".

“ Poland possesses also very important reserves of iron ore and the production of these deposits could be so increased as to suffice not merely to cover entirely its own requirements but to enable the export of considerable quantities of ore (K. Flegel : Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Montanindustrie etc., p. 69).

In his work “ The production of iron in Europe ” (1911), Dr. Setmer speaks as follows with regard to the Polish iron ores : “ The Western confines of Russia (the present Poland) constitute, at the very frontier of Germany (of Upper Silesia), the field of the Polish iron industry. One may note that the reserves of ore capable of being utilized in the near future in blast furnaces are still extensive and amount to approximately 266,500,000 tons of iron ore and to 109,200,000 tons of metallic iron.

The most recent researches have shown that Poland possesses still more abundant reserves of iron ore. “ The Handbook of Poland ” (Handbuch von Polen) published during the German occupation by the General German Government of Warsaw (Kaiserlich Deutsches General Gouvernement Warschau) estimates the Polish reserves of iron ore at from 400-600 million tons. These estimates have been confirmed by the investigations made during the last year by the Polish Government. One may call attention, moreover, to the fact that with the present considerable increase in the cost of transportation, and in view of the rate of exchange (Swedish as compared with German and Polish), the metallurgical industry will be able to produce at much better profit by using an ore less rich in iron but which is found close to the furnaces, than with an ore of superior quality but which is imported from a long distance and purchased in countries enjoying a high rate of exchange.

ZINC INDUSTRY

The most important of the Upper Silesian industries after those of coal and of iron is the zinc industry. It draws its raw materials from the neighbouring territory. Of 515,000 tons of zinc ore which it converted in 1915, 451,000 tons, or almost 85 % came from the deposits of Upper Silesia itself. In 1919, this proportion was still further changed to the advantage of the production of these deposits which furnished 221,000 tons of the total consumption of 233,000 tons or 94 % (Statistik der Oberschlesischen Berg- und Huettenwerke, 1913 and 1919).

The zinc industry of Upper-Silesia is par excellence an export industry. According to the “ Handbook of the Upper Silesian industrial District ” there was exported in 1911, outside of Germany, by land and waterways, 46.5 % of the zinc produced by Upper Silesia. A large part of this

exportation was destined to provinces which now constitute Poland, namely approximately 50 % of the shipments by railroad.

The union of Upper Silesia with Poland will in no way injure its situation from the point of view of the exportation of the products of its zinc industry. On the contrary, the conditions of its production will be advantageously changed.

The development of the Upper Silesian zinc industry was hindered by the difficulties which it encountered for the marketing of sulphuric acid which constitutes one of its by-products. The German acid market was saturated and the very high tariff taxes imposed upon this product on its entry into Russia forced the Upper Silesian zinc works to sell it at less than cost, which materially diminished the output.

Poland, on the other hand, will be able easily to utilize the excess of sulphuric acid furnished by Upper Silesia in her petroleum refineries, her sugar factories, her artificial fertiliser works, etc. Even before the war Poland's own production was insufficient to cover its requirements. She suffers still more from lack of this article at present since most of the factories which existed in the Congress Kingdom have been destroyed or greatly damaged by the war and during the German occupation. Her production of sulphuric acid has fallen as a result of these devastations by about 70,000 tons annually, which corresponds approximately to the quantity of sulphuric acid exported by Upper Silesia into Germany before the war.

The loss of Upper Silesia would cause no injury to Germany from the point of view of the supply of zinc for her internal market. In fact she exported outside of her own boundaries (i. e. without Upper Silesia) a quantity of zinc greater than she imported from Upper Silesia.

COKE

The coke industry is closely connected with the metallurgical industry. When therefore the annexation of Upper Silesia to Poland offers to the metallurgical industry of this province and especially to its iron industry full opportunity of prosperous development, the coke industry will also from that fact find itself in much more favourable conditions than at present, when the competition of German industry places the metallurgical industry of Upper Silesia in a catastrophic situation.

From 1890 to 1913, the production of coke in Upper Silesia increased from 1,065,000 tons to 2,210,000 tons, while for Germany, as a whole, it increased during this same period of time from 6,557,000 tons to 54,650,000 tons. The German industry as a whole therefore showed

much more rapid progress than that of Upper Silesia. In 1890, the participation of the latter in the coke production of Germany was 16.7 %; in 1913, it had already fallen to 6.4 %.

As regards the exportation of Upper Silesian coke, it was especially directed toward the Polish territories. Out of 649,000 tons of coke shipped from Upper Silesia in 1913 by railroad, more than 50 %, namely 339,000 tons, were destined to Poland in its present boundaries.

The question of Teschen having been decided in a manner unfavourable for Poland, only the possession of Upper Silesia can assure to her the necessary independence from the point of view of coke supply. For Germany, on the other hand, Upper Silesian coke has only an altogether secondary importance, since the Westphalian-Rhenisch and Lower Silesian districts produce a coke much more adapted to the requirements of blast furnaces. Thus even before the war one could scarcely count upon Germany as a market for Upper Silesian coke. In 1913 there was shipped from Upper Silesia to Germany (in its present boundaries) only 150,000 tons.

We cannot pass by without mention the principal by-products of coke manufacture, namely sulphate of ammonia and tar.

The coke ovens of Upper Silesia produced in 1911 : 30,000 tons of sulphate of ammonia and 91,500 tons of tar, or respectively 8.7 % and 10.7 % of the total quantity of these products furnished by the German coke ovens. It would be superfluous to emphasise how indispensable the first of these products is to Poland for the increase of her agricultural production. As regards tar, it might serve as a basis for the development of the chemical industry, Poland suffering from the fact that she has not hitherto been able to develop this industry.

OTHER BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY

Other branches of industry, except the cement and cellulose industries, have been little developed in Upper Silesia by reason of the unfavourable conditions created by its geographical situation and because the policy of the German Government sought to direct the great industries of transformation and of finished products toward the centre of the country.

Thus the development of Upper Silesian industry is in some measure one sided, and many of the branches of German export industry, as for example the manufacture of machines, the electro-technical industry, the chemical and textile industries, etc., are either not represented there or exist only in a rudimentary state.

There might be reason to fear consequently that Upper Silesia might encounter certain difficulties in supplying herself with these products during the first years which would follow her annexation to Poland, difficulties which the German Government might cause, just as it at present causes similar difficulties for Poland. However, as regards the textile industry Poland enjoys an entire independence, this industry there having attained a high degree of development.

As regards the other products for which she was in a certain measure dependent upon Germany, there is no doubt that neither Poland nor Upper Silesia will encounter great difficulty in supplying themselves with these articles.

For that matter it is expressly stipulated in Article 266 of the Treaty of Versailles that Germany cannot apply to the exportation to Poland of its products, of whatever sort, other measures than are in force for the exportation to Allied or foreign countries. It is even in the interests of Germany to create and maintain close economic relations with Poland.

The German business men have often given proof of this during recent times, since despite the prohibition of the German Government against the exportation of goods into Poland, they have succeeded in bringing some goods upon the Polish market by making use of round-about routes through Czecho-Slovakia, Danzig and even Roumania.

On the other hand Poland, aiming to free herself from the chicanery practised by the German Government, has sought and found other purveyors in the Allied countries and in Austria. It has thus come about that in the course of the last year Poland has in a large measure ceased to be tributary to Germany as regards machinery and explosives necessary for her mining industry.

WOOD

For its wood supply Upper Silesia depends in great part on importations from Poland. The wood of Upper Silesia is entirely unable to provide for the requirements of the country, the more so because for several years the consumption has increased greatly on account of the development of the cellulose industry. For the same reason the forests of the Regencies of Breslau and Lignitz play only an altogether secondary part in the supply of Upper Silesia. The forests of other German districts are too distant from the Upper Silesian industrial centres and are exploited for the benefit of nearer consumers.

The Prussian Mine Counsellor, I. Westphal, says with regard to the wood requirements of Upper-Silesia, in his work entitled, " Wohin muss

Oberschlesien gehoeren ". (To whom should Upper Silesia belong. Gleiwitz, 1921, p. 7) :

" The wood of Upper-Silesia represents only a small part of the great quantities necessary for its consumption; importation from the interior of Germany, on the other hand, encounters many difficulties so that it is more and more necessary to seek supplies abroad. "

Of the 640,000 tons of wood brought to Upper Silesia by railroad in 1915, the Polish territories furnished 70 %.

Calculating the quantities of wood used in Upper Silesia, Westphal says in the work already mentioned : " These figures show the preponderant role of Poland in the wood supply of Upper Silesia. "

The Upper Silesian Union of Furnaces and Mines moreover states in its Memoir of September 3rd 1916 : " Without Polish wood it would be impossible to maintain the exploitation of the mines of Upper Silesia during the war at the present level But after the conclusion of peace it will be equally indispensable to make sure of the wood supply from Poland for the mines of Upper Silesia. "

UPPER SILESIA DEPENDENT ON POLAND FOR ITS FOOD SUPPLY

Germany is unable, as is generally known, to feed its population from its own production and is compelled to seek supplies abroad, especially for the industrial districts with a dense labouring population such as Upper Silesia.

After the loss of Posen, that granary of Germany, the problem of the food supply of Upper Silesia would present even greater difficulties than before the war.

Referring to official German statistics " Statistik der Gueterbewegung auf deutschen Eisenbahnen ", (Statistics of the transportation of Merchandise on the German Railways), it is seen that Germany was less important than Poland in the supply of food products to Upper Silesia. This is shown by the following figures covering the year 1912 :

Classes of products.	Total importations into Upper-Silesia by railroad, in tons.	Importations from Poland in tons.
Wheat	9,468	4,322
Rye	55,022	21,464
Barley	25,742	22,833
Potatoes	91,368	78,773
Millet and leguminous grains.	12,554	11,270
Hogs (number)	142,055	120,075
Poultry (number)	314,760	297,400

It should be pointed out that it is impossible to distinguish the products imported into Upper Silesia from Russia proper (that part beyond the frontiers of Poland as established by the Treaty of Riga) so that such importations are included in the above figures. However the importations into Upper Silesia of products from Russia apart from the provinces now belonging to Poland was insignificant.

Certain quantities of bread grains were exported from Upper Silesia, but only from agricultural regions situated outside of the plebiscite territory.

It is true that Poland itself at present has to struggle with difficulties as regards food supply. However, these difficulties are only temporary and caused by the ravages of the Bolshevik invasion and by the lack of artificial chemical fertilisers. The annexation of Upper Silesia to Poland will facilitate the supply of chemical fertilisers to the latter and will thus improve its situation as regards food supply.

The managers of industry in Upper Silesia describe as follows the role of Poland in the food supply of Upper Silesia (*Annals of the Chamber of Commerce of Oppeln*, September 24, 1916) :

“ The regulation of the transport of food coming from Russian Poland is also of primary importance for our district. As soon as rational agrarian technique shall be applied to the fertile lands of Russian Poland, we should be able to make of it a rich German colony. As an importing region our district is particularly interested in the incorporation of the neighbouring Polish territories, since Upper Silesia has not enough cultivated land to suffice for the supply of its very dense population, while Russian Poland, in many respects, plays the part of a natural hinterland for Upper Silesia ”.

QUESTIONS OF CURRENCY AND FINANCE

The law voted by the Polish Diet, July 15, 1920, in Articles 9 and 10, gives to the local elements full autonomy for regulating the currency question of Upper Silesia after the union of that province with Poland. It permits Upper Silesia to solve this question in a manner conforming to its own interests and needs.

As regards finances, it should be mentioned that the union of Upper Silesia with Poland will involve no essential modifications in the financial organization, on which its industry is founded. That industry rests chiefly upon the great fortunes of the Upper Silesian magnates. Stock companies are for the most part organised only for solving questions with regard to the partition of properties.

If for political reasons, and contrary to their own interests, the German banks should refuse to cooperate with Upper Silesian industry, which is established from the financial point of view on sound principles, this industry would always be able to gain the support of great international capital which gladly finances the large scale coal and metallurgical industry in different countries.

MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

Placed at the extremity of a cul-de-sac, Upper Silesia has contact with Germany only to the extent of the width of this cul-de-sac and is separated from the territory of the Empire proper by a distance of 300 klm. (i. e. by the whole length of Silesia from Southeast to Northwest).

This geographical situation with reference to Germany is rendered still more unfavourable since the lower and middle course of the Oder, the sole waterway which connects the industrial district with Germany, has only a single affluent flowing toward the East, while on the other hand it possesses several important branches which rise in the heart of Poland in the neighbourhood of Warsaw.

This disadvantageous situation of Upper Silesia as a part of Germany cannot be changed because it results from natural conditions and because the German Government, as has been sufficiently proved by experience, has not been able to give aid to the development of the means of communication which would serve the interests of Upper Silesia since it would thus work to the detriment of the industries of its western provinces, which constitute an infinitely more important natural resource for Germany than the industry of Upper Silesia.

“ The great advantage which the industry of western Germany has gained over Upper Silesia in the field of foreign trade, will be the better assured in the future since that industry is served by two waterways of the first order, which assure to it an outlet into the regions of eastern Germany.... As a consequence of the limitation of its possibilities of competition, resulting from the establishment of these waterways, the mining industry of Upper Silesia is largely frustrated as regards the advantages which it might have obtained through the regulation of the course of the Oder. ” (Handbook of the Upper Silesian District p. 305).

The possibilities of communication between Upper Silesia and Poland present quite a different aspect. In the first place, the industry of Upper Silesia is much more important than any which exists within a distance of nearly 1 500 kilometers toward the East.

Again natural conditions themselves direct the products of Upper

Silesian industry toward the East thanks to the net of affluents of the Oder above mentioned, and also to the geographical disposition of the affluents of the Vistula which form an arc open toward the West in such a way that the distance between the Upper Silesian industrial district and the mouth of the Vistula (from Kattowitz to Danzig) is shorter than that which separates this district from the mouth of the Oder.

It is evident that, from the point of view of means of communication, Poland will have to struggle against great difficulties, particularly by reason of the lack of rolling stock. But every unprejudiced person must recognise that there has already been a material improvement in this respect which cannot fail to be accentuated still further, when Germany carries out its obligations with regard to the restitution of cars and locomotives in conformity with the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles.

TECHNICAL ADMINISTRATION

(Expert employees and workmen)

Aiming to germanize the country, the Government of Germany, as well as its large scale industry which adopted the same policy, brought specialists from the interior of Germany to Upper Silesia thus forcing the Polish technicians to emigrate.

This fact explains why all the industrial enterprises in Upper Silesia had Germans at their head. Nevertheless, the attribution of Upper Silesia to Poland would involve no lowering of the production of its mines and metallurgical plants by reason of lack of qualified personnel in the administration of these enterprises, and that for the following reasons :

1. More than two thirds (6,000) of the mine and factory employees of superior and middle rank joined the Polish professional association during 1920, when the economic pressure of Germany had been reduced under the regime of the interallied High Commission. From the political point of view this association has above all set itself the task of working for the attachment of Upper Silesia to Poland.

2. A large number of employees who are not members of the Association have, during the course of the last few weeks, made personal declarations certifying that they will remain in Upper Silesia and will continue their work independently of the result of the plebiscite.

3. A large number of Polish technicians, many of them altogether eminent, are found outside of Upper Silesia, who have had to leave there by reason of their national or political convictions.

4. If necessary, the Krakow and Dombrowa basins would be in a position to furnish a considerable number of specialists, Moreover Poland

possesses many excellent technicians who before the Russian Revolution were working in the plants of Southern Russia and who there often directed the biggest industrial enterprises.

5. If, however, certain branches of industry should lack specialists, they could easily be found in the Allied countries.

SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS

The Polish Government has assured to Upper Silesia a very wide political, economic and social autonomy in conformity with the interests of the district itself. This autonomy affects likewise all public institutions such as the sick funds, relief funds, funds for old age retirement, etc. All these organizations will have an autonomous existence and will not be made dependent on similar organizations which already exist in Poland or which may be created there.

FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS

On the basis almost exclusively of official German data or of data coming from the most competent German sources, we have shown that, despite the fact that Upper Silesia has long been attached to Germany, the economic bonds which unite it with the German organism have been becoming looser and looser during the course of recent years, as the result of the unfavourable conditions which the union of Upper Silesia with the Empire created both from the economic point of view and from its geographical situation.

At the same time we have shown that the economic relations between Upper Silesia and the Polish territories were becoming closer and closer. In fact, those territories constitute, for the most important products of Upper Silesia such as coal, coke, iron, zinc, artificial fertiliser, sulphuric acid etc. an export market of inestimable importance which can today be replaced by no other market.

Furthermore, the Polish territories have, during recent years, furnished Upper Silesia the most important of the raw materials indispensable to its industry, and they will be able to furnish it still more of these in the future.

We have also found that Upper Silesia constitutes *the basis of the economic independence of Poland* while its role in the economic life of Germany is by no means important and has been diminishing from year to year.

It is therefore indisputable that the separation of Upper Silesia from the German Empire could not cause important economic disturbances for Germany and would have only an altogether insignificant influence upon her capacity of payment.

The total value of the wealth of all kinds (land, factories, capital) of the plebiscite territory estimated on the basis of the " Wehrbeitragspflichtgesetz " (Law concerning the obligation of defense contributions) amounted only to 1,887,500,000 marks which in comparison with the wealth of the entire Empire which (before the Treaty of Peace) amounted to 152,544,200,000 marks, constituted only 1.25 %. If however we take into consideration the territorial modifications resulting from the Treaty of Versailles, this percentage rises by 0.15 and thus becomes 1.36 %,

One obtains almost identical results by a study of the tax paying capacity of the population of Upper Silesia and comparing it with the average tax paying capacity of the population of the Empire. Estimates based on the official German statistics, (" Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer den preussischen Staat 1915 ") show that the population of Upper Silesia contributes only 1.61 % of the direct taxes of the Empire in its present boundaries. Upper Silesia contains 3.3 % of the total population of the Empire. It follows that the Upper Silesian tax payer is on the average only one half as rich as the average German tax payer.

ANNEX 5

Exploitation of Upper-Silesia by the Germans

Distribution of wealth. — The forms taken by the Prussian oppression in Upper Silesia are numerous and diverse. Apart from national oppression, we see in fact the systematic oppression of the peasant and labourer by the large landed proprietors and by the managers of industry and commerce.

The distribution of the landed property in Upper Silesia is as follows :

Area of landed property.	Number of proprietors	Number of hectares
Properties of 100 — 500 hectares . . .	113	50,000
— — 500 — 1,000 —	65	45,000
— 1,000 — 3,000 —	50	78,000
— 3,000 — 10,000 —	22	112,500
— 10,000 — 50,000 ha.	9	229,000
— above 50,000 ha. (German state) .	1	96,919

That which especially deserves to attract attention and to be remembered is the fact that seven German proprietors including the Prussian State, alone possess 286,697 ha. of land or 27 % — more than a quarter — of the total area of Upper Silesia.

The following are the names of these proprietors with the amount of land in their hands.

Properties of the State (forest, domaines, mines and factories)	96,919 hectares.
Prince of Ujest	42,001 —
Prince of Pless	40,457 —
Prince of Ratibor	35,597 —
Prince Stölberg Wernigerode	26,517 —
Prince of Hohenlohe Ingelfingen	25,486 —
Comte Henckel von Donnersmark	21,942 —

The greater part of the coal, zinc, lead and iron mines — all the natural resources — in Upper Silesia are the monopoly of big German proprietors. The “Fest-schrift zum XII allgemeinen deutschen Bergmanstage in Breslau 1915” (Report of the 12th German Mining Congress held at Breslau in 1915) expresses itself on this subject as follows :

“The proprietors of the sub-soil of Upper Silesia are in the more favourable situation because the mineral resources of the country are divided among a small number of persons.”

The coal mines of Upper Silesia are in fact in the hands of 22 proprietors. In 1911, 92 % of the total production of coal was furnished by mines belonging to 14 of these proprietors among whom is counted the Prussian State whose collieries furnished 47 % of the production.

Conditions of labour of the working classes. — Germany passes for being that Power of the old continent which first comprehended the necessity of surrounding the labouring classes with the protection and care of the State. Nevertheless, the situation of the working class in Upper Silesia was, from the point of view of the application of social legislation, distinctly worse than that of the labourers of the Westphalian-Rhenish provinces.

The system of exploiting the working population began with the discharge from the mines of the underground workers receiving higher wages, and their replacement by unskilled workers paid at lower rates. This method was practised on a huge scale during the war in the Upper Silesian coal mines. According to data furnished by the “Zeitschrift fuer Berg-, Huetten-und Salinenwesen im Preussischen Staate” published by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for the years 1913-1919 (with the exception of the year 1915), the unskilled labourer at lower wages is tending to replace the skilled labourer with higher wages in all the mining regions of Germany. But everywhere else this phenomenon is as yet very little pronounced and the proportion to which the substitution has been carried does not exceed 2 or 5 %, as for example in the Saar district. It is quite otherwise in Upper Silesia. The skilled labour is systematically replaced by common labour. The number of professional miners has fallen during the last 11 years from 52 % to 22.5 % of the total, i. e. by more than half. Thus, while in 1919 they constituted more than half of the total number of workers in the mines of Upper Silesia, they represented less than a quarter of the total in 1909. On the other hand, the unskilled underground labourers who formerly constituted 16.3 % of the total, have increased to 56.5 %. The proportion of workers of other categories including women has also increased from 51.7 % in 1909 to 41.4 % in 1919.

The same phenomenon appears as regards the duration of labour. The working day in Upper Silesia has always been longer than in the western mining basins of Germany. The "Zeitschrift fuer Berg-, Huetten- und Salinenwesen im Preussischen Staate", for the years 1914, 1915, and 1919 shows that while the working day at Dortmund varies from 6 to 8 hours, in Upper Silesia it ranges from 9 to 12 hours. Thus while 9 hours per day is more than the maximum in the provinces of the West, it constitutes a minimum for the Upper Silesian miner.

The wages of Upper Silesian labour have always been lower than those of German labour in the other provinces of the Empire. They were inadequate to such a degree that the Polish working man and day labourer was condemned to vegetate miserably. This situation was not changed during the war. In 1918 while the labourer in Upper Silesia was paid on an average 7-8 marks per day, the wage of the Westphalian labourer amounted to 10.54 marks or 10.3 marks. (Stat. Jahrbuch fuer das deutsche Reich, page 102).

The exploitation of the Polish working class in Upper Silesia does not stop with men, for women and children are also exploited. While in 1912-1914 the workers in coal mines of Upper Silesia constituted only 20.3 % of the miners of all Prussia, the women working in the mines of this province represented at that time 94.17 % of the total number of women employed in the coal mines of all Prussia. Thus in fact female labour was used in mines before the war practically exclusively in Upper Silesia.

As for young persons, to say nothing of children, this is what we read in the "Handbook of the Upper Silesian Industrial District" (Handbuch des oberschlesischen Industriebezirkes) published by the Upper-Silesian union of mines and furnaces (Oberschlesischer Berg und Huettenverein) :

"The number of young persons working in Upper Silesia is about the same as that of young persons employed in Westphalia and the Saar basin. It represents in round numbers 4 % of the total number of workers. The difference between the two sections consists solely in the fact that in Upper Silesia the young persons are largely required to work underground which has not yet occurred elsewhere up to the present time. "

This document dates from the year 1915. It was evidently not easy to conceal such a fact registered in official statistics : the fact that to the exclusion of all other Prussian provinces children of less than 16 years were employed in Upper Silesia for under-ground labour.

Centres of administration and exploitation. — It is evident that such a system of exploitation of the natural resources of the country and

of its population can be realised only by means of an expert organization. In this organization it is the cities which play at the same time the role of central organs of administration and of exploitation.

In the territory within the line which we have already indicated and where the Poles are in the majority, there are nevertheless strong German minorities which form centres of German influence. This is particularly true of the industrial district comprising 360 sq. kilometers. It is in this region — districts of Katowice (Kattowitz), Krolewska Huta (Koenigshutte), Zabrze, Gliwice (Gleiwitz) and Bytom (Beuthen) — that three quarters of the coal production of Upper Silesia is concentrated and the greater part of the metallurgical establishments. On this strip of territory surrounded by regions strictly Polish, are found a number of German islands so densely populated that with the aid of the émigrés they gave a German majority in the plebiscite. From the economic point of view those islands are employed in the exploitation of the entire country.

The results of the vote in the cities of this region, as well as in the district of Zabrze where the Germans obtained only a small majority and that thanks to the émigrés, appear as follows :

	German votes.	Polish votes.
Katowice (Kattowitz)	22.809	5.889
Krolewska Huta (Koenigshütte)	31.848	10.764
Bytom (Beuthen)	29.889	10.102
Gliwice (Gleiwitz)	52.022	8.599
Zabrze	45.282	43.519

These islands possess on their own territory neither iron nor zinc ore, nor a sufficient amount of coal. They are engaged in the transformation of raw materials and these raw materials as well as the human labour are taken from the outside, i. e. from the Polish territories that surround them.

In these German agglomerations the bulk of the population consists of a class of entrepreneurs, merchants and persons who depend on them, as well as of state and municipal functionaries, for, in conformity with the program which has just been set forth, these cities represent not merely centres of economic exploitation but also the points around which the administrative authorities of the region are grouped.

The cities serve as administrative centres for the entire region and consequently the majority which the Germans obtained there is merely artificial, since their population is floating and its interests are not bound up with the fate of the country so closely as are those of the rural population.

As regards the formal right to assign these German islands to Poland, we find certain instructive examples in preceding plebiscites. Thus the territory of the district of Sztum in West Prussia which constituted a Polish island was assigned to Germany although it was separated from the Polish frontier only by a strip of territory some 10 km. wide.

Is it permissible under these conditions to attribute to these German agglomerations, grouped in cities which are centres of exploitation and of oppression of this province, a value equal or superior to that of the votes of the Poles who represent the permanent element fixed in the country?

It is thus seen that Upper Silesia is far from constituting merely a problem of nationality as is generally believed. It is at the same time a social question which must be settled in conformity with the principles of democracy and justice for which rivers of blood were poured forth in Europe during more than four years.



LM 1

