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Dr. STANISLAW SLAWSKI

Member of the Harbour and Waterways Board in Danzig

POLAND'S ACCESS TO THE SEA

AND THE CLAIMS OF EAST PRUSSIA

WITH A PREFACE

BY

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Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Republic

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PREFACE.

THERE are many points in this short book which are well calculated to attract the interest and sympathy of British readers. The author has all throughout endeavoured to place before the British public a clear and balanced statement of the attitude of Poland towards such vital questions as the sanctity of her frontiers and her right of access to the sea.

On the latter question at any rate he is sure of interested attention. The British Empire has been built up and guarded by generations of stout-hearted seamen, and its citizens can hardly do other than sympathize with Poland's claim to hold the very small coast-line which forms an integral part of her ethnographic entity, and the possession of which is essential to her future prosperity. From the standpoint of public law there appears to be no more clearly defined right of a sovereign state than that to safeguard, where such is possible, a free and unimpeded access to the sea.

In Poland's case, of course, there are some particular considerations. The author of this book has dealt quite frankly with any really important points which have been raised in connection with this matter. Even from the purely material point of view it is in the highest degree essential that there should be the closest appreciation and understanding between Great Britain and Poland, for Poland is a potential market with the most glowing possibilities, and so far as the people of Poland are concerned, they are most anxiously desirous of encouraging trade with Britain.

Apart, however, from all commercial considerations there is the further fact that the sea makes the same striking appeal to the spirit of Poland as it does to that of England—an appeal all the more poignant that the Polish coast-line is so much smaller and consequently so much rarer. The Poles, furthermore, are

naturally proud of the fact that it was a countryman of theirs, Joseph Conrad, who came as a guest to England, and who, by his genius and writings, best expressed in immortal English prose the character and personality of the English seamen with all those roving and daring qualities which have contributed so much to England's greatness.

On the other vital question dealt with in this book, the sanctity of the Polish frontiers, only one observation need be made in a short introduction. Over-zealous theorists of all nationalities are wont to treat the settlement of frontiers as if this were a simple operation to be regulated from outside and offering little or no difficulties in its practical application. In this opinion they are altogether beside the mark. There is no record in history of any nation with its own consent yielding up territory inhabited by its own kith and kin to which its title has been confirmed by the solemn engagements of an International Treaty and the control over which is essential to the maintenance of its continued security.

ALEXANDER SKRZYNSKI.

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POLAND AND GERMANY.

INTRODUCTION.

THE VERSAILLES TREATY AND GERMAN PROPAGANDA AGAINST THE POLISH OUTLET TO THE SEA.

The thirteenth point of President Wilson's historical declaration (speech at the Washington Congress, January 8, 1918) read as follows :

"13. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputable Polish populations, in which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by International Covenant . . ."

On the strength of the above Poland claimed at the Peace Conference in Paris that Danzig should belong to her as being her only access to the sea, and likewise as being situated at the mouth of the Vistula. The so-called "Cambon" Commission decided on two occasions, after impartial local investigation, that Danzig should be unconditionally allotted to Poland. On account of the objection raised by Mr. Lloyd George, the Peace Conference, however, decided to give Poland only a small portion of the Baltic coast—measuring 146 kilometres, 70 kilometres of which are taken up by the narrow peninsula "Hel." The town of Danzig and the country immediately surrounding it (about 350,000 inhabitants and 1,850 kilometres), occupying the mouth of the Vistula, were made into a "Free City" (Articles 100 to 108, Treaty of Versailles) and placed under the protection of the League of Nations.

Although Germany had accepted Wilson's fourteen points on November 11, 1918, the German Delegation protested against this proposal, which would give Poland access to the sea, and insisted that the sea coast, Danzig and the mouth of the Vistula, should remain in German hands.

The German protest was rejected in the well-known letter of Clemenceau, acting as President of the Peace Conference, dated June 16, 1919, and in the enclosed note : "The reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace."

"Poland will be given certain economic rights in Danzig, and the city itself has been severed from Germany because in no other way was it possible to provide for that "free and secure access to the sea" which Germany has promised to concede. The German counter-proposals . . . deny secure access to the sea to a nation of over twenty million people, whose nationals

are in the majority all the way to the coast, in order to maintain territorial connection between East and West Prussia, whose trade has always been mainly seaborne. They cannot, therefore, be accepted by the Allied and Associated Powers."

The relevant passages in the Allies' Reply read as follows:

SECTION IX.—EAST PRUSSIA.—" . . . for Poland to have immediate and unbroken communication with Danzig and the remainder of the coast by railways which are entirely under the control of the Polish State is essential. The inconvenience caused to East Prussia by the new frontiers is negligible compared to that which would be caused to Poland by any other arrangement."

SECTION XI.—DANZIG.—"The economic interests of Danzig and Poland are identical. For Danzig as the great port of the valley of the Vistula, the most intimate connection with Poland is essential. The annexation of West Prussia, including Danzig, to Germany, deprived Poland of that direct access to the sea which was hers by right. The Allied and Associated Powers propose that this direct access shall be restored. It is not enough that Poland should be allowed the use of German ports: the coast, short as it is, which is Polish, must be restored to her. Poland claims, and justly claims, that the control and development of the port which is her sole opening to the sea shall be in her hands, and that the communications between it and Poland shall not be subjected to any foreign control, so that in this, one of the most important aspects of national life, Poland should be put on an equality with the other States of Europe."

PART XII.—PORTS, WATERWAYS, AND RAILWAYS.—"Similarly, it is noted that, with regard to the question of Danzig, Germany declares herself ready to accord, to assure Poland free access to the sea, facilities and advantages similar to those which are asked from her at Hamburg and Stettin on behalf of the Czecho-Slovak State; but without raising any objection of principle she claims to make the matter in both cases the subject of and a counter in special negotiation with the interested parties only, without any international guarantee."

By virtue of the Versailles Treaty Poland was given almost the whole of the Province of Posen and three-fifths of Polish Pomerania.

A clause in Article 89, however, provides that Poland should guarantee free transit between Germany and East Prussia. In accordance with this provision and in execution of Article 98 of the Treaty of Versailles, a Polish-German Convention was concluded in Paris on April 21, 1921. The said Convention came into force as from June 1, 1922, and is being carried out by Poland to the complete satisfaction of Germany's transport and economic

needs (see Part III). Notwithstanding these facts, objections are now and again raised in the German Press to the effect that East Prussia is cut off from Germany, that such a state of affairs cannot continue, and that Germany should demand an alteration of the frontiers fixed by the Treaty of Versailles, and first and foremost, that the so-called "corridor" should be given back to her.

It is therefore necessary to lay particular stress on the importance to Poland of having an outlet to the sea (Part I); the position of East Prussia (Part II); and communication between Germany and East Prussia (Part III).

It should be emphasized, in the first place, that Germany does not desire the positive gain, i.e. the recovery of the 146 kilometres of Polish seaboard so much as the negative gain, i.e. the cutting off of Poland from the sea, and, consequently, from other countries. Germany refers to the "corridor" as hampering her means of communication, but she proposes the annexation of Danzig which, in accordance with the Treat of Versailles, is under the protection of the League of Nations; Germany would like to repeat the events of 1772 and 1793, when, in the first Partition of Poland, Prussia annexed Polish Pomerania, and later, in 1793, Danzig fell ino her hands like "ripe fruit," to use the words of a certain Prussian diplomat.

The Germans are endeavouring to seize Danzig, the one port which Poland possesses, and also the mouth of the Vistula, so as to cut Poland off from the Baltic and thus to make her economically dependent on Germany. Poland is mistress of her own coast; her rights in Danzig, though limited, are nevertheless rights, whether they be those of ownership (railways), partnership (harbour and waterways), or control (customs). In advocating the annexation of Danzig and Polish Pomerania, Germany would like to make of Poland a customer, to whom she might dictate her conditions. The plan is very simple: to impoverish Poland, to ruin her, and, finally, to annex her.

By trying to bring about these results Germany is sapping the foundations of the new status of Europe, which she herself accepted in 1918–1919:

(*a*) She actually protests against President Wilson's thirteenth point, which guarantees to Poland free and secure access to the sea.

(*b*) She demands an alteration of the territorial frontiers fixed by the Treaty of Versailles.

PART I.

POLISH ACCESS TO THE SEA.

By virtue of the above-mentioned thirteenth point of Wilson's declaration, Poland had the right to expect that Danzig, with its port and the mouth of the Vistula would be allotted to her, thus giving her "access to the sea." In reality, however, Poland received only a strip of sea-coast (146 kilometres in length), but without the port and the mouth of the Vistula; on the other hand Poland secured certain rights in respect of the port of Danzig, but without any territorial ownership.

In this way a wedge was driven into the Polish possessions, and the limitation of Poland's rights in Danzig only helps Germany to drive this wedge further in, and threatens to cut Poland off from the sea.

Her access to the sea, in a geographical and territorial sense, is formed by the Polish coastal territory, termed by Germans "the corridor," but which is really an integral part of Poland, together with the Free City of Danzig, which was established as a self-governing unit under the protection of the League of Nations, although closely linked up to Poland in the matter of communications and economic conditions. This access to the sea German propaganda is trying to destroy.

Although making every use of the rights she is entitled to with regard to Danzig, Poland—as will be shown later—does not consider them adequate, and she is therefore endeavouring to assure her access to the sea by building a port on her own coast at Gdynia (Gdingen).

In the first place, therefore, let us examine the political and economic relations of Poland to Danzig and, later, we shall go into the question of the Polish coast.

CHAPTER I.

THE FREE CITY OF DANZIG.

1. The Juridical and Political Basis of the Constitution.

The principal stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles and the Paris Convention concluded between Poland and Danzig, and dated November 9, 1920, are the following:

(*a*) Danzig is a Free City under the protection of the League of Nations.

(*b*) Danzig is included in the Polish frontier, in so far as "customs and duties" are concerned. (This took place January 1, 1922.)

(*c*) Poland conducts Danzig's foreign relations.

(*d*) The railway system and its control are given to Poland.

(*e*) Poland has the right to establish in the port postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication with Poland on the one hand, and with foreign countries on the other.

(*f*) Besides the above-mentioned Convention, the second juridical basis of the Free City of Danzig is to be found in its constitution, elaborated in conjunction with the High Commissioner of the League of Nations, who permanently holds office in Danzig, and who, in the first instance, arbitrates in all disputes which may arise between Poland and the Free City of Danzig.

(*g*) The Polish minority in Danzig shall enjoy the same protection as national minorities enjoy in Poland.

(*h*) The exploitation and management of the port, that part of the Vistula which flows through the territory of Danzig, the canals and immovable property formerly belonging to Germany or Prussia, come under the administration of a mixed governing body, consisting of representatives of Poland, and of Danzig, i.e. "the Harbour and Waterways Board." At the head of this Board are a Polish Commissioner, who represents the Polish Government on the one side, and a Danzig Commissioner, representing the Free City, on the other. The Harbour Board must guarantee to Poland "the free use and service of the port and means of communication, as stipulated in Article 20, without any restrictions.

(*i*) The Constitution voted by the Constituent Assembly in May, 1920, was accepted and adopted by the Council of the League of Nations after certain modifications had been made. According to this Constitution the Free City is governed by the Senate which is vested with executive power.

Seven senators are elected every four years by the Lower Chamber, while the other fourteen are parliamentary senators.

In order that a Statute may become law, both Senate and the Chamber must agree. The Chamber consists of 120 deputies.

The Free City of Danzig did not come into existence *ipso jure* from the time of the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, but only by virtue of an additional declaration dated October 27, 1920, made by England, France, Italy and Japan, on the strength of Article 102 of the Treaty of Versailles. Accordingly the Free City of Danzig came into existence on November 15, 1920; and simultaneously the Polish-Danzig Convention, which embodies the principal Polish laws concerning the "access to the sea" through the territory of the Free City of Danzig, came into power. The only reason why Danzig was detached from Germany and made a Free City was the desire to secure free access to the sea for Poland. The fact that the original decision was to assign Danzig to Poland is authentic proof of this desire. (See "Reply" dated June 16, 1919.)

2. Special Rights of Poland.

Whereas Poland's access to the sea through her own territory, *i.e. her 146 kilometres of sea coast, is an actual and technical* reality which will find its final realization in the construction and exploitation of the port of Gdynia (Gdingen), her "access to the sea" by way of Danzig is, on the contrary, a purely legal theory. There are here in question a whole series of privileges to be granted either to the Polish Republic—such as in respect of the means of communication on the territory of Danzig (railways), the Lower Vistula (navigation), and the port—or to Polish citizens as concerning the Free City.

Proper facilities were actually existent, and it was only necessary to define Poland's legal position with regard to them:

(*a*) The main railways within the Free City of Danzig are all, without exception, being controlled and utilized by the Polish State Railways, as from December 1, 1921. The movable and immovable property and the rolling stock belong to Poland, with the exception of a small portion of the latter officially belonging to the Harbour Board, which enjoys some privileges in respect of the "Port Railroads."

(*b*) The port, the Vistula, and the water communication within the territory of the Free City of Danzig are governed and exploited by the "Harbour and Waterways Board," which is a mixed body, composed by Poles and Danzigers in equal number.

The Polish railway authorities contend that the railways within the territory of Danzig, although not extensive, are nevertheless important as facilitating access to the sea, and that they constitute an integral part of the Polish State Railways, and that, therefore, both passengers and goods may be transported in Polish trains directly to and from the coast.

As administrative and legislative power is in the hands of the Senate and the "Volkstag," Poland has been somewhat restricted in the use of her railways (as well as in her Port and Customs services and her Postal and International Communication). The present Senate is not in favour of the administration of the railways by Poland, and much inconvenience is therefore caused to the railway authorities. As a result there are numerous disputes, the settling of which is very troublesome to the High Commissioner of the League of Nations. Some of these disputes, as, for instance, the refusal of the Senate to allow the Board of Management of that portion of the Polish State Railways to have its headquarters in Danzig, and also the question of the right of issuing orders, have not yet been settled.

(*c*) The postal rights of Poland have not yet been enforced, and in this matter too lengthy negotiations and several appeals to the High Commissioner were required before the Senate would

recognize these rights which had been guaranteed to Poland by the Treaty of Versailles and the Convention. Early in 1925 Poland began to build a post office on a site leased to her by the Harbour Board in 1924. Stress must, therefore, be laid on the fact that with regard to her postal communication Poland does not enjoy full access to the sea.

(*d*) With regard to Customs, Danzig was included in the Polish Customs frontiers on January 1, 1922, by virtue of the Treaty of Versailles, and was made subject to Polish legislation. The executive power, however, is in the hands of the Danzig Customs authorities, and the Senate of Danzig insists that they should be regarded as an independent unit, that Customs officials should not come under Polish jurisdiction, and that the Polish Government should have no voice in their appointment. The Senate further claims an independent policy in regard to imports and exports, on the plea that this policy does not come within the sphere of Customs legislation. This state of affairs has involved Poland in incalculable economic losses.

The provision of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides that Danzig shall be included in the Polish Customs frontiers aimed at uniting Poland and Danzig in one economic unit, while leaving to Danzig the freedom of its autonomous administration. Without this economic union Danzig would be "beyond the frontier," as far as Poland is concerned, and would not constitute her access to the sea.

The many difficulties in connection with the Customs which are continually arising from the present condition of affairs as interpreted and carried out by the Senate, prove that here again Poland's free access to the sea is not assured.

As regards the conduct of Foreign Affairs the Senate of Danzig also insists that Poland should recognize its independent right to negotiate and make treaties, etc. This leads to new disputes with Poland, and much opposition to her on the part of the Senate. On this point, too, Polish access to the sea is not definitely established, and still causes innumerable difficulties.

So much for the principal rights of the Polish Republic in respect of Danzig.

The individual rights of Polish citizens were regulated in the Agreement of Warsaw, concluded on October 24, 1921, which contained no fewer that 244 articles, and settled the following points :

> The right of acquiring Danzig citizenship, intercourse across the frontiers, the opening of Polish commercial firms in Danzig, the right of purchasing real estate, jurisdiction. In addition, the Agreement regulated a number of questions bearing on Customs, finance, navigation, imports and exports, etc.

Certain difficulties again arose, both as to the rights of the Polish Republic and also those of Polish citizens, because of the different interpretation which the Danzig Senate and the Polish Government put on the Agreements which had been concluded.

The main reason of this diversity of interpretation is the Senate's deliberate disregard of the fact that the Free City was created for the purpose of giving Poland access to the sea. In consequence the administrative and legislative policy of Danzig should aim at the realization of this fundamental principle, which in no way encroaches upon the internal independence of the Free City, or affects its mainly German character.

The Senate adopts the opposite point of view by regarding the Free City as a sovereign state entitled to follow an entirely independent policy, without any consideration for the interests of Poland and her citizens.

This attitude of the Senate, conflicting as it is with the spirit of the Treaty of Versailles, raises difficulties of a juridical character which, in accordance with Article 89 of the Convention dated November 9, 1924, must be submitted to the High Commissioner for arbitration.

The following is a list of the decisions of the High Commissioner of the League of Nations, issued on the strength of Article 39 of the Polish-Danzig Convention in the years 1921, 1922, 1923, and 1924.

YEAR 1921.

Polish transport guard in the new port	4th	II.
The Puppel Case (Bauernbank)	28th	II.
Railways on the territory of the Free City: ownership, control, etc.	15th	VIII.
Visas for foreigners entering Danzig	30th	VIII.
Control and management of the Vistula on the territory of the Free City of Danzig	1st	IX.
Railways on the territory of the Free City: language, currency, payment of duties and taxes. The right of issuing orders. Appointment of staffs	5th	IX.
Option by the citizens of Danzig	26th	IX.
The legal position of the Polish Fiscus, Polish authorities, offices and officials, Polish vessels—within the territory of the Free City of Danzig..	6th	XII.
Power for the Danzig authorities to deport Polish and foreign citizens from the territory of the Free City ..	16th	XII.
The conduct of Danzig's foreign affairs	17th	XII.
Agreement between Danzig and Germany in regard to legal matters	18th	XII.

YEAR 1922.

Transit warehouses for Polish Army stores	7th	IV.
Polish post, telegraph and telephone in the port of Danzig..	25th	V.
The raising of foreign loans by the communes of the Free City of Danzig	22nd	VIII.

Competence of the representatives of the Polish Republic in Danzig	23rd	VIII.
The representations of the Free City of Danzig at international conferences	24th	VIII.
Renting of properties from the Harbour Board	27th	X.
The Treaty concluded by Poland with Memel, on behalf of Danzig	3rd	XI.
Form of correspondence in foreign affairs of the Free City of Danzig	28th	XI.
Official languages of the Harbour Board	5th	XII.
The organization of the Polish Railway Board in Danzig for the administration of railway lines outside the territory of Danzig	12th	XII.
Polish demand for compensation against Danzig for the delay in reloading ammunition	20th	XII.
The establishment of a Polish letter sorting office at the main railway station of Danzig	23rd	XII.
The admission of a Polish firm to the main railway station of Danzig to act as a travel bureau	31st	XII.

YEAR 1923.

The financial position of the Harbour Board	29th	IV.
Visas for citizens of Danzig entering Poland by any other than the Danzig-Poland frontier	1st	V.
The levying of taxes on property acquired by the Polish Government within the territory of the Free City, and used for official purposes	22nd	V.
Diplomatic status of Polish State officials	23rd	V.
Authority for the Harbour Board to raise loans	24th	V.
Harbour Board Police	6th	VI.
Liquidation of the property of citizens of Danzig in Poland	24th	VI.
The Harbour Board's flag	13th	XII.

YEAR 1924.

The appointment of a representative of the Free City to the International Railway Conference in Berne	8th	I.
Issue of passport to citizens of Danzig	28th	I.
"Moltan" and "Kaiserhafen"	29th	I.
The post office at the new port	23rd	II.
The question of place-names	31st	VII.
The question of the deportation of Danzig citizens from Poland	1st	VIII.
The adhesion of Danzig to the Breslau Railway Convention	18th	X.
The building of a ferry on the Hulm	5th	XI.
The introduction of export duties	6th	XI.
The ratification of Polish-Danzig Agreements	7th	XI.
The appointment of citizens of Danzig to Polish Consular posts	8th	XI.
The division of the rolling stock transport, etc.	9th	XI.
The Harbour Board Police	10th	XI.
The Postal Conference at Stockholm	10th	XI.
The Liquidation of the Corporation of Public Law "Die Danzig"	15th	XI

This list does not give a complete idea of all the difficulties which the Polish Government has to face in the only port where her "access to the sea" is guaranteed.

If, in practice, this "access" involves Poland in so many difficulties which have to be referred to the High Commissioner for decision, it may easily be imagined what chances she would stand of obtaining access to the sea through German ports! If tiny Danzig, which is under the protection of the League of Nations, can offer such opposition to the realization of the rights of Poland, how much greater would the opposition of powerful Germany be? It is quite true that Danzig would be very willing to constitute Poland's "access to the sea," but only as understood by her, i.e. Danzig would like Poland to become her client, to use her commercial organization, and thus to make Poland economically dependent on her.

3. Harbour and Waterways Board of Danzig.

The Treaty of Versailles, Article 104, paragraph 2, assured to Poland "the free use and service of all waterways, docks, basins, wharves, and other works within the territory of the Free City necessary for Poland's imports and exports. This, together with the "lettre d'envoi," dated June 16, 1919, could only mean that it was intended to give the exclusive administration of the port to Poland. The Paris Convention of November 9, 1920, concluded between Poland and Danzig, with the assistance of the Great Powers, has, however, not only deprived Poland of the exclusive administration of the port, but also of the control of the Vistula within the territory of Danzig, to which Poland was entitled according to Article 104, paragraph 3, of the Treaty.

The administration of the port, the Vistula, and all waterways within the territory of the Free City of Danzig, were handed over to a mixed Polish-Danzig governing body called the Harbour and Waterways Board, which became also the owner of the harbour, with its land, premises, and all technical plant belonging to it.

Thus Poland's access to the sea was to have become effective through, firstly, the adjudication of Danzig to Poland; secondly, by means of Polish administration of the port and the Vistula within the Danzig area; and, thirdly, through Danzig being made a Free City. This was, however, practically reduced to half-ownership and co-partnership in administration with the Free City of Danzig, to which the other 50 per cent. of ownership and rights of administration were given.

At the head of the Harbour and Waterways Board, which is composed of Poles and citizens of Danzig, there are delegates both of the Polish Government and the Free City. In the event of equality of votes, the decision rests with the President, who is appointed by the League of Nations, and must be of Swiss nationality. (Article 19 of the Convention.)

The Harbour Board, as a governing body, is independent of both Poland and Danzig. The Polish Government and the Senate of Danzig can exercise their influence only through their delegates.

The Polish rights in the port, according to the Paris Convention, come under two heads :

(*a*) Poland is regarded as a customer of the port, and as such is guaranteed the right of Polish import, export, and navigation (Articles 26 and 28 of the Paris Convention, dated November 9, 1920).

Article 26 of the Convention reads as follows :

> "It is the duty of the Harbour Board to secure to Poland the free use of the port and means of communication, which are mentioned in Article 20, without any restrictions and on the scale necessary for import and export from and into Poland. The Harbour Board have to take all necessary steps to ensure such development and improvement of the port as to make it sufficient for all the needs of this intercourse."

Article 28 reads as follows :

> "Poland is entitled, at any time and under all circumstances, to import and export through Danzig goods of any description which are permitted by Polish Law."

On the strength of Article 26 the High Commissioner decided, on November 27, 1922, that the Harbour Board should give to Polish firms the first refusal of leasing the warehouses, stores, and ground belonging to it, unless utilized by the Board itself, in which case both parties should have equal rights of using these warehouses, etc. In this respect Poland holds a privileged position in the port of Danzig. This privilege, however, now means but little, as most of the warehouses, stores, building sites, etc., are being exploited by the Harbour Board itself.

(*b*) As matters stand at present Poland is, together with the Free City, the co-owner and co-administrator of the port, and has, therefore, her half share in the management of the port.

In practice, however, the realization of these rights of Poland (i.e. the introduction of Polish officials, and the use of the Polish language) meets with great difficulties because of the opposition of the Danzig delegates. It is evident that in such a complicated undertaking as a seaport co-operation is bound to be faced with great difficulties, which can be only partially eliminated.

4. The Economic Development of Danzig and of its Port in 1920–1924.

Danzig has now, in accordance with the Treaty, obtained, as her hinterland, a large territory which was formerly in Russian hands, and separated from her by the customs barrier, and she

has therefore reverted to her historic rôle, and has again become the chief port of the new Polish State. Having, during the nineteenth century, played only a secondary part—and that of a purely local character because of the political situation being unfavourable to her—Danzig has now to adapt herself, in a very short time, to the new conditions and be prepared for a sudden increase in her commercial activity.

Realizing this fact, the Harbour Board has energetically taken up the improvement of conditions in the port. Since it took over the administration it has handed over about 700,000 square metres of land to the timber trade; it has erected many new warehouses and granaries, so that the area now occupied by the former covers some 230,000 square metres. The total extent of the railway sidings built in the port amounts, at the same time, to about 33 kilometres. Loading and reloading operations have been facilitated, thanks to the new cranes which have been set up by the Harbour Board, as well as by private firms.

These improvements have enabled Poland to concentrate a considerable amount of her foreign trade in Danzig, and her doing so has a favourable effect on the development of the port. According to official statistics the registered net tonnage of the vessels entering and leaving Danzig has increased from 1,963,805 tons in 1912 to 3,283,033 tons in 1924.

MOVEMENT OF SHIPS.

	ENTERED PORT.	LEFT PORT.
1912	2,480	2,480
1923	2,913	2,873
1924	3,312	3,330

The gradual development of the port of Danzig from local to international significance (Welthafen) is noticeable from the great variety of national flags seen in the port, for, whereas in 1913 only eight different nations were represented among the commercial shipping of the port, in 1924 eighteen nations were represented.

The growing interest in the port of Danzig is further proved by the increase of regular steamship communication. At present over fifteen lines (companies) are operating regularly with Danzig. Danzig is keeping up a regular communication with London, Hamburg, Libau, Reval, Hull, Copenhagen, and Norwegian ports, with Le Havre, Dunkirk, New York, Amsterdam, Antwerp, Bordeaux, as well as occasional connection with a large number of other places. Great changes are to be observed in the commercial activity of Danzig.

The economic situation in Poland has great influence on the commercial development of Danzig. For instance, in 1921 Poland, exhausted by the war and with reduced supplies, had to import large quantities of absolutely necessary commodities. According to the statistics of the port of Danzig, the figures for the year 1921 show 473,930 tons, i.e. nearly a tenfold increase in comparison with the pre-war imports, which averaged 52,000 to 73,000 tons. The import of salted herrings, which is one of the staple foods of Eastern Europe, is now 112,000 tons in comparison with the pre-war 42,597 tons.

It will be seen from the above that in the early stages of her co-operation with Poland, Danzig was merely an import channel for her. Now, however, when Poland is gradually recovering from the burden of war, and her economic situation is improving, her imports of foodstuffs are decreasing, for Poland is becoming, in this respect, not only a self-supporting country, but in her agricultural products she is now even showing a surplus, which she can export herself. Instead of the imports of foodstuffs, Poland is now increasing her import of artificial manure, which, together with chemical products (the import of which, in 1912–1913, equalled 228,747 tons), was in the statistics for 1921, 51,687 tons; in 1922, 94,023 tons; in 1923, 219,116 tons; which figures represent 69 per cent. of the total import of these articles into Poland. The first half of 1924 showed 137,084 tons. The constant and rapid increase in the above-quoted figures, which have already passed those of pre-war times, goes to prove the development of agriculture in Poland and the increasing importance of the hinterland of Danzig.

Simultaneously with agriculture, Polish industry is also extending her activities; for this reason raw materials are beginning to enter Poland by way of Danzig. One of the most important products is cotton, for the Polish textile industries. Before the war Poland received her supplies of cotton through Bremen. Formerly no cotton whatsoever came through Danzig, but since this import of cotton was first started we observe a steady rise in the figures of this import. In 1923, 16,333 tons of cotton were imported through Danzig, which is 27 per cent. of the total amount required by the Polish cotton industry. Wool is also now being imported by way of Danzig, and 1,809 tons were registered for 1922, i.e. 6 per cent. of the total required, whereas in 1923, 8,432 tons were imported, which is 40 per cent. of the total demand for this commodity in Poland.

In proportion to the consolidation of the economic life in Poland, exports attain an increasingly greater importance. According to the statistics of the port of Danzig for the year 1923, the imports to Poland stood at 654,929 tons, whereas the exports had already reached 1,062,864 tons.

The chief article of export is *timber*, the export of which, by

way of Danzig, is increasing every year and has already well passed the pre-war figures.

1911 and 1913	258,960 tons.
1920	48,577 ,,
1921	209,434 ,,
1922	335,214 ,,
1923	700,210 ,,
1924 (first ten months)	773,308 ,,

Timber exports have reached these high figures owing to the fact that the whole of Poland's export of this commodity passed through Danzig. This was achieved through the special tariff policy of the Polish railways, by which exports of timber from any part of Poland worked out cheaper via Danzig than via any other port.

Amongst other articles of export, sugar should also be mentioned, the figures being :

1923	113,067 tons.
1924 (first ten months)	110,484 ,,

The importance of the export of this article is due to its being carried exclusively via Danzig.

New articles of export which have made their appearance in the port of Danzig are crude petroleum and its by-products, which, before the war, were imported into Poland. In 1923, 25,519 tons of petroleum were exported, as the yield of petroleum in the oil-fields of Poland not only covers all her own consumption, but gives a certain surplus for export. The same applies to coal which, before the war, was not known as an article of trade in the port of Danzig, but has now appeared on the export market. In 1923, 29,271 tons of coal were exported, and in the first six months of 1924, 20,672 tons; and the natural wealth of the Polish coal-fields gives reason to believe that the export of coal will continue to increase.

In studying the above figures it must be remembered that, although Poland has passed the most difficult period of her economic crisis, yet her present situation cannot be regarded as normal. Though agriculture and industries have considerably improved, they have still to overcome financial difficulties in regard to credit. Not until this last obstacle is removed can Poland achieve her full economic development, when productivity, and the home consumption of the country, will naturally increase. Any changes which may take place in the economic life of Poland are reflected in the commercial market of Danzig, thus proving the economic dependence of the Free City on Poland. The tendency of the post-war situation towards steady improvement gives rise to hopes of rapid development in this direction.

If we now pass to the analysis of the economic life of Danzig we can note the rapid development of this city. In the short period, from 1921 to 1924, an immense change has taken place. Danzig, which, before the war, was a German port of only local significance, after being included in the Polish customs frontier, by virtue of the Polish-Danzig Convention, dated October 24, 1921, has been given new and vital possibilities. Danzig industries, which, before the war, were stagnant, have now gained an extended market in Poland, which is industrially less developed than Germany and the present conditions make it possible for Danzig to introduce new industries and to develop the old. The metal industry is engaged in building and mounting rolling stock for the Polish railways. Twenty sawmills, totalling sixty circular saws, are engaged in dealing with the raw timber which arrives from Poland. The chemical, textile, and electro-technical industries are also developing.

The total number of banking establishments in Danzig has increased owing to the fact that many large Polish banks have opened branches there. This has had a wonderful effect on the economic life of Danzig. The Danzig Exchange is again beginning to play an important part as the barometer of the financial life of Eastern Europe. This recalls the former days of Danzig's splendour when, as a Polish port, she was the greatest sea port of the Baltic.

Danzig derives great advantage from her inclusion in Poland's economic life and means of communication, and her part in Polish foreign trade is constantly growing.

The advantages which Danzig at present enjoys should be specially emphasized, as they raise the Free City to a much higher level than she would attain under German control. It suffices to say that the annual taxation per head is :

In Germany	144 guldens.
In Danzig	85 „

Danzig owes her favourable financial position to her close contact with Poland, especially in regard to her Customs receipts, which constitute one of the principal items of the budget of the Free City. According to the Warsaw Agreement of October 24, 1921, the total receipts derived from Customs collected in Poland and Danzig are being divided between the two parties in proportion to the number of inhabitants and the average consumption of dutiable goods per inhabitant in each of the two territories. The normal consumption per inhabitant of the Free City is fixed at the rate six times greater than that per inhabitant of Poland. This rate was fixed according to the trade statistics for 1919, i.e. for a period when Danzig was being abundantly supplied with foreign goods after a five years' blockade, and when Poland, owing to her still unsettled financial position and her state of war, could show but a small consumption. This does not corre-

spond with the present actual state of affairs in this respect, and gives Danzig exceptional advantages, for thus reckoned her share in the total Customs receipts amounts to 7·35 per cent. instead of the 1 per cent. which should actually be her share according to the number of her inhabitants. Thus Customs receipts occupy the most important position in the budget estimates of the Free City. The estimates for 1925 amply confirm this fact. Customs receipts, which in 1924 were estimated at 7,825,000 gulden in Danzig, are estimated for 1925 at the amount of 17,500,000 gulden, considerably exceeding all other items.

CHAPTER II.

THE NORTHERN PART OF POLISH POMERANIA AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF POLAND.

1. Tendentious Use of the Expression "Corridor."

Northern Pomerania and the 76 kilometres of coast line on the Baltic which was given to Poland by the Treaty of Versailles have been given the name of "Corridor" by German propaganda.

This tendentious expression is used in order to give weight to the suggestion that this stretch of land is only of secondary importance to Poland, whereas it is a "barrier" between East Prussia and Germany. This stretch of land, which together with Danzig forms the access to the sea, and is necessary to the 27,000,000 of Polish population, and which was promised and guaranteed by President Wilson's thirteenth point, has been called a "Corridor" by the Germans in order to belittle its importance, because it is supposed to be a "barrier" for 2,000,000 East Prussians.

By this very fact of having recourse to the term "Corridor" for describing one of the economically most important parts of Poland, German propaganda confesses that it is uncertain of its success; it dare not say openly: "Poland has no access to the sea," but says instead, "the Polish Corridor is a barrier to East Prussia."

The expression "Corridor" has sometimes been used to define an analogous narrow, but long, stretch of territory; for instance, the district of Petsamo was ceded to Finland by Russia, according to the Treaty signed in Dorpat on February 2, 1920, to give Finland access to the Arctic Ocean. Mention is also made about the Carpathian Corridor of Czecho-Slovakia; however, neither of these stretches of land has the same vital importance to the existence of the respective countries as the so-called Polish "Corridor" which is Poland's *only* access to the sea.

2. Geographical and Political Importance for Poland of Northern Pomerania.

Polish Pomerania, the northern part of which is situated on the Baltic and is called the "Corridor," occupies about 16,000 square kilometres, and has a population of about 1,000,000. This territory is of no special importance to Germany, which is easy to understand, if we consider that Germany has in her possession 498 kilometres of coast on the North Sea, and 990 kilometres on the Baltic coast, totalling 1,488 kilometres; therefore the extra 76 kilometres of coastline would not mean very much to her. To Poland, however, these 76 kilometres of sea coast, linking her with the Baltic, are as important as the 1,488 kilometres are to Germany, or England's 8,000 kilometres of coastline are to England.

A German author, Ernest Tiessen, has written in his article, under the title of "Der Friedensvertrag von Versailles und die politische Geographie" ("Zeitschrift für Geopolitik," 1924, p. 211), the following :—

"A sea coast, however, is of infinite importance, for with the dominating development of overseas trade its extensiveness and favourable position in regard to the ocean have become an absolute condition of existence to a strong and populous State."

The "Corridor" in the wider meaning, i.e. together with Danzig, does not only occupy the *only* Polish sea coast, but also the mouth of her *only* big river. The Vistula is the backbone of Poland; her old capital, Cracow, her new capital, Warsaw, and her only port, Danzig, are all situated on the banks of the Vistula. As the most important rivers of Central Europe (with the exception of the Danube) like the Seine, Rhein, Weser, and Oder flow from south to north, so does the Vistula, the latter being thus a sort of Polish signpost from the geographical and economic point of view. Polish imports and exports follow the river from south to north, and show a tendency to develop towards the Baltic nations and the great Western Powers, i.e. England, France, Italy, and the U.S.A. Thanks to her sea coast and possibility of communication by sea, Poland is a quasi-neighbour of these countries, whereas, according to the thesis suggested by German propaganda, she should be only a State shut in by the territories of Germany and Russia.

It was by no coincidence that all big German ports are situated on river mouths: Königsberg on the Pregel, Stettin on the Oder, Hamburg on the Elbe, Bremen on the Weser, and, as the mouth of the River Rhein is in Holland, the Germans constructed at the end of the nineteenth century a canal, Dortmund-Ems, which they call "die deutsche Rheinmuendung" (the German

mouth of the Rhine), at the foot of which stands a big port, Emden. Germany was deprived by the Treaty of Versailles of two ports of secondary importance, Memel and Danzig. Now, if Poland were to be deprived of Danzig and her 76 kilometres of the sea coast, it would be equivalent to taking away from Germany the whole 1,488 kilometres of her sea coast from Emden to Königsberg, with two of the most important ports in the world, Bremen and Hamburg, her ports of secondary importance, like Stettin and Königsberg, and all other smaller ports which number about sixty. To deprive Poland of Danzig would mean as much as to take away Rotterdam from Holland or Antwerp from Belgium, or to cut off the French or English access to the sea; and, as all these ideas are impracticable, so equally is the suggestion to cut off independent Poland from the sea, and the mouth of the Vistula inconceivable and paradoxical.

Apart from the absolutely real, geographical, and economic facts, an important part is played by the psychological and cultural condition. For the last thousand years the Vistula was always an integral part of the Polish organism, an organ which cannot be amputated without destroying the vitality of the Polish State and nation. To see how closely the Vistula is connected with the fate of Poland it is sufficient to recollect the "Miracle on the Vistula"—the battle of August 15, 1920, which saved Poland and even Europe from Bolshevism.

Poland gets from the Vistula not only her economic, but also her psychological and cultural strength, and as the Vistula flows through Polish territory from its source to its mouth, Poland extracts strength from the Vistula in a higher degree than, for instance, Germany does from the mythical Rhine, the source and mouth of which are outside German territory, and the upper part of which constitutes the boundary line between Germany and Switzerland, and Germany and France. If, in spite of this fact, the Germans say "The Rhine is a German river, not a German frontier," how can Poland forfeit her right to the lower part of the Vistula ?

Even the German author, Otto Jessen, who is not very favourably disposed towards Poland, states the importance of the Vistula to Poland in his work, "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik," 1924, p. 580, in the article "Die Lage der Hauptstädte ifn neuen Europa" ("The position of the Capitals in New Europe"), which reads as follows :—

> "The life nerve of the Polish State is the Vistula. Except for the first century of the existence of the Polish State the capital was always on the shores of the Vistula. With the creation of Warsaw as the capital of Poland, the capital was accidentally placed half-way down the river. This natural waterway leading to the sea has from the



GERMANY, POLAND, AND
EAST PRUSSIA.

MAP SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF THE
TWO RACES.

POLES.

GERMANS.

earliest times influenced the trend and aims of Polish politics, and in times of expansion has pointed the direction in which points of view and national feelings played an important rôle. To-day the whole of the Vistula up to the territory at its mouth is in Polish hands."

Following the course of the Vistula lies the main railway line from Torun (Thorn) to Danzig and Gdynia through Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) and Tczetw (Dirschau), connecting Poland with the sea. Thus the coastline, the lower part of the Vistula, and the parallel railway line form one connecting link, which is so essential to Poland's political and economic independence.

3. Polish Pomerania from the Historical and Ethnographical Point of View.

"Pomorze," i.e. the coastal district (called in German "Pomerellen," and in Latin "Pomerania"), is historically of Slavonic and not German origin. In the beginning of the eleventh century, the Polish King, Boleslav (the Brave), the founder of Poland's power, who first united Polish territories, included this part in the kingdom of Poland. For several centuries Pomerania was either an integral part of the Polish State or under her protection.

The first time Polish Pomerania was annexed by the Germans was in 1308, through the Teutonic Order (Knights of the Cross), and was held by them until 1454, i.e. for 146 years. In 1454, Pomerania went over to Poland and was in her possession until the first partition of 1772, which means that for 318 years, Poland had her own sea coast. On January 10, 1920, Polish Pomerania was, after 148 years, again returned to Poland, although considerably mutilated, as a great part both to the east and the west remained in German hands. This mutilated Pomerania the Germans now call the "Corridor."

Not only from the historical but also from the ethnographical standpoint does this district belong to Poland; while under the German rule the German immigrant population was always in the minority; and though twice in history this province has been in German hands, the population resisted Germanization and remained Polish (see map).

In 1921, 19·6 per cent. of the population was German, inclusive of the "optants" who, in accordance with the Vienna Agreement, dated August 30, 1924, declared their intention to leave the country before the year 1926. After that the German population will represent only some 12 per cent. or a maximum of 14 per cent.

During the elections to the Polish Parliament on November 5, 1922, only 15 per cent. of the population voted for German candidates.

While under German rule (from 1871 to 1918) in the fifteen elections to the "Reichstag," this province, consisting of six districts, *returned only Polish candidates. Not once was a German candidate elected.*

From the facts described above it is obvious that Polish Pomerania, and especially the northern part, is even at present, ethnographically, purely Polish; and it is inconceivable that this province, which has over 800,000 inhabitants, should be placed under German rule for the sole reason that this would be convenient to East Prussia with her 2,000,000 population.

4. The Port of Gdynia.

In accordance with the Treaty of Versailles Poland received coastal territory without a port, as well as certain rights in the port of Danzig without territory. Owing to the fact that Poland is only part-owner of the Danzig port and that she has to cope with great difficulties connected with the complicated administrative system of the port, she has been compelled to build her own port at Gdynia (see Parts 1 and 2).

The locality chosen by the Government for the erection of the port is ideal; the depth near the shore is 10 to 20 metres; the bed of the harbour is very good for anchorage, and the entrance is sheltered by the peninsula of Hel. All foreign experts have unanimously agreed that Gdynia is by nature fitted for a port.

The Polish Government started the construction of the port in 1921, and up to 1924 the wharf (550 metres in length) was finished, as also the breakwater (170 metres in length); the water supply laid on, and electric power station and warehouses constructed. A normal gauged railway line runs to the foot of the mole.

By virtue of the Agreement of July 4, 1924, the Franco-Polish combine has undertaken the further construction of the port, and in particular:

1. The entrance canal, 11 metres in depth, to the harbour.
2. The harbour comprising 150 hectares of water surface.
3. The inner dock of 43·5 hectares of water surface.

This work has to be concluded by the end of 1930. The first portion of the port is calculated at an annual turnover capacity of 2,500,000 tons.

This combine includes some world-famous French firms, such as: Batignolles, Schneider & Co., and Hersent, which should ensure the work being carried out in a thorough manner and in the time specified.

Commercial vessels already started using the port as early as 1923, and shipping has considerably increased during 1924. Many firms have already reserved for themselves plots of land in the port for future exploitation. The "Compagnie Générale Transatlantique," which transports Polish workmen to France, has its offices at Gdynia. Ships belonging to this company also export pit-wood to France. Barracks for emigrants have been erected, railway sidings have been extended and adapted for passenger service by the construction of a platform on the quayside. The shipping agents, "Hartwig" and "Polbal," have established branches at Gdynia.

We restrict ourselves to the above few observations on Gdynia and would like to emphasize the fact that Poland started the exploitation of her sea coast during the first years she came into possession of it by commencing the construction of a commercial port. Only by building her own port on her own coast did she attain the realization of the thesis "Access to the Sea."

Poland, with her valuable natural resources and considerable population is justly seeking an outlet by having *two* ports; therefore Gdynia is not being constructed for the purpose of competing with Danzig, but as its necessary complement.

The building of a port a few years after the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles clearly shows how justly the Conference acted by giving these 76 kilometres of the sea coast to Poland, the lawful owner of this territory, and provides a complete justification of the hopes reposed in her ability to reconstruct her economic and commercial position.

The construction by Poland of her own port at Gdynia not only demonstrates the necessity for her to have her own seaboard, but at the same time does away with every argument of German propaganda against Poland's dominion on the sea.

This propaganda is not in a position to prove that Germany would or could reconstruct and maintain Gdynia, consequently it remains silent in regard to the economic and industrial significance of Gdynia and its natural advantages as a port. The upkeep of this port would be strictly opposed to Germany's policy, in respect to seaports and communications, which policy operates on the thesis, "from West to East," whereas Poland directs her communications from "South to North."

Poland's dominion over that narrow seaboard of 76 kilometres is therefore expressed in the construction of a commercial port, whereas Prussia's dominion was expressed in the existence of a small, insignificant fishing village. During the 148 years of her possession of this Polish seaboard, Prussia in no way justified her dominion over it, whereas during the first five years of her possession, Poland has proved her need of it by building a port at Gdynia.

Another result of the handing over of these 76 kilometres to their rightful owners is the erection since 1920 of a large number

of new summer resorts; during the summer months of 1924 there were about 30,000 visitors from Poland to the Polish sea. While it was under German rule it was deserted, for Germany had many other seaside places, and did not need this one. Poland treats this seaboard as a mother her children; Germany neglected it as a stepmother would do, for it regarded it as a foreign and annexed country.

In connection with the construction of the port at Gdynia, it is only fitting that we should mention other extensive works executed by the Polish Government during the years 1920–1924, as part of the administration of the port: the construction of a railway line, 40 kilometres in length, from Puck along the peninsula to Hel; the construction of the line Kokoszki-Gdynia, 18 kilometres long; the general repair of the fishing port on the Hel peninsula, which has cost about 200,000 zloty; the construction of a fishing harbour in Kuznica, on the Hel peninsula; the reinforcement of the seashore near Karva, which has cost 500,000 zloty; and the installation of electric light in the lighthouse situated on the Hel peninsula.

It must also be added that, in addition to this expenditure, the Polish Government has to bear all the expenses of the constant work connected with the preservation of the seashores, sea walls, plantation of trees and bushes on the coast, the maintenance of lighthouses at Rozew, Jastarnia, Hel, and Oksywja, buoys, storm signals, etc., etc.

5. Emigration and Re-emigration.

Having a large emigration, access to the sea through her own coast, as well as through Danzig, is of vital importance to Poland. Before the war Prussia, Germany, and Austria directed the emigration of Poles through other ports, chiefly through Bremen and Hamburg, which meant a good profit for the German shipping lines. Only since the port of Danzig was opened to Poland as an "access to the sea" did she direct her own emigration, and also the transit of some foreign neighbouring emigrants through Danzig. The total number of emigrants, Polish and others, who have passed through Danzig are:

	No. of Emigrants to:	
YEAR.	AMERICA.	FRANCE.
1920 (last six months)	23,325	—
1921	31,705	—
1922	25,165	—
1923	32,697	25,212
1924 (first ten months)	7,702	9,736

Biblioteka Śląska

The proportion of Polish emigration directed through Danzig is increasing: 70 per cent. of the whole movement is now being conducted through Danzig, and only 30 per cent. through other ports. It is unnecessary to explain the benefit which this emigration affords to Danzig in general, and to the port in particular.

Owing to this emigration numerous shipping companies keep up communication with the western ports, and the "Baltic-America Line" with New York, this being the only line which is keeping up an independent communication between Danzig and America.

From 1920 to 1923 an emigration camp was inaugurated in Danzig under the management of the Danzig Senate. Owing, however, to the difficulties caused to the Polish Government, as well as to the emigrants individually, by the Danzig Senate, which claimed the right of control over emigrants contrary to Article 24 of the Convention, dated November 9, 1924, which accorded this right to Poland, Poland was compelled to set up emigration camps on her own territory. As a result of this a big camp was built in Wejherowo, situated 25 kilometres from Gdynia, and 45 kilometres from Danzig. This camp was recognized by foreign experts as one of the best in Europe.

Apart from the emigration conducted through Danzig, Poland is also using—and will continue to use—her own port, Gdynia, for transporting emigrants, particularly Polish workmen, to France.

Although the use of foreign ports is at times necessary for the transport of cargo, from a geographical and commercial point of view, it is different where emigration is concerned, as every country will naturally try to transport her emigrants direct from her own ports, and not through other countries. The emigration question is such a complicated one, and lays such heavy and important social obligations on a state, that it cannot be laid on the shoulders of a third state; thus every state endeavours to keep its emigrants under its protection until they actually embark.

If Poland encounters difficulties in Danzig, in spite of the rights accorded her in the Free City by the Treaty of Versailles, it is easy to imagine the complicated situation in a foreign port, where she would only be a client. An emigrant is not a commercial commodity, and a state is not a buyer of the same; it is the protector of its citizens. Government protection is never more required than in the case of emigration. Poland is therefore endeavouring to concentrate all her emigration through Danzig and Gdynia; the same thing applies to re-emigration.

In this connection, again, Poland must have full right to utilize her access to the sea.

Biblioteka Sejmu

6. Poland's Participation in the Use of the Sea.

"Access to the sea" expresses but one relation between a country and the sea, whereas by "use of the sea" we understand the exploitation of sea communications by the national commercial fleet and fishing industry.

(*a*) Commercial Fleet.

Poland received her limited coast-line without any port, and, what is still worse, without any commercial fleet, and was, therefore, faced, not only with the task of building a port, but also of creating a national commercial fleet. The Polish Government did all that was possible in this respect; a naval school was founded at Tczew, and in Danzig and Wejherowo commercial navigation offices were established; a law was introduced regulating the right of vessels to fly the Polish commercial flag.

If the development of the Polish commercial fleet has not yet been successful it is due to two reasons. In the first place post-war economic conditions have been, and still are, unfavourable for commercial navigation. This was experienced by ship-building countries possessing large commercial navies like England, France, Norway, etc.

It is clear that those conditions are not favourable for such a country as Poland, which after 130 years under foreign rule, has to build up her economic life right from the start.

The second reason is the fact that Poland's access to the sea by way of Danzig is restricted, while Gdynia, her only port, is yet in process of construction. All branches of commercial navigation like importation, exportation, forwarding agencies and a commercial fleet, are closely connected with each other. If Polish merchants and agents are able to find room for expansion in Gdynia, the Polish Navy will also develop simultaneously. Poland's desire to possess a commercial fleet, that *territoire flottant*, is quite clear and economically justifiable. Below are quoted the famous words of Frederick von List (died 1846), the German Professor of Economics:

> "A nation without navigation is like a bird without wings, or a fish without fins, or a stag without horns, a knight with a wooden sword, a helot or a knave of humanity! He who has no share of the sea is shut out from the good things of this earth, he is God's stepchild."

(*b*) Fishing Industry.

Poland has only an insignificant sea-coast in comparison with other nations; for this reason she attaches greater importance to her fishing industry as carried on by the fishermen along the 146 kilometres of the Polish coast-line, and which is of considerable economic and rationing value.

The efforts of the Polish Government are directed in three ways :

(a) To provide fishermen with the necessary equipment either by way of purchase or by granting credits.

(b) To settle fishermen on the sea-coast.

(c) To increase the rate of production and to facilitate the sale of the fish.

The Ministry of Agriculture, under whose administration the fishing industry is placed, has established on the Hel Peninsula an aquarium, and in Wejherowo the Department of the Sea-Fishing Industry, for the purpose of thoroughly investigating fishing conditions.

The activities of the Polish Government in this direction were discussed at the last "Permanent International Council for Sea Investigation," held in Copenhagen in September, 1924, where they created a good impression and caused considerable interest.

Thanks to the continual care of the Ministry of Agriculture, the economic standard as well as the productive capacity of the Polish fishermen has, for the last five years (1920–1924), considerably increased in spite of the difficult financial position of the country.

Only by means of possessing *her own* "access to the sea" is Poland able to take an active part in the exploitation of the sea-fishing industry.

CHAPTER III.

EXAMINATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL POINTS OF THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA.

Having proved that Poland has a right of access to the sea, both through Danzig and through her own small coast-line, from economic, geographical, political, ethnographical, communicational, and historical points of view, and having also proved that Poland is intensively exploiting her position by making use of Danzig and also building her own port at Gdynia, we have now to examine two points of the argument which German propaganda has put forward for some time past, viz. :

1. That Poland does not require her own seaboard or any special rights in Danzig, for she could make use of Danzig if it were a German port equally well as she now makes use of some German ports, in addition to Danzig, for her exports and imports.

2. That many countries do not possess any sea-coast or ports and yet manage to exist.

The first point takes its origin from the German proposals which were rejected by the Peace Conference in June, 1919, protesting against the cession of Pomerania to Poland and the creation of the . . . . of Free City Danzig; let us examine this point of the German proposals.

1. German Proposal of June, 1919, on the Use of German Ports by Poland, and its Rejection by the Peace Conference.

The proposals read as follows :

> "The German Government, for these reasons and in order to fulfil the obligations undertaken by them to give Poland free and secure access to the sea, is prepared to declare the ports of Memel, Königsberg and Danzig as free ports, and to give Poland far-reaching rights in these ports. By means of a corresponding agreement every possibility could be assured to the Polish State to enable her to erect and make use of the available docks, wharves, warehouses, quays, etc., in the free ports. (Counter proposals by the German Government to the Peace proposals, 7, Eastern Questions, D. Danzig.)"

This proposal was modelled on the clauses of Articles 363 and 364, providing for the leasing by Czecho-Slovakia of parts of the free ports of Hamburg and Stettin. However, up to the present, i.e. five years after the ratification of the Treaty, this provision exists only on paper, as Czecho-Slovakia has not been able to come to an understanding with Germany. In reality, Czecho-Slovakia has no more rights in these ports than any other nation, i.e. the Czecho-Slovakian merchants can use them for the exportation or importation of their goods just the same as they can use any other ports. Germany wanted—and still wants—to put Poland in a similar position : Poland was not to have her own seaboard so that she could not build a port, neither was she to be joint-owner of the port of Danzig—in short, she was to be reduced to the position of a client in regard to German ports. Poland was not to be given the possibility of establishing a commercial fleet; it would then depend upon Germany whether—and on what conditions—German ports and vessels would be used for Polish importation and exportation. Polish commerce would entirely depend on the good will of Germany. Germany would be able to fix her own port tariffs and, more important still, her own railway tariffs; Poland would be compelled to pay the tribute imposed, as Germany would have the monopoly in this respect. If Poland encounters difficulties in the small port of Danzig in obtaining her right of free access to the sea, it may easily be foreseen that, in spite of all agreements, powerful Germany would soon reduce that access to nought.

It would be impossible for Poland to develop her navigation and foreign trade, for in both ports would the German shipbuilder, forwarding agent, importer and exporter, step in as middleman between the foreign merchant and the Polish producer or importer.

The Peace Conference very justly rejected this German proposal in its "réponse," Section XI, Danzig, in the words : "It is not sufficient for Poland to have the right of using German ports."

Czecho-Slovakia's case is quite different, as is mentioned below. Though Czecho-Slovakia may not have her own seaboard, she is, owing to her geographical position, not dependent upon Germany to the same extent as Poland would be without her own seaboard and without Danzig. Up till now Czecho-Slovakia has not been able to obtain the realization of her rights, as she has not obtained from Germany the lease of a part of the ports of Hamburg and Stettin as laid down in Articles 363 and 364. She has, therefore, no rights at her disposal for the use of even the smallest part of these ports. She can only make use of them as a client through the agency of Hamburg and Stettin firms.

The above example testifies that the German offer of 1919 would most surely not be carried into execution in regard to Poland, just as Germany has not fulfilled her obligations in virtue of Articles 363 and 364 of the Treaty of Versailles in regard to Czecho-Slovakia. Besides, such an offer would by no means satisfy Poland's legitimate demands.

From this it does not follow, however, that Poland does not want to use the German ports; apart from Danzig and Gdynia, Poland is directing a considerable part of her exports and imports through Stettin and Königsberg because of their communicational and geographical position, which in this respect plays a similar part as Antwerp and Rotterdam in respect to the Rhinish-Westphalian industries. As owner of a port at Gdynia and part owner of a port at Danzig, Poland can also be a customer in the ports of Stettin and Königsberg. But the German proposals of 1919 to the effect that Poland's needs are satisfied by the use of the German ports cannot be reconciled with Poland's existence and her political and economic independence.

2. Nations which have no Sea-Coast by Reason of Their Geographical Position.

German propaganda states further, that there are nations which exist, without their own sea-coast and their own port or ports, and that Poland could also exist without Danzig and Gdynia.

Of the independent countries in the world, approximately sixty in number, only a very small number have no access to the sea on account of their geographical position.

In America there are nineteen countries, of which, counting from the north, Canada, United States of America, Mexico, and the five Republics of Central America, are situated on the coast of both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. This favourable position of these countries is the source of their prosperity and independence and the very foundation of the world-power of the U.S.A. Out of the ten Republics of Southern America, only Bolivia and Paraguay are without sea-coast. Bolivia lost her coastline to Chile in the "Saltpetre" war of 1879–1883.

In Africa, only Abyssinia, and in Asia, Afghanistan, the buffer state between India, Persia and the Russian Turkestan, have no sea-coast.

Europe, however, is of more interest to us: before the war, three European countries had no sea-coast; two of these were of small size and importance. Luxemburg—which up to 1914 was dependent on Germany with regard to customs and railway union, and which was detached from Germany in accordance with Article 40 of the Treaty of Versailles—is now united to Belgium and uses her ports.

Switzerland is of particular interest to us, as the German propaganda readily compares her position with that of Poland.

According to the "Hamburgischer Correspondent" of October 14, 1924, the former Premier of Italy, Mr. Nitti, stated that the Polish pretensions with regard to the "Corridor" and Danzig have no more ground than if Switzerland were to have pretensions to possess Genoa.

A similar example is also given by Professor Fritz Jaeger, in his article, "Die deutsch-polnische Grenze," published in "Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin," 1924, No. 8–10, p. 258, where he speaks about the so-called cutting off of East Prussia:

> "This is the only case in the new arrangement of Europe where a State is to be robbed of the connection of its component parts. An exactly similar plan would be if Switzerland —so as to have access to the sea—were to receive a broad 'corridor' alongside of the valley of the Rhone. In this way the whole French Alps district would be separated and could only connect with the rest of France either by the corridor frontier or by sea. Thus, Marseilles and district—to keep up the comparison with Danzig—would not belong to this corridor, but would also become a separate Free State and Switzerland would then take the direction of the foreign affairs of Marseilles. The harm which would accrue to France in such a case would certainly be far greater than the gain to Switzerland. Poland has secured a similar access to the sea at the expense of Germany. If the district lying between the valleys of the Netze and the Vistula in a northerly direction

had been left with Germany, and Poland had been compensated with corresponding transit and port rights to meet her need for expansion, then Poland would have obtained a far better access to the sea, than—for instance—Switzerland has, not to mention present-day Austria and Hungary, who were deprived of their outlets to the sea."

To these arguments of Mr. Nitti and Professor Jaeger, we reply as follows :

Neither Marseilles, nor Genoa, had ever belonged to Switzerland, whereas Danzig *did* belong to Poland from 1454–1793, i.e. for 339 years; and from 1793–1807 and from 1814–1920, i.e. Danzig belonged to Prussia for only 120 years.

The Swiss population does not live either on the lower part of the River Rhone, or on any part of the sea-coast of the Mediterranean Sea, whereas the Polish people have "grown" to the Vistula, occupying it from her very source up to Dirschau, which is situated near the river mouth. The 146 kilometres of the sea-coast from the mouth of the River Piasna to the town Sopott are also inhabited by Poles. We repeat that six districts of Polish Pomerania have elected, in the years 1871–1918, only Poles as their representatives, in fifteen elections to the Reichstag.

It is true that Switzerland controls only the upper parts of rivers, but of such great rivers as the Rhine and the Rhone. In this lies the difference of the geographical and political situation of the two countries. Switzerland is situated so centrally that she is equally distant from the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea as she is from the Mediterranean Sea. For this reason Switzerland has a choice of using, to the north, ports belonging to four different nations : Le Havre (France), Antwerp (Belgium), Rotterdam (Holland), and the German ports, of which Emden is directly connected with Basel through the Rhine. On the South, Switzerland has a choice of Marseilles and Genoa ports belonging to two nations. All the above-mentioned ports are among the best organized ports, not only in Europe, but the whole world.

Let us compare this geographical situation of neutral Switzerland with that of Poland. Poland has a natural tendency towards the Baltic Sea, the ports of which, such as Stettin, Königsberg, Danzig, Memel, are only the smaller European ports. In the South, Poland can utilize Trieste and some Roumanian ports, but only on a very limited scale. Being deprived of her sea-coast, Poland would therefore depend entirely on Germany, having to direct her export and import through German ports, Stettin, Königsberg, and, according to the wishes of Mr. Nitti and Professor Jaeger, also "German" Danzig.

The favourable geographical and political situation of Switzerland with regard to the sea, though not having her own sea-coast and ports, was best illustrated by the last war

(1914–1918): this was the worst imaginable constellation for Switzerland, where all four nations surrounding her were involved in the war (France and Italy fighting against Germany and Austria). And in spite of that, cut off from the ports of the North by military operations, Switzerland, through her excellent organization of the S.S.S. ("Société Surveillance Suisse"), overcame all her difficulties by importing the commodities and raw materials she needed through Marseilles, Genoa, and even through the small port in Monaco.

If Poland were cut off from the sea, according to Mr. Nitti's and Professor Jaeger's recommendations, she would be entirely in German hands, as we have already described.

The comparison of Switzerland and Poland by the above-mentioned authors is the more difficult to understand as the former has 3,880,000 population, whereas Poland has 28,000,000 and is ten times larger in size.

The arguments of German propaganda showing a comparison of Switzerland with Poland are therefore beside the question.

The third nation which had not its own access to the sea before the war was Serbia. The elemental natural gravitation of this healthy and young nation towards the sea used to find barriers and difficulties raised by Austria-Hungary, which was one of the most important causes of the world-war. This classical example goes to prove that any attempts to cut off a country from the sea to which it has ethnographical and geographical rights cannot pass unpunished. The cutting off of Poland from the sea and making it dependent on German ports would vividly call to mind the situation of Serbia up to 1914, which would most likely result in another war.

Yugo-Slavia, by virtue of the treaties of St. Germain and Trianon, received a sea-coast several hundred kilometres long, extending from Fiume to the borders of Albania with the ports—Split, Dubrovnik, Kodar—and, finally, by the agreement of January 29, 1924, with Italy, obtained possession of the southern part of the port of Fiume, namely, Baros. Besides that it makes use of parts of the port of Fiume, and it also utilizes parts of the port of Salonica. Nobody thinks seriously of denying the rights of access to the sea of Yugo-Slavia, which—happier than Poland—disposes of a long coastal frontier and several ports. Still less can one question the rights of Poland to its 76 kilometres of coast and to Danzig.

After the war, on the ruins of old Austria-Hungary, three new countries came to life having no sea frontiers: Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, and Hungary.

The pioneers of German propaganda obsessed with the idea of cutting off Poland from the sea, say, the three mentioned countries have no access to the sea, and still they exist, and Czecho-Slovakia is in a prosperous economic state! The comparison of

these three countries with Poland is just as inadmissible as the comparison with Switzerland, and that on account of a totally different political and geographical situation.

Firstly, the territories of these three countries, even taken together, do not equal Polish territory :

Austria	83,904	square kilometres.
Czecho-Slovakia	140,352	,, ,,
Hungary	92,916	,, ,,
Total	317,172	
Poland	386,634	kilometres.

Secondly, the population of Austria, Hungary, and Czecho-Slovakia, taken together, only just exceeds that of Poland :

Austria	6,562,661
Czecho-Slovakia	13,611,349
Hungary	7,980,143
Total	28,154,153
Poland	27,185,709

Thirdly, the geographical position of these three countries with regard to communications is such that lack of sea frontiers is not really a great deprivation to them. First of all, all these three countries lie on the Danube, the biggest European west-eastern traffic artery, and thus they are connected in the east with the Black Sea and with the Roumanian ports, and in the west with France and her ports, because the Seine and the Rhone are connected by canals with the Rhine, and the Rhine by the Ludwigscanal with the Danube. Ships under the French flag can go from Paris and Marseilles to Vienna, Pressburg, and Budapest, and vice versa, the Danube flotilla : Austrian, Czecho-Slovakian, Hungarian can reach Paris and Marseilles in the west and Braila and Galatz in the east.

Germany desires, however, to direct the western-eastern traffic of the Danube towards the north, and for that purpose they wish to connect the Rhine with the Danube through two new canals for ships of 1,500 tonnage through the Rivers Main and Neckar. This gigantic enterprise has to be completed in 1930. Thus the Danube will get a connection via the Rhine and Dortmund-Ems Canal with Bremen and Hamburg. As a result, the Danube will play a very important part for the three countries mentioned above. Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, and Hungary will get connection via the Danube with Antwerp, Rotterdam, and German ports.

The railway connections of all these three countries are also very advantageous, and they enable them, according to their

choice, to make use either of the German sea-ports on the North Sea (Bremen, Hamburg) or on the Baltic (Stettin or Kiel, which is *port d'attache* of the Hungarian commercial fleet), or of the Adriatic ports, Trieste and Fiume; finally, of the Roumanian ports on the Black Sea. Besides, Czecho-Slovakia has excellent water connections with Hamburg through the River Elbe—which may also be used by Austria—with Stettin through the River Oder; she can also use the port of Danzig.

Thus it is true that each of these countries, in spite of the lack of sea frontiers and their own ports, thanks to their happy geographical situation and to their water and railway communications, can be served by ports of different countries on four different seas : North Sea, Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Sea. In other words, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, and Hungary, are hinterlands, not of one port, and not of several ports of one country, but of several ports on four seas belonging to different nations.

None of them is at present or will in future be in such a hopeless situation in which Poland would find herself if cut off from the sea. Poland would then be economically dependent on one country only, that is, on Germany.

Finally, none of the three countries possesses ethnographical rights to its own coast, because on none of the shores of these four seas do Czechs, Austrians, or Hungarians live. Whilst on these 76 kilometres of the Polish coast Poles have lived and live there now exclusively.

Thus the argument of German propaganda referring to the situation of nations which do not possess their own access to the sea falls through, and Germany's claim that Poland ought to do without her own port and shores becomes void.

CHAPTER IV.

INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF POLAND'S ACCESS TO THE SEA.

Opposing the idea of Polish access to the sea through the so-called Corridor, German propaganda passes in silence over the problem of Danzig, knowing that the opening of the question of Danzig would encroach, not only upon the interests of Poland and the Free City, but also upon international interests. These interests are of twofold nature : economic and political.

Danzig, united with Poland economically, became a great international port. The Chief of the Statistical Office of the Free City, Dr. Funk, writes in an article "Changes in the Danzig foreign commerce since the existence of the Danzig-Polish customs union" (October, 1924) : "At present it cannot be said the Free City is only a Baltic port, for it is developing more into

a trans-oceanic and world port." This is, above all, manifested by the great variety of the flags of foreign states on the ships, which in 1923 accounted for 65 per cent. of the total tonnage—Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, France, Sweden, Holland, and thirteen other states. Germany only accounted for 31 per cent. of the total tonnage and Danzig for 4 per cent. From the year 1920 exporting and importing firms, banks, and shipbuilding firms from Great Britain, France, Denmark, Norway, etc., have settled in Danzig. Poland's chief exporting commodity via Danzig is timber. In comparison with the pre-war years the export of timber via Danzig to England has increased by 70 per cent., and it is one of the staple exports to France, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark. New markets have opened up for Polish timber, the export of which, via Danzig, in 1923, amounted to 739,834 tons, of a value of 199,000,000 guldens, that is to say, double the amount that was exported in 1922.

The extensive international commercial and naval traffic in the port of Danzig is explained by the fact that it is Poland's only port. If Danzig had not been separated from Germany in 1919 she would not have developed in the same way, for traffic from and to Poland would have been divided amongst different German ports whereby, as stated above, German trade would have obtained the chief profit. Before the war Danzig was a small port and principally a military port. German commercial traffic from the east to the west was directed via Hamburg, Stettin, and Königsberg, and not via Danzig. The existence of the Free City for international trade with Poland is, therefore, of international interest, for it is to the advantage of all countries having trade relations with Poland.

It will be the same thing with the future port of Gdynia : the same international trade will find conditions as advantageous in Gdynia as in Danzig. Foreign trade with Poland has increased since the creation of this second port. For this reason the construction of the port of Gdynia is welcomed by foreign countries who are also taking part in its construction (French, Dutch, and Danish firms).

Those States which belong to the League of Nations are politically interested in Danzig, because the Free City is under its protection in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles. Together with the Saar, Danzig is the only territory which is the permanent seat of international administration based on the Treaty of Versailles. Appointed by the League of Nations, the High Commissioner is the representative of the League and, as such, is responsible to it for his actions. He turns to it for support in political matters and for advice in technical matters. The whole powerful instrument of the League of Nations is at his disposal. The position and duties of the High Commissioner at Danzig (and of the League of Nations Commission in the Saar) therefore must

be distinguished from similar international appointments before the war when the member in question was only a representative of his own government.

The protection of Danzig by the League of Nations and the regulation of Polish-Danzig relations with the help of the arbitration of the High Commissioner, especially in the realization of Poland's rights to an "access to the sea," form one of the most important functions of the League. The activities of the League in regard to Danzig, whether through the High Commissioner, the Secretariat, or the Council, are closely connected with the problem of the further development and its continually-growing authority.

The Council of League of Nations reports once a year to the Assembly about affairs concerning Danzig, and the members of the League receive the reports and can discuss the same at the Assembly. Almost all the documents are published, so that the opinion of the whole world is continually kept in touch with affairs in Danzig, and especially whether, and how far, Poland's access to the sea, via Danzig, is already realized.

The League of Nations execute the mandate it holds in reference to Danzig. The closing of Poland's access to the sea by uniting Danzig with Germany would mean that the mandate of the League of Nations referring to Danzig ceased to exist. That would be the change in the Versailles Treaty towards which Germany continually aspires.

Equally from political, as well as from economic motives, international circles have their interest in seeing that Poland should have her own access to the sea and should execute a right which is acknowledged to be hers by the Treaty of Versailles as regards Danzig. German propaganda fighting against Poland's access to the sea deliberately hits international interests at their most vital point.

PART II.

GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION OF EAST PRUSSIA.

CHAPTER I.

THE SITUATION IN GENERAL.

East Prussia comprises four administrative districts : Königsberg, Gumbinen, Allenstein and Marienwerder, of a total area of 38,551 square kilometres and about 2,220,000 inhabitants. The following table gives the population of other countries comparable with East Prussia with regard to area :—

Denmark	43,016 sq. kil.	..	3,267,000 inhabitants.
Switzerland ..	41,298 ,,	..	3,880,000 ,,
East Prussia ..	38,551 ,,	..	2,220,000 ,,
Holland	34,201 ,,	..	7,860,000 ,,
Belgium	30,437 ,,	..	7,400,000 ,,
Sicily	29,200 ,,	..	4,132,000 ,,
Sardinia	24,000 ,,	..	866,000 ,,

In discussing the situation which has been brought about in East Prussia by the creation of the Free City of Danzig with a seaboard of 55 kilometres, and by the further cession to Poland of other 76 kilometres of seaboard, the German Press endeavours to persuade its readers that East Prussia is "cut off" from the Reich.

Such catch-words, as "Dismemberment of East Prussia from the Fatherland," "East Prussia—an island, a colony," "Exclave," "Enclave," "Isolated and doomed to go under in the sea of Slavdom," are continually used.

It is therefore advisable to consider the general geographical position of East Prussia and to analyse her relations with the Reich, and also the neighbouring States. Let us assume that her designation as "An island"—although inexact—means that East Prussia's communications with other countries—including Germany—are principally carried on overseas. It may here be mentioned that Denmark, which is, moreover, divided into several islands and the peninsula of Jutland—as well as Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, find themselves in the same situation. The goods and passenger traffic between Northern and Central Italy and Sicily does not make use of the railways via Reggio and Messina, but is carried overseas via Naples—Palermo.

The importance of these islands to Italy and France is at least as great as that of East Prussia to Germany, and yet there are no complaints made of these conditions.

German propaganda puts forward the further argument that such a geopolitical situation is unprecedented.

"This is the only case in the new arrangement of Europe where a State is to be robbed of the connection between its component parts. An exactly similar plan would arise if Switzerland —in order to have access to the sea—were to receive a broad 'Corridor' along the Valley of the Rhone.

" In this way, the whole of the French Alps would be separated from the rest of France, and could only connect with her either by the corridor frontiers or by sea.

" Marseilles and district—to keep up the comparison with Danzig—would not belong to this corridor, but would also become a separate free state (or city), and Switzerland would then have to look after the foreign interests of Marseilles. The harm which would be caused to France would, in this case, certainly be far greater than the gain to Switzerland.

" Poland has secured such an access to the sea at the expense of Germany. If the district lying between the valleys of the Netze and the Vistula in a northerly direction had been given to Germany, and Poland had been compensated with corresponding transit and port rights to meet her needs for expansion, then Poland would have got a far better access to the sea, than—for instance—Switzerland has, not to mention present-day Austria and Hungary, who were deprived of their outlets to the sea."

Now, to take an example from pre-war Europe, Dalmatia was also cut off from the rest of Austria by the granting of access to the sea to Hungary, consisting of the autonomous city of Fiume and about 150 kilometres of Croatian coast. Dalmatia never had any railways to speak of. As a typical maritime country she relied on oversea communications in her trade with the principal economic centres, such as Trieste and Fiume, and even in local trade between her own cities. There are other countries in the same situation, as for instance Chile and Brazil, which have no railway lines leading into the interior of their respective countries.

Furthermore, it is not true to say that at the present time there is no such "enclave." The town of Zara, the former capital of Dalmatia, and its district ceded by Jugo-Slavia to the Italians in the Treaty of Rapallo of November 12, 1920, comprising an area of 58 square kilometres with 17,000 inhabitants, can be cited as an example. This seaport town is completely surrounded by Jugo-Slavian territory, is distant 150 kilometres from the nearest Italian port of Fiume, and is entirely dependent on overseas communication, having no railway connection whatsoever, either with Italy or Jugo-Slavia.

Outside Europe we find exactly the same conditions where a colony is separated by foreign territory from its mother country and must depend on overseas communication with the latter. Alaska, in relationship to the United States, is

an example of this. True, Alaska has only 65,000 inhabitants, but its area extends over 1,500,000 square kilometres. These examples of a small "enclave" like Zara and of an enormous one like Alaska prove how superficial is the contention of German propaganda that the geographical position of East Prussia with regard to Germany is unique. Should it be urged that a comparison to Zara and Alaska is inadmissible, because both these "enclaves" have a far smaller population than East Prussia, it should be remembered that no less authorities than Messieurs Nitti and Jaeger themselves quoted the example of Switzerland, comparing it with Poland, a country ten times larger in area, and having a seven times larger population.

If Messieurs Nitti and Jaeger pretend that Poland could do without a seaboard, as Switzerland does, we may be allowed to say that East Prussia is not an isolated instance, because Zara and Alaska are exactly in the same position.

CHAPTER II.

THE RELATION OF EAST PRUSSIA TO GERMANY.

Connection between East Prussia and Germany is maintained in two ways : overseas and overland across the Western frontiers, a line of 118 kilometres running south, and then east along the Nogat and Vistula.

(1) Overseas Connection with Germany.

East Prussia with over 2,000,000 inhabitants is in a far more favourable geographical position than Poland, with its 27,000,000, as her coast is much longer than the 76 kilometres belonging to Poland; on this coast she has the great port of Königsberg, which, in pre-war days was, so far as traffic was concerned, the third Prussian port after Stellin and Danzig, and also a number of smaller ports such as Pillau, Elbing and Tolkemit.

It follows, therefore, that she is much more favourably situated than Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, and Czecho-Slovakia, which have no coast of their own, and are obliged to make use of foreign ports. East Prussia is smaller than any of these countries, has fewer inhabitants than the smallest of them, Switzerland (which has 3,880,000 inhabitants), but has her own coast and her own ports.

German authors, when discussing the so-called cutting off of East Prussia, openly admit her excellent situation on the Baltic Sea, e.g. Dr. Mager, in his "East Prussia, Her Natural Economic Possibilities, a Source of German Power," Hamburg, 1922, p. 1 : "The most important characteristic of the natural situation of

East Prussia is her position on the Eastern edge of the great European Continent, and on the Baltic owing to the vast territories of the various adjacent countries, the Baltic Sea enjoys an extraordinary importance as a highway of traffic, so that the direct position of East Prussia on the Baltic Sea itself offers a tremendous advantage."

In a special monograph dealing with the question of the so-called "corridor," entitled "East Prussia and the Polish Corridor" (Jena, 1921), the author, Dr. Deuticke, says, on p. 28: "Considered by itself from the point of view of transport, East Prussia is not unfavourably situated. The Province lies with its long curved coast-line on the Baltic and both its principal centres, Königsberg and Memel, are most suitable ports, for shipping of goods by sea is much cheaper than freight by river or rail."

The steamship traffic on the Baltic is particularly brisk; not less than 100,000 ships per annum enter and leave via the Sund and the Kiel Canal from and to the North Sea.

Königsberg is, therefore, one of the most important ports, not only of Germany, but of Europe: "The situation of East Prussia made Königsberg one of the most important centres of transit trade in Europe." (Dr. Mager, loc. cit., p. 8.)

Before the war (1913) nearly one-half, or 45 per cent., of the exports from the port of Königsberg used to go to German ports and 54 per cent. to non-German ports (Rühl, "The North Sea and Baltic Seaports in the Foreign Trade of Germany." Berlin, 1920, p. 87). These exports were served by 1,672 ships of 505,809 registered tons. ("Statistiches Jahrbuch fur den Preussischen Staat 1914," p. 262.) Thus, it may be assumed that half the ships and half the cargoes went to *Germany*. On the other hand, the goods traffic by rail between East Prussia and Germany was, before the war, quite insignificant (see "East Prussia Economics and Traffic Before and After the War," published by the Railway Board of Königsberg, p. 6):

"Before the war there was only very inconsiderable traffic in goods between East Prussia and the rest of Germany. The favourable situation of East Prussia on the Baltic, the capacity of our commercial fleet and the cheapness of water freightage have directed almost the whole of the goods traffic (especially coal and cereals) to the sea. Extensive goods traffic by rail was carried on *only* with Upper Silesia and between Russia and the East Prussian ports."

M. Clemenceau was therefore right when he said in his note of 16/6/1919, on the connection of East Prussia with Germany, that, "Commerce has always been principally carried overseas."

Considering East Prussia's excellent situation on the sea and the extensive use made of transit by sea for commercial purposes, terms such as "dismemberment," "isolation," "enclave," "exclave," and so on, are not justifiable and are meant to serve the purpose of propaganda against Poland's access to the sea.

Thanks to her geographical situation on the sea, East Prussia is neither "enclaved," nor "exclaved," even had she no overland connection with Germany whatsoever.

We may add that soon after 1920 a cable, 170 kilometres long, was laid, connecting Tenkitten (North of Königsberg) with Leba (in Pomerania).

(2) The Geographical Relations of East Prussia with Germany Overland.

(*a*) The Frontier between East Prussia and the so-called "Corridor."

This frontier, running from the mouth of the River Nogat to the point where the Drweca crossed the former German-Russian frontier, is about 180 kilometres long : that is the width which once formed the neck which joined East Prussia with Germany. Now the length of her frontier, with the so-called "corridor," is a little greater on account of the incorporation in Poland of the district of Soldan.

(*b*) The Distance of East Prussia from the Economic Centres of Germany.

The overland connection of East Prussia with Germany both before and after the Treaty of Versailles, was effected by railway lines crossing the above-mentioned line, 118 kilometres long. The position is best illustrated by Dr. Mager (loc. cit., p. 6). Even before the war the political and geographical situation of East Prussia could be described as peculiar. The province formed, together with West Prussia, a relatively narrow salient of the German Reich, extending north-eastwards along the Baltic and was surrounded by Russian territory in the north-east, east, and south. The fact that it is situated on the extremity of the longest extent of Germany, together with its relatively narrow connection with the main body of the Reich (about 118 kilometres wide), made itself felt in various ways. The conditions of traffic within the borders of the Reich were obviously rather unfavourable in comparison with other parts of the country, because East Prussia always had to take into account the very great distances which separate her from the various economic centres of the Reich, viz :—

Direct line Königsberg—Berlin, 520 kilometres.
" " —Hamburg, 680 kilometres.
" " —Essen, 960 kilometres.
" " —Saarbrucken, 1,090 kilometres.
" " —Leipzig—Munich, 1,020 kilometres.

Similarly Deuticke, in the above-quoted pamphlet, "East Prussia and the Polish Corridor," p. 28, writes : "On the other hand, as far as overland traffic is concerned, East Prussia is at a disadvantage compared with the other territories of the Reich. Here its position, far from the centre, made itself felt."

(*c*) East Prussia as a "Colony."

The great distance that East Prussia, and especially her capital, Königsberg, are from the economic centre of Germany is responsible for the definition—popular since the war—that East Prussia is a colony in relationship to its mother-country. ("Die nenen Aufgaben des Instituts für Ostdewtsche Wirtschaft," pp. 4 and 5.) There is indeed much truth in this description, not only because of its maritime character and distance from Germany, but also by reason of its historical development. If the distance from Marseilles to the capital of the nearest French colony, Algiers, is only 744 kilometres, then, considering the distance of Königsberg from other German towns, it is equally correct to speak of East Prussia as a colony.

But East Prussia was, in fact, a land of German colonization and it is the same even to-day. It was and may still be considered a bridgehead, for the Crusade which the Order of the Teutonic Knights launched in the thirteenth century along the Baltic shores of Latvia and Esthonia almost as far as where Petersburg was founded at a later date was inaugurated for the purpose of conquering "dominium maris Baltici."

In 1525 East Prussia became a secular dukedom and a fief of the Polish Crown, acquiring sovereign rights in 1657. East Prussia never belonged to the ancient German Empire, which fell in 1806, but as a colony remained outside. Owing to her colonial character, East Prussia was excluded from the German Federation (Deutscher Bund), which existed from 1815 till 1866. Only fifty-eight years ago, in 1867, was East Prussia incorporated into the German Reich and became an integral part of Germany.

It is clearly stated in "The reply of the Allied and Associated Powers, Section ix, East Prussia." Consequently it is necessary to remember that during several centuries East Prussia has indeed been so obviously separated, that in no time until 1866 has she been really included in the political frontiers of Germany.

German historians have always recognized that East Prussia is not a country of German origin, but a German colony. Thus, on account of her geographical situation, remoteness, and historical development, East Prussia was and will always be described as a colony. Colloquially, this definition was sometimes applied even before the war, when the inhabitants of East Prussia used to say they were travelling "to the Reich," when going westwards into Germany.

It is, therefore, not true that this colonial character was imposed on East Prussia by the Versailles Treaty, i.e. by giving Poland access to the sea or as a political expedient, for it is inherent in its unalterable geographical and historical conditions. We have already mentioned in Part I that East Prussia enjoyed contiguity with other Prussian territories for only 148 years (1772 to 1920), and that for 318 years previously, or

more than twice as long, East Prussia was just as isolated as she is now. This isolation did not prevent Frederick II from making East Prussia one great armed camp, which enabled him to successfully defy half Europe in the Seven Years' War. Intellectually East Prussia stood on a high level (Kant, 1724–84). Her isolation did not delay the intellectual development, just as to-day the creation of Poland's access to the sea over 50 kilometres in no way hinders East Prussia's intellectual intercourse with Germany (Königsberg possesses two operas, of which not many European provincial towns can boast). This proves the old German saying: "Thoughts cannot be taxed."

(*d*) The Economic Distinctions between East Prussia and Germany.

German authors agree that East Prussia, on account of its economic situation had, even before the war, a different character to the other provinces and countries of Germany. Compare, for instance, Dr. Mager, loc. cit., p. 7: "In short, it may be said in consequence of her remoteness, East Prussia led a separate cultural and economic existence."

This distinctiveness from Germany had its economic difficulties as well as its advantages.

As regards the former, we have already mentioned the traffic difficulties consequent upon geographical distances. As a predominantly agricultural country, East Prussia was, and is, sparsely populated, especially as before the war about 17,500 people emigrated annually to the West of Germany (Hesse, "The Population of East Prussia," Jena, 1916, p. 46). It is obvious, for instance, that artificial manures and agricultural machines imported from Germany were, owing to the cost of freight, more expensive than in the West. "Isolation" cannot be blamed for such a state of affairs, which is consequent on the geographical character of East Prussia as a colony.

These same geographical causes, although engendering difficulties, on the other hand, give many advantages to East Prussia. (Compare Dr. Mager, loc. cit., p. 7.)

"The above-mentioned disadvantages are more or less balanced by certain advantages. The great distance from the chief industrial centres and from great cities of Middle and West Germany, with their large demands for agricultural products prevented excessive emigration to the West, and, given an adequate supply, kept food prices and also wages not inconsiderably lower than in the rest of Germany. . . . There remained here a strong and healthy people, which had a refreshing and stimulating effect on the industrial and overcultured West."

These advantages will continue to increase in the future. Deuticke, loc. cit., p. 30.

"But in many respects East Prussia is placed in a more favourable position than the Reich. In future the province will have the advantage of not having taken part in the industrialization of Germany, but of having continued to be a mainly agricultural country, although it consequently remained behind in wealth. In future the importance of East Prussia, which has hitherto done its utmost as a reservoir of labour for industry, will gain very considerably because it is one of the few agricultural provinces remaining to Germany which produce a surplus of food."

In recapitulating the above it may be stated:

(1) If there are any difficulties of an economic nature they only arise from the unalterable geographical position of East Prussia and have nothing to do with the creation of an access to the sea for Poland by the Versailles Treaty, an access which did not render the situation of East Prussia worse as regards Germany.

We have not considered, above, the question of transport between East Prussia and the Reich after the war, because this point will be discussed in Part III.

(2) Economic difficulties are balanced by advantages with regard to Germany. We shall consider separately the advantages which East Prussia obtained in regard to countries other than Germany in the East, as well as her distinctive relations to Poland.

CHAPTER III.

THE RELATION OF EAST PRUSSIA TO THE BALTIC COUNTRIES AND RUSSIA.

It is known that because of her elongated shape, which penetrates far into the East and borders the Baltic, East Prussia may be considered a bridgehead on the road to Germany's conquest of the East of Europe. Königsberg is 1,150 kilometres distant from Odessa, and this is the shortest distance between the Baltic and the Black Sea. The distance from Königsberg to Saarbrucken is only a little shorter. The road from Königsberg leads straight to Kovno, Riga and Reval, and it points to the pacific penetration of Russia. When realizing this gigantic economic scheme (Treaty of Rapallo) it is obvious that the so-called "Polish Corridor" can as little obstruct the attainment of this object as does the "Lithuanian Corridor" with Memel. While enjoying a free transit through the Western part of Poland to East Prussia (on the strength of Treaty of April 21, 1921, see Part III), Germany can direct her traffic from East Prussia to Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia and Russia and vice versa. Nothing stands in the way of German commerce with the East, just as nothing stands in the way of France's commerce with the East, which must obviously direct its transit via Germany and Poland.

It is true that on the strength of the corridor agreement of April 21, 1921, privileged transit was established to insure the connection between Germany and East Prussia only, and not with the more remote countries. In practice, however, as the goods in transit can easily be re-shipped from East Prussia to Lithuania, Latvia, and Russia, and vice versa, Germany enjoys the privileged transit of Poland between Germany on the one side and Lithuania, Latvia, and Russia on the other, without any interference on the part of Poland. Considering these facts, there is no reason for complaint that East Prussia is an "exclave" or "enclave," threatened with denationalization.

It follows further, that the so-called Polish "corridor" not only does not prevent Germany's development of her traffic and economic relations with the East, but it serves as an additional link. Further links are : The Railway Agreements of May 1, 1923, between Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia ; the Railway Agreement of January 1, 1924, on the direct communication between East Prussia and Russia ; the extension of the Port of Königsberg, completed in the beginning of 1924, including two large new docks, two big grain elevators, a free zone for the transit traffic. "A stupendous undertaking . . . the biggest construction executed in Germany after the War," to quote the "Königsberg News," No. 205, 1/9/1923), "with the object of concentrating the export of the two principal branches of commerce, namely, timber and cereals."

Königsberg is quick to take advantage of the political changes caused by the Great War : "In consequence of the separation of East Prussia, Königsberg is her only seaport. The ports of Danzig and Memel belong to foreign countries. . . . As the ports of Libau and Riga no longer belong to Russia, the importance of the Port of Königsberg as a port of entry for Russia has increased. Important railway lines and waterways reaching far into the interior of Russia terminate in Königsberg and favour the exchange of goods between Germany and Russia by means of this port. Königsberg will therefore become, even more than in pre-war times, the intermediate commercial centre between Germany and Russia." ("Shipping News" of 26/1/1924, No. 8, p. 35.) To quote further proofs from literature on the importance of Königsberg :

"The situation of East Prussia made Königsberg one of the most important transit trade centres of Europe . . . Königsberg plays, for the Russian hinterland, the same rôle as Rotterdam and Antwerp for the Rhine and the Westphalian industrial zone." (Dr. Mager, loc. cit., p. 8.)

Further links in this "East Prussian economic programme" are : Reduced tariffs fixed by the Railway Board of Königsberg for the purpose of concentrating the export on Königsberg; Eastern Fairs, and the construction of East Prussian water-

ways. Even Elbing which could not hitherto develop because of Danzig, has profited from the political and economic changes. "Now that Danzig has been excluded by the Polish customs frontier, Elbing endeavours to take the place of Danzig for the afore-mentioned territory, viz. the Western part of East Prussia as far as Allenstein and the remainder of West Prussia, and to control the sea traffic." (Mager, loc. cit., p. 13.)

The Institute for East German Economics, founded in 1916, in Königsberg, gives a scientific basis for and encourages this expansion. In conclusion, it may be said that Königsberg is the centre of aerial communication in the East. The following lines are in operation :—

Königsberg—Smolensk—Moscow.
Königsberg—Memel—Riga—Reval.
Königsberg—Danzig—Berlin.

From Danzig there is communication to Warsaw; from Moscow to Kharkoff, Batum, and Tiflis, from Berlin to the West. Königsberg aeroplanes fly over 5,727 kilometres daily.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RELATION OF EAST PRUSSIA TO POLAND.

A glance at the map will be enough to see that East Prussia forms the barrier which separates Poland from the sea. Let us remember that since 1525 till 1657 East Prussia was a fief of Poland, while a part of it, Ermeland, was from 1454 to 1772 an integral part of Poland. If Germany, in the name of free communication, demands the inclusion of Polish Pomerania and Danzig in Germany, Poland may, on the grounds of access to the sea, claim the annexation of East Prussia, or the creation of a Free City of Königsberg.

It may be pointed out that East Prussia has a certain number of Polish inhabitants on the Vistula—in Ermeland and in Mazury.

The natural hinterland of Königsberg is besides Lithuania and Russia—Poland, especially the north-eastern part of the latter with its wealth of timber. East Prussia with its flourishing timber and paper industry is dependent on the import of wood from Poland. The present strained situation between Poland and Germany and the keen German propaganda against Polish access to the sea, has brought it about that Poland avails herself only in a very small degree of Königsberg, notwithstanding the efforts of the local traders who suffer very much on account of the isolation of Königsberg from the Polish side. This difficult situation can be made easier only by a Polish-German commercial treaty.

The economic dependence of East Prussia on Poland was to be foreseen. During 1918 the Great Powers discussed the economic necessity of incorporating East Prussia in Poland and the well-known geographer and expert in frontier matters, Colonel Th. Holdich, then President of the Royal Geographical Society, in his work, "Boundaries in Europe" (London, 1918, p. 137), has recommended that Poland should be given, as frontiers, the Carpathians and the Baltic Sea, by the inclusion of East Prussia.

That was not realized. East Prussia remained with Germany, but she is dependent on her trade with its hinterland—Poland. If, from the Prussian point of view, commercial relations with Poland do not develop satisfactorily, it is not the fault of the "corridor," but the political atmosphere and the absence of a commercial treaty between Germany and between Poland. We may conclude by stating that the geographical situation of East Prussia points to its being an outlet to the sea also for Poland, but that Germany does not want to avail herself of this advantage.

PART III.

FREEDOM OF TRANSIT BETWEEN GERMANY AND EAST PRUSSIA THROUGH POLISH POMERANIA AND POZNAN.

CHAPTER I.

THE FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL BASIS.

In reply to the objections of the German Delegation that Poland's access to the sea cuts East Prussia off from Germany, M. Clemenceau stated in his Note of June 19, 1919, " . . . Difficulties which might arise for East Prussia on account of the new arrangement of frontiers are nothing compared with the losses which Poland would have had to suffer eventually in consequence of different arrangement of frontiers. Besides, the Treaty fully recognized the importance of the railway connecting East Prussia with Germany, and suitable clauses were included. These clauses were submitted to a very careful examination. They offer perfect security that the connection through Polish territory shall not encounter any difficulties." (Reply, section 1x.)

In the execution of this announcement, the Treaty of Versailles imposed upon Poland the respective obligations in two separate clauses: Article 89 established the principal of "free transit" for the traffic between Germany and East Prussia. It is obvious that this burden, imposed as an equivalent for the territories ceded to Poland, rests mainly on the ceded territories, i.e. the present provinces of Polish Pomerania and Poznan, and does not extend to other provinces of Poland.

The stipulation of Article 89 is included in Chapter VIII of the Treaty, entitled "Poland" (Articles 87–93), as, in the opinion of the makers of the Treaty the general obligation of Poland to give "free transit" was not regarded as an adequate guarantee for Germany. There was added in Chapter 9, entitled "Eastern Prussia," Article 98, containing "Definite stipulations for the conclusion of a Polish-German Convention" to provide for the connection of :—

(*a*) Germany with East Prussia through the territory ceded to Poland and through the Free City of Danzig.

(*b*) Poland with Free City of Danzig via East Prussia, on the right bank of the Vistula.

CHAPTER II.

NEGOTIATIONS AND PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS.

Soon after the Treaty of Versailles came into force, i.e. on February 23, 1920, negotiations were opened in Warsaw between the Polish and German Governments for the purpose of realizing the free transit as stipulated in Article 89, and of concluding the "Convention" prescribed by Article 98. Owing to the unrest produced by the so-called "Kapp Putsch," the Polish Delegation declared the plenary powers given to the German Delegates as insufficient, and the negotiations were interrupted. They were reopened in Paris on April 1, 1920. The Council of Ambassadors acted as intermediary from August, 1920, through their delegate, M. Gaston Leverve, a well-known French expert. Under his guidance the negotiations took place almost without interruption from November 22, 1920, till February, 1921, on which day "The Convention" was finally initialled.

These highly complicated negotiations conducted on behalf of Poland by M. K. Olszowski, Director of the Political Department of the Polish Foreign Office, who is, at the present, Polish Minister in Berlin, were rendered even more difficult by the fact that the Polish-Danzig Convention had, in the meantime, been concluded (on November 9, 1920), and contained the stipulation (Article 6) that Poland ought to consult Danzig before concluding the Treaty or Agreement in which the Free City of Danzig was interested. Article 33 of the Convention decides, amongst other points, "that Article 89 of the Versailles Treaty shall apply also to the Free City of Danzig."

The Convention was signed in Paris on April 21, 1921, by Mr. Olszowski in the name of Poland and Danzig, and by Herr von Mutius in the name of Germany. The Convention came into force on June 1, 1922. It is entitled "Convention between Germany and Poland and the Free City of Danzig, concerning the free transit between East Prussia and the rest of Germany," signed in Paris on April 21, 1921.

The Introduction reads: "Whereas Poland and the Free City of Danzig on one part and Germany on the other part desire to regulate the free transit provided for by Article 89 of the Treaty . . . and to conclude the Convention provided for by Article 98 of the Treaty. . . ."

Thus, it is necessary to consider the interdependence of Articles 89 and 98 of the Treaty. Article 89 puts Poland under the obligation to give to Germany free transit. But Article 89 did not impose on Poland the obligation to conclude with Germany an *Agreement* which should regulate ***bilaterally*** all questions bearing on the freedom of transit. On the contrary, Article 89 foresees in section 3 that such an agreement ought to be concluded in regard of telegraphic and telephonic communication.

Article 98 repeats once more that there should be concluded a Convention assuring to Germany full and suitable facilities in telephonic and telegraphic communications, and adding the most important railway communication.

In summing up the obligations imposed on Poland by Articles 89 and 98 of the Treaty, it may be stated that :—

1. The following questions were to be regulated by means of the Convention to be concluded *with the participation* of Germany :

(*a*) Railway communications.

(*b*) Telephone communications.

(*c*) Telegraph communications.

2. On the other hand, Poland was entitled to regulate *unilaterally*, i.e. without Germany's participation and outside the Convention, by means of administrative decrees, the following questions :—

(*a*) The detailed means of communication other than railway, telephone, and telegraph communication.

(*aa*) Postal communications.

(*bb*) Navigation in territorial waters and internal waterways.

(*cc*) Traffic of motor-cars and motor cycles.

(*b*) Furthermore, Poland had, according to Article 89, the possibility of settling unilaterally all technical questions concerning the freedom of transit, and therefore also the question of passports, customs, and the problem of military transports.

Poland, meanwhile, in order to prove her good will and to avoid disputes with Germany over Article 89, agreed to extend the system of bilateral settlement to *all* questions mentioned under (*a*) and (*b*) : thus, Poland went far beyond the obligations imposed on her by the Treaty of Versailles.

Further proof of Poland's loyalty :

Although the Convention provided by Article 98 has not yet been concluded, Poland has, soon after the taking over of Polish Pomerania, i.e. from February, 1920, carried through the railway transit, on the lines of Article 89, at first by Government decree and, subsequently, on the strength of provisional agreements of November 13, 1920; September 3, 1920; and May 4, 1921.

In consequence of this Eastern Prussia had uninterrupted communication even with Upper Silesia, which at that time formed the Plebiscite territory.

Poland agreed to recognize simple identification cards in lieu of passports and waived her right to customs inspection. On the strength of a separate provisional agreement concluded in Paris on January 9, 1920, Poland permitted the transport of German troops by rail via Pomerania. In July, 1920, the first railway transport of the Reichswehr passed via Pomerania.

This provisional state of affairs lasted until June 1, 1922.

CHAPTER III.

THE TRANSIT CONVENTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE MEMORANDUM OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT OF 1921.

The German Government when presenting this Convention to the German Parliament for ratification accompanied it with a Memorandum (Denkschrift des Answärtigen Amts Zum Gesetz uber das Durchgangsabkommen. Reichstags Druchsache. Nr. 2191).

In discussing on these pages the provisions of the Convention, we shall do so from the standpoint of this Memorandum, thus giving voice to the German Foreign Office, as the most suitable protagonist of German interests and analysing the Convention from the German point of view.

1. General Stipulations.

The Convention which was to replace the connection between Germany and East Prussia, interrupted by the Treaty of Versailles, departs from the principle that only the economic needs of Germany should be taken into consideration when determining the volume of transit traffic. As a consequence, Poland put her own rolling stock at the disposal of Germany in order to carry the railway traffic over the territories ceded to Poland by Germany, i.e. the countries of Polish Pomerania and Poznan. Recognizing, however, that Poland is for the present not able to supply the required number of carriages, Germany is to lend her, for a period of five years, the necessary number of locomotives to be fixed in advance by the two administrations for the duration of each period of their timetables. Should there be an acute shortage of coal in Poland, Germany shall deliver it (Articles 22/27 and 111).

In case of war the stipulations of the Convention do not lapse "ipso jure." If one party desires to limit the transit traffic, it must inform the other in advance through diplomatic channels. The limitation can be introduced only forty-eight hours after notification.

The transit traffic is not given ex-territorial rights but is subject to Polish laws, notably in questions of public safety. Arrests may be made in cases of crime or felony, but not in cases of trespassing. Going far beyond Article 89 of the Versailles Treaty, Poland in urgent cases conceded to Germany the right of free transit to and from East Prussia over the territory of what was formerly Russian Poland. Furthermore, on strength of Article 33 of the Polish-Danzig Convention, dated 9th/XI/1920, Poland extended her obligation to grant transit over the territory of the

Free City of Danzig as well. Railway communication falls into two classes: "privileged" and "ordinary" transit (Article 4). The former is to run over definitely stipulated lines (Article 23). In time of peace the privileged transit traffic is not subject to passport and customs formalities. In case of war, German citizens will be required to produce identification cards; other nationals, a passport with a Polish visa. Travellers are not allowed to alight from the trains during the transit journey. They are also not allowed to pass or receive anything through the windows. Goods traffic is equally exempted from customs if carried on special transit trains.

"Ordinary" transit takes place on all the lines of the Western provinces; when travelling, German nationals must have passports and a Polish visa. Traffic of goods does not come under any tariffs, but is subject to customs formalities, such as the sealing of waggons, etc.

No agreement was reached—according to the German Memorandum—on two important points.

(1) On the extraordinary movement of troops (for the ordinary military transports are covered by the Convention).

(2) On the question of aerial communication.

Article 1 limits the provisions of the Convention to all communications on land and water. The German Memorandum describes the establishment of an arbitral tribunal as the outstanding success of the Convention, adding, however, "although it may be hoped that the transit traffic will in future develop on smoother lines than has hitherto been the case since Poland took possession of the ceded territories, but it may be assumed that owing to the multiplicity of legal relations touched upon by the agreement, differences of opinion on their interpretation or execution can hardly be avoided." (Memorandum of the Foreign Office, p. 101.)

Further on the Memorandum emphasizes that the Convention goes beyond Article 98 of the Treaty because it is not limited to railway, postal and telegraph communication, but (1) provides for military transports, navigation, and also traffic by road.

2. Railway Communications.

The Memorandum confirms that the railway traffic should be regulated by the economic needs of Germany and East Prussia. The chapter dealing with the railway traffic begins with a statement of the principle that Poland is obliged to carry through her territory the whole of the transit traffic dispatched by Germany. According to the volume of this traffic, the needs of traffic in East Prussia must be regulated. (Memorandum of the Foreign Office, p. 102.)

The following lines were earmarked for the privilege transit through Poland (Article 23):

(*a*) Lebork-Danzig-Tczew-Malbork.

(*b*) Chojnice-Tczew-Malbork.

(*c*) Pila-Bydgoszcz-Torun-Devtsch Eylau.

(*d*) Swiebodzin-Zbaszyn-Poznan-Torun-Devtsch Eylau.

(*e*) Cylichova-Zbaszyn-Poznan-Torun-Devtsch Eylau.

(*f*) Rawicz-Leszno-Poznan-Torun-Devtsch Eylau.

(*g*) Wschova-Leszno-Poznan-Torun-Devtsch Eylau.

(*h*) Olesnica-Krotoszyn-Gnieszno-Torun-Devtsch Eylau

At the request of Germany this list can be changed every three years. At present the privileged passenger traffic is running only on the first three Polish-Pomeranian lines, but not on the further five Posen lines.

As an important success the Memorandum mentions that over and above Article 89, Poland undertook to direct the traffic by the shortest route, which gives Germany protection against increased costs of transport and loss of time. Moreover, Poland is not allowed to attach any carriages to the transit trains, neither empty nor carrying freight. On the other hand, Poland admits German sleeping and restaurant cars.

The goods traffic is run on the whole according to the Berne Convention and supplementary agreements.

It may be added that similarly privileged transit as the above was introduced between the following countries :—

(1) Transit from Germany to the Island Sylt across Danish territory.

(2) Transit from Latvia across Lithuania to Latvia.

(3) Transit from Lithuania across Latvia to Lithuania.

(4) Transit from Russia across the Finnish corridor Petsamo to Norway.

(5) Transit from Austria across Yugo-Slavia to Italy.

(6) Transit from Upper Silesia across Germany to Posnania.

(7) Transit from Mlawa across Germany (Marienburg) to Polish Pomerania.

3. Military Transports.

The Germans are entitled to one train weekly carrying troops and to one train carrying war materials. Arms must be deposited in a special carriage under Polish guard. The Memorandum says: "In short, it may be again emphasized that the provisions of Chapter III are entirely adequate for the needs of military traffic between Germany and East Prussia, as some 1,400 men and 800 tons of war material may be transported each way within a week." (Memorandum of the Foreign Office, p. 106.)

4. Postal, Telephonic and Telegraphic Traffic.

The transport of the German mails by railways is carried in German wagons. These carriages, together with the German staff, are put under the charge of a Polish official.

For telegraphic and telephonic communication Poland cedes a certain number of lines for German use against payment.

5. Navigation and Road Traffic.

The transit covers all kinds of ships, barges, and steamers, belonging to German, Danzig, or Polish ports. The motor traffic is limited to roads indicated by Poland.

The contents of the Memorandum of the Foreign Office, quoted above, give an idea how far the Convention exceeded Article 98 of the Versailles Treaty, by regulating military, navigable and road transit as well and by extending in case of need the whole transit over the territory of what was formerly Russian Poland, thus satisfying all the needs of Germany. (See Deuticke, " East Prussia and the Polish Corridor.")

CHAPTER IV.

EXECUTION OF THE CONVENTION BY POLAND.

The fact of the execution of the Convention by Poland itself which has lasted over two and a half years, proves that the economic desires of Germany are being satisfactorily executed.

Contrary to the above-quoted anxiety of the Memorandum, that the interpretation of the Convention may give rise to numerous conflicts and disputes before the arbitral tribunal, it must be stated *that up till* February, 1925, not a single matter had been brought forward by Germany. This fact alone, quite apart from all others, suffices to refute all German propaganda about the alleged difficulties caused by the grant to Poland of an access to the sea.

The number and category of trains scheduled as well as of additional ones running on the above-mentioned lines have been fixed by Article 29, according to the desire of the German Government at a special Conference on Railway Time Tables (the last one took place at Frankfurt-on-the-Oder, on March 11, 1924). They are so numerous that they cover the needs of Germany. Even more freight sidings were provided than Germany was able to use. For the increased passenger traffic, especially in the summer-holiday season, fourteen special trains were agreed upon.

The Polish Railway Administration is running the trains within the scheduled time; passenger trains arriving from Germany with a delay are being run across without any delay or with a decreased delay. The Polish Railway Administration have not as yet

demanded the cancellation of any privileged train, although these trains never reached an average of 60 per cent. The Polish Railway Administration would be entitled to put forward this demand on the strength of Article 29. The following statement shows the number of seats, number of passengers, and the percentage of travellers and transit carriages in the privileged German-Polish traffic for seven months ending December 31, 1923:

Route:	No. of Seats.	No. of Passengers.	Per cent. of Occupied Seats.
Strzebielin-Malborg	22,257	7,571	34
Malborg-Strzebielin	20,578	5,966	28
Chojnice-Malborg	303,498	176,582	58
Malborg-Chojnice	301,567	174,608	57
Kaczory-Bydgoszcz Torun-Jamielnik	127,519	65,432	51
Jamielnik-Torun Bydgoszcz-Kaczory ..	127,182	75,600	59
Total	902,601	505,759	56

SIMILAR TABLE FOR SEVEN MONTHS ENDING JULY 31, 1924.

Route:	No. of Seats.	No. of Passengers.	Per cent. of Occupied Seats.
Strzebielin-Malborg	24,809	9,270	35
Malborg-Strzebielin	24,753	7,903	32
Chojnice-Malborg	442,258	226,510	51
Malborg-Chojnice	414,952	186,725	44
Kaczory-Bydgoszcz Torun-Jamielnik	186,013	66,127	35
Jamielnik-Torun Bydgoszcz-Kaczory ..	223,915	93,430	41
Total	1,316,700	589,965	44

The above table shows that in 1924 nearly 590,000 passengers made use of trains and transit carriages "East Prussia—Germany" and *vice versa*, all as privileged traffic. Passengers using the ordinary transit are not included. On the other hand, passengers by steamers on the route "Swinemunde-Pillau," barely amounted to a few thousands (see Table No. 9).

This is the best proof of the state of the railway transit traffic. During the two and a half years of the existence of the Convention,

the German Government have not demanded any changes in the latter, they have only asked for an increase in the speed of the trains, which was done. Express service : 80 kilometres (ordinary service : 70 kilometres).

Telegraphic and telephonic wires ceded to Germany in accordance with Article 37 are being carefully looked after. Not one complaint has been lodged.

Goods traffic directed on the strength of the Convention via Poland to Germany is so convenient, that large masses of goods, which formerly used to go by sea from Germany to Königsberg and *vice versa*, are transported to-day principally by rail. In the same way on the line Chojnice-Tczêw-Marienburg fully loaded wagons containing briquettes, iron goods, agricultural machinery, artificial manure, seeds and paper pass from Germany to East Prussia. The freight of fully-loaded wagons forms 60 per cent. of the total consignments.

In an opposite direction, from East Prussia to Germany, cattle and other live-stock, timber, planks, cellulose, hides, meat, sugar, and wool are carried. Fully loaded wagons form 75 per cent. of the total consignments.

On the line Schneidemühl-Torun-Dt. Eylau, the traffic is similar. Fully loaded wagons going to East Prussia form 70 per cent. of the total amount of consignments and 70·5 per cent. in the opposite direction.

On the line Lauenburg-Wejcherovo-Danzig, Germany does not make use of the privileged goods traffic granted to her, as the bulk of her consignments is too insignificant. The goods go in both directions by ordinary transit.

We assert, therefore, that Germany has every facility of communication to East Prussia and *vice versa*. Both in regard to passenger and goods traffic, she prefers communication by rail to that by sea, as can be seen, for example, in an article in "Ostseehandel," No. 4, of January 25, 1925, under the title, "Der seeweg nach Ostpreussen über Stetin," an extract of which reads as follows : "Up till now the maritime traffic of the last pre-war years has not yet been reached on the Stettin-Königsberg line." So far as passenger traffic is concerned, the Germans did not make use of the number of seats put at their disposal.

CHAPTER V.

THE DIRECTION OF RAILWAY COMMUNICATION FROM EAST TO WEST AND SOUTH TO NORTH. DANZIG'S RÔLE.

In spite of Germany's facilities in regard to communication from east to west and *vice versa*, this traffic, which we may call "German," is almost 100 per cent. less than "Polish" traffic, from south to north, i.e. from Poland to Danzig and *vice versa*.

The following number of privileged transit wagons ran daily on the line Chojnice-Marienburg and Schneidemühl-Dt. Eylau :—

Eastwards.	In	Westwards.
234	1923	235
222	1924 (I–IX)	230

At the same time on the line Poland-Tczew-Danzig, the following number of wagons ran daily :—

To Danzig.	In	From Danzig.
427	1923	428
422	1924 (I–IX)	433

These figures prove clearly that traffic from south to north and *vice versa* is almost 100 per cent. greater than that from east to west. The same figures also prove that "Poland's access to the sea " is much more intensively used than traffic by the so-called "Corridor."

In this connection Danzig's rôle is continually increasing in importance as a transhipping station from train to ship and *vice versa*.

The same applies to passenger traffic. In 1914 the number of trains arriving daily at and leaving Danzig amounted to 276, in 1924 to 294. These figures include suburban traffic amounting to 195 in 1914, and 218 in 1924. Before the war long-distance trains running northwards, did not go farther than Breslau. Nowadays they go as far as Cracow, and there is a project to extend the service from Poznan via Breslau to Prague, Vienna, and Belgrade.

The Polish State Railway Administration endeavours to maintain the highest standard in passenger traffic by giving the inhabitants of the Free City of Danzig, the German Reich, and East Prussia the most convenient communication between each other and with Poland. Direct night train service from Danzig to Berlin and *vice versa* runs only in July and August; it has been abolished for the remaining months at the special request of the German Railway Administration, because of the small number of passengers.

CHAPTER VI.

AN OFFICIAL OPINION OF THE GERMAN RAILWAY ADMINISTRATION IN 1923 ACKNOWLEDGING THE STRICT EXECUTION OF THE CONVENTION OF 21st APRIL, 1921, BY THE POLISH STATE RAILWAYS.

Anyone not yet sufficiently convinced of the fact that since the Convention came into life, i.e. from June 1, 1922, till the end of January, 1925, not a single complaint has been lodged by Germany about Poland not having fully executed the Convention, a fact

which proves that there can be no question of East Prussia being cut off from Germany in regard to communication, would do well to read as documentary evidence, Germany's official opinion, i.e. the opinion of the Directory of German Railways in Königsberg, under the title, "East Prussian Economics and Communications before and after the War," edited by the Reich Railway Authorities at Königsberg, published by Grafe and Unzer, Königsberg. The date of publication is not mentioned, but judging by the text it would appear that the pamphlet was published in the second half of 1923. We give below an extract, p. 9 (printed in block letters in the original) :—

"It can be stated . . . with satisfaction that the continual endeavours of the German Reich Railways have succeeded in putting aside these difficulties after prolonged negotiations with the Polish Railway Administration.

"*In regard to transit traffic East Prussia can no longer be called an 'enclave.' The Reich Railways have bridged the way over the Polish transit territory.*"

"That was no easy task. Since June 1, 1922, there is in force an agreement signed at Paris, which forms a safe judicial base for the future, and which affords the Reich Railway the necessary means against the Polish Railways Administration in case difficulties should arise in the question of transit. For over a year transit traffic has been carried on without friction, as though Germany herself had the management of the traffic in the Polish Corridors."

"The accounts for freightage of the German internal tariffs is reckoned in a way as if the territory ceded to Poland and lying between East Prussia and Germany were still German. *It must be acknowledged that the Polish Railway Administration do all in their power to excuse their obligations under the Treaty.* Therefore, it can be hoped that in future all difficulties in regard to traffic can also be easily eliminated."

"On the one hand it must be appreciated that in view of the extraordinary difficulties encountered in this special type of traffic through foreign land, the management has been carried out in a most satisfactory manner by those responsible for the traffic, and on the other hand it must be acknowledged that this has only been achieved by the efforts and the friendly policy of the Reich Railway. . . . In consequence of this development, the question whether it would be of any use to direct the traffic between East Prussia and the remainder of Germany totally or partially by sea has lost its practical importance."

This impartial opinion of a technical organ and the most competent to express an appreciation of the execution of the Convention by Poland and its importance for Germany—the

Direction of the German railways in Königsberg—is sufficiently and indisputably convincing that the complaints published in the political Press concerning the cutting off of East Prussia and so on, are totally without foundation.

At the close of the pamphlet the statistics prove that between East Prussia and Germany the export of goods by sea in 1923 was considerably less than in 1913, and that it has decreased in proportion to railway traffic.

CONCLUSION.

"The greatest significance of the Polish 'Corridor,' where Germany is concerned lies, quite apart from direct losses of German territory, in the separation of East Prussia from the Reich." "Deuticke," p. 52. There are thus two questions to be dealt with. The loss of territory from a material point of view and as a link between Germany and East Prussia. The loss of territory consisting of about 2,000 square kilometres in the Free City of Danzig, and about 16,000 square kilometres in Polish Pomerania is undoubtedly a loss for Germany, but considering the extent of the country, it is very insignificant. In view of the fact that the population of Pomerania is undoubtedly and indisputably Polish, German complaints in that direction are not justified. We have tried to prove in the first part that the creation of the Free City of Danzig and the cession of Pomerania to Poland with a coast-line of 76 kilometres long was an absolute necessity in order to give her access to the sea. It is the minimum of what could be given to Poland, taking into consideration that a little town like Danzig has a coast-line of 55 kilometres long and 30 kilometres of Fresh gulf. A small country like Lithuania has 70 kilometres of coast-line and 115 kilometres of the gulf of Courland.

England has 100 per cent. of sea frontier, Spain has about 66 per cent., France and Italy 50 per cent., Germany about 25 per cent., and Poland not even 2 per cent.

The German coast on the North Sea amounts to 498 kilometres, on the Baltic 990 kilometres altogether 1,488 kilometres. Nevertheless, Germany claims the 76 kilometres of Polish coast and 85 kilometres of Danzig coast.

England, France, and Spain border on the ocean, the latter two countries border on the Mediterranean as well; Germany has access to the ocean by the North Sea, is the strongest country on the Baltic, and possesses the largest port of that sea, namely, Stettin. A small country such as Finland having a long coast-line, with twenty-three ports on the Baltic gained at the Peace Treaty of Dorpat on February 2, 1920, the "Corridor" Petsamo, with access to another sea, the Arctic Ocean.

Taking such considerations into account nobody can seriously deny to Poland the right to have her own free access to the sea, as even a small country like Bulgaria possesses two ports.

The next German reproach is that East Prussia is cut off from Germany. That was already discussed in Part II, where we showed that the existing economic difficulties arise from the natural and geographical conditions of East Prussia as a typical colony.

Finally, in Part III, we have adduced evidence that so far as communication is concerned, Poland has completely satisfied the most pretentious German claims, which fact was recognized in expert German circles. In the same way we have proved that German propaganda against Poland's access to the sea has not a shadow of justification, and that the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles relating to Poland's seaboard constitute but a minimum of what is due to her. *We have shown that Poland's Western frontiers are unalterable.*

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