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Introduction

The present volume of *Scripta Calssica* follows the tradition of the series and holds a collection of miscellaneous articles in which various aspects of ancient civilization are discussed. The texts may attract interest of those who study Greco-Roman culture and its impact on modern world.

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Poetic Inspiration in Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*

Abstract: The concept of poetic inspiration — fundamental to ancient poetics, was for centuries founded on the image of a poet as an unconscious vessel for the Muses. However, no evidence of an actual possession was to be found in works of archaic poets, such as Homer, Hesiod or Pindar. The text of *Iliad* and *Odyssey* show that the relation between an artist and the goddess is of an intellectual nature, and that these two interact on many different levels. The Muse, stirs the bard to sing, supplies him with 'divine' knowledge, assists him whenever a need arises. But, at the same time, leaves him enough freedom when it comes to the composition of the poem.

Key words: poetic inspiration, the Muses, Homer, *Iliad*, *Odyssey*

Plato writes in *Laws*: “There is... an ancient saying — constantly repeated by ourselves and endorsed by everyone else — that whenever the poet is seated on the Muse’s tripod, he is, not in his senses, but resembles a fountain, which gives free course to the upward rush of water”¹. This passage conveys a powerful image of the poet as a passive instrument of some supernatural force, deprived of any control over what he is actually saying, becoming, thus, incapable of explaining either the source, or the meaning of his poetry². However, recent studies of the works of Homer, Hesiod and Pindar, to name only these three authors, have shown, that none of them described the poet as μαντικός, or ἐκστατικός (adjec-

¹ Plato: *Laws*, 719 C.

² The idea of a ‘possessed’ poet can be found throughout Plato’s dialogues e.g. *Menon*, *Ion*, *Phaedrus*; and in contemporary studies on the subject: E.R. Dodds: *The Greek and the Irrational*. Berkeley 1951; D.A. Russell: *Criticism in Antiquity*. London 1981; E. Mueller: *Geschichte der Theorie der Kunst bei den Altens*. Breslau 1834; W. Kranz: „Das Verhältnis der Schöpfers zu seinem Werk in der altgriechischen Literatur“. *Neue Jahrbücher für das „Klassische Altertum“* 1924, 27; A. Sperduti: “The Divine Nature of Poetry in Antiquity”. *TAPA* 1950, Vol. 81, pp. 209—240.

tives reserved for Pythia) — a seer, be it man or woman, who, put to a state of ecstasy, would freely communicate with the divinity, thus, was able to say or do things impossible to a human being in a normal state of mind³.

Since, no evidence gathered from the ancient literature, from Homer onward seemed to validate the thesis of ecstatic possession, many scholars came to the conclusion that the notion of poetic inspiration, was in fact, a formulation of the 5th century philosophers⁴. The image of the “possessed” poet was, nevertheless, repeated with no, or hardly no scepticism up to the 20th century.

The concept of poetic inspiration is fundamental to Greek notions about poetry, and from Homer onward, was expressed through a mysterious bond between the poet and Muses. In an essay “Poetic Inspiration in Early Greece” Penelope Murray correctly observed that, in order to escape Platonic misunderstandings about ancient views on poetic creativity, one must make a clear distinction between the concept of poetic inspiration and poetic genius. She defines the first as “temporary impulse to poetic creation, relating primarily to the poetic process”⁵, whereas the latter stands for “a permanent quality on which poetic creativity depends, and relates to the poetic personality”⁶. Thus, the relationship between the poet and his Muse is to be understood twofold. In the beginning the deity, Muse or god Apollo himself, bestows on him, the gift of permanent poetic ability, which becomes from now on the poet’s inherent quality; and later, when a need arises supplies him with temporary aid as well.⁷

In the course of *Iliad* and *Odyssey* Homer addresses his Muse, seeking her assistance, in order to gather accurate information, as for example in the beginning of the Catalogue of Ships⁸:

Ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ’ ἔχουσαι
 ὑμεῖς γὰρ θεαὶ ἐστε ἐπάρεστέ τε ἴστε τε πάντα,
 ἡμεῖς δ κλέος ο ον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν
 οἱ τινες ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι ἦσαν

And now, o Muses dwellers in the mansions of Olympus, tell me —
 for you are goddesses, are in all places so that you see everything

³ G.M. Ledbetter: *Poetics before Plato*. Oxford 2003; P. Murray: “Poetic Inspiration in Early Greece”. *JHS* 1981, Vol. 101, pp. 87—103; E.T. Tigerstedt: “*Furor Poeticus*: Inspiration in Greek Literature before Democritus and Plato”. *JHI* 1970, Vol. 31, pp. 163—178.

⁴ See: E.A. Havelock: *Preface to Plato*. Oxford 1963. Also, P. Murray and E.A. Tigerstedt; however, they reject Havelock’s opinion, that the concept of poetic inspiration was altogether alien to Homer, Hesiod or Pindar.

⁵ Murray, “Poetic Inspiration...”, p. 89.

⁶ Ibidem.

⁷ For example of permanent poetic ability see *Od.* VIII 44—45; and temporary inspiration: *Od.* 8. 73.

⁸ The list of invocations: *Il.* I 1—7, II 761—762; XI 218—220; XIV 508—510; XVI 112—113; *Od.* I 1—10.

while we know nothing but report
 Who were the chiefs and princes of the Danaans.
 (*Il.* II 484—47)⁹

The Muse is believed to be a source of reliable information, more specifically, a certain kind of knowledge, which in any other case, apart from poetry and oracles, would and should be inaccessible to a mere mortal. Homer's Muse, provides him with information, mostly knowledge of the past. Therefore, the need for accurate information, as opposed to a mere rumour, was interpreted as the author's desire to make — preservation, the key aspect of his poetry. Indeed, the archaic poets were considered “historians” of their culture, guarding and maintaining, in their poems, tradition of their societies.

Homer viewed his poetry as a source of divine knowledge but, foremost, a source of pleasure. We are told, in *Odyssey* that Demodocus' talent is his power to give delight through his song. The Muses, thus, help the poet to enchant and mesmerise his audience, in the moment of delivering his song to the listeners. With the assistance of the goddesses the bard is able to seduce his audience and evoke the atmosphere of tension and curiosity. The association of poetry and pleasure is brought up throughout *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, for example when Achilles finds delight in his lyre, singing epic poetry:

τὸν δ' εὔρον φρένα τερπόμενον φόρμιγγι λιγείῃ
 καλῇ δαιδαλέῃ, ἐπὶ δ' ἀργύρεον ζυγὸν ἦεν,
 τὴν ἄρετ' ἐξ ἐνάρων πόλιν Ἡετίωνος ὀλέσσας·
 τῇ ὃ γε θυμὸν ἔτερπεν, ἄειδε δ' ἄρα κλέα ἀνδρῶν.

and they found Achilles playing on a lyre, of cunning workmanship,
 and its cross-bar was of silver,
 it was part of the spoils he had taken when he sacked the city of Eëtion.
 And he now was diverting himself with it and singing the glory of heroes.
 (*Il.* IX 186—189)

or the Sirens promise that their song will bring both pleasure and knowledge: ἀλλ' ὃ γε τερψάμενος νείται καὶ ρλείονα εἰδώς¹⁰.

Although the opening lines of *Iliad* (Μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ) seem to confirm the thesis of the poet as a passive instrument of the deity, the invocation before the Catalogue of Ships, and the poet's request for specific information imply his active part as a recipient of the divine knowledge. His role becomes more evident in the

⁹ *The Iliad*. Ed. S. Butler. New York 1999.

¹⁰ *Od.* XII 188. See also; *Il.* 472—474, IX 186, IX 189; *Od.* I 421—423, VIII 429, XVIII 304—306, XVII 605—606, XII 188.

description of the bard Demodocus. The audience is told that the Muse bestowed on him the gift of sweet song, as a compensation for his blindness:

τὸν περὶ Μοῦς' ἐφίλησε, δίδου δ' ἀγαθὸν τε κακὸν τε·
ὀφθαλμῶν μιν ἄμερσε, δίδου δ' ἡδεῖαν ἀοιδίην.

The Muse loved him above all men, and gave him both good and evil;
of his sight deprived him, but gave him the gift of sweet song.

(*Od.* VIII 62—64)

She stirs him to sing, but never physically “takes abode in him”, nor is such a possession depicted when the bard enters the hall of Alcinous, the king of Phaeacians. It is his active part in the process of the composition, which becomes stressed in the following passage:

τῷ γάρ ῥα θεὸς περὶ δῶκεν ἀοιδίην
τέρπεν, ὅππῃ θυμὸς ἐποτρύνῃσιν ἀεΐδειν

For the god gave to him song beyond others —
to give pleasure in whatever way his spirit urges him to sing

(*Od.* VIII 44—45)

Although the gift of sweet song is attributed to god, it is Demodocus' θυμὸς — spirit that is in control of the song, affirming the bard's responsibility for its creation. He is given a tool, he must make a good use of, but Demodocus is never described as god's tool himself. Moreover, Phemius, Odysseus' court-poet states that:

αὐτοδίδακτος δ' εἰμί, θεὸς δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἶμας
παντοίας ἐνέφυσεν·

I am self-taught, and the god has planted in my heart all manners of lays.

(*Od.* XXII 347—348)

He perceives himself simultaneously as self-taught and a recipient of the divine gift of poetry. Thus, he acknowledges the supernatural origin of his art, but, at the same time, emphasises his independence in the composition of his song. Neither Demodocus, nor Phemius are presented as unconscious vessels of the Muses. They are inspired, moved, compelled to sing, are taught by the deity, and, most of all, are able to freely communicate with her, but mantic ecstasy is absent from these contacts.

The lack of ecstatic possession does not exclude the possibility of another level of interaction between the Muse and her disciple. The mode of invocations in *Iliad* suggests that the poet may, at some moments, treat the Muse not only as a well-informed source dispensing him knowledge, but a part of his audience: a “knowing

recipient” among other listeners. At the outset of the Catalogue of Ships Homer acknowledges Muses’ knowledge (τε ἵστέ τε πάντα), as well as their presence (πάρεστέ), which can be interpreted two ways. Either the poet implies divine presence at the site of the event he is about to narrate to his audience, or simply wishes to emphasise presence of the Muses as listeners during his performance. Such approach to the text *Iliad* disturbs the firm teacher — pupil division, by reversing the respectful roles of the poet and his Muse, since the deity is present not only to correct and assist, but also to enjoy the performance.

The relation poet — Muse goes even further and operates at yet another level. Readers of both epic poems, *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, are reminded that gods, and Muses in particular, are themselves accomplished artists, entertaining other celestials at heavenly feasts¹¹. Thus, the outstanding affinity between the poet and Muses is founded on a common ground — their craft. The bard finds it easier to address god knowing he will find in him or her a fellow artist. However, the price for such kinship with immortals can be extremely high and Homer is well aware of that.

In the Book II of *Iliad* he relates the story of Thamyris, who engaged in a musical contest with the Muses, boasted he could excel their musical skills. Punished for his vanity and arrogance he was maimed, and deprived of the divine power of song. The Muses also took away his ability to play the lyre¹². The story of Thamyris demonstrates that a poet must know his limits, and especially know the time to take a step back. Homer shows in the course of the epic that he is aware of the terrible consequences of uncontrolled pride and egotism, against which he warns the audience. The poet stresses his reverence and esteem to his patrons in a remark, he makes in the middle of a lengthy passage describing the Trojans storming the rampart in Book XII of the *Iliad*:

Ἄλλοι δ’ ἀμφ’ ἄλλησι μάχην ἐμάχοντο πύλῃσιν·
ἀργαλέον δέ με ταῦτα θεὸν ὥς πάντ’ ἀγορεύσαι·

Meanwhile the Trojans were fighting about the other gates.

I, however, am no god to be able to tell all these things.

(*Il.* XII 175)

This personal remark can be interpreted twofold: Homer declares the difficulty and complexity of the material he set out to narrate to the listeners — a task almost surpassing his poetic abilities, but at the same time he emphasises in a self-deprecatory manner his inferior status as an artist. The poet’s awareness of his human limitations and his caution not to offend the gods is evident in this passage.

¹¹ See: *Il.* I 604, 9. 186—189.

¹² *Il.* II 591—600. For other versions of Thamyris story see Pseudo-Apollodorus, *Myth.* I.3.3; Pausanias *Perieg. Graeciae descriptio* IV 33.3,7—11.

Throughout *Iliad* Homer maintains a strict observance of the rules while addressing a deity, having in mind the sad fate of Thamyris.

When it comes to the fundamental aspect of an ancient epic narrative — the performance — the invocations the poet makes serve few practical functions. First of all, they confirm the relationship between the poet and his Muse. The poet transcends human limitations, in order to communicate with the goddess. Secondly, by breaking the narrative, invocations alert the audience, and prepare the listeners for what will come next¹³. Moreover, they express the belief that the Muse is a source of inspiration for the epic — she is the teacher, and the one, who incites the bard to sing. Finally, each invocation confirms the story's extraordinary character and legitimises the cultural content of the poem.

The passages of *Iliad* and *Odyssey* emphasise a close link between inspiration and knowledge. Both epic poems are to preserve glory of old heroes (κλέα ἀνδρῶν), from accounts gathered with the aid of Muses. However, as the daughters of Μεινοσύη, their relation to this particular goddess brings up another interesting aspect of their relationship with the poet, which lays in the specific nature of inspiration they grant him. The connection between Muses and memory, is to be found throughout ancient literature, for example in Hesiod and in Plato, but already Homer attributes the ability of memorising to the Muses in *Il.* 2. 492 εἰ μὴ Ὀλυμπίδες Μοῦσαι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο θυγατέρες μνησαίεθ' ὅσοι ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθον. This commemorative function strengthens the primary task of epic poetry, which is conservation of κλέα ἀνδρῶν. Memory also constitutes the very mode in which oral poetry is created. Without this ability no oral composition could be even conceivable.

The poet addresses the Muse during the course of *Iliad* and in the outset of *Odyssey* asking for help in narrating to the audience accurate information, or when he seems to have problems with the composition of a particular passage, but he is never portrayed as a passive recipient or a mouthpiece. Their relationship is of an intellectual nature. Surely, she communicates with him, but never she sends him into the state of ecstasy — every time a contact is made, the poet maintains his active part in the composition of the poem. The invocations confirm that the source of his poetry is divine, but the poet remains, at the same time, conscious of his own contribution in the process of composition.

¹³ For a more detailed analysis of the performative aspects of Homer's invocations see: E. Minchin: "The Poet Appeals to His Muse: Homeric Invocations in the Context of Epic Performance". *CJ* 1995, Vol. 26, 91.1.

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A Pragmatic Analysis of Achilles' First Speech in Homer's *Iliad*¹

Abstract: The article constitutes a pragmatic analysis of Achilles' first speech in Homer's *Iliad*. Basing on a detailed reading of the text, both on a lexical and grammatical level, the author makes an attempt to establish psychological motivations of its hero. The linear method of analysis used allows for a coherent investigation of the statement whereas the references to earlier and later Achilles' speeches and other characters of the epic may shed a new light on the interpretation of the conflict of the bravest warrior with the commander of the excursion, focusing the whole action of *Iliad*.

According to the main assumption of the article, the verb οἶω, appearing already in the first verse of Achilles' speech, allows for an insight into a dynamic structure of the hero's psyche. Further on, the central theme of the article is the implementation of a linguistic analysis to a psychological study of the development of Homer's heroes. The article also tries to use the observations made by Homer's experts, such as Irene de Jong and John Redfield.

Key words: Homer, Achilles, speech, a pragmatic analysis, discourse, οἶω

Introduction

The aim of this article is to look at Achilles' first speech in the *Iliad* and, through the use of linguistic methods basing on minute analysis of the text, to recreate the range of possible complex mental strategies and emotional struc-

¹ The article is a part of chapter 3 of master's thesis written under tutelage of prof. B.D. MacQueen: "Speakers of words and doers of deeds: a pragmatic analysis of first eight speeches in Homer's *Iliad*." Some additions have been made due to the change of form.

tures of the character. All that, having in mind the major problems of pragmatics of ancient texts, most importantly, the degradation of the meaning in time due to the processes of entropy, which make the text unintelligible at all levels².

The material has been chosen for several reasons. *Oratio recta*, a speech by character may seem a more than sufficient mean to make the heroes of any epic work take on various personal traits. It is so for any language art. Therefore it is worthwhile pondering the text in search of the answer to the key question, to wit: Does Homer individualise his characters, and if so, how does he do it, with regard to the well-known problem of the formulaic nature of his poetry?

The second reason for choosing a sample from the very beginning of the Homeric text is the sheer excitement of yet another question: How much is there in Homer before the moment which, in general opinion, starts the story — the taking of Bryseis?

James Redfield in his analysis of the *Iliad's* proem says: “The *Iliad* is, or at least is like, oral poetry, poetry created in performance by rapid and relatively unreflective means. As we come to understand such poetry better, we begin to invent philologies to appropriate to it. Philology then reveals that the oral poet is also a creator. He handles his material freely, and therefore meaningfully”³. The basic idea is, therefore, to read the chosen speech carefully, with the true quality of φιλόλογος — ‘the one who loves words’ and look for meanings on all the possible levels of speech. The use of verb forms, aspect, the complex or simple participle structures, the semantic component of words, their deictic function, the repetitions of certain stems, the use of personal, relative and demonstrative pronouns, word order and emphatic positioning of certain structures — all these will be taken into account as potentially meaningful and responsible the complex image of the inner life of the character and the representation of his will.

In the article, after presenting the text of the speech and roughly its context I will go on to analyse the formulaic words, possibly devoid of meaning, go on to linear analysis, which will have to be broken at some point by a digression, the importance of which makes it impossible to avoid it, and finally finish the linear analysis by commenting on some less common aspects of Homeric style.

² Ł. Tofilski: *In Search of Lost Meanings. Towards a Methodology of the Pragmatics of Ancient Texts. An Essay Presented on an International Conference “Etos i egzegeza” Katowice 2005.* [Awaiting publication].

³ J. Redfield: “The Proem of the *Iliad*: Homer’s Art”. In: *Oxford Readings in Homer’s Iliad*. Ed. D.L. Cairns. Oxford 2001, pp. 456—457.

Φοῖβος

The adjective Φοῖβος, to begin with, is a typical of Apollo, to such an extent that it is treated as a name and not translated, but just transferred to other languages⁶. However in this line it may have at least remains of its original meaning. It is derived from the word φοβος which in terms comes from φάος (φάφος) — ‘light of day, figuratively eyes’⁷. The Foebus is then the god of light and, possibly as well, to a much lesser extent, of the eyes. In the previous utterances of the characters the god has already been presented from two extreme perspectives: on one hand the point of view of his priest Chryses, for whom Apollo was the free shooter (ἐκρηβόλος — 21), the holder of the golden bow (ἀργυρότοξ’ — 37), the powerful ruler (Χρύσην ἀμφιβέβηκας Κίλλαν τε ζαθέην Τενέδοιό τε Ἴφι ἀνάσσεις), on the other in the slighting remark of Agamemnon, who not only calls Apollo a mere god, but does not even bother to call him openly, in *casus rectus* or the vocative, he rather prefers to use genitive (θεοῖο — 28) vaguely describing the staff and fillets of the priest. In the speech by Achilles the reader is presented with a balanced, neutral version with a use of the common phrase. The same name is given to Apollo by unbiased narrator in a line preceding the current speech⁸.

If Φοῖβος is to be treated as a name it holds its meaningful position as a stage between the threatening image created by Chryses, and almost non existent uttered by Agamemnon. It is rendered like that also on the metric level — the line is not a twelve-syllable spondaic menace (21), but neither is it a slighting generalisation given in three syllables — it is an Adonius, short colon, still much more than just foot and a half, a normal amount of respect given to the god by men.

The second interpretation of this specific use is that Achilles does not want to anger the god more than he already is, therefore he calls him the god of light, which even if not regarded as reverencing, has at least to be seen as neutral. In such a sense calling Apollo Foebus and not representing him in a disrespectful way is an *apotropaic* measure, though at least in some sense taken *post factum*. The god has already been angered. These two interpretations of the use of Φοῖβος are not an “all or nothing” opposition. They present a spectrum and the actual meaning resides somewhere within.

⁶ Both the English translation by W.T. Murray and the Polish by K. Jeżewska give the Φοῖβος in line 64 a given name respectively: Foebus, Fojbos. It is in compliance with the tradition. Homer: *Iliad*..., p. 17. Homer: *Iliada*. Trans. K. Jeżewska. Warszawa 1999, p. 26.

⁷ G. Autenrieth: *Homeric Dictionary*. Trans. R. Keep. London 1999, p. 323.

⁸ τοῦ δ’ ἔκλυε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων, p. 43.

ΤΕΛΕΪΩΝ

The remarks on the genitive plural τελείων have to follow, as the pragmatic context of the two adjective forms may be quite similar. Indeed due to this fact less emphasis will be put on it. The noun τέλος that the adjective form in question is derived from, means ‘end’, ‘sum’, ‘completion’, and when used about victims for offering — ‘perfect’, ‘unblemished’⁹. Either it was a custom that the goats and lambs had to be perfect, so that the ‘steam of their burning fat’, κνίση, pleased the gods, then the adjective is relatively free of meaning, or in the given moment Achaeans are to put special effort into the hecatomb. The importance of the phrase may be strengthened by its position in the verse: last word in the line is noticeable, and so it might underscore a certain quality of the offering to the god — the fact that these are not just any animals, but ones that are perfect in their kind.

A problem, which is not really important in the Greek original, comes up in translations, where sometimes only the goats are perfect and sometimes both victim species. There is only stylistic argument for any of these, as their syntactic structure and the use of particle τε does not rule out any of the interpretations, though equal treatment of both could be assumed¹⁰.

ΟΪΩ

Finally, there is the verb. In his *Homeric Dictionary* Georg Autenrieth defines: οἶω — “*suspicor*, to suppose, *opinor*, think, intend, mean”¹¹. The general usage, possibly due to its meaning and the narrative structure of the *Iliad*, is almost restricted to *oratio recta*. The phrases with οἶω outside the speeches by heroes are predominantly participial¹².

There is a general rule, that the verb in first person of the present active indicative is used in a rather emphatic position, in the last two syllables of the verse. This is possibly due to a metric fact that most often the *iota* is long, while *omikron* short. Moreover, as *verbum cogitandi* οἶω very often requires A.C.I. All these things are initially relevant, because they render the current use, as relatively typical.

There is also a syntactic emphasis of the verb. The whole speech of Achilles consists of two sentences. First one in lines 59—61 presents the situation at hand, in the camp, and the second 62—67, devises roughly the possible way out or, at

⁹ G. Autenrieth: *Homeric Dictionary*..., pp. 298—299.

¹⁰ So: C. Pharr: *Homeric Greek, a book for beginners*. Oklahoma 1955, p. 57.

¹¹ G. Autenrieth: *Homeric Dictionary*..., pp. 228—229

¹² Examples are given by G. Autenrieth — *ibidem*. These are: *Iliad*, Book XV, p. 728, *Odyssey*, Book XXII, p. 210.

least, the methods of learning the reason of sorrows brought upon the Achaeans. The verb in question is one of the two predicates of the main clauses. It makes it syntactically one of two most marked words in the speech.

For the purposes of this article intending mainly to cast some light on the initial questions it shall be enough to look at several key passages of the *Iliad*, as, in spite of this restriction, the work may still yield sufficient results. Let alone in Book I the verb is found nine times, of which all are in *oratio recta*. Twice it is not first person singular of the *indicativus activi* (78, 561 middle). One of the seven left is not used in the final position of the verb (558). However, of the six uses of the form in the final position, four are in Achilles' speeches. In Book I, in lines where it is not uttered by Achilles, the verb is regularly preceded by the infinitive *πείσεσθαι* — 'obedire', 'obey', first it is used by Agamemnon (289), then in reply to him Achilles himself copies it mockingly (296). For the third time it is Thetis who uses it, to assure her son, that Zeus will grant her wish (427).

The question arises, whether it is important that Achilles uses *οἶω* in the final position of the verb more often than the other characters¹³ and if so, what are the implications of it. The use of *οἶω*, not only in Achilles' words, but throughout the works of Homer requires a far more detailed study than any that could be presented here. Nevertheless, as it happens, this speech rouses an argument, which will finally provoke the *μῆνις* of Achilles. It is this sacred anger, that provides a good reason to examine the problem in some detail. The importance of this structure lies not in itself, but in the fact that it helps to picture one of the strategies with which Homer creates his heroes and the story.

The soft version of the hypothesis is this: *οἶω* is an important element of the creation of Achilles' way of speaking and it is as meaningful, if not more, also in the opening line of his first speech at the assembly. Apart from the line 59, Achilles uses it in verse closure three more times in Book I, and never differently. The analysis of these lines has to be done, rendering their most evident traits with regard to the verb looked at, before an attempt of understanding the current verse/speech can be made.

Book I, Line 170: οὐδέ σ' οἶω 170 / ἐνθάδ' ἄτιμος ἐὼν ἄφενος καὶ πλοῦτον ἀφύξειν.

'and I don't think, being without honor here, to pile up possessions and riches for you'¹⁴.

It is a sentence directed to Agamemnon. The indirect object σοί through elision becomes just one sibilant consonant — only a little more than a simple breath,

¹³ He uses it also in Book IX — in the scene of the embassy, in answers to Odysseus and to Ajax, as it is shown later in the article.

¹⁴ All the translations, unless stated otherwise, have been done by the author. These philological translations make it easier to illustrate processes in the text, which are often presented differently by translators for stylistic purposes.

showing how little reverence for the king is left in the open speech of the most important warrior.

The conjunction ἄφενος καὶ πλοῦτον could be treated as *hendiadys* used in order to amplify the image of exploit. At this stage Achilles refuses to stay and gives two reasons for that: lack of respect as the direct and problem with the prizes as the indirect one. It is his second speech directed towards Agamemnon, and both anger and irony are presented partly through a clever usage of οἶω, which not only joins two lines being thus marked syntactically, but also makes Agamemnon almost disappear between the thinking process of Achilles and the negation (οὐδέ σ' οἶω).

Book I, Line 204: τὸ δὲ καὶ τελέεσθαι οἶω: / ἧς ὑπεροπλήσι τάχ' ἂν ποτε θυμὸν ὀλέσση 205.

‘for this I think shall come to pass: because of his arrogant acts soon might he loose his life’.

This time the message, though about Agamemnon, is directed to Athena. The anger and strife are yet again clearly visible. This line is not even ironic, but rather openly sarcastic, much stronger, less sophisticated.

In the opening of line 205 Achilles calls the behaviour of Agamemnon ἧς ὑπεροπλήσι using the dative of cause. This noun is heavily burdened with information value, as it is a *hapaks legomenon*. The slightly problematic etymology is provided again by Autenrieth:¹⁵ either from πέλω — ‘be busy about’, ‘be in motion’, or from a noun ὄπλον — general meaning of ‘utensil’, ‘implement’¹⁶. It is the preposition ὑπέρ — ‘over’, ‘beyond’, that makes the word so meaningful. It is ‘over usage’, ‘over business’, too much of action and self-confidence on the side of Agamemnon that is so nerve-wracking for Achilles.

There are, of course, other important elements here: the futuristic use of the subjunctive¹⁷, the ellipsis of the subject of ὀλέσση, which in the whole speech does not appear in *casus rectus* (only in the genitive used with *hybris*¹⁸).

It is also the adverbial structure with elision in τάχ' and its relation with the following particle, that create the image of lack of time on the side of Agamemnon and pressurizes him even more. Yet the subjective, modalized οἶω may be making the abrupt phrase all the more striking.

Book I, Line 296: οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ' ἔτι σοὶ πείσεσθαι οἶω.

‘I don't think I will listen to you any longer’.

Again directed to Agamemnon, this time with an adverb ὑποβλήδην — ‘interrupting’. These are one of the last words uttered on the assembly. In this very

¹⁵ G. Autenrieth: *Homeric Dictionary*..., p. 313.

¹⁶ In context divided into *cordage*, on a ship, *weapons* in the battle or *tools* for construction. Ibidem, p. 234.

¹⁷ C. Pharr: *Homeric Greek*..., p. 303.

¹⁸ The same strategy was introduced by Agamemnon in line 28, to dishonour Apollo.

speech several line later Achilles threatens to kill Agamemnon should the latter wish to take away more than the girl (I, 300—304).

The sheer aggression of the phrase is built up partly on the use of the verb, as it is a direct repetition of Agamemnon's words from his previous locution about Achilles, describing him as of foul language, always willing to have fights: (I, 289): ἄ τιν' οὐ πείσεσθαι οἶω. — 'to which someone may not obey, I think'. In his comments to the line Pharr notes: "τιν' perhaps, refers to Agamemnon. If so, it is superlatively ironical and sarcastic. If it merely means 'many a one' as often, it still has a considerable amount of the ironical element"¹⁹. Repeating this very structure in the answer is even more marked, however modalized in the same direction, it is a statement of contemptuous disregard.

These remarks seem sufficient to observe the function of οἶω placed at the end of the verse. However, what might be even more telling, Achilles uses the verb also in Book IX, which recounts the embassy. In that book οἶω is used only these two times, both of which take in the final position of the verse. I will, therefore, proceed to analyze it briefly:

Book IX, Line 315:²⁰ οὐτ' ἐμέ γ' Ἀτρεΐδην Ἀγαμέμνονα πεισέμεν οἶω 315 / οὐτ' ἄλλους Δαναούς,

'Not me, I suppose, Atreus Agamemnon will persuade, nor will the other Danaans'.

It is pronounced in answer to Odysseus, who offers Achilles, in a verbatim repetition of his words, the goods of Agamemnon. The situation is no longer of an open argument, however the animosity towards the king prevails and is present in the words of Achilles.

The parallelic structures opening both verses with negative particles and two accusatives, being the two subjects of A.C.I. dependant from *verbum regens* οἶω which is under scrutiny here, may also be a representation of the anger.

It is the first statement of the refusal in Book IX, and the first formulation of it. Before making that point Achilles only explained, that he would try to express himself in the best possible way, not trying to keep something away from the emissaries (IX, 308—314).

Book IX, Line 655: ἀμφὶ δέ τοι τῇ ἐμῇ κλισίῃ καὶ νηὶ μελαίνῃ / Ἑκτορα καὶ μεμαῶτα μάχης στήσεσθαι οἶω.

'But around my hut and near the black ship, I think Hector will be stayed, though he be eager for battle'.

¹⁹ Ibidem, pp. 127—128.

²⁰ The verb form in this line has a different metric structure, with first two vowels contracting into a diphthong. However, both Autenrieth and Pharr present such version, as possible. This variation may be partly due to a difference of the whole structure. Here οἶω is preceded by a form of future active infinitive of πείθω: πεισέμεν.

The previous passage pictured the first refusal, the current phrase on the other hand presents Achilles' last word, the final 'no'. In it the verb *ὀίω* is the last word too. The threat of Hector, presented by the legates, is very ironically disregarded: 'I think, I will manage, thank you gentlemen'.

What Achilles underscores, through the use of personal adjective *ἐμῇ* (about hut, but possibly the ship as well, syntactically there is no argument against that), and also through the use of the verb *ὀίω*, is that at this stage of the affairs both Hector and Troy and the whole war are a problem of the rest of the Achaeans, mainly of Agamemnon, who wants him back so much, but not to him anymore. The fact that this kind of modalisation happens in a very emphatic position could have been expected by now — it seems that it is in the speeches by Achilles that it has most common and most striking use.

One more comment of Pharr could be added to line 296 of Book I: "*ὀίω* is ironical, as usual"²¹. His assurance of the fact may also prove, that there is such usage of the word in the *Iliad*. There is, however, an impression that in line 59 the situation is slightly different²². At that point no argument between the two main Achaeans is yet visible. In his analysis of the Book I of the *Iliad* Kumaniecki notes, that on the tenth day of the plague Achilles asks Calchas for the reasons of the plague. Kumaniecki then says that Agamemnon gets angry, but soon decides to give the Chryseis back to her father. It is only later after Agamemnon asks for some other *γέρας*, that the quarrel between the two gradually grows into an open strife²³.

From the above analyses we learn, that each time Achilles uses *ὀίω*, it creates an ironic or even sarcastic impression, and it is consistently used, in some way or another, against Agamemnon.

The Linear Analysis of the Speech Part I

The opening word of line 59 is a vocative *Ἀτρεΐδῃ*. What is more, his name and the verb take the extreme positions in the verse. Two more structures are found here: there is the deixis of time: *νῦν*, and the A.C.I. accusative, which consists of the first person plural personal pronoun *ἄμμε* and *participium coniunctum* *παλιμπαγχθέντας*, which in terms of flexion is the participle of aorist passive, and means: 'having been driven back in disgrace'. It has to be pointed out that the

²¹ C. Pharr: *Homeric Greek*..., p. 129.

²² Both the Polish translation by K. Jeżewska and English by A.T. Murray do not leave any doubts as to the sincerity of Achilles' speech.

²³ K. Kumaniecki, J. Mańkowski: *Homer*. Warszawa 1974, pp. 79—80.

formation of this word includes a prefix πάλιν — ‘back’, ‘back again’ and the verb πλάζω — ‘drive away’²⁴.

The second line finishes the A.C.I., but starts with ἄψ — the alternative form of the preposition ἀπό ‘back’. It immediately reverberates in the prefix of ἀπονοστήσειν — ‘return (back) home’. It is yet another verb with a prefix meaning ‘back’, which already has that meaning in itself, without any additions. It is, then, clear that, before the sentence is completed, the direction of the possible retreat of the Achaeans is stated five times: twice in the prefixes, twice in the verb stems and once in a preposition in the opening syllable of line two.

There is one more meaningful opposition in the first two lines of the speech. It is very often in Homeric verse, that compound verbs undergo *tnesis*. It so happens also in the last line of current speech, where ἀπό indeed is separated by λοιγὸν from ἀμῦναι. Here, however, there is nothing to separate the verbs from their prepositions. Two semantic elements in the first line and three, filling the whole first hemistich, in the second, all convey one thought.

Such a beginning seems to be fully open to claims of irony or even sarcasm. The information about the direction is given so many times, so monotonously, and in an annoyingly non open, but utterly obvious way, that it is evidently redundant.

The strategy of Achilles may be yet again more delicate and complex. It is so, because the beginning of his speech may also illustrate the situation in the camp. The plague is raging, the bodies are being burned; αἰεὶ δὲ πυραὶ νεκύων καίοντο θαμειαί — “and forever the pyres of dead bodies were burned” (I, 52), one can hear it whispered everywhere: “Back, back, back”. The situation is very tense, especially because such whispers are not what is supposed to be heard on the attackers’ side. Achilles, as the mightiest of warriors, may be creating some sort of an ironic distance between the panic in the camp and himself, and doing it partly with a precise use of ὄϊω.

On the other hand it is the son of Atreus who is responsible for the whole attack and who may be starting to feel the burden of that responsibility weigh heavily upon his chest. Therefore such a declaration on the side of Achilles, his mightiest warrior as claimed, is brought forward definitely contrary to the will of the king of the people.

Now we proceed to look at two important clauses. First: εἴ κεν θάνατόν γε φύγοιμεν — “if we should escape death”, and the second: εἰ δὴ ὁμοῦ πόλεμος τε δαμᾷ καὶ λοιμὸς Ἀχαιοῦς — “if indeed (seeing that) the war and plague are to subdue the Achaeans”. Pharr²⁵ notices the difference in forms, from aorist optative φύγοιμεν to future indicative: δαμᾷ (*δαμασει) and concludes that Achilles implies that it is more probable that they will die than escape.

²⁴ G. Autenrieth: *Homeric Dictionary...*, p. 245.

²⁵ C. Pharr: *Homeric Greek...*, p. 64.

The first conditional may be *modus potentialis*, of an unclear connection with the condition. In Homeric Greek it may also be *irrealis*²⁶. The second case is thus described by Autenrieth: “in conditional clause εἰ δὴ, if *now*, if *really*, if *at all events*, expressing a supposition which cannot be contradicted”²⁷. However the assertion of the main sentence is weakened by the fact, that it is formulated as A.C.I. with a problematic reporting verb.

Though the interpretations of Pharr and the outline given by Kumaniecki seem perfectly plausible, it is, nevertheless, possible to read the passage differently. First of all Achilles uses Ἀχαιοὺς in the final position of line 3. This sentence, being a strong assertion, can still be uttered ironically. Irony, the communicative strategy based on the difference between the actual locution and the real opinion of the speaker, between his or her internal world and the words he/she chooses to use²⁸, is often pertaining to strong assertions. There are, as it has been shown so far, language grounds to look for irony here. It would then mean, that Achilles continues to withdraw from the general opinion, only stating it. It may be significant, that he uses Achaeans as the object of δαμάσσω, this way separating himself from the rest. *Maybe we will then escape death, as it's sure now that the war and plague will destroy Achaeans*. It gives a notion of an account of the things whispered around the camp. The questions remains, to what extent he agrees with them, and to what extent we are able to trace it.

The most obvious assumption is that Achilles is a speaker of the crowd's will. He uses the plural accusative of ἐγώ — ‘us’, he suggests coming back home, and gives two very good reasons for that, the war and the pestilence.

After three lines of a sentence presenting negative aspects of the situation, however, there comes a breakthrough. The second sentence (62—67) starts with a very energetic exclamation: ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ — ‘quick! Come!’ The next phrase is τίνα μάντιν — ‘some prophet, seer, expounder of omens which were drawn from flights of birds, from dreams, and from sacrifices’²⁹. It is used in the accusative as an object of the verb which it is followed by, namely a hortative use of the subjunctive first person plural: ἐπέομεν — ‘let us ask’. There are two more accusative forms which are objects in this sentence and to them the word τίνα — ‘some’ may apply as well — thus making the sentence even less concrete.

The final position of the verse is taken by another profession connected with the supernatural, ‘a priest’ — ἱερεῖα. This word has already been used in the poem. In line 23 all the other Achaeans (as far as we know all except Agamemnon) agree to reverence Chryses, the priest of Apollo. The accusative ἱερεῖα is the word presented in the indirect speech reporting how they reacted to his plea. There, it was

²⁶ M. Golias, M. Auerbach: *Gramatyka grecka*. Warszawa 1962, p. 209.

²⁷ G. Autenrieth: *Homeric Dictionary...*, p. 83.

²⁸ M. Pytasz, R. Cudak: *Szkolny słownik wiedzy o literaturze*. Katowice 2000, pp. 154—156.

²⁹ G. Autenrieth: *Homeric Dictionary...*, p. 200.

the final word before *caesura*. Here it is the final word before the verse closure. The hypothesis worth presenting at this point is, as it has been in line one of this speech as well, that in the words of Achilles the quiet talks from the Achean camp can be heard. It is another one of them, as he must have heard soldiers say it, possibly even a lot. It is also imaginable that the Achaeans remember the way that Agamemnon, against their will, turned the priest away, and that Achilles could now be making the best of it.

The fifth line continues to present the traces of possible explanations of the plague, through the professions which deal with certain aspects of divine causation. Again it is an accusative depending from ἐπέιμεν — ‘let us ask’; ὀνειροπόλον — ‘some dream interpreter’. This completes the list of possible functions of people, whose knowledge may be useful in helping the Achaeans appease whoever it is who is raging against them. There are three groups of people to choose from, indeed a kingly variety.

The first possibility is some μάντις, which is a general word for any sort of divine power ‘interpreter and helper’. Then comes the word of alternative ἢ — ‘or’, and in the opening two syllables of line 5 it is strengthened to ‘or even’ — ἢ καί. The range presented varies from ‘any’, as shown by the indefinite pronoun τινα (τίς), ‘kind of seer’, ‘priest’ or even ‘dream interpreter’. Achilles adds a specific argument for the latter, as it possibly is the least worth mentioning in this context, and thus requires supports. ‘Because even the dream comes from Zeus’ — καὶ γάρ τ’ ὄναρ ἐκ Διός ἐστιν.

The enumeration is not clear altogether, as it could be argued, that the level of seer, and priest is somewhat different to the one of the dream-interpreter, he being a specific professional, while the other two still requiring to be specified: what kind of seer, a priest to whom, etc.

Achronological Intrusion

For the reasons of integrity of the article, and in order not to repeat large parts of the material afterwards, it is necessary at this point to, leaving all the things said, stray away from the strict linear and chronological order of the analysis to look at phrases not coming from the speech of Achilles and, because there are many of them, to discuss them in less detail. The things considered seem important in rendering the speech of Achilles in full context, this way adding meanings and shades to the interpretation of his speech.

Firstly, Calchas starts his answer to the current speech of Achilles (lines 74—83) by using A.C.I.: ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ κέλεαί με μυθήσασθαι — ‘O Achilles, you command me to speak’. The verb κέλομαι requires A.C.I. which in terms requires

a subject³⁰. However it did not have to be used. Indeed, between the two speeches there is a description of Calchas and his powers, which pictures him as the best of the prophets who tell the future on the basis of bird's flights — he is supposed to know everything. However, Achilles does not ask him directly! Why not? Why build the long enumeration, list of the whole groups of people, who could help, if there is a ready answer at hand?

There is an interpretational option, slowly building up through the article, that Achilles, since the beginning of his first speech, has consciously been attacking Agamemnon. The long phrase given as possible list of alternatives would not then, really present any alternatives. *Everybody knows*, that it is Calchas, a person with the closest connections with Apollo among the Achaeans, who has to talk. The additional fact supporting that thesis, namely that when Achilles finishes and sits down, Calchas stands up:

ἦτοι ὃ γ' ὥς εἰπὼν κατ' ἄρ' ἔξετο: τοῖσι δ' ἀνέστη 68
Κάλχας Θεστορίδης οἰωνοπόλων ὄχ' ἄριστος 69

can be interpreted in terms of rigid Homeric style, but it can also be explained in terms of his mastery in describing human reactions. “We all know who you speak against Achilles” — may be the outline. Calchas goes on to say, that he knows, the things he is about to declare may anger:

[...] ἄνδρα χολωσέμεν, ὃς μέγα πάντων 78
Ἀργείων κρατέει καὶ οἱ πείθονται Ἀχαιοί: 79

[...] a man who mightily rules over all the Argives, and who the Achaeans obey.

He does not give the name. It is understood, partly because in the first collective of the Greeks, he uses a noun, which, though commonly used to signify the Greek warriors at Troy, originally meant inhabitants of Ἄργος — the city of Atreus and his sons. Than he adds one more word: βασιλεύς — ‘king’, and makes the whole thing known, as there probably was not a single soldier in the camp unable to connect the images. However it is Achilles who overtly gives the name. The moment when he does comes finally in line 90: οὐδ' ἦν Ἀγαμέμνονα εἶπης. The phrase will be looked at soon enough indeed.

It is worth remembering that a very important question has not been answered yet: Why should Achilles be ironic? What is the motive of his using the ironic verb *οἶω* and the far too strong, possibly even sarcastic statements? Why present two lines of different divine professions, if in the end it is the bird flights interpreter

³⁰ M. Golias, M. Auerbach: *Gramatyka grecka...*, p. 196.

to answer? The situation in the camp is grim. It is no time to be joking around, no time for being sarcastic. According to the full blown version of my hypothesis the deeper reason of Achilles' actions is made public in this passage:

οὐδ' ἦν Ἀγαμέμνονα εἵπης, 90
ὃς νῦν πολλὸν ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν εὔχεται εἶναι

Even if you name Agamemnon, who has been lately boasting that he is the best of the Achaeans.

The real reason, therefore, may most probably be ambition. It is Achilles who calls himself ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν (I, 244). He does not want to be contradicted in this filed. It is a matter of life and death for him. Or, in fact, a matter of death and death.

It is only after this statement, that Calchas presents his explanation. Achilles needs authority to attack Agamemnon and it is the authority of the god that through the words of Calchas is granted. The key point being made here is that the animosity between Agamemnon and Achilles does not start with the problem of γέρας and Bryseis. Achilles, while attacking Agamemnon (in lines 91, 122, 160, 167, 226—229), gives his own description of Agamemnon's behaviour and character observed before the quarrel: the king is boastful (91), greedy (122), he does not appreciate the help of others (160), he gets the best gifts (167) and he is cowardly (226—229). Moreover, the answers of Agamemnon come in lines 177, 287—288, 291, that is much later in the text, and consist mainly of observations which in the context given may be regarded as reasonable: that Achilles always wants to quarrel, and fight (177), that he wants to govern everybody (287—288), and also, also very true here, that he uses a disrespectful, foul language (291). Is it then Achilles who is looking for a quarrel with Agamemnon and not the other way round?

Such observation would render two important facts on the level of the whole epos in a slightly different light. Firstly 'the wrath' — μῆνις the opening idea, and the main subject of the epos. It has to be so strong, and for that reason it should have solid psychological grounds. And so it does. The undoubtedly slighting behaviour of Agamemnon is twice more painful for Achilles, as coming from someone so disregarded. Secondly, the fact, that Agamemnon, who really until the moment of strife did not have much against Achilles, is first to stop the rage also seems credible. There are of course more aspects of it, and more details to be given. This is just an outline.

Now there are three important points about this interpretation that have to be added here to render it credible within the world of Homer's epos: the relevance of the proem and the beginning, the mirror story, and the use of ὀίω, which will round this part up, before we come back, to finish reading the first speech by Achilles.

Proem and the Beginning

James Redfield³¹ describes the poetry of Homer minutely analysing the proem of the *Iliad*. Apart from other important contributions, he describes the difference between the μῆνις, the godlike wrath of Achilles, similar to the wrath of gods themselves about which the same noun is used, the χόλος name it is given often by Achilles, and others, as if the other one was too sacred to be mentioned, and the ἔρις, which is a petty, down to earth anger³². Redfield claims that, while μῆνις in the first line is the statement of the general idea of the poem, the ἐρίσαντε aorist active participle in line 7 is a turn toward the story.

While considering the very beginning of the epos it is important to note, that at the beginning the arrangement of scenes (8—12) in the *Iliad* is set backwards, with Chryses coming to the camp of the Achaeans as the pivotal scene³³. The same rule may be applied to “the anger words”. It is, of course μῆνις (1) that appears first, then two times it is ἔρις (in participle 6 and noun 8 forms), while chronologically it should have been the down to earth anger, that preceded the divine wrath.

In the context of this interpretational hypothesis it is necessary, however, to concentrate on line 8: τίς τ’ ἄρ σφωε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι; — ‘who of the gods brought these two to fight in strife?’ With regard to what has been proposed, it should be assumed that a simple understanding of the line, that it was one of the gods (Apollo) who made the two warriors angry with each other, is to be set aside for a moment, as there is yet another possibility. The dative ἔριδι — ‘in strife’ does not have to be taken with the infinitive μάχεσθαι. If it is connected with a word closer to it in the verse: σφωε, the accusative dual of third person pronoun, we get the two in strife before any divine causation. Of course the action of the god is inevitable and will happen, however the god is only responsible for transforming the ἔρις into the μῆνις by making them fight for the girl. Had it not been for Apollo and his priest, Achilles would not like Agamemnon, but nothing would probably have happened. Line 8 of Book I, the very beginning of *Iliad*, may thus agree with the ironic, negative use of οἶω in verse 59.

³¹ J. Redfield: “The Proem of the *Iliad*...”, p. 456—477.

³² Ibidem, p. 459—460.

³³ I. De Jong: “*Iliad* 366—39: A Mirror Story”. In: *Oxford Readings in Homer’s Iliad*. Ed. D.L. Cairns. Oxford 2001, p. 489.

Mirror Story

The second problem is connected with an article of Irene de Jong³⁴ where she points out certain qualities of the Achilles' account of what happened in the assembly and shortly before it, when he retells it to his mother Thetis. Not only does he remember the events which are described in the beginning of the poem, but also he has a specific, individualized picture of them. Chryses, for instance, goes away not afraid, as it was described by the narrator, but angered³⁵.

De Jong writes:

A second more complex example concerns Achilles' ordering and selection of events. The emotional climax of his story lies, of course, in his quarrel with Agamemnon. Surprisingly enough he describes it in only two and a half verses (236—238), whereas the narrator devoted 250 verses to it! On reflection, this brevity on Achilles' part is very effective: with a few well chosen-words he contrasts his own sane advice (386: θεὸν ἰλάσκεσθαι) with Agamemnon's anger (387: *cholos*). To underline the contrast between the two reactions Achilles also places them in a chronological relation to each other [...], thereby suggesting that Agamemnon opposed his (Achilles') sane counsel of placating the god. In reality, the course of events was slightly different: Achilles' proposal to placate the god was made before, not after Calchas' speech (59—76). It also was not Achilles but Agamemnon who first reacted to the words of the seer, which is only logical, given his direct involvement in the whole matter³⁶.

The way that Achilles structures his story does not rule out the possibility that he was angry with Agamemnon before the strife. On the other hand, it most surely pictures him as a person capable of strong irony, as the things he says in the given passage and his way of presenting them is very different from the factual and it is with the very same methods one modalises an assertion to make it sound ironic.

Some Final Remarks on οἶω

The way it was used has been presented. The verb form used in the first line of first speech by Achilles started the whole analysis of motivation of the hero.

³⁴ Ibidem.

³⁵ Ibidem, p. 493—494.

³⁶ Ibidem, p. 491—492.

There is however one more important *addendum* here. When Achilles lets go of his anger towards Agamemnon, he also lets go of the use of *οἶω*. Neither in the scene with Priam in Book XXIV, nor in the *Nekyia*, in Book XI of the *Odyssey* does he modalise his speech in that way.

The verb *οἶω*, therefore, in the language of Achilles, could be interpreted as the stylistic method of showing the anger, both in a suppressed — ironic and free flowing form. The use of this word makes it possible to create a hypothesis which deepens the psychological background of the characters, may render them less materialistic (it is through hurt ambition more than Bryseis, and she is just an addition to the insult, that the action of the epos really opens), still fitting their own, rather than our world, as the ambition factor in the poems of Homer is influential.

This way *οἶω* could be used to show one more thing, which is not often mentioned with regard to the *Iliad*, or rather the lack which *is* — the psychological development. In case of Achilles it may not only be observed at the level of behaviour, but also at the level of his speech — one of Homeric tools to individualise characters.

The Linear Analysis of the Speech Part II — Conclusion

Line 6 presents the reason for asking the specialist. As Achilles mentions Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων Pharr notes, that he might have supposed the plague to be his work, as Apollo was the god of health and disease³⁷. It is important, however, that similar messages could have been shared around the camp. The actuality of the situation is emphasized even more, as another deictic word is applied here: τόσσον. It may be relatively free of meaning, “this much”. However, as Pharr noted on some other occasion, there might be even a gesture presented here.

Surprising as it may be, it is the first time in the speeches of the characters that Apollo is a subject of the verb: ἐχώσατο — ‘He got angry’. The anger constantly comes back as the main reason of the whole *epos*, so it does appear again.

Line 7 of Achilles’ speech will return sounding almost the same in the second answer of Calchas. It is a second use of alternative, this time presented by a different particle: εἴτ’ ἄρ’ ὃ γ’ εὐχολῆς ἐπιμέμφεται εἴθ’ ἐκατόμβης. The verb used here means ‘find fault, be angry about’ and requires genitive form of the cause³⁸. Both εὐχολή — ‘a prayer’ and ἐκατόμβη are not causes. It is the lack of them that would be. Their status can be seen from the point of view of the word order. The line is

³⁷ C. Pharr: *Homeric Greek*..., p. 66.

³⁸ G. Autenrieth: *Homeric Dictionary*..., p. 121—122.

symmetrical, both genitives are used in the breaking points, the first being *caesura*, the second — verse closure. Both are also preceded by εἴτ'. The symmetry is even more evident because the verb comes directly between them. As opposed to presenting different professions, where the structure of importance was complex and difficult to ascertain, here these two possibilities seem to be equal.

The interpretation in compliance with the “ironic Achilles” scenario, would say, that he intends to present these forms as identical, because they are most probable here and as such are known to everybody around, and have little or no meaning. Thus the things unsaid could gain relevance. Namely the fault of Agamemnon.

The positive condition is presented by a futuric subjunctive with κέν, which opens last line of the speech, βούλεται. It is the previous verse (66) that introduces it as another conditional clause in this speech. It is the fifth conditional clause in this speech, but there is also a triple choice list. The gradation of conditions, pertaining to which Pharr's comments have been presented here, is difficult to be continued, because there is no good method to differentiate between the use of *indicativus futuri* and the subjunctive used futurically³⁹. However the line brings element exterior to the predicate itself, which may be both just an informational futility, and yet quite meaningful phrase in its context. It is the enclitic πώς used to weaken the assertion of the subjunctive, ‘maybe’, ‘possibly’. Even this slight chance, seems at this point less probable than the final destruction.

The last line finishes the speech in a similar manner to that in which it was started: with a plural of ἐγώ. This time the dative ἡμῖν. The *participium coniunctum* ἀντιάσας explains the form of κνίσης (acc.) from the line above, already analysed with regard to τελείων. The final three words of the locution are very important: ἀπὸ λοιγὸν ἀμῦναι — ‘to ward off the death’. Death is the key motive of Achilles as the main character of the *Iliad*. The traces of his tragic decision, the choice of short, but glorious life, can be heard as early as in the final position of the first speech. This phrase also presents the key aspect for all the Achaeans gathered at the assembly.

The general uncertainty of the speech can also be shown by presenting together the alternatives and conjunctions. There is a rather weak conjunction joined by a lonely particle τε the goats and the sheep. The only real conjunction, even strengthened by the use of an adverb ὁμοῦ — ‘together’ and the use of τε καί structure is πόλεμός [...] καὶ λοιμός — ‘war and pestilence’. It is, then: ‘war and pestilence against the sheep and goats?’ — Achilles could be saying here.

There is yet another global interpretation of the first speech of Achilles, and, as it has been proved before, it does not rule out the previous interpretation completely, but renders it in a slightly different light. The key factors here would be the uncertainty and the use of plural. It would render Achilles as an almost frank

³⁹ It is even apparent, that in Homeric language the subjunctive can stand in the futuric sense in the main clause. Thus: M. Goliás, M. Auerbach: *Gramatyka grecka...*, p. 210.

giver of the thought of the soldiers from the camp: *Vox populi*. He starts with plural accusative and ends with plural dative. One of the two predicates of main clauses is the first person plural, hortative. The uncertainty and feeling of defeat is also visible in the amount of semantic elements directing retreat of first and a half lines, the probability gradation of conditional sentences.

This analysis of first locution of Achilles gives a real insight into how complex and credible, in their tangled mental hierarchies, the Homeric characters really are. Everything is a hypothesis, sometimes even a whole structure of them. The only sure things remain: πόλεμος and λοιμός.

The Rhetoric of Simon's Adversary (Lysias 3)

Abstract: Negation and trivialization — these two chief objectives of the defense in Lys. 3, and, in fact, chief objectives of any defense whatsoever, are achieved in the speech firstly and foremostly through contrasting *ethopoiai*. The speaker rebuts the claims of the plaintiff, arguing from probability, that unlike his adversary, he is not mad, and only a madman would be capable of doing the deeds he is being accused of. The speaker trivializes the incident under trial as unworthy of prosecution, unless of course, the prosecutor is a sycophant — like Simon. Underlying these is yet another tendency, conveyed through Simon's hubristic *ethopoia*. This tendency is voiced out in a theoretical treatise on composing successful speeches, claiming the authorship of Aristotle himself. Its argument is: "[...] it seems to me that it comes close to no injustice at all, whenever one is subject to the mistreatment by which he himself abused others, as for example, if someone batters (αἰκίσαιτο) one who is accustomed to assault others with *hybris* (ὕβρις)" (*Rhet.* 1373a). Whatever befell Simon, he certainly had it coming.

Key words: Greek literature, rhetoric, Lysias

The third speech preserved in the Corpus Lysiacum (henceforth Lys. 3) enjoys deserved interest the students of Greek rhetoric and history, and that not only because of the unique insights it offers into the some aspects of everyday life in ancient Athens, including those not always taught about in grade schools, but also because of the air of the sensational surrounding the events under trial: there is an almost clandestine love affair, fierce erotic rivalry, abduction, violence fuelled by wine and above all there are the characters, even if somewhat too one-sided for the modern taste, vivid and captivating nonetheless.

The case under trial is legally defined as *trauma ek pronoias*, literally signifying "intentional wounding", though, as some have argued on the very basis of Lys. 3 (3.28, 41), embracing the meaning of "wounding with intent to kill". The

latter interpretation is sometimes doubted, considered rather a biased interpretation of a defendant attempting to escape this charge¹, there is no doubt however that an accusation of a *trauma ek pronoias*, just like other homicide cases, fell within the jurisdiction of the Areopagus, followed similar procedures² and was generally classified among the *phonikoi nomoi*³. Despite the procedural similarity, there are reasons to believe that cases of *trauma ek pronoias* were, unlike homicides, open to both private (δίκη τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας) and public (γραφὴ τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας) prosecution, with the former available only to the victim, and the latter to ‘any Athenian who wishes so and has the right to it’ (ὁ βουλόμενος Ἀθηναίων οἷς ἔξεστιν). Attempts have been made to represent Lys. 3 as belonging to either one, though without decisive results⁴. The speech was written for an unnamed defendant⁵, accused of *trauma ek pronoias* by an otherwise obscure Simon. Whatever the procedural status of the case (were it a *graphe*, any Athenian citizen would be entitled to prosecute), it is the victim himself, i.e. Simon, who brings in the case before the court.

There is a basic pattern underlying all conflicts mediated by a third party, be it arbitration among the transhumant pastoralists of the Greek-Albanian frontier, or the Nomads of Cyrenaica on the one hand, and complex judicial litigation in modern nation-states on the other. In terms of ethnology this pattern is most clearly articulated by Black-Michaud on the example of Cyrenaican Bedouins⁶:

If the creditors [i.e. the injured party] think it to their advantage to seek composition rather than revenge, they will attempt by all every means in their

¹ Thus D.M. MacDowell: *The Law in Classical Athens*. London 1978: 123f; contra M.H. Hansen: “The Prosecution of Homicide in Athens: A. Reply”. *GRBS* 1981, Vol. 22 (1), p. 15; C. Carey: *Lysias. Selected Speeches w. Introduction and Commentary*. Cambridge 1989, p. 109 (ad. 3.42); S.C. Todd: *The Shape of Athenian Law*. Oxford 1993, pp. 105, 272.

² Cf. C. Carey: *Lysias...*, p. 92f (ad 3.1); S.C. Todd: *Lysias. Speeches I—II w. Introduction and Commentary*. Oxford 2007, p. 281f; quite certainly among these were solemn oaths (δωμοσία), mentioned in Lys. 3.1, sworn by both litigating parties at the beginning of the hearing-in-chief (for a detailed discussion see M.D. MacDowell: *Athenian Homicide Law*. Manchester 1963, pp. 90—100), cf. also M.D. MacDowell: *The Law...*, p. 119; S.C. Todd: *The Shape...*, p. 273; E. Carawan: *Rhetoric and the Law of Draco*. Oxford 1998, pp. 138—147), and regulations against irrelevance alluded to in 3.45f (cf. M.D. MacDowell: *Athenian Homicide...*, p. 43f).

³ Cf. M.D. MacDowell: *Athenian Homicide...*; M.H. Hansen: *The Prosecution...*, p. 14f; S.C. Todd: *Lysias...*, p. 281ff.

⁴ C. Carey: *Lysias...*, p. 109 — γραφή; S.C. Todd: *Lysias...*, p. 284 — δίκη (‘tentatively’); Idem: *The Skape...*, p. 269 (γραφὴ — ‘generally’).

⁵ Cf. S.C. Todd: *Lysias...*, p. 276; C. Carey: *Lysias...*, p. 86.

⁶ J. Black-Michaud: *Cohesive Force*. London 1975, p. 101. Cf. the strategies meant ‘to manipulate the moral context’ in one’s favour in arbitrated disputes among XIX-century Montenegrins (C. Boehm: *Blood Revenge*. Philadelphia 1987, p. 131).

power to pressure the mediator into awarding them the maximum compensation, whilst the killer's group will resist and, by skilful manipulation of the mediator, try to make minimal concessions in conditions least prejudicial to their prestige.

In a case tried before a court the offender becomes, of course, the defendant, and the strategies of "skilful manipulation" available to him in order to make "minimal concessions" are threefold: downright negation, justification or trivialization. To put it more bluntly, if you can't get out of it, either prove that you have done the right thing, or do your best to make it look like an insignificant trifle, unduly inflated by the adversary, and unworthy of the court's attention. Lys. 3 is a defense-argument ingeniously woven out of all these three patterns. There is blatant trivialization of the incident under trial; there is also denial, and finally there is a distinct, though, understandably, less explicit attempt at justification. It should be noted in the first place that the Athenian law-courts were a *locus* convenient for such manipulations. The speakers generally were not constrained by requirements of truthfulness⁷, and with the exception of particular cases — of which, incidentally, Lys. 3 is an example (see n. 2) — neither they nor their witnesses swore any kind of oath on a regular basis, and even when they did, perjury had no legal consequences whatsoever. False testimonies, accusations, not to mention abusive and frequently irrelevant slander⁸, were therefore constant features of everyday court-reality, and to an extent unthinkable in modern legal practice.

To lie however, is one thing; to lie persuasively — something quite different. We do not know (and probably never will), how much of what the speaker of Lys. 3 claims is true; we can however assess, to a limited degree, how persuasive his arguments might have been. This, of course, requires more than our purely personal appreciation of their credibility. The speaker's argumentation should be appraised in the light of its proper context, its "background", which in this case is the Athenian legal and ethical discourse, the discourse of which Lys. 3 otherwise forms part itself.

Let us begin by hearing it for Simon, whose arguments, unfortunately, are preserved only in his opponent's speech, and hence fragmentary, and above all most likely distorted. In the prehistory of the case Simon has arranged a sexual contract

⁷ A witness bringing in false testimony could have been subsequently sued by the opposing litigant through a *δίκη ψευδομαρτυριών*, the penalties here are not known; cf. A.R.W. Harrison: *The Law of Athens*. Vol. 2. London 1998, pp. 192—197ff; M.D. MacDowell: *The Law...*, p. 244; M. Christ: *The Litigious Athenian*. Baltimore 1998, p. 30f.

⁸ Slandorous accusations — at least in some specific cases (e.g. accusation of parricide) — could have been prosecuted through a *δίκη κακηγορίας* cf. M.D. MacDowell: *The Law...*, pp. 126—129; S.C. Todd: *The Shape...*, p. 103; M. Christ: *The Litigious Athenian...*, p. 39f; on slander (*diabole*) in the rhetoric of forensic oratory see C. Carey: "Rhetorical Means of Persuasion". In: *Persuasion, Greek Rhetoric in Action*. Ed. J. Worthington. London 1994, p. 31f.

with a Plataean boy by the name Theodotus⁹, to whom he gave 300 drachmas for his favours. The speaker then enters into the story, seducing Theodotus and causing him to abandon Simon. After some time the speaker and Theodotus quite unexpectedly pay Simon a “visit”, upon which the very incident under trial took place (3.29):

He says that we came to his house carrying pottery, and that I threatened to kill him — and that this constitutes “premeditation”¹⁰.

The ‘pottery’ (ὄστρακον) allegedly carried by the speaker is, of course, the weapon with which he was to threaten his — alleged — victim. An incriminating detail, and quite probably a pivotal element of the subsequent charge — *trauma ek pro-noias* — itself¹¹.

Negation

The speaker’s version of events is, understandably, quite different. Having suffered harassments by the jealous Simon — who lost Theodotus’ favours not due to the speaker’s scheming, but due to his harsh and hubristic treatment of the boy — the speaker, accompanied by his young lover, decides to quit the country for some time. Upon his return he installed Theodotus at the house of his friend, Lysimachus, who lived near Simon’s place (3.11). The boy’s presence did not go unnoticed, and Simon along with some companions arranged to abduct him. As he and Theodotus were leaving Lysimachus’ house, Simon with his friends rushed at them, and attempted to seize the boy (3.12). Theodotus managed to escape, leaving

⁹ Theodotus’ social status has been subject to controversy; in 3.33 we are told of the possibility of extracting depositions from him under torture (μηνῦσαι δὲ ἱκανὸν ἦν βασανιζόμενον), which strongly suggests that he was a slave; on the other hand we hear nothing of Theodotus’ master, whose intervention one would naturally expect in the course of the affairs recounted; the majority view (accepted by C. Carey: *Lysias...*, p. 87) balances nonetheless towards the slave-hypothesis, some however find it more plausible to view Theodotus as a free non-citizen (including S.C. Todd: *Lysias...*, p. 281, where (279ff) an overview of the discussion so far is given).

¹⁰ Translation by S.C. Todd in: Idem: *Lysias. Speeches I–II w. Introduction, Translation and Commentary*. Oxford 2007. Unless indicated otherwise, all translations of Lysias are taken from this edition.

¹¹ A tentative and brief reconstruction of Simon’s case is presented by C. Carey: *Lysias...*, p. 90f: upon being denied the favours of Theodotus, for which he paid 300 drachmas, Simon ‘repeatedly demanded that the boy repay the money or return to him’, to which the speaker responded in paying Simon a visit and warning him ‘to keep away’ — apparently in a manner not quite friendly nor polite.

his cloak in the hands of his would-be kidnappers, and sought refuge in the fuller's shop owned by a Molon (3.15). In the meantime the speaker (3.13), believing that the boy managed to escape, 'walked away' (ᾠχόμεν ἀπιών). The attackers however did not give up their pursuit: they barged into Molon's place and dragged out Theodotus screaming and calling for witnesses (3.16). Trying to help the boy, Molon, the unfortunate fuller, also received his share of the beating, as did some other concerned bystanders (3.17). As Simon and his consorts lead the unwilling youngster home, they run again into the speaker, who attempts to pull their victim away, and demands explanation. Quite predictably, he is attacked: 'a brawl' (μάχη, θόρυβος) ensues in which both sides get their heads cracked (3.18).

As for the incident under trial, the *diegesis* makes it clear that: 1) the *trauma ek pronoias* described by Simon in his accusation never took place; 2) both the speaker and Simon were slightly injured in a brawl initiated by the latter; this contention is supported in a sequence of "proofs" (21—45), aimed at discrediting the case itself along with the credibility of plaintiff/prosecutor on the one hand, and specifically at rebutting the charge of *pronoia* along with.

The *pistis* aimed at rebutting the charges of *pronoia* is a simple argument from probability¹². It is highly unlikely that the speaker, accompanied only by Theodotus, would arrive with the intention of killing (or at least threatening to do so) at the house of Simon, where his would-be victim entertained a large group of men¹³, who would be more than eager to give the intruder a severe and humiliating beating (29). It might be conceivable that the speaker indeed attempted such a reckless attack, acting out of passion, on the condition that the young Theodotus were entertained at that time by Simon. The very fact that the boy was keeping his, not Simon's, company however, strips the latter's accusations of any *logos* (31). In doing what he is being accused of the speaker would not be right in the head; such behaviour would be a symptom of *mania* (29) and *amathia* (34) on his part.

Trivialization

Thus the speaker attempts to prove that the event described by Simon never took place. At the same time however he is far from denying the fight altogether, nor is he disclaiming any responsibility whatsoever for hurting Simon. The circumstances of this wounding, however, present the whole incident in a very differ-

¹² On *pisteis* derived from character see in general C. Carey: "Rhetorical Means...", pp. 34—43 (with 40f on Lysias' mastery in characterization).

¹³ C. Carey: (*Lysias*..., p. 106, ad loc.) rightly observes that "Simon could reply to this that the speaker did not know this in advance".

ent light. There was indeed a street brawl, initiated by Simon and his companions, in which both sides got their heads knocked a little. The relevant passage deserves full quotation:

μάχης δὲ γενομένης, ὦ βουλή, καὶ τοῦ μαιρακίου βάλλοντος αὐτοὺς κάμοῦ περὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀμυνομένου καὶ τούτων ἡμᾶς βαλλόντων, ἔτι δὲ τυπτόντων αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῆς μέθης κάκεινου ἀμυνομένου, καὶ τῶν παραγενομένων ὡς ἀδικουμένοις ἡμῖν ἀπάντων ἐπικουρούντων, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ θορύβῳ συντριβόμεθα τὰς κεφαλὰς ἅπαντες. (3.18)

A battle developed, members of the council. The young man was pelting them. He was defending his own life. They were pelting us. They were still hitting him, because they were drunk. I was defending myself. The passers-by were all helping us, because we were the ones who were being wronged. And in the course of this *melée*, we all got our heads broken.

The description of the *thorybos* is in itself a *thorybos* of words with a wild run of absolute genitives both in content and in form signifying the rapid exchange of blows. The picture of an *ostrakon*-wielding Nemesis, deliberately wounding (27) and hurling deadly threats at his victim, is thus replaced by that of a cluttered street-brawl resulting in minor and, by implication, accidental (cf. ἔτυχον, 41) injuries on both sides¹⁴. There was no sinister malice but a trivial erotic rivalry. And it would be, the argument follows, a dreadful (δεινόν) thing to bring exile upon anyone on account of such trifles (43).

Simon's Ethopoia I: The "Mental" Simon

As already noted, the refutation of the charge of *pronoia* is an argument from probability: the speaker could not behave the way Simon described it, unless he suffered from madness (*mania*). Madness however is explicitly given as a character trait of Simon himself (7). His behaviour, leading to the first incident, almost exactly mirrors that refuted by the speaker himself. Enraged by the fact that Theodotus was entertained by the speaker, Simon seeks him out. Despite the fact that the speaker is in the company of friends (and the boy, apparently) 'dining' (ἐδειπνοῦμεν), he calls him out from the street, and upon meeting him face to face attacks him. We do not know, whether or not Simon was at that point alone, though

¹⁴ C. Carey: (*Trials from Classical Athens*. London 1997, p. 82) takes the fight to be represented 'as a confused and slightly comic affair' and 'a petty squabble unworthy of the attention of the Areopagos'.

no mention is made here of his cronies, who accompanied him in his intrusion into the speaker's *gynaikonitis*. The fact that he was easily repelled (and forced to resort to "ranged attack"), and that his friends did not approve of his previous actions (δαινὰ ἡγοῦμενοι ποιεῖν), may suggest that by that time he was alone.

Accusing one's adversary of madness may seem to us a questionable strategy: in modern jurisprudence such claim would be far more likely exploited to his advantage than detriment. In the Athenian public discourse (encompassing not only all forms of oratory, but also other public *logoi*, such as drama) however, words denoting insanity were freely used in vilifications, and commonly associated with moral reproach; to quote K. Dover (p. 127): "Morally shameless behaviour, carried to an abnormal point, could be treated as evidence of insanity"¹⁵. Such is the treatment of this issue in the rhetoric of Simon's adversary. His "mad" behaviour is condemned as most unnatural (ἀτοπώτατον) and unbelievable (ἀπιστότατον); such evaluation points not only to its recklessness and foolishness but to the fact that it is presented as yet another step in an offense subject to far more serious charges both from the moral and from the legal standpoint. For if Simon's attack on the speaker when he enjoyed a *deipnon* with his friends was a symptom of *mania*, his previous intrusion into his house, and most importantly into the seclusion of his *gynaikonitis*, is explicitly condemned as an act of *hybris* (7). Evaluated thus are also Simon's physical assaults on the speaker (23, 40) and his mistreatment of the young Theodotus, both during the incident under trial (17, 26) and in its prehistory (5).

Simon's Ethopoiia II: The *Hybristes*

In classical Athens *hybris* and its cognates denoted not only moral censure (let alone a metaphysical pride — a meaning ascribed to it by later misreadings of Greek tragedy) but also a serious offence liable even to capital punishment. What exactly constituted an act of *hybris*? The relevant law, cited by Demosthenes, is typically vague when it comes to defining its categories (D. 21.47):

If anyone treats with *hybris* (ὕβριζι) any person, either child or woman or man, free or slave, or does anything unlawful (παράνομόν τι ποιήσῃ) against any of these, let anyone who wishes, of those Athenians who are entitled (ὁ βουλόμενος Ἀθηναίων οἷς ἔξῃστιν), submit a *graphe* to the *thesmothetai*¹⁶.

¹⁵ On the issue of mental health in moral evaluation in Greek see K. Dover: *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle*. London 1974, p. 126—129; cf. S.C. Todd: *Lysias...*, p. 315 who notes that 'insanity is in no sense a defense in Athenian law'.

¹⁶ D.M. MacDowell: *Demosthenes. Against Meidias*. Oxford 1990.

While it specifies clearly who can be the victim of *hybris* and what procedures are to be undertaken against the offender (voluntary prosecution), the offense itself is given no attention, as if the meaning of ὑβρίζειν was too obvious to merit explanation¹⁷. Significant, however not decisive, information as to what sort of behaviour was liable to the procedures prescribed by the law, can be gathered from rhetorical practice (extant speeches) and theory (Aristotle's *Rhetoric*). The most conspicuous feature of *hybris* is its association with physical violence. These two however should not be equated, for not every wanton use of force was and could have been considered an act of *hybris*, but only that aimed at dishonouring (ἀτιμάσαι; ἀτιμία) the victim (Ar., *Rh.* 1374a, 1378b; D. 21.72). Aristotle however, makes it clear that physical violence need not be a necessary factor here (ἔστι γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνῃ ἔστι τῷ πάσχοντι, 1378b)¹⁸, and there is evidence suggesting that such actions may have also been subject to prosecution through *graphe hybreos*. A more specific aspect of *hybris* was its relation to various forms of sexual misconduct. The obvious delicts encompassed by this notion were acts of sexual violence; *hybris* and its cognates however, were also applied in forensic oratory to illegal relations based on consent: the speaker of Lys. 1 speaks of adultery as δεινοτάτη ὕβρις (1.3), though Athenian law provided other, by far harsher than *graphe hybreos*, means of dealing with this issue¹⁹.

Simon's behaviour is not only evaluated as *hybris*; more than once the speaker asserts that he ought to have been brought into court for his misdeeds (1, 9, 44). In the *peroratio* the speaker slips in what can be interpreted as an allusion to such prosecution, stating "that it would be far more just for him to be on trial for his life than for him to put other people in danger of exile" (44, tr. Todd). This is usually taken as a generic insult, an unspecified accusation of crimes liable to capital punishment²⁰; it may well be so, however of the numerous misdeeds imputed to Simon in the speech, only *hybris* could have resulted in a prosecution of this kind.

The most obvious aspect of Simon's behaviour considered as *hybris* is, of course, violence. Its only hubristic feature lies however in that it is wanton, unprovoked. Unlike Ariston, the speaker of D. 54, and Demosthenes himself, in his famous speech against Meidias, who, while accusing their adversaries of *hybris*²¹,

¹⁷ For a discussion on the text of the law see D.M. MacDowell: *Demosthenes...*, ad loc.; N. Fisher: *Hybris*. Warminster 1992, p. 36f.

¹⁸ Cf. N. Fisher: *Hybris...*, 42; 92ff (verbal insults); D. Cohen: *Law, Violence, and Community*. Cambridge 1995, pp. 146—149.

¹⁹ On *hybris* in illicit sexual relations based on consent see N. Fisher: *Hybris...*, p. 41, 104f; D. Cohen: *Law, Violence...*, 154f; on the relation of women's sexual purity to the question of masculine honour / dishonour see D. Cohen: *Law, Sexuality and Society*. Cambridge 1991, pp. 133—170.

²⁰ C.C. Carey: *Lysias...*, p. 111 (ad loc.); S.C. Todd: *Lysias...*, p. 340 (ad loc.).

²¹ Neither of them however actually brought in a *graphe hybreos*. Ariston's case is a δίκη αἰκείας, a private lawsuit for violent attack: according to the speaker (54.1) he was persuaded by his friends to resort to this less serious charge, instead of the grave γραφή ὕβρεως, for the latter might

devote considerable effort to describe the humiliation suffered at their hands, the speaker does not care to make any mention of being dishonoured by Simon's assaults. Furthermore, both attacks were met with successful defense — or, in fact, retaliation, since the verb ἀμύνεσθαι encompasses both meanings, and in some contexts unambiguously invites the latter interpretation. During the first incident the speaker managed thus to repel Simon, and force him to “ranged attack”, while during their second clash it was obviously Simon, who got the worse of it.

Simon's mistreatment of Theodotus and his intrusion into the speaker's *oikos* may seem a far more serious matter. As for the prehistory of the incident under trial, we are told that “through *hybris* (ὕβριζων) and lawlessness (παρανομιῶν) he decided to force him [scil. Theodotus — J.K.] to do whatever he wanted” (5)²², which clearly points to sexual violence, perhaps even rape. The same sinister overtones are present in the description of the boy's abduction (17), where the speaker witnessed him ‘subjected to violent and lawless *hybris*’ (ἀνόμως καὶ βιαίως ὕβρισθέντα). The law quoted above provided support for anyone, regardless of age, sex and social status, who fell victim to *hybris*. Judging therefore from the version of events presented in the speech, Simon's conduct here could have been liable to prosecution through *graphe hybreos*. Finally the intrusion into the speaker's house, twice in the text referred to as *hybris*. The only act of violence actually associated with it is Simon knocking the door down (6). Though such a display of komastic behaviour, along with Simon's liking for a drink (during both incidents he is said to have been inebriated) are common narrative motifs in the representation of *hybris*, the most offensive aspect appears to be his entering into the *gynaikonitis*²³. In Lys. 1 such violation of the seclusion of one's *oikos* is twice explicitly referred to as *hybris* (1.4; 1.25); by contrast, the speaker of D. 47 is careful to demonstrate that upon entering his (then) adversary's house he knew that he was not married — and that, by chance, the door was open (47.38)²⁴.

Simon's Ethopoiia III: The Sycophant

Violence is the dominant theme of Simon's *ethopoiia*, but not the only one. Apart from being a bully, he is also a liar and a sycophant, and these two traits

have been more than could cope with. Demosthenes' on the other hand, a προβολή, formally dealing with misconduct in relation to a festival (ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὴν ἑορτήν).

²² On the relation of sexual (especially homosexual) violence with *hybris* see C. Cohen: *Law, Violence...*, pp. 149—161; N. Fisher: *Hybris*. Warminster 1992, p. 108ff.

²³ Cf. C. Cohen: *Law, Violence...*, p. 149.

²⁴ Cf. 47.50: εἰς μὲν τὴν οἰκίαν οὐκ εἰσῆλθεν (οὐ γὰρ ἡγεῖτο δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ παρόντος γε τοῦ κυρίου).

are, quite understandably, closely intertwined. A lie is the founding principle of Simon's case against the speaker: this is stated explicitly by means of the *elenchos*, and implied through the whole *diegesis*, which presents an account of the incident radically different from that given in the accusation. As already noted lying in Athenian courts, even when under oath, did not in itself entail liability to punishment (with the exception of witnesses). Sycophancy however, apart from the indirect checks against it prescribed by the law, was considered a "public" crime, and therefore was itself liable to prosecution by οἱ βουλόμενοι by means of diverse procedures.

In the defense against Simon, however, sycophancy may seem at first glance a strained, if not downright misguided accusation. According to the traditional appraisal of this phenomenon, sycophants were a quasi-professional group of Athenian citizens, who made their living from abusing the principle of public accusation, whereby prosecution was made available to οἱ βουλόμενοι²⁵. Their main interest consequently lied in the possibility of financial gains from bringing in such a prosecution. These included out-of-court settlements on the one hand (with the would-be accused paying the sycophant off to drop the case)²⁶, and monetary rewards for conducting a successful prosecution on the other. Hence, it has been argued, among the procedures most favoured by sycophants were not only those available to anyone "who wishes to do so", but most importantly those among them promising the greatest profit for their sycophantic efforts²⁷. The case brought in by Simon may well have been neither (if it was a δίκη τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας), and certainly not the latter (even as a γραφή it would not bring any financial gain to the successful prosecutor). Furthermore, according to the traditional interpretation, the sycophants, as a rule, were not the injured party: their motivation was pecuniary, not vindictive. This appears to make the case for the speaker's claim even worse, for it was precisely Simon himself, the prosecutor, who fell victim to the alleged wounding with intent to kill.

According to the traditional interpretation, the cases where allegations of sycophancy are most likely to be found, would be defenses in public prosecutions, especially those in φάσεις, ἀπογραφὰι and γραφαὶ ξενίας. Strangely enough however, the defense *contra Simonem* is by no means the only one where such — apparently misguided — allegations are found. According to Osborne, in private cases "defendants [...] almost invariably alleged that the prosecution was sycophantic,

²⁵ J.O. Lofberg: *Sycophancy in Athens*. Chicago 1917 *passim*; cf. MacDowell's 'Sycophancy' in OCD³, where, however, gaining 'political or oratorical reputation' is also mentioned among the motives for sycophantic prosecutions.

²⁶ Such was the predicament of Crito, who, according to Xenophon (Mem. 2.9.2), complained of being harrassed by sycophants who believed he would find it more advantageous to pay them of instead of πράγματα ἔχειν.

²⁷ That is φάσεις, ἀπογραφὰι and γραφαὶ ξενίας (J.O. Lofberg: *Sycophancy*..., pp. 26—32).

and they did so both in bringing injunctions and in making their main defence”²⁸. In doing so they could not seriously base their allegations on the traditional (modern) view of sycophancy. Hence the attempt to redefine this term in relation to Classical Athens, whereby sycophancy was “a conceptual rather than sociological phenomenon”²⁹. As such it does share some characteristics of the social-class view of sycophancy, most notably the money-grubbing attitude³⁰, many other however, though inextricably linked with the traditional appraisal, are far from being the core-traits of this phenomenon. The emerging picture of a sycophant from various rhetorical accusations is that of a person, who, apart from being motivated by financial gains³¹, (1) brings in false charges, in which he resorts to (2) sophistical quibbling and (3) slanderous attacks (διαβολή); a sycophant furthermore is a (4) litigious person, frequently filing in lawsuits, and finally often (5) “acts after the event and rakes up old charges”³².

With these traits of the “conceptual” sycophant we are on more familiar ground to assess the validity, or rather persuasiveness, of the accusations in Lys. 3. Simon has brought a false charge against the speaker, which is derived from the already discussed argument from probability. Simon’s claim that the speaker disregarded his financial agreement with Theodotus is slander, for, according to the *elenchos*, no such thing ever took place. Simon didn’t have the courage (οὐκ ἐτόλμησε, 39) to bring in his suit directly after being beaten and robbed of his lover; instead he waited four years, fearing for himself (20), and proceeded with his accusation only after the speaker fared ill in his own court dealings (20). This, of course, conforms with the last of the sycophantic traits discussed above.

In case these particular accusations of *hybris* and *sycophancy*, firmly rooted in the *diegesis* of the speech, weren’t enough to dispose the judges adequately towards his adversary, the speaker is not sparing on a generic evaluative language either. Quite unsurprisingly Simon’s previous misdeeds, are referred to as ἀμαρτήματα (9), and, as they are made to constitute serious breaches of law, consequently censured as παράνομα (37)³³; a description of his disorderly violence is predictably followed by derogatory adjectives ἀκοσμότατος and πονηρότατος, with the latter’s substantive cognate, πονηρία given as a permanent trait of his ethos (9, 30, 44), manifesting itself in his unruly behaviour. In the semantic sphere, however, the

²⁸ R. Osborne: “Vexatious Litigation in Classical Athens”. In: *Nomos. Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society*. Eds. P. Cartledge, P. Millett, S.C. Todd. Cambridge 1990, p. 92.

²⁹ M. Christ: *The Litigious Athenian...*, p. 64f, drawing from the arguments of Osborne and Harvey, though the latter argues plausibly (114ff) that ‘professional sycophants’ may well have existed in Classical Athens.

³⁰ Discussed by D. Harvey: „The Sycophant and Sycophancy”. In: *Nomos...*, p. 110ff.

³¹ Ibidem, p. 112ff; corroborated by M. Christ: *The Litigious Athenian...*

³² D. Harvey: “The Sycophant...”, p. 113.

³³ It should be noted that the notion παράνομον is closely associated with the law of *hybris* quoted above (D. 21.47): ἐάν τις ὑβρίζῃ εἰς τινα [...] ἢ παράνομόν τι ποιήσῃ.

most prominent themes or keywords of Simon's vilification are: δεινόν and τόλμα. δεινόν is an ambivalent notion and has no fixed ethical meaning. When applied to wrongs committed or suffered, it provides however convenient and conventional means of rhetorical amplification. As such, δεινόν becomes the one of the keywords in Simon's vilification, and its significance is marked from the very beginning of the speech: πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ συνειδώς Σίμωνι (3.1). His misdeeds thus represented are no 'ordinary' ἀμαρτήματα or παράνομα, but acts of 'unbelievable' (ἄπιστον) and 'unnatural' (ἄτοπον) gravity — indeed acts of a madman. Their contrast with the trivial συντριβόμεθα τὰς κεφαλὰς ἅπαντες could not be more evident.

To do anything δεινόν — regardless of its moral and legal quality — is always a daring attempt, and as such requires an adequate, "daring" disposition. Both these aspects of appraising one's behaviour are conveyed by the word τόλμα along with its verbal and adjectival derivatives. A "daring" ἀμάρτημα or παράνομόν τι is, again, something much "bigger" than an ordinary misdemeanor. Just like the epithet δεινόν, τόλμα (and its derivatives) hyperbolizes the deed, shifting it from the realm of the 'ordinary' to the 'unnatural' and 'unbelievable'. The semantics of δεινόν and τόλμα provide also an evaluative bridge linking the present and the past: the series of unnatural crimes committed by Simon both in the prehistory and the history of the incident under trial is concluded with his final, ultimate act of τόλμα: bringing in a sycophantic lawsuit against the speaker (1, 20).

The Positive Paradigm

Simon's negative *ethopoia* would not be complete without a positive ethical paradigm, bringing out even further its alleged depravity. As observed by Carey: "[...] the case for the defence relies heavily on a tapestry of contrasting characterization"³⁴. Unsurprisingly the contrasting exemplar is provided by the persona of the speaker himself. His character traits diametrically oppose those of Simon in all three respects, where the latter is represented as failing so badly: mental sanity, violence (*hybris*) and litigiousness (*sycophancy*). Yet again, as in the negative *ethopoia* of his adversary, they are closely tied with each-other.

As already noted, the speaker draws his refutation of Simon's version of events from probability, founding it upon the simple premise that only a madman would be capable of such actions (29, 34). Barging into his enemies house, even if he had reasons to believe that Theodotus is there, would be something "more stupid than is probable" (ἀνοητότερόν τι τῶν εἰκότων, 31, tr. Todd). Elsewhere the speaker is

³⁴ C. Carey: *Trials...*, p. 82; cf. S. Usher: *Greek Oratory. Tradition and Originality*. Oxford 1999, p. 91.

at pains to persuade the jury that throughout his involvement with Theodotus (and harassment by Simon) he was always careful not to appear ‘foolish’ (ἄνόητος) and hence notorious (περιβόητος) to his fellow-citizens. For this very reason he decided not to bring in any lawsuit, despite the frequent acts of *hybris* to which he was — allegedly — subjected (7, 23, 40). The issue of mental sanity and notoriety becomes thus intertwined with the other two prominent features of speaker’s positive *ethopoia*: his non-litigiousness and non-aggressive disposition. This is poignantly summed up in the rhetorical question binding these two patterns of his rebuttal (3.31)

I sought to keep the peace so as not to become notorious, in the belief that his wickedness was my own misfortune. Can I really (as he claims) have developed a passion, after a time, to be notorious again?

The speaker’s non-aggressive and non-litigious *ethopoia* has recently been subject to a controversy spawning some extreme and equally misguided interpretations. It has been argued, that the speaker casts himself into the role of a cowering wimp, who avoiding violence at all costs and puts up with repeated insults. In doing this, the argument follows, he attempts to win the sympathy of the judges, by appealing to sentiments allegedly common to the Athenian morality, that is non-vindictiveness, moderation and under-reaction to provocation³⁵.

Let us start our scrutiny of these traits from the narrative in which they are rooted. The only passages obliquely admitting the claim to cowardice on the part of the speaker are those related to the episode in which Simon and his cronies ambushed him and Theodotus:

It was at this moment that I arrived from Peiraieus, and because I was passing I called at Lysimakhos’ house. We spent a short time inside, and then came out. These men, who were by now drunk, jumped out on us. Some of those who were present with him refused to join in this criminal behaviour, but Simon here, together with Theophilos, Protarkhos, and Autokles, began dragging away the young man. He, however, threw off his cloak and ran away. (3.12)

No mention whatsoever is made of any form of any physical assault upon the speaker here. Assuming that Theodotus will have escaped the speaker himself

³⁵ “The speaker is deliberately casting himself in the role of what we would now call a wimp, a man who under-reacts to provocations [...] instead of demanding satisfaction for all these far from trifling humiliations, he claims to have put up with them” (G. Herman: *Morality and Behaviour in Democratic Athens*. Cambridge 2006, p. 167, reiterating the arguments from Idem: “Honour, Revenge and the State in Fourth-Century Athens”. In: *Die Athenische Demokratie*. Hrsg. W. Eder. Stuttgart 1995, p. 46 and G. Herman: “Athenian Beliefs About Revenge”. *PCPS* 2000, No 46, p. 23f); a persuasive refutation of Herman’s views is offered by Harris 364f; without lapsing into Herman’s extreme interpretations S.C. Todd: (*Lysias*..., p. 284f) nonetheless considers the speaker’s cowardice as a ‘venial flaw’ serving to ‘render his character more credible’

takes off choosing a different route (3.13). Later on he builds an argument from probability upon this very incident:

Which group ought you to consider responsible for what happened: those who ran away (φεύγοντας), or those who tried to catch them? For my part, I think it is clear to everybody that the people who flee (φεύγουσι) are those who are afraid for themselves, whereas the ones who pursue are those who want to do something unpleasant. (3.36)

The referentially oblique φεύγοντας and φεύγουσι³⁶ is as close as it comes to any admission of cowardice on the part of the speaker. The *diegesis* makes it clear though that the only one whom the attackers tried to catch was Theodotus. Furthermore, in both descriptions of this incident, there is a marked contrast between the speaker's behaviour, referred to with the phrases ἐτέραν ὁδὸν ᾠχόμεν ἀπιών (3.13) and ἐτέραν ὁδὸν ἀπελθὼν ᾠχόμεν (3.36) and those of the young Theodotus, who in the very same passages is said to ᾤχετο φεύγων (3.13), ἐκφεύξεσθαι (3.13) and φεύγον ᾤχετο (3.36). The slave-boy is indeed depicted as hastily and perhaps cowardly, fleeing the scene; the speaker himself calmly 'walks away'. Whatever he may be hinting at, he obviously shrinks from explicitly describing his behaviour as anything beneath a dignified recession.

As for Simon's physical assaults upon the speaker two incidents are related in the *diegesis*: the first (3.8), an unprovoked attack, and the second (3.17), a violent response to the speaker's indignant reprimands ('why are you treating the boy so lawlessly'), where it is clearly stated that Simon managed to deliver some blows at him; during the first assault, however, he was repelled by the speaker and forced to "ranged attack", whereas during the second himself injured badly enough to bring in the trial at hand on this very basis (with significantly differing circumstances though). Neither of these accounts of violent incidents allows an interpretation of the speaker's behavior as that of a cowering wimp. Instead he consistently presents himself as firmly holding his ground when attacked; furthermore, his actions in both incidents are described with the verb ἀμύνεσθαι, which apart from denoting 'defense' also encompassed the meaning of 'avenging'. In fact, these two concepts were closely related to each-other in the legal and ethical discourse of Classical Athens³⁷, not mutually exclusive, as one might expect judging from modern standards. Thus the speaker of Lys. 3 can even be considered as both defending himself and retaliating on the spot at once, though, as the circumstances both then (violent assault) and now (pleading 'not guilty' when accused of premeditated

³⁶ Todd (ad. loc.) notices a verbal play on the double meaning of φεύγων: running away — defendant.

³⁷ On the meaning of ἀμύνεσθαι see LSJ s.v. B; the most instructive rhetorical example in this respect is Ant. 4 (*Third Tetralogy*), where the defendant's case of mortal ἀμύνασθαι is founded on the fact that the victim had started the fight (ἄρχων χειρῶν ἀδίκων); more on this case see M. Gagarin: *Antiphon. The Speeches*. Cambridge 1997, p. 160ff; E. Carawan: *Rhetoric...*, pp. 301—308.

wounding) may suggest, with a greater emphasis upon the ‘defense’ element. Quite the same, though with far less serious outcomes, as a certain Euthynus, mentioned by Demosthenes (21.71), who upon being subjected to *hybris* by an equally obscure Sophilus (αὐτὸν ὑβρίζειν ᾤετο), defended himself / retaliated so vigorously that his attacker ended up dead (ἀμυνόμενον οὕτως ὥστε καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι)³⁸.

To sum up, the speaker’s characterization in respect to the issue of violence, produces an *ethos* no doubt antithetical to that of a hubristic bully, that is — to that of Simon. Unlike his adversary, the speaker is not prone to violence, and ready to avoid it. This however to a certain degree, for when attacked he stands his ground and does not hesitate to respond with force to *hybris*. Thus in his *ethopoia*, while persuasively lending credibility to the refutation of Simon’s charges (wounding with malicious intent), the speaker manages nonetheless to steer clear of the ethical Charybdis of a cowardly wimp.

The speaker, having suffered many indignities from Simon, not only refrained from extralegal, violent retaliation — with the exception, that is, of the act of ἀμύνεσθαι upon being attacked — but also chose not to bring in any lawsuit against his enemy. This course of action marks a strong contrast with Simon’s sycophantic behaviour. It has been argued however, that the speaker’s non-litigious attitude is yet another appeal to the non-vindictive sentiments, allegedly pervading the Athenian popular morality, and ruling over the minds of the jury. A good Athenian, the argument follows, was expected not only to forego violent retaliation, but also to refrain from attempting to right his wrongs through the courts: these were to be approached only in the utmost necessity, while lesser wrongs — endured patiently by the humane Athenian folk. There are, however, less imagination-straining explanations for the speaker’s non-litigious attitude. The first is given in the text of the speech itself (3.9):

I chose not to bring an action over these offences, rather than to appear foolish (ἀνόητος) to my fellow-citizens. I knew that what had happened would be seen as appropriate for a criminal like him (τούτου τῇ πονηρίᾳ πρέποντα ἔσται τὰ πεπραγμένα), but that I would be laughed at for my misfortunes. (Todd)

Why exactly would the speaker appear foolish (ἀνόητος) to his fellow-citizens? Surely not for attempting to punish Simon’s *poneria*!³⁹ The problem was the con-

³⁸ It has been argued that Euthynus may have been tried at the Delphinium upon pleading justified in the homicide for the very reason of defending / avenging an insult. According to D. 21.75 he was condemned, but only by one vote and that without resorting to excessive pleading; cf. the discussion in D.M. MacDowell: *Demosthenes*..., p. 292 (ad loc.); E. Carawan: *Rhetoric*..., p. 308ff and D.M. MacDowell: *Athenian Homicide*..., p. 75f (general).

³⁹ A claim made by G. Herman: (*Honour*..., p. 46; Idem: *Athenian Beliefs*..., p. 23f), refuted by V.W. Harris: (“Lysias III and the Athenian Beliefs about Revenge”. *CQ* 1997, No 47, p. 364f); Herman’s misinterpretation is followed by A. Lanni: *Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens*. Cambridge 2006, p. 30.

text of his misfortunes, that of an erotic rivalry, and most of all (3.4) his own, too foolish for his age engagement in a homosexual affair with Theodotus (παρὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀνοητότερον πρὸς τὸ μαιρακίον διατιθείς). The repetition of the very same epithet (ἀνόητος, ἀνοητότερον) is no coincidence.

It should also be noted that the speaker's non-litigious attitude provides convenient means to validate his *diegesis*: it gives a persuasive (since in itself it is an embarrassing — to a limited degree — confession) reason to explain the speaker's idleness in the face of Simon's offenses, his *poneria*, his *paranoma*, his *hybris*. The speaker thus shields himself from the obvious suspicion his *diegesis* might arouse in the minds of the jury: 'if indeed you have been subject to all theses heinous indignities, why haven't you undertaken any legal action'.

Conclusion

Negation and trivialization — these two chief objectives of the defense in Lys. 3, and, in fact, chief objectives of any defense whatsoever, are achieved in the speech firstly and foremostly through contrasting *ethopoiiai*. The speaker rebuts the claims of the plaintiff, arguing from probability, that unlike his adversary, he is not mad, and only a madman would be capable of doing the deeds he is being accused of. The speaker trivializes the incident under trial as unworthy of prosecution, unless of course, the prosecutor is a sycophant — like Simon. Underlying these is yet another tendency, conveyed through Simon's hubristic *ethopoiia*. This tendency is voiced out in a theoretical treatise on composing successful speeches, claiming the authorship of Aristotle himself. Its argument is: "[...] it seems to me that it comes close to no injustice at all, whenever one is subject to the mistreatment by which he himself abused others, as for example, if someone batters (αἰκίσσας) one who is accustomed to assault others with *hybris* (ὑβρίζειν)" (*Rhet.* 1373a). Whatever befell Simon, he certainly had it coming.

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Διάθεσις in the Τέχνη γραμματική Attributed to Dionysios Thrax and in the Περί συντάξεως by Apollonios Dyskolos A Comparative Analysis

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to attempt at conducting analysis of the meaning given to the word διάθεσις in two most important grammatical texts written in ancient Greece, i.e. in the Τέχνη γραμματική attributed to Dionysios Thrax and in the treaty Περί συντάξεως by Apollonios Dyskolos. The study leads to the conclusion that the meaning of that term occurring in both texts is quite difficult to find. Its ambiguity undoubtedly stems, at least to some extent, from real complexity of the matter it refers to. Apart from that, its vagueness results, on the one hand, from not sufficiently precise description of the criteria identifying the concepts related to that term, and from multitude and incoherence of those criteria, on the other. Due to those shortcomings, the designatum of that term, although close to the notion of the grammatical category of voice, is not quite equivalent to it. However, it reflects undoubtedly the way Alexandrian grammarians perceived the effects of the existence of that category in the grammatical system of the Greek language.

Key words: Dionysios Thrax, Apollonios Dyskolos, ancient grammar, diathesis

The term διάθεσις in the Greek grammar tradition refers most frequently to the formal and functional verb variance, which is linked to the inflectional category of voice. However, the exact identification of that term meaning, as used by Greek grammarians, brings about a number of difficulties. They are caused mainly by the unclear and diverse way ancient grammarians characterised the concept denoted with this term in particular texts, which results, in turn, from a sig-

nificant complication of the way in which the category of voice functioned in the grammatical system of ancient Greek. In this article, we will attempt at conducting analysis of the range of meanings given to the word διάθεσις in two most important grammatical texts written in ancient Greece, i.e. in the Τέχνη γραμματική attributed to Dionysios Thrax and in the treaty Περί συντάξεως by Apollonios Dyskolos.

The text of the Τέχνη constitutes the final codification of the Greek word science. The conceptual and terminological apparatus included there exerted a huge influence upon the development of modern grammar in the area of morphology, and especially the theory of inflection. Irrespective of doubts as to the possibility of attributing the Τέχνη to Dionysios Thrax (170—90)¹, the studies performed in recent years have shown that the text of that treaty reflects the grammatical knowledge which was shaped in the circle of Hellenistic philologists already in 2nd — 1st centuries before Christ². The term διάθεσις appears in the Τέχνη first of all in the context of the verb characteristics (ῥήμα)³. We encounter it already in the definition of that part of speech, reading as follows:

¹ Cf. e.g. V. Di Benedetto: "Dionisio Trace e la Techne a lui attribuita". *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa* 1958, No 27, pp. 169—210; 1959, No 28, pp. 87—118; Idem: "La Techne spuria". *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa*. 1973, No. 3, pp. 797—814; Idem: "At the Origins of Greek Grammar". *Glotta* 1990, No 68, pp. 19—39; J. Pinborg: "Classical Antiquity: Greece". In: *Current Trends in Linguistic Theory*. Ed. T.A. Sebeok. Vol. 13. The Hague—Paris 1975, pp. 69—126; A. Wouters: *The Grammatical Papyri from Graeco-Roman Egypt. Contributions to the Study of the 'Ars Grammatica' in Antiquity*. Brussel 1979; W. Ax: *Laut, Stimme und Sprache. Studien zu drei Grundbegriffen der antiken Sprachtheorie*. (Hypomnemata, Heft 84). Göttingen 1986; D.J. Taylor: "Rethinking the History of Language Science in Classical Antiquity". In: *The History of Linguistics in the Classical Period*. Ed. D.J. Taylor. Amsterdam 1987, pp. 1—16; *Dionysius Thrax and the Techne Grammatike*. Eds. V. Law, I. Sluiter. Münster 1995; P. Swiggers, A. Wouters: *Grammatical Theory and Philosophy of Language in Antiquity: Introduction*. In: *Grammatical Theory and Philosophy of Language in Antiquity*. Eds. P. Swiggers, A. Wouters. Leuven 2002, pp. 9—20.

² Cf. W. Ax: „Aristarch und die »Grammatik«". *Glotta* 1982, No 60, pp. 96—109; Idem: „Aristophanes von Byzanz als Analogist. Zu Fragment 374 Slater (= Varro, de lingua Latina 9,12)“. *Glotta* 1990, No 68, pp. 4—18; Idem: „Sprache als Gegenstand der alexandrinischen und pergamenischen Philologie“. In: *Sprachtheorien der abendländischen Antike*. Hrsg. P. Schmitter. Tübingen 1991, pp. 275—301; H. Erbse: „Zur normativen Grammatik der Alexandriner“. *Glotta* 1980, No 58, pp. 236—258; S. Matthaios: *Untersuchungen zur Grammatik Aristarchs: Texte und Interpretation zur Wortartenlehre*. Göttingen 1999; Idem: *Neue Perspektiven für Historiographie der antiken Grammatik: Das Wortartensystem der Alexandriner*. In: *Grammatical Theory and Philosophy of Language in Antiquity*. Eds. P. Swiggers, A. Wouters. Leuven 2002, pp. 161—220; E. Siebenborn: *Die Lehre von der Sprachrichtigkeit und ihren Kriterien. Studien zur antiken normativen Grammatik*. Amsterdam 1976; Ch.K. Callanan: *Die Sprachbeschreibung bei Aristophanes von Byzanz*. Göttingen 1987.

³ Apart from that, it occurs also in the chapter concerning ὄνομα (46, 1—2 – see below, note 4), where it denotes a specific semantic feature of a certain groups of nouns. However, that feature is of lexical and not grammatical nature, and therefore its description goes beyond the topical scope of this study.

46, 4 — 47, 2⁴: Ῥῆμά ἐστι λέξις ἄπτωτος, ἐπιδεκτικὴ χρόνων τε καὶ προσώπων καὶ ἀριθμῶν, ἐνέργειαν ἢ πάθος παριστάσα. Παρέπεται δὲ τῷ ῥήματι ὀκτώ. ἐγκλίσεις, διαθέσεις, εἶδη, σχήματα, ἀριθμοί, πρόσωπα, χρόνοι, συζυγίαι.

A verb is a word deprived of cases, capable of expressing tenses, as well as persons and numbers, denoting action or experience. Eight [properties — H.W.] accompany the verb: moods, diatheses, figures, schemas, numbers, persons, tenses, and groupings.

Thus, we can see that διαθέσεις (‘diatheses’) have been shown here as one of characteristic features (παρεπόμενα) of the verb, which, apart from others, such as, *inter alia*, moods, numbers, persons or tenses, constitutes an obligatory attribute of that class of words. Further on in the treaty, that feature is described in the following way.

48, 1—49, 3: Διαθέσεις εἰσὶ τρεῖς, ἐνέργεια, πάθος, μεσότης· ἐνέργεια μὲν οἷον τύπτω, πάθος δὲ οἷον τύπτομαι, μεσότης δὲ ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἐνέργειαν ποτὲ δὲ πάθος παριστάσα, οἷον ἐπέγηγα διέφθορα ἐποιησάμην ἐγραψάμην.

There are three diatheses: ἐνέργεια, πάθος, μεσότης: ἐνέργεια, as e.g. ‘I hit’, πάθος, as e.g. ‘I am hit’, μεσότης, which sometimes expresses action and sometimes experience, as e.g. ‘I am stuck’, ‘I have gone mad’, ‘I have done for myself’, ‘I have enrolled’.

As can be easily seen, this description causes big difficulties with interpretation. These are related to the exact identification of the meanings of the terms which co-create the characteristics of the verb’s διαθέσεις presented here. In this respect, we should note, first of all, that two of those terms, namely, ἐνέργεια and πάθος, appear also in the definition of ῥῆμα quoted above: ῥῆμά ἐστι λέξις [...] ἐνέργειαν ἢ πάθος παριστάσα. In this definition, they refer undoubtedly to the semantic features of the verb and they denote action and experience, respectively, as properties of the semantic characteristics of the words of this class. In other words, a definitional feature of verbs is that each of them expresses either action or experience. On the other hand, in passage 48, 1—49, 3 under consideration, those terms identify specific διαθέσεις of the verb, being some of its παρεπόμενα. The problem is, however, that the author of the Τέχνη distinguished not two but three διαθέσεις, i.e. apart from ἐνέργεια and πάθος, there is still μεσότης. Thus, the terms ἐνέργεια and πάθος (and μεσότης), as terminological exponents of (three) different διαθέσεις ῥήματος, can no longer refer straightforwardly (and exclusively) to the verb semantics; if it were so, the meaning of the term μεσότης, being

⁴ All quotations from the Τέχνη according to the following edition: *Dionysii Thracis Ars Grammatica (Τέχνη γραμματική)*. Ed. G. Uhlig (Grammatici Graeci I 1). Lipsiae 1883 (reprint: Hildesheim 1965).

the third element of the functional opposition, together with ἐνέργεια and πάθος, would have to be interpreted in the same semantic categories, i.e. it would have to be identified with some meaning of the verb being neither action nor experience. However, several circumstances weigh against such a solution.

First of all, the adoption of such a solution would require distinguishing the same kind of meaning of a verb (i.e. neither action nor experience) in the very definition of ῥῆμα as well. Yet, as we have observed before, this definition shows that verbs express only action or experience and there is nothing about expressing anything else but action or experience. Besides, μεσότης has been characterised as the notion which, in the semantic aspect, is also related only either to action or experience: μεσότης δὲ ἢ ποτέ μὲν ἐνέργειαν ποτέ δὲ πάθος παριστᾶσα. Therefore, μεσότης is not any special kind (type) of the meaning of the verb, other than action or experience. In other words, it is not something that could be expressed by the verb, as a specific meaning, since the verb representing μεσότης as one of διαθέσεις expresses also (exclusively) either action or experience⁵. So, we should assume that the terms ἐνέργεια and πάθος are used in the Τέχνη in two different meanings. The first of the two is 'action' and 'experience,' respectively, as properties of the verb semantics. In this meaning, those terms were used in the definition of ῥῆμα and in the phrase: ποτέ μὲν ἐνέργειαν ποτέ δὲ πάθος παριστᾶσα, which characterises μεσότης. The other meaning relates to the use of those terms, alongside the term μεσότης, in the function of the terminological exponents of particular διαθέσεις ῥήματος (διαθέσεις εἰσὶ τρεῖς, ἐνέργεια, πάθος, μεσότης). When interpreting the meaning of ἐνέργεια, πάθος and μεσότης in this very function, i.e. in the function of the terminological exponents of three different διαθέσεις ῥήματος (and, at the same time, when interpreting the notion διαθέσεις as such), the identification of the semantic range of the term μεσότης plays obviously a key role. In this context, it seems especially important to obtain the answer to two fundamental questions: the first one: how should we understand the word ποτέ in the expression: ποτέ μὲν ἐνέργειαν ποτέ δὲ πάθος παριστᾶσα, and the other one: what is the difference, on the one hand, between μεσότης (ποτέ) ἐνέργειαν παριστᾶσα and ἐνέργεια as a kind of διάθεσις, and between μεσότης (ποτέ) πάθος παριστᾶσα and πάθος as a kind of διάθεσις, on the other?

Due to the lack of any explanations regarding the topics under discussion, the answers to the above questions can be found only in the interpretation of the attached exemplification material. And so, ἐνέργεια as the first of διαθέσεις ῥήματος being distinguished was illustrated by means of an active form in the present tense,

⁵ See also R. Popowski: „Passivum w antycznej teorii helleńskiej”. *Roczniki Humanistyczne* 1982, nr 30 (3), (pp. 35—64), p. 41: „[Medium — H.W.] z semantycznego punktu widzenia oznacza bądź to spełnianie czynności, bądź doznawanie czynności”; M. Bednarski: „Kategoria strony u gramatyków starożytnych”. *Zeszyty Naukowe UJ. Prace językoznawcze*. Z. 681. Kraków 1984 (pp. 103—123), p. 105: „[Według gramatyków starożytnych — H.W.] jakiegoś szczególnego, różnego od activum czy passivum, znaczenia medium nie posiada.”

i.e. τύπτω ‘I hit’. An example of πάθος as another διάθεσις ῥήματος is an analogical medial / passive form, i.e. τύπτομαι ‘I am hit’. Finally, μεσότης as the last of the διαθέσεις ῥήματος was illustrated with the following examples: πέπηγα, διέφθορα, ἐποιησάμην and ἐγραψάμην. The first example, namely, πέπηγα, is an active perfect of the verb which can convey both transitive (τήγνυμι ‘I stick (sth) in’ / πήγνυμαι ‘I am being stuck’) and intransitive (πήγνυμαι ‘I am stuck’, ‘I become numb’) meaning; the perfect form πέπηγα itself can also assume both kinds of meanings, and thus it can mean both ‘I have stuck (sth) in’ and ‘I was stuck’, ‘I became numb’. The other example, διέφθορα, represents the same perfective formation of a verb which can also have a transitive (διέφθειρώ ‘I destroy’, ‘I ruin’ / διαφθείρομαι ‘I am destroyed’, ‘I am ruined’) and intransitive (διαφθείρομαι ‘I am losing my mind’, ‘I am going mad’) meaning; and similarly, the perfect form διέφθορα can mean both ‘I have destroyed’, ‘I have ruined’ and ‘I have lost my mind’, ‘I have gone mad’. The forms ἐποιησάμην and ἐγραψάμην, in turn, are medial aorists of transitive verbs: ποιέω ‘I am doing’ and γράφω ‘I am writing’; those aorists have reflexive or indirectly reflexive meanings, thus: ‘I have done for myself’, ‘I have achieved (something)’ and ‘I have enrolled’, ‘I have written down (something) for myself’, respectively.

As it seems, this whole exemplification material permits, in general, double interpretation of the meaning of the terms ἐνέργεια, πάθος and μεσότης used as terminological exponents of three different verb διαθέσεις, and thus it enables two different answers to the questions posed above. On the one hand, one can assume that the said ποτέ in the phrase characterising μεσότης (ποτέ μὲν ἐνέργειαν ποτέ δὲ πάθος παριστάσα) refers to verb forms representing μεσότης in the sense that each of them can mean both action and experience, depending on the context (*scil.* in different contexts). This would also constitute the essence of the difference between this διάθεσις and the other two, out of which one, *scil.* ἐνέργεια, would constitute the attribute of forms expressing only action, whereas the other one, i.e. πάθος, would refer to the forms denoting exclusively experience. In this way, the phrase μεσότης (ποτέ) ἐνέργειαν παριστάσα would characterise μεσότης by showing action as one of two possible functional options realised by the verb form representing this διάθεσις, whereas with the notion ἐνέργεια as a separate διάθεσις standing in opposition to μεσότης would be linked, in turn, the action as the only obligatory semantic function realised by verb forms representing this διάθεσις. The same, *mutatis mutandis*, should be said about the relation between the sense of the phrase characterising μεσότης as διάθεσις (ποτέ) πάθος παριστάσα and the meaning of the term πάθος as the kind of διάθεσις. The notion διάθεσις itself would be based — within the scope of this interpretation — only on the semantic capacity of a given verb form, which could be expressed in the scale with the values: action/experience/action and experience.

The drawback of the above interpretation is, however, the fact that although to each of the two perfect forms, mentioned as the examples of verb formations representing μεσότης, we can really attribute meanings of which one could be

qualified as ἐνέργεια (i.e. ‘I have stuck (sth) in’ and ‘I have destroyed’, respectively), and the other as πάθος (i.e. ‘I was stuck’ and ‘I have gone mad’), it is more difficult to state the same with regards to aoristic forms presented as the examples of μεσότης. The point is that as far as the verbs ποιέω and χράφω are concerned, meanings identifiable unambiguously with πάθος are updated in the aorist by passive formations, i.e. ἐποιήθην ‘I have been made (created)’ and ἐγράφηθην ‘I have been enrolled’, whereas the meanings of the forms ἐποίησάμην and ἐγραψάμην, i.e. ‘I have done for myself’, ‘I have achieved (something)’ and ‘I have enrolled’, ‘I have written down (something) for myself’, respectively, seem to constitute concepts that, within the opposition ἐνέργεια/πάθος, are placed exclusively on the side of ἐνέργεια (‘action’).

However, on the other hand, we can assume that the terms ἐνέργεια, πάθος and μεσότης, as terminological exponents of the three διαθέσεις ῥήματος, and the term διάθεσις itself, should be connected not just with the meaning of the verb as such, but rather with the relation between the meaning and the form of the verb. Along this interpretation line, the term ἐνέργεια would refer to the situation in which a verb in the form (perceived as) suitable (from the system point of view) to express action, expresses action indeed, as e.g. τύπτω ‘I hit’. We would have to do with πάθος, in turn, in the situation when a verb, which has a form (regarded as) suitable to express experience, expresses experience indeed, as e.g. τύπτρομαι ‘I am hit’. And finally, we would have to do with μεσότης in the situation, when a verb which has the form (identified as) suitable to express action, expresses experience, as e.g. πέπηγα ‘I got stuck’ or διέφθορα ‘I went mad’, or when a verb having the form (identifiable as) suitable to express experience, expresses action, as e.g. ἐποίησάμην ‘I have done for myself’ or ἐγραψάμην ‘I have enrolled’⁶. And thus, the notion μεσότης would refer to the situation in which the meaning of the verb does not correspond, in a way, to its form or even stands in opposition to it⁷. At the same time, it would imply that the author of the Τέχνη, when pointing to πέπηγα and διέφθορα as the examples of forms representing μεσότης refers exclusively to their intransitive meanings, interpreted as experience (πάθος). Let’s add that such interpretation of those meanings is additionally grounded in the fact that the meaning of ‘I got stuck’ can be understood as including the effect of the fact that ‘I was stuck’, similarly to the meaning of ‘I went mad’, which can be perceived as embodying the result of the fact that ‘I was destroyed (mentally)’. We have already mentioned earlier the meaning of the forms ἐποίησάμην and ἐγραψάμην as concepts identifiable with ἐνέργεια.

⁶ Cf. N.E. Collinge: “The Greek Use of the Term ‘Middle’ in Linguistic Analysis”. *Word* 1963, No 19, (pp. 231—241), p. 236: “The Greek choice of the adjective μέση rests on the basis of a combination of features different *inter se* and respectively shared by the ‘middle’ with each of the polar terms in the voice system, but not exhausting the range of features of any one voice”.

⁷ Also P.K. Andersen: “Remarks on Dionysios Thrax’s concept of ‘Diáthesis’”. *Historiographia Linguistica* 1994, No 21 (1—2), pp. 1—37 strongly favours such interpretation.

Adoption of this interpretation implies obviously also the assumption that certain formal features of verbs (endings) were perceived as suitable, from the system point of view, to express meanings qualified as ἐνέργεια, whereas others were perceived as suitable for meanings constituting πάθος. The legitimacy of such assumption seems not to raise any controversies, especially that in the text of the Τέχνη we encounter a similar case of showing specific formal structures as particularly suitable to express specific contents. We mean here the case when the number category (ἀριθμός) of names (ὀνόματα) is presented⁸. In the respective passage one can find the terms ἐνικοί χαρακτήρες and πληθυντικοί [χαρακτήρες — H.W.], which identify just nominal formal structures (perceived as) predisposed — evidently due to specific endings — to express singularity and plurality, respectively; and, what is more, the context in which those terms appear attests to similar — as assumed in the interpretation of the notion μεσότης under discussion — awareness of the cases of incompliance between contents systemically connoted by those structures and contents really expressed by some noun forms representing those structures (cf. ἐνικοί χαρακτήρες καὶ κατὰ πολλῶν λεγόμενοι and πληθυντικοί [χαρακτήρες — H.W.] κατὰ ἐνικῶν τε καὶ δυϊκῶν [λεγόμενοι — H.W.]). The forms δῆμος, χορός and ὄχλος as well as Ἀθῆναι, Θῆβαι and ἀμφότεροι, listed in the above-mentioned passage as the examples illustrating that incompliance, would thus exemplify *sui generis* μεσότης within the number category.

Within the frameworks of this interpretation, ποτέ in the characteristics of μεσότης (ποτέ μὲν ἐνέργειαν ποτέ δὲ πάθος παριστάσα) would thus mean not that each formation representing this διάθεσις expresses — depending on the context — action or experience, but that that διάθεσις relates sometimes to the expression of action (by verb formations predisposed formally to express experience), and sometimes to the expression of experience (by verb formations predisposed formally to express action). In this way, μεσότης (ποτέ) ἐνέργειαν παριστάσα would be different from ἐνέργεια (as another type of διάθεσις) in terms of the formal shape (and not the meaning) of word formations representing each of the two διαθέσεις in question; analogous — *mutatis mutandis* — would be the nature of the difference between μεσότης (ποτέ) πάθος παριστάσα and πάθος as a kind of διάθεσις. The concept διάθεσις itself would thus be of relational nature, based on the relation between the meaning and the form of the verb. The general sense of the word διάθεσις i.e. ‘setting’, ‘arrangement’, ‘order’, in the technical application

⁸ 30, 5—31, 4: Ἀριθμοὶ τρεῖς· ἐνικός, δυϊκός, πληθυντικός· ἐνικός μὲν ὁ Ὅμηρος, δυϊκὸς δὲ τῷ Ὀμήρῳ, πληθυντικὸς δὲ οἱ Ὅμηροι. Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες ἐνικοί χαρακτήρες καὶ κατὰ πολλῶν λεγόμενοι, οἷον δῆμος χορός· ὄχλος καὶ πληθυντικοὶ κατὰ ἐνικῶν τε καὶ δυϊκῶν, ἐνικῶν μὲν ὡς Ἀθῆναι Θῆβαι, δυϊκῶν δὲ ὡς ἀμφότεροι. — “There are three numbers: singular, dual, plural; singular: *Homer*, dual: *two Homers*, and plural: *Homers*. However, there are certain singular forms that are also used in reference to multiple [objects], for example, *people*, *choir*, *crowd*, and plural forms that are used in reference to singular or dual [objects]; the example for singular could be *Athens* or *Thebes*, and *both* is an example of dual”.

of that word as a grammatical term, would thus refer to those very elements, i.e. the meaning and the form of a verb, as entities constituting that particular arrangement or order.

It is difficult to decide in a definite way which of the two presented interpretations corresponds more strictly to the concept of διάθεσις (especially μεσότης) which was intended by the author of the Τέχνη and reflected in such a laconic, or even ascetic, way in the text of the treaty. Unfortunately, the scholia do not offer much help in this case, since in this matter, even the same authors often present various opinions, some of them being close to the first of the presented interpretations⁹, whereas others are closer to the other one¹⁰, still other opinions are slightly different from both of them¹¹, and yet there are also scholiasts who present their own, individual opinions about this matter, which are totally different from the systematics presented in the Τέχνη¹². All that proves obviously that those issues

⁹ Cf. e.g. Heliodorus (*Scholia in Dionysii Thracis artem grammaticam*. Ed. A. Hilgard (Grammatici Graeci I 3. Lipsiae 1901, pp. 401, 20—23): Μέση δὲ καλεῖται διάθεσις, ὅταν ἢ αὐτὴ φωνὴ χωρὶ εἰς τε ἐνέργειαν καὶ [εἰς — H.W.] πάθος ὡς τὸ βιάζομαι· αὕτη γὰρ ἢ φωνὴ χωρεῖ καὶ εἰς ἐνέργειαν καὶ [εἰς — H.W.] πάθος, οἷον ἐὰν εἴπω βιάζομαι σε καὶ βιάζομαι ὑπὸ σοῦ. Similarly, Sophronius (Grammatici Graeci IV 2. Ed. A. Hilgard. Lipsiae 1894, pp. 411, 34—36): μεσότης δὲ ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαρακτηρῶσι ποτὲ μὲν δρᾶσιν ποτὲ δὲ πάθουσιν σημαίνουσα, οἷον πέπηγα διέφθορα ἐποιήαμην ἐγραψάμην.

¹⁰ Cf. e.g. Heliodorus (*Scholia in Dionysii Thracis artem...*, pp. 401, 29—34 — with reference to the characteristics of μεσότης: ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἐνέργειαν ποτὲ δὲ πάθος παριστᾶσα): Προστιθέναι δεῖ ἐνταῦθα τὸ «ἐν φωνῇ ἐνεργητικῇ» καὶ «ἐν φωνῇ παθητικῇ», ἵν' ἢ ὁ νοῦς οὕτως «ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἐνέργειαν ἐν φωνῇ παθητικῇ, ποτὲ δὲ πάθος ἐν φωνῇ ἐνεργητικῇ»· τὸ μὲν πέπηγα ἐν φωνῇ ἐνεργητικῇ πάθος δηλοῖ, ἴσον γάρ ἐστι τῷ πέπηγμαί, τὸ δὲ ἐποιήσάμην ἐν φωνῇ παθητικῇ ἐνέργειαν σημαίνει, ἴσον γάρ ἐστι τῷ ἐποίησα.

¹¹ Cf. e.g. Choeroboscus (Grammatici Graeci IV 2, pp. 9, 5—15): μεσότης δέ, ἥτις ποτὲ μὲν ἐνέργειαν ποτὲ δὲ πάθος παρίστησιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ τέτυπα καὶ τέτῃκα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τέτυπα ἐνέργειαν δηλοῖ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔτυπα, τὸ δὲ τέτῃκα πάθος, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐτάκην καὶ πάλιν ἐγραψάμην καὶ ἐλουσάμην· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγραψάμην ἐνέργειαν δηλοῖ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔγραψα, τὸ δὲ ἐλουσάμην πάθος παρίστησιν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐλούσθημι. Καὶ ἀποροῦσί τινες λέγοντες, διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν [ταῦτα — H.W.], φημί δὴ τὰ λεγόμενα μέσα, μὴ ἐκ τοῦ σημαινομένου ἐκλήθησαν, ἵνα ὅταν μὲν σημαίνωσιν ἐνέργειαν λέγωνταν ἐνεργητικά, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ τέτυπα καὶ ἐγραψάμην, ὅταν δὲ σημαίνωσιν πάθος λέγωνται παθητικά, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ τέτῃκα καὶ ἐλουσάμην. Ἔστιν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ὁ χαρακτήρ, ἥγουν ὁ τύπος, τῆς φωνῆς ἐπεκράτησεν ἐπὶ τούτων. An interpretation of μεσότης, similar to the one presented by Choeroboscus, however, limited to the formation of medial aorist, was also presented by Heliodorus (*Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem...*, pp. 401, 23—28): Ἡ πάλιν μέση ἐστὶ διάθεσις, ὅταν τῷ αὐτῷ ῥήματι τυπῶ μόνον πάθος καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ῥήματι τυπῶ μόνον ἐνέργειαν, ὡς ὁ εἰς μὴν τύπος· μέσος γάρ ἐστι μόνων παθητικῶν καὶ πάλιν μόνων ἐνεργητικῶν· καὶ ἐνεργητικῶν μὲν μόνων ἐγραψάμην ἐφάμην, παθητικῶν δὲ μόνων ἐτριψάμην ἡλειψάμην ἴσην γὰρ ἔχουσι δύναμιν κατὰ σημασίαν τῷ ἐτρίφθην καὶ ἡλείφθην παθητικῷ τύπῳ.

¹² What we have in mind here are, first of all, the views of the authors which distinguish a higher number of διαθέσεις, as e.g. the author of Vatican Scholia, who states that, to be exact (κατὰ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν), there are five different διαθέσεις — cf. *Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem...*, pp. 246, 7—8: Διαθέσεις δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν πέντε εἰσὶν, ἐνεργητικῇ, παθητικῇ, οὐδέτερα, μέση, ἐμπερικεκτική. It is worth adding here that only in the above quoted conception such διαθέσεις

caused a lot of difficulties to ancient Greeks. However, it seems that, with a high dose of likelihood, we can regard the second of the presented interpretations as the one closer to the intention of the author of the Τέχνη¹³, first of all, due to the fact that some of the attached exemplification material (*scil.* ἐποιησάμην and ἐγραψάμην) does not correspond well to the first interpretation. Apart from that, the second interpretation, discerning the essence of ἐνέργεια, πάθος and μεσότης (as three different διαθέσεις) in the specific relations between the meaning of the word and its form, gives, at the same time, the notion διάθεσις itself (as one of παρεπόμενα ῥήματος) the status of a concept being in a closer relation with the voice as the inflectional category of the verb. It does not obviously mean that thereby the grammatical category of the verb voice was analysed and described accurately in the Τέχνη. Such a description was impossible since the grammarians tried to explain the very phenomenon, named by them διάθεσις and strictly related to the verbal voice, referring exclusively to the semantic categories of action and

is distinguished which is linked with a meaning different than action or experience (ἐνέργεια or πάθος). And this is not διάθεσις μέση, but οὐδέτερα: οὐδέτερα δὲ ἢ μήτε ἐνέργειαν μήτε πάθος σημαίνουσα, οἷον ζῶ πλουτῶ δύναιμαι βούλομαι (Ibidem, 3—5). And thus, this διάθεσις is characterised by the fact that the verb does not express neither action nor experience, e.g. “I live”, “I am rich”, “I can”, “I want”. On the other hand, διάθεσις μέση still relates exclusively to the meaning of action or experience: μέση δὲ ἢ πῇ μὲν ἐνέργειαν πῇ δὲ πάθος δηλοῦσα (Ibidem, 5). However, the comment accompanying the characteristics of διάθεσις μέση is quite surprising: τὸ γὰρ ἐποιησάμην δηλοῖ, ὅτι ἑμαυτῷ ἐποίησά τι, τὸ δὲ ἐποιήθην, ὅτι δι’ ἑμαυτοῦ ἐποιήθη (Ibidem, 5—6). Generally, about διάθεσις in Dionysios Thrax and his later commentators see: A. Rijksbaron: “The Treatment of the Greek Middle Voice by the Ancient Grammarians”. In: *Philosophie du langage et grammaire dans l’antiquité*. Ed. H. Joly. Bruxelles—Grenoble 1986, pp. 427—444; M. Iwanek: “Kategoria strony w różnoantycznych scholiach do ΤΕΧΝΗ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΗ Dionizjosa Traka”. *Roczniki Humanistyczne* 1997, nr 45 (3), pp. 43—55.

¹³ A similar position is taken by A. Rijksbaron (“The Treatment of the Greek Middle Voice...”, p. 428): „Dionysius’ formulation of the ‘middle’ as the διάθεσις ‘which sometimes signifies activity and sometimes affectedness’ is ambiguous and has been a constant source of confusion, for this definition makes not clear whether the ‘middle’ diathesis consists of verbs whose morphology is not in accordance with their meaning — i.e. verbs that have active forms but passive meaning and vice versa — or verbs that individually have forms that may have active as well as passive meaning. In the first case the term ‘middle’ relates to the anomalous behaviour of certain verbal *endings*, in the second, to that of certain *verbs*. To all appearance Dionysius takes μεσότης in the first sense: πέπηγα and διέφθορα are perfects with active endings — nowadays sometimes called secondary perfects — with passive meaning, from πήγνυμαι and διαφθείρομαι, respectively; by the same token ἐποιησάμην and ἐγραψάμην must be considered as having active meaning.” However, that scholar identifies (not rightly, in our opinion) the meanings constituting πάθος with “passive meaning,” which leads him to the conclusion that Greek grammarians were not aware of the existence of the intransitive meaning of such verbs as πήγνυμαι and διαφθείρομαι (and such forms, respectively, as πέπηγα and διέφθορα): “Observe, in this connection, that the *intransitive* use of πέπηγα and διέφθορα (and also πήγνυμαι and διαφθείρομαι, for that matter) is not mentioned. It is, in fact, one of the striking features of the Greek grammarians’ treatment of voice that the important group of intransitive ‘middle’ verbs that correspond to active so-called causative verbs (e.g. διαφθεῖρω: διαφθείρομαι, ἴστημι : ἵσταμαι) is not recognized as a separate group” (Ibidem).

experience, which obviously excludes a possibility of adequate presentation of the essence of the voice as a grammatical category.

In the treaty *On Syntax* (Περὶ συντάξεως) by the most distinguished Greek grammarian Apollonios Dyskolos (2nd century after Christ)¹⁴, the term διάθεσις also denotes a property of the verb, which is close to the inflectional category of voice and which is — similarly to the Τέχνη — related to the expression of action and experience as well. Among other verb features, it occupies a privileged position; the grammarian treats it as a “special verb property”:

Καὶ τοῦ ῥήματος δὲ ἀναγκαίως πρόκειται τὸ ὄνομα, ἐπεὶ τὸ διατιθέναι καὶ τὸ διατίθεσθαι σώματος ἴδιον, τοῖς δὲ σώμασιν ἐπίκειται ἡ θέσις τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἐξ ὧν ἡ ιδιότης τοῦ ῥήματος, λέγω τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὸ πάθος¹⁵.

The noun necessarily precedes the verb, since influencing and being influenced are properties of physical things, and things are what nouns apply to, and to things belong the special features of verbs, namely doing and experiencing” (I, 16)¹⁶.

In the Apollonios’s opinion, the privileged position of διάθεσις in the verbal system manifests itself also by the fact that — apart from expressing of time — it characterises all verb forms, including infinitives¹⁷.

And finally, also in Apollonios’s text, just as in the Τέχνη, the term διάθεσις refers to a property which, at the level of particular verb forms, is displayed in different ways, which leads to distinguishing various types of διάθεσις standing in

¹⁴ Extensive studies concerning that grammarian were presented by: M. Bednarski: *Studia nad grecką terminologią gramatyczną Apolloniosa Dyskolosa*. Kraków 1994; Idem: *Apollonios Dyskolos: O składni*. Przekład, interpretacja, wstęp M. Bednarski. Kraków 2000; M. Bednarski: *Apollonios Dyskolos i jego gramatyka*. Kraków 2000; D.L. Blank: *Ancient Philosophy and Grammar. The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus*. Chico, California, 1982; I. Sluiter: *Ancient Grammar in Context. Contributions to the Study of Ancient Linguistic Thought*. Amsterdam 1990.

¹⁵ The text of the treaty is quoted according to the following edition: *Apollonii Dyscoli Περὶ συντάξεως*. Rec. G. Uhlig (Grammatici Graeci II 2). Lipsiae 1910. All translations of the quoted passages come from: *The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus*. Translation and commentary F.W. Householder. Amsterdam 1981.

¹⁶ Cf. J.M. van Ophuijsen: “The Semantics of a Syntactician. Things meant by verbs according to Apollonius Dyscolus Περὶ συντάξεως”. In: *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt*. Band 34/1. Berlin—New York 1993, p. 741; E.A. Hahn: “Apollonius Dyscolus on Mood”. *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 1951, No 82, p. 36.

¹⁷ Cf. III, 147: Ἀκολουθὸν ἐστὶ διαλαβεῖν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐγγινομένης διαθέσεως καθ’ ἐκάστην ἐγκλισιν, ἥς οὐδὲ τὰ ἀπαρέμφата ἐκτὸς ἐγένετο διὰ τὸ κατηναγκασμένον τοῦ συνέπεσθαι ἅπασιν τοῖς χρόνοις ἢ ἐνεργητικῶς ἢ παθητικῶς ἢ μέσως — “We must now discuss the category of voice which is present in every mood, not even excluding the infinitives, because of the logical necessity for all tenses to be marked as either active or passive or middle”.

opposition to one another. However, the principles of their identification adopted by Apollonios are not easy to grasp; therefore, we will quote a longer fragment of the *Syntax*, where the grammarian discusses the issues interesting to us, and next we will try to draw some conclusions in this matters:

III, 148: Οὐκ εἴ τι ῥῆμα ὀριστικόν ἐστίν ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἐγκλίσεως, τοῦτο πάντως ἐν διαθέσει καταγίνεται τῇ ἐνεργητικῇ. χρή γὰρ νοεῖν ὅτι ἡ ἐνέργεια ὡς πρὸς ὑποκείμενόν τι διαβιβάζεται, ὡς τὸ *τέμνει, τύπτει*, τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια· ἥς καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν ἐκ προϋφεστῶσης ἐνεργητικῆς διαθέσεως ἀνάγεται, *δέρεται, τύπτεται*. οὐ δὴ τούτοις ὁμοιά ἐστίν τὸ *ὑπάρχω*, τὸ *ζῶ*, τὸ *εἰμί*, τὸ *πνέω*, τὸ *φρονῶ*, τὰ ὅμοια.

III, 149: τῶν δὴ τοιούτων ἀναλόγως ἡ παθητικὴ ἐγκλίσις ὑποσταλήσεται, ὅτι μὴδὲ διὰ τῆς ἐνεργητικῆς ἐγκλίσεως τὰ ἐνεργούμενα πρόσωπα παρέστησαν, ἀ πάντως διατεθέντα τὸ παθεῖν ὁμολογήει. εἰ γοῦν τὸ *φρονῶ* ἐν συνθέσει γένοιτο *καταφρονῶ*, τὴν ἐκ τοῦ *φρονεῖν* διάθεσιν μεταβιβάσαν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑποκείμενον ἐν τῷ *καταφρονῶ σου*, ἀκώλυτον ἔξει τὴν ἀντιπαρακειμένην παθητικὴν διάθεσιν, *καταφρονῶμαι ὑπὸ σοῦ*. ὡς οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ῥήματα κλίνοντες καὶ εἰς παθητικὰς ἐκφορὰς ὁμολογοί εἰσι μελετήματα φωνῆς παραλαμβάνοντες, οὐ μὴν φυσικὴν κλίσιν οὐδὲ συστατὴν.

III, 150: Ἔστιν ἂ καὶ ψυχικὴν ἢ σωματικὴν διάθεσιν σημαίνει, οἷς οὐ προσγίνεται πάλιν ἡ παθητικὴ κλίσις διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ προσούσῃ καταλήξει τὸ πάθος ὑπαγορεύεσθαι [...], τὸ *καπιῶ* ἢ τὸ *ὀφθαλμιῶ*· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα τῶν ῥημάτων ἐν αὐτοπαθείᾳ ἔχει τὸν ὀρισμόν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ διατίθεσθαι ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὐκταίοις γίνεται ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ οὕτως ἔχουσιν, ὁμολογον ὅτι οὐ συστήσεται παθητικὰ τοῦ *πάσχω, χαίρω, ἐρυθριῶ, θνήσκω, γηρῶ, θάλλω, οὖρητιῶ, γαυριῶ*. τοιοῦτον γάρ τι παρακολουθήσει, ὡς εἰ καὶ ἀρσενικοῦ ὀνόματος ἀρσενικόν τις ζητήσειεν ἢ θηλυκοῦ θηλυκόν· οὐ δὴ οὖν παθητικοῦ ὄντος παθητικόν τις ζητήσει.

III, 151: Τὰ γοῦν διὰ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεστῶτος ἐν τύπῳ παθητικῷ ἐνέργειαν σημαίνοντα ἀπαράδεκτον ἔχει τὴν διὰ τοῦ *ω* κατάλεξιν, ἐνεργητικὴν οὖσαν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ταύτης εὐχρηστον διὰ τοῦ προειρημένου μέσου ἐνεστῶτος κατείληπτο, ὡς ἔχει τὸ *βιάζομαι σε, μάχομαι σοι, χρῶμαι σοι* καὶ ἄλλα πλείστα. σαφὲς οὖν ὅτι παντὸς παθητικοῦ εἰς *μαι* λήγοντος ἐνεργητικὸν ἔστιν παραδέξασθαι, ἐὰν μετὰ τῆς καταλήξεως συντρέχη καὶ τὰ τῆς συντάξεως, *ἴσταμαι ὑπὸ σοῦ* — *ἴστημι σέ, δέρομαι ὑπὸ σοῦ* — *δέρω σέ, ἔλκομαι ὑπὸ σοῦ* — *ἔλκω σέ*· οὐχὶ τὸ *πέταμαι ὑπὸ σοῦ*, διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὸ *πέτῃμι σέ*. ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ *ἄγαμαι, δύναμαι, ἔραμαι*.

III, 152: Ἔστι ἂ καὶ διάθεσιν σημαίνει ἐνεργητικὴν, οὐ μὴν ἔχει ἀντιπαρακειμένην παθητικὴν ἐκφορὰν, καθὼς τὰ διατιθέμενα ἄψυχα καθεστῶτα οὐ κῆδύνατο ὁμολογήσαι τὸ παθεῖν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτῶν τις λόγον διαθεῖτο, ὡς ἔχει τὸ *περιπατῶ*. τούτου γάρ οὐ συστατὸν τὸ *περιπατοῦμαι* οὐδὲ τὸ *περιπατῇ*, καθὼς οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα αἱ ἀποφάσεις τῶν λόγων,

οὐδέ ἐξ ἀψύχων αἱ ἀποφάσεις γίνονται, περί γε μὴν αὐτῶν, περιπατεῖ ἡ ὁδός, οἰκεῖται ἡ γῆ. ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐπὶ τοῦ πλέω, τρέχω καὶ ἀπάντων τῶν τοιούτων.

III, 148: Just because a verb occurs in the indicative (or in any other mood) it does not necessarily follow that it will have a true active voice. For you must consider that activity is something that passes over to some object, as in verbs like *temnei* ('he cuts'), *tuptei* ('he beats'), and similar verbs, and from these basic actives is derived the passive voice *deretai* ('he is skinned'), *tuptetai* ('he is being beaten'). But there are quite different verbs such as *huparchō* ('I exist'), *zō* ('I live'), *eimi* ('I am'), *pneō* ('I am breathing'), *phronō* ('I am sensible') etc.

III, 149: The passive inflection of such verbs is regularly lacking, because there are no persons acted upon in the active voice, so there can be no persons affected in such a way as to need to show passivity. Of course if you put a prefix on *phronō* ('I am sensible') and make *kataphronō* ('I scorn, have contempt for'), then there is a passing over of action or attitude of mind to some object as in *kataphronō sou* ('I look down on you'), and so there is nothing to prevent passivization, *kataphronoumai hupo sou* ('I am scored by you'). So anybody who makes up passive forms for such verbs [i.e. 'be', 'live', etc. — H.W.] is obviously just making them up as examples, since they have no such inflection naturally or grammatically.

III, 150: Some verbs signify a mental or physical disposition, which cannot take the passive inflection because the passivity is already present even with the active endings [...], like *kopiō* ('I'm getting tired') or *ophthalmiō* ('I have got eye trouble'): for such verbs involve self-suffering. And since this passive experience may belong either to the class of desirables or those which are not so, it's generally agreed that there are no passives for *paschō* ('I experience (something)'), 'I have (something) done to me', happen to me'), *chairō* ('I rejoice'), *eruthriō* ('I blush'), *thnēiskō* ('I die'), *gērō* ('I grow old'), *thallō* ('I flourish'), *ourētiō* ('I have to urinate'), *gauriō* ('I exult'). Trying to passivize these would be like adding a masculine suffix to masculine nouns or a feminine suffix to feminine nouns. You cannot make something passive if it already is passive.

III, 151: Verbs with 'middle' present form, formally like the passive, but signifying an activity, are incapable of taking the *-ō* endings of the active because the possibility of using it is destroyed by the aforesaid present 'middle', as for instance *biazomai* ('I force you'), *machomai soi* ('I'm fighting you'), *chrōmai soi* ('I use you') and many, many more. It is clear that every passive form in *-mai* etc. has a corresponding active, provided that the syntax-and-semantics agree [in passivity — H.W.] with the form: *histamai hupo sou* ('I am stood up by you'), *histēmi se* ('I stand you up'), *deromai hupo sou* ('I am skinned by you'), *derō se* ('I skin you'), *helkomai hupo sou* ('I am drawn by you'), *helkō se* ('I draw you'), but not **petamai hupo sou* ('*I fly by you'), hence

not **petēmi se* (? ‘I cause you to fly’): the same holds good for *agamai* (‘I admire...’), *dunamai* (‘I can...’, ‘I am able...’), *eramai* (‘I’m in love with...’).

III, 152: Some other verbs signify an activity, yet have no corresponding passive paradigm because the inanimate objects affected by these verbs cannot be considered to experience or feel anything, unless someone makes up a speech as if spoken by them: so *peripatō* (‘I walk’). You cannot make a **peripatoumai* (‘I am being walked’) or a **peripatēi* (‘You are walked’) since we do not address speech to inanimates [for the second person — H.W.] and inanimates cannot make assertions [to use the first person form], but we do talk about them, and can say *peripateitai hē hodos* (‘The road is being walked’), *oikeitai hē gē* (‘The land is inhabited’). The same account works for *pleō* (‘I sail’), *trechō* (‘I run’) and all of that sort.

It results from the above-quoted text that Apollonios made an attempt at distinguishing three different language plans, i.e. formal, semantic and grammatical one. This distinction manifests itself in applying such terms as ἐνεργητική/παθητική ἔγκλισις (ἐκφορά, κλίσις, τύπος) with reference to the formal shape of the word, such expressions as ἐνέργεια/πάθος with reference to the word meaning, and such terms as ἐνεργητική/παθητική διάθεσις with reference to its grammatical characteristics, related to the specific syntactic properties (σύνταξις). And so, ἐνεργητική διάθεσις is characterised with the fact that a respective παθητική διάθεσις is derived from it and that it is manifested only by verb forms which have ἐνεργητική ἔγκλισις and express ἐνέργεια “transferred from the nominative of the subject to the accusative of the object”. In this way, ἐνεργητική διάθεσις is identified here with transitivity. In turn, παθητική διάθεσις is a feature only of those verbs which are characterised by παθητική ἔγκλισις, which express πάθος, connote a suitable syntax with a (noun in) genitive preceded by a pronoun ὑπό and which have formal/functional (inflectional) equivalents characterised by ἐνεργητική διάθεσις. All other verb forms, which do not meet those criteria, are outside the strict opposition ἐνεργητική διάθεσις/παθητική διάθεσις. Apollonios distinguishes four groups of such verbs¹⁸.

One of them is made up of such verbs as ὑπάρχω ‘I exist’, ζῶ ‘I live’, εἰμί ‘I am’, πνέω ‘I breathe’, φρονῶ ‘I think’ etc., which have an active form (ἐνεργητική ἔγκλισις), but do not connote objects the activity is transferred to; therefore, they do not have their equivalents with a passive form (παθητική ἔγκλισις), expressing παθητική διάθεσις.

The second group consists of such verbs as κοπιῶ ‘I am tired’, ὀφθαλμῶ ‘I have an eye problem,’ πάσχω ‘I experience something,’ χαίρω ‘I am happy,’ ἐρυθριῶ ‘I blush,’ θνήσκω ‘I die,’ γηρῶ ‘I grow old’ etc., which do not have passive forms as well, since they express experience already in the active form (towards oneself).

¹⁸ Cf. M. Pantiglioni: “Il termine διάθεσις nella linguistica classica e Dionisio Trace”. *Athenaeum* 1998, nr 86, pp. 258—259.

Another group includes verbs which express action in a passive form, so they do not have active forms, such as e.g. βιάζομαι σε ‘I use violence towards you’, μάχομαι σοι ‘I fight with you’, χρῶμαι σοι ‘I use you’ etc.; the status of *medial praesens* (μέσου ἐνεστώτος) has been attributed to those verbs.

Finally, the last group consists of verbs in an active form, which express an activity addressed exclusively to inanimate objects, such as e.g. περιπατῶ ‘I walk’, οἰκέω ‘I live’, πλέω ‘I swim’, τρέχω ‘I run’, and therefore, they have forms of the passive voice only in the third person, and thus περιπατεῖται ἡ ὁδός ‘the road is walked on (i.e. one walks along the road)’, οἰκεῖται ἡ γῆ ‘the earth is inhabited’ etc.

Apollonios does not classify, by means of any terms, the words belonging to the above-mentioned groups. Only (transitive and intransitive) *verba deponentia* he specified as the forms of μέσου ἐνεστώτος, which may suggest their connection with μέση διάθεσις which would hence consist in expressing action by verbs having a passive form. However, it is difficult to establish in a strict and unambiguous way, what was μέση διάθεσις to our grammarian, since he expresses his opinions about it extremely rarely and in a very brief way. And so in one place he says only:

ἡ συμπαραπομένη διάθεσις, ἐνεργητικὴ οὐσα ἢ παθητικὴ, καὶ ἡ μεταξὺ τούτων πεπτωκυῖα μέση, οὐ προσχωροῦσα οδετέρᾳ.

the inflection for voice, active or passive, and the middle voice which lies between these two. (III, 54).

In another place he writes as follows:

III, 30: Ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ διαθέσεως τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπιδειξάιναι. τὰ γὰρ καλούμενα μέσα σχήματα συνέπτωσιν ἀνεξέτατο ἐνεργητικῆς καὶ παθητικῆς διαθέσεως, [...] τὸ γὰρ ἐλουσάμην καὶ ἐποιησάμην καὶ ἐτριψάμην καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια ἔχει ἐκδηλοτάτην τὴν σύνταξιν ὅτε μὲν ἐνεργητικὴν, ὅτε δὲ παθητικὴν, εἴγε τὸ ἐτριψα τοῦ ἐτριψάμην διαφέρει καὶ τὸ ἔλουσα τοῦ ἐλουσάμην, παράκειται δὲ τῷ ἐποίησα τὸ ἐποίησάμην καὶ ἔτι τῷ προήκα τὸ προηκάμην.

A similar situation can be demonstrated in respect to voice. The forms which are called ‘middle voice’ admit a neutralization (coincidence of form) of active and passive [...]. For *elousamēn* (‘I took a bath’, ‘I bathed (myself)’), *epoiēsamēn* (‘I took part in’, ‘did or made (for myself)’, ‘considered or regarded (X as Y)’), and *etripsamēn* (‘I got tired’) and similar forms are most explicitly construed in both ways, sometimes as actives, sometimes as passives, since *etripisa* (‘I crushed, wore out (something or someone)’) differs from *etripsamēn*, and *elousa* (‘I washed or bathed (someone else)’) differs from *elousamēn*, but there is no such difference between *epoiēsa* (‘I made’, ‘did’) and *epoiesamēn* or between *proēka* (‘I sent’, ‘let go’, ‘threw’) and *proēkamēn* (‘I threw out’, ‘I threw away’).

As can be seen, Apollonios does not speak here about μέση διάθεσις, but about μέσα σχήματα ('medial forms'), which are characterised by the fact that they "admitted coincidence of active and passive diathesis" (συνέμπτωσιν ἀνεδέξατο ἐνεργητικῆς καὶ παθητικῆς διαθέσεως)¹⁹, whereas the notion of active and passive diathesis itself is combined again with the specific syntactic properties (ἔχει ἐκδηλοτάτην τὴν σύνταξιν ὅτε μὲν ἐνεργητικὴν, ὅτε δὲ παθητικὴν). In this context, the forms ἐτριψάμην and ἐλουσάμην were shown as characterised with παθητικὴ σύνταξις (διαθεσις), since they are different from ἔτριψα and ἐλουσα respectively, which in an obviously way have to represent ἐνεργητικὴ σύνταξις (διάθεσις); in turn, the forms ἐποίησάμην and προηκάμην were presented as characterised with ἐνεργητικὴ σύνταξις (διαθεσις), since they are not different from the forms ἐποίησα and προῆκα, which have the same σύνταξις (διαθεσις). It leads to the conclusion that the said "coincidence of active and passive diathesis" (συνέμπτωσις ἐνεργητικῆς καὶ παθητικῆς διαθέσεως), which characterises medial forms (μέσα σχήματα), concerns a specific morphology type (here: medial aorist) and it consists in the fact that some of the formations representing this type are characterised by διάθεσις ἐνεργητική (such as ἐποίησάμην and προηκάμην), whereas other ones (such as ἐτριψάμην and ἐλουσάμην) are characterised by διάθεσις παθητική²⁰. Taking into account passage III, 151, one would need to add that the same status of μέσα σχήματα also characterises the forms of medial *praesens* (μέσου ἐνεστώτος), of which some, e.g. βιάζομαι (σε) express διάθεσις ἐνεργητική, whereas other ones, e.g. ἴσταμαι (ὕπὸ σοῦ), express διάθεσις παθητική.

At this point, it is worth noting that Apollonios mentions in passing also "an action (διάθεσις) which relates one entity to the same entity"²¹, but it occurs while discussing pronouns with reflexive meaning and the grammarian does not refer there to any verb properties related to the voice category²².

In summary, we can state that for Apollonios the notions ἐνεργητικὴ διάθεσις and παθητικὴ διάθεσις identify transitive verb formations, which mean action and experience, respectively, and connote mutually conditioned syntactic structures: *nominativus* + *accusativus*, and *nominativus* + *ὕπὸ* + *genetivus*. The term μέσα refers to the morphological type (medial aorist), the representations of which (i.e. verb forms in medial aorist) are not all characterised by the same διάθεσις, but

¹⁹ Translation of F.W. Householder referring to the place seems to be not very exact.

²⁰ Cf. A. Rijksbaron: "The Treatment of the Greek Middle Voice...", pp. 433—434 (with reference to the quoted passage III, 30): "The middle forms, then, 'received a falling together of the active and the passive diathesis'. This is primarily to be taken in the sense [that] passive endings may have either active or passive meaning". However, that scholar adds (p. 434): "I think that Apollonius, too like Dionysius, considered forms... with active endings but passive meaning as 'middle' ". Cf. also M. Pantiglioni: "Il termine διάθεσις nella linguistica classica...", p. 258: "I verbi con diatesi media [...] sono i verbi che mostrano una sorta di neutralizzazione delle diatesi attiva e passiva, dal momento che hanno un senso sia attivo che passivo".

²¹ II, 139.

²² See M. Bednarski: „Kategoria strony u gramatyków...", p. 106.

some of them by the ἐνεργητική διάθεσις, and some by the παθητική διάθεσις. Intransitive formations are outside that systematics. It is also worth mentioning that the grammarian paid attention to the relations occurring between διάθεσις and other verb properties (such as e.g. tense and mood) and verb formations (e.g. infinitive).

Another issue is the fact that Apollonios uses the term διάθεσις also in meanings which are not linked to the voice category at all²³. Some of them are of non-grammatical nature²⁴, other are close to action (expressed by a verb) as such²⁵, and still other refer to the temporal (aspectual)²⁶ or modal categories. In the latter case, that term is used with the determiner ψυχική (διάθεσις), or τῆς ψυχικῆς (διάθεσις) and it concerns the mood category. Let us add that the application of the terms διάθεσις τῆς ψυχῆς or ψυχικῆς διάθεσις with reference to modal verb features related to the mood was not only Apollonios's habit, but it constituted a more widely spread practice. Therefore, verb properties connected with the voice category were also referred to by means of the term σωματική διάθεσις for differentiation purposes²⁷.

When comparing the meaning of the term διάθεσις in both texts under analysis and its relation to the (present-day) concept of the grammatical voice category, we come to the conclusion that in both texts this term refers to a certain x verb property the essence of which is the relation between the form x and semantics of the verb, while the latter (i.e. semantics) is accounted for in the form of two-part opposition: action/experience (ἐνεργεια/πάθος). Since the said relation can be shaped in different ways at the level of particular verb formations, several kinds of διάθεσις were distinguished by means of specific determiners (ἐνεργητική διάθεσις/ἐνεργεια, παθητική διάθεσις/πάθος, μέση διάθεσις/μεσότης). Apart from those common

²³ What made A. Hahn ("Apollonius Dyscolus...", p. 34) state: "I doubt whether in Apollonius *diathesis* by itself ever has a technical meaning at all. It is rather a colorless word which, chameleon-like, acquires color from its surroundings."

²⁴ E.g. III, 160.

²⁵ τὰ τῆς διαθέσεως — 'actions expressed by a verb'; cf. I, 137: Αἱ πλάγιοι συντάσσονται ταῖς εὐθείαις μεταξὺ πίπτοντος ῥήματος, οὗ τὰ τῆς διαθέσεως ἐπὶ τὴν πλαγίαν μέτεισιν ἐκ τῆς συνοῦσης εὐθείας. [...] παραλαμβάνεται ῥῆμα τι ὑπαρξιν δηλούντων, ἵνα τὴν τοῦ δάσαντος προσώπου διάθεσιν δηλώσῃ, ἐπεὶ καὶ προσώπων ἡ μετοχὴ ἀμοιρεῖ, ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὑβρίσας Τρύφων ἐστίν — "The oblique [forms — H.W.] are connected with the nominative ones by means of a verb whose action passes over from the nominative to the oblique [...]. A verb is added from the class of existence verbs, in order to clarify the identity of the person acting, since participles cannot express person. *The one who injured the man is Thryphon*". See also I, 148; I, 149.

²⁶ E.g. I, 114: ἅπαντα τὰ προστακτικὰ ἐγκειμένην ἔχει τὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος διάθεσιν, προστασσόμενα ἢ εἰς παρατατικὴν διάθεσιν ἢ εἰς συντληκὴν — "all imperatives contain an implicit future tense, whether the command is in imperfective or perfective aspect". See also III, 98; III, 102.

²⁷ Cf. Choeroboscus (Grammatici Graeci IV 2, pp. 5, 4—7): Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι τὰς ἐγκλίσεις οἱ παλαιοὶ καὶ τὰς διαθέσεις κοινῶς ἐκάλουν διαθέσεις, καὶ λοιπὸν ὕστερον διεμέρισαν, καὶ τὰς μὲν ψυχικὰς ἐκάλεσαν ἐγκλίσεις, τὰς δὲ σωματικὰς διαθέσεις. But see also *Scholia in Dionysii Thracis artem*..., pp. 245, 26—27: Διάθεσις ἐστὶ δίατα ψυχῆς καὶ διοικήσεως.

features, however, we note also significant differences as to the way of accounting for various details related to the issue of diathesis in both texts.

With reference to Τέχνη, one can state that the factors given above, in principle, exhaust the criteria which the classification of particular διαθέσεις (kinds of διάθεσις) was based upon. The essence of two of those διαθέσεις, i.e. ἐνεργεία and πάθος, turns out to be the compliance of formal and semantic features within a given verb form. Those types, from a terminological point of view, were identified with semantic features of verb forms, which are characterised by those kinds of διάθεσις. The basis for distinguishing the third type, i.e. μεσότης, is contradiction between formal and semantic characteristics (or, in opinion of some scholars, semantic ambivalence), manifested by specific verb forms.

In turn, in Apollonios's text, apart from those indicated above, an additional syntactic criterion was introduced, which gave a much more restrictive character to the two main and mutually conditioned types of διάθεσις distinguished there, namely, ἐνεργητική διάθεσις and παθητική διάθεσις; in this way, the distribution of those διαθέσεις was narrowed down exclusively to transitive verbs. This was accompanied by a considerable extension of the terminological apparatus, which permitted a more precise description of formal and semantic verb features, and the very features, together with that additional syntactic factor, constituted, as we have already mentioned, criteria for identifying particular διαθέσεις. As a result, determinants of one kind of diathesis, i.e. ἐνεργητική διάθεσις, became the following factors: a specific formal shape of the verb identified as ἐνεργητική ἔγκλισις, suitable meaning, i.e. ἐνεργεία, and transitivity determined by connoted syntax with a subordinate noun in the accusative. In turn, the determinants of the other type of διάθεσις, i.e. παθητική διάθεσις, became: παθητική, ἔγκλισις πάθος and the connoted syntax: ὑπό + noun in the genitive, respectively. Those specific, but very narrow criteria, did not, however, enable Apollonios to determine clearly the διάθεσις of a wide group of intransitive verbs. Although the grammarian mentions middle diathesis (διάθεσις μέση), he does not define it in any way. On the other hand, he introduces the notion of 'medial forms' (μέσα σχήματα) characterised by the fact that they "admitted the coincidence of active and passive diathesis" (συνέμπτωσιν ἀνεδέξατο ἐνεργητικῆς καὶ παθητικῆς διαθέσεως). He includes in those "medial forms" the forms of medial aorist, the specifics of which is that they may be characterised both by διαθέσεως ἐνεργητική (e.g. ποιησάμην or προηκάμην), and διάθεσις παθητική (e.g. ἐτριψάμην or ἐλουσάμην). Therefore, any separate type of diathesis relates to the phrase talking about the "coincidence of active and passive diathesis" (συνέμπτωσις ἐνεργητικῆς καὶ παθητικῆς), but only the ambivalence of diathesis (active or passive) characteristic of specific morphological type (medial aorist) at the level of particular verb forms which represent it, is pointed out.

As can be seen, then, the meaning of the term διάθεσις occurring in both texts is quite difficult to find. Its ambiguity undoubtedly stems, at least to some extent, from real complexity of the matter it refers to. Apart from that, its vagueness

results, on the one hand, from not sufficiently precise description of the criteria identifying the concepts related to that term, and from multitude and incoherence of those criteria, on the other. Due to those shortcomings, the *designatum* of that term, although close to the notion of the grammatical category of voice, is not quite equivalent to it. However, it reflects undoubtedly the way Alexandrian grammarians perceived the effects of the existence of that category in the grammatical system of the Greek language.

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Pojedynek Eneasza z Turnusem (*Eneida* XII 887—952)

Analiza wybranych elementów stylistycznych

Abstract: The author conducted a stylistic analysis of the last 65 poems of the Book XII of *The Aeneid* by Virgil in terms of the effects the dactylic hexameter and sound instrumentation provided the Roman poets with. The very analysis should make the readers of Virgil and other Ancient authors aware of the fact that translating words is only a preliminary activity to understanding an extremely refined art of word which astonishes us.

Key words: a stylistic analysis, metre, sound instrumentation, caesuras, aliterations, enjambement, onomatopoeia, syllabic homophony, euphony

Styl literacki jest zjawiskiem bardzo złożonym, do dzisiaj filolodzy nie są zgodni co do tego, jakie zasady i środki językowo-stylistyczne powinien uwzględnić badacz. Jest oczywiste, że nawet niewielkiej liczby wierszy nie sposób poddać wszechstronnej analizie w jednym studium. Zwłaszcza gdy bierze się na warsztat filologiczny Wergiliusza, którego wyrafinowana sztuka przejawia się w ogromnej ilości zjawisk bardzo różnych. Wątpię, czy kiedykolwiek potrafimy je wszystkie odkryć i w pełni poznać. Postanowiłem zatem ograniczyć się do efektów metrycznych czy też rytmicznych¹ (częściowo sygnalizowanych obok testu) oraz instrumentacji dźwiękowej, czyli różnych rodzajów powtórzeń dźwiękowych² i ich

¹ Korzystałem w tym zakresie z artykułu J. Hellegouarc’ha: “Le récit de la mort de Turnus (Aen. XII 919—952). Analyse métrique et stylistique”. *Studii Clasice* 1968, Vol. 10, s. 133—139.

² Warto przypomnieć, że J.B. Hofmann i A. Szantyr w znanej pracy *Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik* (wiele wydań) omówili aliterację. Postulat uwzględnienia tzw. warstwy brzmieniowej

roli (te dwie grupy tematyczne poprzedzają cyfry rzymskie I, II). Tekst podzielony został na odcinki, co ułatwi zagłębienie do niego podczas lektury analiz. Nie posłużyłem się dostępnymi przekładami *Eneidy* na język polski, mając przekonanie, że lepiej spełni swą funkcję tłumaczenie możliwie wiernie oddające sens słów Wergiliusza.

I jeszcze krótkie wprowadzenie w treść wierszy będących przedmiotem niniejszego studium. *Eneidę* Wergiliusza kończy pojedynek Eneasza z Turnusem. Jak do niego doszło? Wedle znanego mitu Eneasza po klęsce Troi przybył do Italii, aby ocaleni Trojanie połączyli się w jeden naród z ludnością miejscową. Po upływie wielu lat narodzili się potomkowie Eneasza — bliźniacy Remus i Romulus, założyciel Rzymu. Rzymianie z woli Przeznaczenia (*Fatum*) mieli pokojowo władać światem i krzewić cywilizowane obyczaje. Król Latynus zgodził się na małżeństwo swej córki Lawinii z Eneaszem. Raniło to ambicje Turnusa, władcy plemienia Rutulów, który chciał zostać zięciem królewskim. Wybuchła tragiczna wojna, ponieważ była to właściwie wojna domowa. Eneasza sprzymierzył się z Ewandrem, królem Arkadyjczyków, i wziął pod opiekę jego syna Pallasa. Zapalczywy, żądny sławy młodzieniaszek zapragnął zdobyć łupy wojenne na Turnusie, ten jednak w pojedynku bez trudu zabił Pallasa, a tryumfując postawił stopę na jego ciele i jako trofeum wojenne zabrał pas skórzany pokryty złotą blachą. Eneasza przeżywał wielką tragedię. Dążąc do zakończenia rozlewu krwi postanowiono, aby losy wojny rozstrzygnął pojedynek wodzów. Opis walki Eneasza z Turnusem jest właśnie treścią epilogu *Eneidy*.

- 887 Aeneas INstat COntra Telumque COruscat (SSSSD³) (semitem. + semiquin. +
+ semisept.)⁴
- 888 INgens Arbore(um), et saevo sic pecTore faTur: (SDSSD) (semitem. + semi-
quin. + semisept.)
- 889 “quae nunc DeinDe mor(a) est? aut quid iam, Turne, reTracTas? (SDSSD) (se-
miquin + semisept.)
- 890 non CuRsu, saevis CeRtandum (e)st Comminus armis. (SSSSD) (semitem. +
+ semiquin.)
- 891 verT(e) omnis TeT(e) in facies et conTrahe quidquid (semitem. + semiquin. +
+ semisept.)
- 892 sive Animis sive ARTe vales; opt(a) ARDua pennies (semitem. + semisept.)
- 893 Astra seQui ClausumQue CAva te Condere terra”. (semitem. + po 3. trocheju +
+ semisept.)

utworu jest wysuwany powszechnie. Jest to szczególnie ważne w przypadku literatury greckiej i rzymskiej, które przeznaczone były do odbioru słuchowego! Por. J. Korpanty: „Dla uszu, nie dla oczu”. *Nowy Filomata* 2007, Vol. 11 (3), s. 179—189.

³ S = spondej, D = daktyl.

⁴ Używam także nazw łacińskich: semitemnaria (cezura po 3. półstopie), semiquinaria (cezura po 5. półstopie), semiseptenaria (cezura po 7. półstopie).

- 894 ille CAput QUAssans: “non me Tua **fervi**Da Terrent (semitem. + semiquin. +
+ semisept.)
- 895 DIcTa, **ferox**; DI me Terrent et IuppiTer hosTis”. (semitem. + semiquin. +
+ semisept.)
- 896 nec plur(a) effatuS Saxum circumspicit ingenS, (semiquin. + semisept.)
- 897 Sax(um) antiqu(um) ingens, campo quod forte iacebat, (semiquin. + semi-
sept.)
- 898 LImes agro posiTus LIt(em) ut Discerneret arvis. (semitem. + semiquin. +
+ semisept.)
- 899 VIx illum lecti biS Sex cerVice Subirent, (semitem. + semiquin. + semisept.)
- 900 Qualia nunc hominum producit Corpora tellus; (semitem. + semiquin.)
- 901 Ille manu rapTum Trepida Torquebat In hosTem (semitem. + semiquin. +
+ semisept.)
- 902 altior InsurGens et CURsu ConCitus heros. (semiquin.)
- 903 sed neQue CURrentem se neC Cognoscit euntem (semiquin. + semisept.)
- 904 tollentemve MANuS Saxumu(e) imMANe Moventem; (semiquin. + semi-
sept.)
- 905 Genua LABant, GeLidus ConCrevit friGore sanGuis. (semitem. + semiquin.)
- 906 tum LAPis Ipse Viri Vacuum per Inane VoluTus (semiquin. + semisept.)
- 907 nec spaTium eVasiT ToTum neque perTulit icTum. (semiquin. + semisept.)
- 908 ac velut in somnis, oculos ubi languida pressit (semitem. + semiquin. + semi-
sept.)
- 909 nocte Quies, neQuiq(uam) avidos extendere Cursus (semitem. + semiquin. +
+ semisept.)
- 910 Velle Videmur et in mediis conatibus aegri (semiquin. + semisept.)
- 911 SUCcidimus; non linguUA UAlet, non corpore notae (semitem. + po 3. trocheju +
+ semisept.)
- 912 SUfFiciunt ViRes nec Vox aut VeRba Sequuntur: (semitem. + semiquin. +
+ semisept.)
- 913 SiC Turno, quacumque Viam VirTuTe peTiVit, (semitem. + po 3. trocheju +
+ semisept.)
- 914 SUCcesSum Dea Dira negaT. Tum pecTore Sensus (semitem. + po 3. trocheju +
+ semisept.)
- 915 VeRTuntur VaRii; RuTulos aspecTat et urbem (semitem. + semiquin. + semi-
sept.)
- 916 cuncTaTurque meTu leTumqu(e) insTare Tremescit, (semiquin. + semisept.)
- 917 neC Quo s(e) eripiat, neC Qua ui TenDat in hosTem, (semiquin. + semisept.)
- 918 neC Currus usquam videt aurigamque sororem. (semitem. + semiquin.)

887 Eneas naciera, potrzeba wielkim drzewcem pocisku i tak mówi groźnie: „Czemu zwlekasz Turnusie, dlaczego się ociągasz? Na nic rączy nogi, broń okrutna w walce wręcz rozstrzygnie. Zwróć ku mnie twarz,

zbierz całą swą odwagę, sztukę wojenną pokaż. Proś o to, byś mógł ulecieć na skrzydłach do gwiazd, co są wysoko na niebie, lub zniknąć w jaskini podziemnej”. 894 Turnus przeczy ruchami głowy, mówiąc: „Nie budzą we mnie lęku twe słowa srogie, pyszałku, bogów się tylko lękam i nieprzychylnego Jowisza”. Po tych słowach rozgląda się i widzi głaz wielki, stary, co zrządem przypadku leżał na polu jako granica gruntów i rozstrzygał spory o miedzę. 899 Z trudem udźwignęło by go dwunastu wybranych siłaczy, jakich teraz wydaje ziemia. Heros dźwignął go przecież ramiony drżącymi i próbował cisnąć na wroga, unosząc się na palcach wyżej i krok przyśpieszając. 902 Lecz w biegu i chodzie nie jest już tak szybki jak dawniej i ręce głazem objuczone ogromnym słabną. Kolana uginają się, chłód krew w żyłach płynącą ściał. I tak kamień przez męża wyrzucony, w locie powietrznym wirując, nie przebył całej przestrzeni i ciosu wrogowi nie zadał. 908 Działo się tak jak we śnie, gdy spoczynek gnuśny zamyka oczom powieki. Wydaje się nam, że na próżno czynimy wysiłki, by biegiem podążyć i znużeni padamy jak podcięci. Język kołowacieje, ciało w niemocy traci dawne siły, ni głos, ni słowa z ust nie wylatują. 913 Tak to Turnus, gdzie tylko skierować chce dzielnie kroki, za sprawą strasznej bogini tkwi w miejscu. W duszy myśli różne się płaczą. Patrzy na miasto i na Rutulów, strachem zdjęty zwleka, drży na myśl o zbliżającej się śmierci. Nie wie, czy szukać drogi ocalenia, czy uderzyć na wroga. Nie widzi ni rydwanu, ni siostry nim powożącej.

I Rozpocznę od uwag ogólnych dotyczących całego tekstu będącego przedmiotem rozważań. Jeśli idzie o cezury, to uderza ogromna liczba wierszy z trzema cezurami. W. Strzelecki napisał: „Największą zdobyczą w zakresie architektoniki heksametru, jaką uzyskała poezja augustowska, jest wykształcenie i wydoskonalenie systemu tzw. cezury potrójnej, która z reguły występowała tam, gdzie nie mogła mieć cezura miejsca po piątej półstopie”⁵. W epilogu *Eneidy* wszakże i w wielu innych miejscach semiquinaria jest często w wierszach z trzema cezurami⁶. Zdaniem W. Strzeleckiego, cezura potrójna miała dwie postaci: 1) semiternaria + + cezura po 3. trocheju + semiseptenaria, 2) semiternaria + diereza po 2. stopie + + semiseptenaria. Pierwsza pojawia się sześciokrotnie⁷, druga ani razu. Tym, co mnie zaskoczyło, są niezwykle liczne semiternarie, często jako jedna z trzech cezur w jednym wierszu. Uważna analiza treści prowadzi do wniosku, że ce-

⁵ Por. W. Strzelecki: *Metryka grecka i łacińska*. Wrocław 1959, s. 108.

⁶ Trzem cezurom towarzyszy nawet często diereza bukoliczna, lecz tylko raz (por. w. 926) spełnia warunek, jakim jest wypadający w niej koniec myśli, którą podejmuje tekst dalszy; por. np. Verg. *Ecl.* III 68 *parta meae Veneri sunt munera: // namque notavi, Georg.* IV 285 *insincerus apes tulerit cruor. // Altius omnem...*

⁷ Por. XII 911; 913; 914; 922; 924; 937.

zury po 3. półstopie sygnalizują emocje, jakich doznaje narrator lub jego bohaterzy⁸. W. 887-9 Przewaga spondejów, które świadczą o tym, że Eneasza porusza się wolno, ostrożnie, jego uwaga jest skupiona⁹. — W. 888-89 Ten sam układ daktyli i spondejów w wierszach sąsiednich jest zjawiskiem niezmiernie rzadkim, ponieważ powtórzenie rytmu było odczuwane jako coś bardzo dla uszów niemiłego. — W. 890 Cztery wolne spondeje wzmacniają groźbę zawartą w słowach Eneasza. — W. 893, 911, 913, 914 Cezury po 3. trocheju, u Homera ważne, w heksametrze łacińskim marginalne, spełniają zazwyczaj funkcję cezur pomocniczych. Można sądzić, że Wergiliusz i inni autorzy stosowali je, podobnie jak semiternarie, np. wówczas, gdy mowa o czymś ważnym, bolesnym; por. np. *Aen.* I 232, 240, 243 (skarga Wenera), II 3 *infandum regina / iubes renovare dolorem* (Eneasza z niechęcią godzi się opowiedzieć o tragedii Troi); IV 306 *posse nefas tacitusque / mea decedere terra?* 318 *dulce meum, miserere domus labentis et istam* (skarga Dydony), VI 701 *ter frustra comprehensa / manus effugit imago* (Eneasza na próżno pragnie objąć marę ojca); Ennius, *Ann.* 106 *aeternum seritote / diem concorditer ambo*; Owid., *Mt.* VI 228 *tela gerit frenisque / manu moriente remissis*, 235 *consequitur summaque / tremens cervice sagitta*, 246 *membra solo posuere / simul suprema iacentes*, 267 *fama mali populi que / dolor lacrimaeque suorum*, 281 *pascere ait satiaque / meo tua pectora luctu* (tragedia Niobe, dramatyczne sceny rzezi). — W. 899 Cztery spondeje oddają wysiłek, jakiego wymaga powolne dźwignięcie głazu. — W. 911-5 Trzy cezury. Semiternarie w sposób niezwykle podkreślają dramatyzm sytuacji Turnusa — W. 918 W całej twórczości Wergiliusza poza tym miejscem nie ma wyrazu *videt* po cezurze po 5. półstopie, u Owidiusza zdarza się to pięć razy: *Mt.* II 685, IV 172, V 363, VII 371, XV 133. W każdym wypadku mamy do czynienia z jakimś napięciem. Już ta niewielka ilość przytoczonych miejsc prowadzi do wniosku, że metryka genialnych poetów kryje w sobie różne efekty, na które zazwyczaj zupełnie nie zwracamy uwagi. — W. 915 *vertuntur varii*, słowa kończące zdanie umieścił poeta na początku wiersza, a zatem jest to tzw. przerzutnia (*enjambement*), która zapobiega nieznośnej jednostajności, z jaką mielibyśmy do czynienia, gdyby zawsze myśl kończyła się wraz z końcem wiersza. Czasem słowo lub słowa przerzucone stanowią dla słuchacza-czytelnika coś niezwykłego, niespodziewanego, nawet szokującego, uzyskując wzmocnienie znaczeniowe, dlatego dobry recytator niekiedy zawiesza głos. Jako pierwszy z polskich twórców zastosował przerzutnię Jan Kochanowski. W omawianym miejscu jest ona ważna, ponieważ Turnus uświadamia sobie właśnie, że jego sytuacja jest beznadziejna.

⁸ Jest to, jak sądzę, problem godny zbadania. Przykład dał zapewne Ennius, u którego semiternarie znajdujemy nawet w kolejnych wierszach, por. np. *Ann.* 30—31, 231—233, 249—250, 402—403, 443—445. Bardzo liczne są one np. na początku *Eneidy* (I 1—33), w opisie igrzysk sportowych w ks. V (114—603), w mowie Turnusa (XI 378—444), liczne w Owidiuszowym opisie śmierci potomstwa Niobe (*Mt.* VI 224—266), pojawiają się w pięciu końcowych wierszach tego poematu (XV 875—879).

⁹ Por. X 878 i 880 (pojedynek Eneasza z Mezencjuszem).

II Zacznę od krótkiego wprowadzenia¹⁰. Każde powtórzenie dźwiękowe, zwane też figurą dźwiękową, jest ozdobnikiem stylistycznym (*ornamentum*). Powtórzenia dźwiękowe w szczególny sposób zespalają wyrazy, podkreślają emocje, a co za tym idzie — wzmacniają ekspresję tekstu, wprowadzają także określony nastrój, np. uroczysty. Ważne są efekty dźwiękonaśladowcze (onomatopeje) oraz gry i żarty słowne. W poezji antycznej powtórzenia dźwiękowe współtworzą tzw. architekturę wiersza, np. podkreślając cezury. W tekście, który będę analizował, jest ogromna liczba powtórzeń dźwiękowych, a zatem nie omówię wszystkich. Zachęcam czytelników do własnych obserwacji, które ułatwić powinno to, że figury dźwiękowe uwidocznione są za pomocą dużych liter, a niekiedy także druku wytłuszczonego.

W. 887-8 Aliteracja: *Aeneas ... Arboretum* oraz w. 892-3 *Animis ... ARTe ... ARDua*¹¹ ... *Astra*. Aliteracje bardzo często świadczą o tym, że autor lub postać z jego utworu przeżywa jakieś silne emocje, np. cieszy się, odczuwa lęk, jest czymś poruszona, współczuje komuś. Aby emocje te podkreślić, autorzy szczególnie często posługują się powtórzeniami głosek *a* oraz *t*, *d*. Zilustruję to wybranymi przykładami: Werg., *Aen.* IV 279-285 *At ... Aeneas*¹² *Aspectu ... Amens, / ARrecTaeque ... hAesit / ARdet Abire ... Dulcisque ... Terras, / AtToniTus*¹³ *TanTo*¹⁴ *moniTu ... Deorum / ... Agat? ... Ambire furenTem / AuDeat AdfaTu ... / Atque Animum* (przerażenie i rozterki Eneasza); IX 443 *Adverso ... Animam Abstulit* (moment zabicia wroga), IX 625-30 *Audacibus Adnue ... / Ad ... / Ante Aras Aurata ... / hArenam / Audit* (podniosła modlitwa Askaniusza), Petroniusz, *Sat.* 38, 3 *APes AB Athenis ... Afferri* (podziw, zachwyt), 61, 9 *in Angustiis Amici Apparent* (połączenie wyrazów w przysłowiu, którego wersja polska brzmi: „Prawdziwych przyjaciół poznajemy w biedzie”), 91, 7 *Amoris Arbitrium Ad Alium* 94, 2 *Accipit Alium Amat* 94, 3 *Animum Adversus Ascyllon* (rozżalenie zdradzonego kochanka), Ennius, *Ann.* 109: *o TiTe TuTe TaTi Tibi TanTa Tyranne TuliTi* (współczucie autora dla Tytusa Tacjusza)¹⁵, X 554-5 *Tum caput oranTis nequiqu(am) et mulTa*

¹⁰ Czytelnikom zainteresowanym problemami warstwy brzmieniowej tekstów polecam pracę L. Pszczołowskiej; „Instrumentacja dźwiękowa”. W: *Poetyka. Zarys encyklopedyczny*. Cz. 2, Z. 2, Wrocław 1977. W figurach dźwiękowych odpowiadają sobie następujące głoski: *c,g; c,q; g,q; y,u; y,i; t,d; p,b; v,f; ch(kh),c; th,t; ph,p; ph,f*.

¹¹ Powtórzenie więcej niż jednej głoski to tzw. aliteracja pogłębiona.

¹² Dyftong *ae* to połączenie samogłoski *a* z niezgłoskotwórczym *e*, dlatego wyrazy mające ten dyftong na początku bierze się pod uwagę w figurach aliteracyjnych jako zaczynające się od samogłoski *a*.

¹³ Podobnie jak większość badaczy, uwzględniam nie tylko początki wyrazów (tzw. aliteracja inicjalna), lecz także początki sylab. Ma uzasadnienie nawet pogląd, że należy brać pod uwagę — przynajmniej niekiedy — powtarzanie się głosek niezależnie od miejsca, w którym występuje w wyrazie.

¹⁴ Por. Ovid. *Mt.* VII 614 *atToniTus TanTo ... Turbine*, XI 127 *atToniTus noviTaTe*.

¹⁵ Autor *Retoryki ad Herennium* uznał, że Ennius przesadził w nagromadzeniu spółgłoski *t*: IV 18 *vitabimus nimiam assiduitatem eiusdem litterae*. Ale poniżej w cytacie z Wergiliusza (*Aen.*

paranTis / Dicere DeTurbaT Terrae Truncumque TepenTem (scena walki, w której odrąbana głowa spada na ziemię), I 8-11 *Musa, Mihi CAusas MeMora, quo nuMine laeso / quidve Dolens regina Deum Tot VolVere CAsus / Insignem pieTaTe Virum, Tot Adire labores / Impulerit. TanTaene Animis Caelestibus Irae?*, Lucrecjusz I 28 *aeTer-num Da DicTis Diva leporem*, Owid., *Mt.* I 1-4 *muTaTas Dicere ... Di coepTis ... mu-TasTis adspiraTe ... munDi ... perpeTuum DeDuciTe Tempora* (wszyscy trzej poeci we wstępach do swych poematów żarliwie proszą bogów o pomoc). — W. 890 *CuRsu ... CeRtandum*, w. 912 *ViRes ... VeRba*, w. 915 *VeRtuntur VaRii* — szczególny rodzaj aliteracji, w której powtarzają się dwie spółgłoski, a zmienia się umieszczona pomiędzy nimi samogłoska. W przykładzie ostatnim (w. 915) powtórzenie dźwiękowe powoduje, że jako rzecz najistotniejszą odczuwamy wstrząs, jaki przeżywa Turnus, uświadamiając sobie, że czeka go śmierć. Włoski filolog Lucio Ceccarelli aliteracji występującej w utworach Wergiliusza poświęcił osobną rozprawę¹⁶. Jest rzeczą znaną, że aliteracja pojawia się w pierwszym wierszu przekładu *Odysei*, którego autorem był Liwiusz Andronikus, pierwszy znany nam poeta rzymski: *ViRum mihi Camena insece VeRsutum*¹⁷. Jest oczywiste, że tutaj figura dźwiękowa w sposób szczególny łączy rzeczownik z przymiotnikiem, a ponadto stanowi tzw. ramę dźwiękową wiersza. Podobnie jak i inne rodzaje powtórzeń dźwiękowych aliteracja ta może mieć niekiedy znaczenie szczególne. W *Satyrykach* Petroniusza jeden z gości Trymalchiona mówi o kobietach: 42, 7 *MuLier ... MiLvium*¹⁸ *genus* — „kobiety to rodzaj istot drapieżnych”, a zatem zjawisko językowe niejako potwierdza trafność tej opinii. Podobnie u Ammiana Marcellinusa: XXIII 5, 19 *FoRtuna VeRsabilis* — „Fortuna zmienna”. Są w łacinie pary wyrazów, w których często występuje omawiana aliteracja, np. *ViRtus, FoRtuna, FoRs*. W ostatnim przykładzie jest przeciwstawienie: *virtus* to świadoma aktywność ludzi, dzięki której coś osiągają, a *Fortuna* i *Fors* to ślepy przypadek, por. np. Ennius, *Ann.* 197-8 *FoRs ViRtute*, 199 *ViRtuti ... FoRtuna*, Werg., *Aen.* XII 714 *FoRs et ViRtus*, 435 *disce, puer, ViRtutem ex me VeRumque laborem / FoRtunam ex aliis*, Sen. *Lucil.* 71, 30 *sapiens quidem vincit ViRtute FoRtunam*, Publilius Syrus V 11 *ViRtuti melius quam FoRtunae creditur*. — W. 896 *effatuS Saxum*¹⁹, w. 899 *biS Sex*, w. 903 *neC Cognoscit*, w. 907 *evasiT Totum*, w. 917 *neC Quo s(e) eripiat, neC*

X 554-5) nasycenie tekstu spółgłoskami *t, d* jest równie duże! W utworze Owidiusza jest nawet podobieństwo do słów Enniusza: *Mt.* XIII 565-7 *claDe sui Thracum gens inriTaTa Tyranni / Troada Telorum lapiDumque incessere iacTu / coepit*. — Dodam, że starożytni nie znali pojęcia głoski.

¹⁶ L. Ceccarelli: *L'allitterazione a vocale interposta variabile in Virgilio*. Roma 1986.

¹⁷ Por. S. Mariotti: *Livio Andronico e la traduzione artistica*. Milano 1952.

¹⁸ Jest to przymiotnik od rzeczownika *miluus, i* — kania (ptak drapieżny).

¹⁹ Kwintyliusz uznał, że spółgłoska *s* to *absona littera* — „litera niemiła dla uszu”, i z tego powodu przestrzegał przed omawianą zbitką. Niemniej jednak zarówno w poezji, jak i w prozie jest ona bardzo częsta, ponieważ głoska *s* w języku łacińskim ma bardzo dużą frekwencję. Niekiedy zbitkę stosowano świadomie w celu osiągnięcia pewnych efektów brzmieniowych lub rytmicznych. W tekstach Lukrecjusza, Wergiliusza i Horacego występuje zazwyczaj w jednej z cezur lub w dierezie po stopie 4. Nieliczne są zatem wiersze takie: *Lucr.* II 526 *formarum finita necesse est quae simileS Sint*, *Verg. Aen.* II 31 *parS Stupet...*, 125 *artificiS Scelus...*

Qua, w. 918 *neC Currus*²⁰ — jest to zbieg spółgłosek na końcu jednego wyrazu i początku wyrazu następnego, zjawisko dosyć częste²¹. Funkcje: emfaza emocjonalna lub retoryczna, onomatopeja, podkreślenie punktuacji, wzmocnienie rytmu wierszowego. Najczęściej zbitki spółgłoskowe występują w cezurach, dzięki czemu uwydatniają się one mocniej (tzw. architektura wiersza), częste są także pomiędzy stopą 4 i 5 (np. Werg., *Aen.* I 57 *sceptra tenens mollitque animos eT Temperat iras*)²². — W. 902 Anagram: *inSURGens ... CURSu*. — W. 906-7 Znów przykład aliteracji głoski *t*, która podkreśla emocje rodzące się w oczekiwaniu na to, czy kamień dosięgnie Eneasza czy chybi. — W. 911-4 Aliteracja na początku kolejnych wierszy²³. — W. 911 *lingUA UAlet* — tzw. dzisiaj homofonia sylabiczna, czyli powtórzenie sylaby na końcu wyrazu i początku wyrazu następnego. Już Izokrates i Kwintylijan radzili unikać takiego powtórzenia dźwiękowego, ale współczesne badania dowiodły, że często było ono stosowane świadomie dla osiągnięcia pewnych efektów²⁴, czego dowodzi tutaj także Wergiliusz. Poeta pisze o śnie, w którym osoba śpiąca chce coś powiedzieć, lecz język odmawia jej posłuszeństwa i w rezultacie z ust wydobywa się tylko bełkot. Oddaje to homofonia sylabiczna, która bez wątpienia jest kakofoniczna. Dodajmy, że pomysł zaczerpnął Wergiliusz zapewne od innych autorów rzymskich²⁵.

919 CunctanTi TeL(um) Aeneas faTaLe Coruscat, (SSSSD) (semitern. + semi-sept.)

²⁰ Zwróćmy uwagę na to, że zbieg spółgłosek występuje na początku dwóch kolejnych wierszy, co w poezji Wergiliusza zdarza się tylko tutaj. Można sądzić, że był to zabieg celowy, którego efekt jest dla nas nieznany. Częściej posłużył się nim Owidiusz: *Mt.* XIV 690-91; *Tristia* II 1, 417-8, *AA* III 63-4; 125-6.

²¹ Por. G. Highet: "Consonant Clashes in Latin Poetry". *Class. Phil.* 1974, 69, s. 178—185; I. Korpanty: "De sonorum iterandorum arte ab epicis Romanis exculca quaestiones duae". *Classica Cracoviensia* 2003, VIII, s. 50—53.

²² W omawianym tekście por. także: 925 *loric(ae) et clipe(i) extremoS Septemplicis orbis* (por. *Lucr.* I 30 *per maria ac terras omniS Sopita quiescent*); 930 *ill(e) humiliS Supplex oculos dextramque precantem* (por. *Lucr.* I 610 *quae minimiS Stipata cohaerent partibus arte*) 933 *tangere cura potest, oro fuit eT Tibi talis* (por. *Horat. Epist.* I 16, 28 *servet in ambiguo qui consulit eT Tib(i) et urbi*). W Uniwersytecie Śląskim w 2008 roku Katarzyna Lesiak obroniła pracę doktorską zatytułowaną *Estetyka dźwięku, czyli instrumentalizacja dźwiękowa oraz jej praktyczna realizacja w poezji epickiej mistrzów heksametru lacińskiego: Lukrecjusza, Wergiliusza i Owidiusza*. Za pomocą specjalnego programu komputerowego badała m.in. właśnie zbitki spółgłoskowe, dzięki czemu mogę przytoczyć pewne dane statystyczne (praca dopiero ukaże się drukiem, mam do niej dostęp jako promotor). Zbitka *-s-s-* u Wergiliusza występuje ogółem 496 razy, w tym 239 razy w cezurze, zbitka *-t-t-* odpowiednio 391 i 109 razy. Pozostałe spółgłoski pod względem częstości wystąpienia zajmują dalsze miejsca.

²³ Por. I. Korpanty: "De sonorum iterandorum arte ab epicis Romanis exculca quaestiones duae". *Classica Cracoviensia* VIII, 203, s. 41—49.

²⁴ Por. J. Korpanty: "Syllabische Homophonie in lateinischer Dichtung und Prosa". *Hermes* 1997, Vol. 125, s. 330—346.

²⁵ Plaut, *Rud.* 905 *sUA UAniloquentia* (mowa chępliwa), *Ps.-Sallust. Ad Caes.* 2, 9 *lingUA UAAna* (o L. Domicjuszu), in *Cic.* 5 *lingUA UAAna*.

- 920 sorTiTUs forTUn(am) oculis, et corpore ToTo (semitem. + semiquin. + semisept.)
- 921 *eminus inTorquet. Murali conciTā numquam* (semiquin.)
- 922 TOrmenTO Sic Saxa Fremunt nec Fulmine TanTi (semitem. + po 3. trocheju + semisept.)
- 923 **DissulTant** crepiTus. volAT ATri Turbinis insTar (semitem. + semiquin.)
- 924 exiTium Dir(um) hasta ferens orasque recludit (semitem. + po 3. trocheju + semisept.)
- 925 loric(ae) et clipe(i) extremoS Septemplicis orbis; (semitem. + semisept.)
- 926 per medium stridens transit femur. **INCidit Ictus** (semitem. + semiquin. + semisept.+ bukol.)
- 927 **INGens** ad Terram DuPLiCaTo poPLITe Turnus. (semitem. + semiquin.)
- 928 ConsurGunt GemiTU Rutuli toTUsque remUGit (semitem. + semiquin. + semisept.)
- 929 mons circ(um) et vocem late nemor(a) alta remittunt. (semiquin. + semisept.)

919 Gdy (Turnus) waha się, Eneasza potrząsa pociskiem, który jest narzędziem przeznaczenia, a widząc, że los daje mu chwilę stosowną, wysiłkiem całego ciała rzuca (pocisk). Kamienie wyrzucone z katapulty stojącej na murach nigdy tak nie świszczą ani od uderzenia pioruna nie niesie się taki łoskot. 923 Pocisk szybkuje niczym czarna trąba powietrzna, niosąc straszną śmierć, przebija pancerz, przebija brzeg siedmiowarstwowego okrągłego puklerza i z szumem przechodzi przez środek uda. Wielki Turnus trafiony zginając kolana pada na ziemię. 928 Rutulowie zrywają się z krzykiem, który odbijają szeroko całe ciągnące się wokół wzgórza i wysokie lasy.

I Powtarzają się wielokrotnie semitemnary, pięć wierszy z trzema cezurami, dwa z czterema. — W. 919-20 Jeśli pominiemy klauzule, to na osiem stóp jest aż siedem spondejów (por. w. 887-9). Pierwsze stopy obu wierszy to spondeje, a pierwsze wyrazy to molosy (molossus — trzy sylaby długie). Mają te wyrazy dwa iktusy wierszowe na sylabie pierwszej i ostatniej, co przydaje im długości uroczystej. Wergiliusz zapewne naśladował Enniusza, *Ann.* 187-8 *incedunt... percellunt*; 249-50 *multorum ... prudentem*; 343-44 *exspectans ... pugnandi*; 402-3 *configunt ... aerato*. — W. 920 Semiseptenaria (po *oculis*), po której zaczyna się opis miotania pocisku, podkreślony przerzutnią *eminus intorquet*. — Szybkość, z jaką leci pocisk, podkreśla daktyl na początku wiersza 921 *eminus*, kontrastujący ze spondejami na początku wierszy poprzedzających. Ale w wierszach następnych 922 i 923 znów pojawiają się molosy — *tormento*, *dissultant*, przedłużając napięcie dramatyczne. — W. 923 Lot pocisku: semiquinaria, po niej *volat*, wyraz pyrryichiczny, co podkreśla szybkość pocisku. — W. 923 Przerzutnia *dissultant crepitus*. — W. 924-25 Daktyle i elizje oddają szybkość lotu nieprzerwanego, od-

nosi się wrażenie, że pocisk niezawodnie zmierza do celu. Zdaniem niektórych badaczy, również w w. 925 spółgłoski bezdźwięczne sprawiają, że odczuwamy straszne skutki pocisku, brutalność zadawania rany. — W. 926 Pocisk osiąga cel, zatrzymuje się, co podkreśla cezura bukoliczna po *femur* oraz to, że wyraz ten składa się z dwóch sylab krótkich poprzedzonych sylabami długimi. — W. 927 Ogromny Turnus ciężko, powoli osuwa się na ziemię — współgrają z tym dwa początkowe spondeje; wyraz spondeiczny (*ingens*) na początku wiersza pojawia się rzadko. — W. 928 zaczyna się od molosa (wolny rytm podkreśla rozpacz Rutulów), kontrast stanowi przerzucenie na początek wiersza następnego wyrazu jednosylabowego *mons*.

II W. 919 Rama dźwiękowa utworzona przez aliterację w wyrazie pierwszym i ostatnim *Cunctanti ... Coruscat*. Aliteracja spółgłoski *t* przechodząca do wiersza następnego: *sorTiTus forTunam ... ToTo*, świadcząca o tym, że narrator przeżywa emocje. Najważniejsza jest aliteracja *TeLum ... (fa)TaLe* zespalająca rzeczownik i przymiotnik. Ceccarelli w pracy wskazanej w przypisie 16 uwzględnił czasowniki poprzedzone przyimkami²⁶, nie brał natomiast pod uwagę początków sylab. Moim zdaniem popełnił błąd, o czym świadczą przykłady bardzo znaczące, np. *Aen.* VI 853 *PaRcere ... suPeRbos*, VII 57 *MiRo aMoRe*, 604 *lacrimaBiLe BeLlum*, VIII 341 *noBiLe PaLlanteum*, X 92 *DaRdanius ... aDuLter* (spółgłoskę *r* w pozycji przed spółgłoską wymawiano jak *l*), 677 *TuRnus aDoRo*, XI 162 *ruTuLi TeLis*, XII 178 *PaTer omniPoTens*. — W. 921 aliteracja *intorQuet ... ConCita numQuam*. — W. 921-2 homofonia sylabiczna *tanTI / DIssultant*. Jest to homofonia bardzo często spotykana u poetów i prozaików, często ma oczywistą wymowę emocjonalną, np. gdy Horacy zwraca się do Augusta: *Sat.* II 1,15 *praesenTI Tibi maturos largimur honores* (uwielbienie); podobnych miejsc jest wiele. U Wergiliusza, Horacego, Owidiusza i innych znajdujemy homofonie *-TI / DI-* na granicy wierszy. W omawianym miejscu prawdopodobny jest efekt dźwiękonaśladowczy: odgłos uderzenia pocisku lub pioruna. — W. 922 aliteracje: *TormenTo ... Tanti, Sic SakSa (disSultant), Fremunt Fulmine*. W. 923 *volAT ATri turbinis instar*, homofonia sylabiczna *-AT AT-*, nasycenie tekstu spółgłoską *r*, która uchodziła za nieeufoniczną. Satyryk Persjusz nazwał ją „głoską psią” — *littera canina* (I 109-10). — *TuRbinis insTaR* jest to powtórzenie dźwiękowe w klauzuli heksametru²⁷. — W. 922-3 W obu wierszach przeważają spółgłoski bezdźwięczne: *t, s, k, p*; wedle niektórych badaczy (np. Hellegouarc’ha) mogą one wywoływać nastrój grozy (tzw. symbolizm dźwiękowy lub synestezja). — W. 924 powtórzenie w arsach

²⁶ Por. np. *Aen.* VII 294 *ocCuMbere CaMpis*, XII 688 *exSuLtatque SoLo*.

²⁷ Por. J.-P. Chausserie-Laprée: “Pour une étude de la structure phonique du vers: la clause de l’hexamètre”. *Revue des Études Anciennes* 1974, Vol. 76, s. 5—28; J. Korpanty: “De sonis in clausulis hexametricis repetitis”. In: “Scripta Classica”. T. 1. Ed. M. Bednarski, ass. ed. T. Sapota. Katowice 2004, s. 17—22. Oto inne przykłady: *Aen.* VII 579 *LImine pelLI*, VIII 541 *TOLLit ab alTO*, IX 31 *fLUmine niLUs* 812 *cORpore sudOR*, X 252 *DIndyma corDI*, 703 *NOcte theaNO*.

hASta ... orASque, które może naśladować świst lecącego pocisku²⁸. — W. 924-5 aliteracja *reCLudit ... CLipei*. — W. 926 *StridenS tranSit* — spółgłoska *s* nasuwa myśl o onomatopei, por. w. 924. — W. 926-7 *INCidit Ictus / INGens* — aliteracja w dwóch spośród trzech wyrazów pogłębiona, wyraża emocje, podkreśla, że dzieje się coś ważnego: Turnus jest już pokonany²⁹. — Godne uwagi jest powtórzenie dźwiękowe w klauzuli wiersza 926 *inCidit Ictus*. Jest to onomatopeja naśladowająca uderzenie pocisku o pancerz. Upewniają nas w tym bardzo liczne podobne klauzule, w których mowa o zadawaniu ciosu lub krzesaniu ognia z krzemienia, np. Lukrecjusz IV 1050 *iCImur Ictu*, 1052 *acClpit Ictus*, VI 313 *exClpit Ictum*, Werg., *Aen.* XII 926 *inCidit Ictus*, Owid., *Mt.* XV 348 *conClpit ICTibus IGnem*. — W. 927 aliteracje: *TeRram ... TuRnus; Teram duplicaTo popliTe Turnus*. Powtórzenie 3 głosek w tej samej kolejności (odwrotność palindromu) *duPLicato poPLite*³⁰. — W. 927-8 *TURnus / gemiTU ... toTUsque* — powtórzenia występują w arsach. Mamy do czynienia z osobnym zjawiskiem, które może pełnić wszystkie funkcje przypisywane powtórzeniom dźwiękowym³¹. W tym miejscu, jak się zdaje, wzmacnia ekspresję tekstu i onomatopei. Inne przykłady tego zjawiska z rzeczownikiem *gemitus* potwierdzają, że jest to efekt zamysłu świadomego: Werg., *Georg.* III 506 *interDum gemiTU*, Lukrecjusz III 495 *exprimiTUR gemiTUs*, VI 196 *TUm gemiTUs*, Owid., *Mt.* II 621 *TUm vero gemiTUs*, IX 163 *gemiTUm virTute*. — W. 928 W większości sylab są spółgłoski bezdźwięczne oraz samogłoska *u* w arsach i nie tylko w nich — z jednej strony podkreśla to wędrówkę dźwięku, z drugiej jest to spółgłoska „smutna”, o czym świadczy np. czasownik *ululo* — „zawodzić, wyć smutno” (por. np. *Georg.* I 486 *lupis ululanti-bus urbes*, *Aen.* VII 18 *ululare luporum*, XI 662 *ululante tumultu*, Sil. Ital. VII 129 *trucis ululatus turba luporum*). — W. 928-9 aliteracja: *gemiTu ruTuli ToTusque ... / laTe alTa remiTunt* (wydarzenie dramatyczne). Aliteracja pogłębiona w ostatnich wyrazach obu wierszy: *REMuGit, REMittunt*.

930 **ill(e)** **humilis** **supplex** **oculos** **DexTramque** **PRecanTem** (semitem. + semi-quin. + semisept.)

931 **PRoTenDens** “equidem merui nec DePREcor” **inquit**; (semitem. + semiquin. + semisept.)

²⁸ Przykładów można przytoczyć bardzo wiele, por. np. *Aen.* X 588 *orAS hASta per imAS*, 783 *AeneAS hAStam*, XII 431 *morAS hAStamque*.

²⁹ Aliteracje samogłoskowe bardzo wzmacniają ekspresję tekstu, por. np. *Aen.* I 348-9 *Inter ... Ille ... Impius*, 737 *Increpans Ille Impiger*, VI 781-2 *Illa Incluta ... Imperium*.

³⁰ Por. J. Korpanty: “Anagrams and Two Other Related Sound Repetitions”. *Classica Cracoviensia* 2000, Vol. 5: *Studies in Ancient Theory and Criticism*, s. 193—209. Por. także np. IX 330 *REMI pREMI*, X 314 *sutA PER TUnicam ... APERTUm*, 451-2 *AEQUOR ... prAECORdia*, 465 *prEMIT gEMITum*, Hor. *Carm.* I 13, 10 *uMEROs ... MERO*.

³¹ Por. J. Korpanty: “Die Lautwiederholungen in den Arseis des Lateinischen Hexameters”. *Classica Cracoviensia* 2001, Vol. 6, s. 145—162.

- 932 „uTere sorTe Tua. miseri te si qua parenTis (semiquin. + semisept.)
 933 TAngere cura poTest, oro (fuit eT Tibi Talis (semiquin. + semisept.)
 934 Anchises geniTor) Dauni miserere SenecTae (semitem. + semiquin. +
 + semisept.)
 935 et me, Seu corpus SpoliaTum lumine mavis, (semitem. + semiquin.)
 936 redDe meis. VICist(i) et VICTum Tendere palmas (semitem. + semiquin.)
 937 Ausonii VIDere; Tua (e)st LaVINia coniunx, (semitem. + po 3. trocheju +
 + semisept.)
 938 ulTerius ne Tend(e) oDiis.” (semitem. + semiquin. + semisept.)

930 Ów (Turnus) jak błagalnik pokorny wzrokiem i gestem prawicy prosi o litość, mówiąc: „Zaiste zawiniłem, lecz nie błagam o litość, 932 korzystaj z daru losu. Jeśli wszakże troska o nieszczęsnego rodzica może cię wzruszyć — wszak i ty miałeś dobrego ojca imieniem Anchizes — to proszę, ulituj się nad nieszczęsnym Daunusem 934-5 i oddaj mnie żywego moim ziomkom lub, jeśli wolisz, moje martwe ciało. 936 Zwyciężyłeś i lud Auzoński widział, jak pokonany wyciągam błagalnie ręce. Lawinia twą żoną. Porzuć już nienawiść.

I Od wiersza 930 następuje zmiana treści: Turnus jest już pokonany i błaga o darowanie mu życia. Molos *protendens* przerzucony jest do wiersza następnego **931**, odczuwamy, że gest Turnusa jest uroczysty, nie pozbawiony wielkości, natomiast w wierszach **932** i **933** dominują daktyle, ponieważ Rutul niecierpliwie ponagla Eneasza do podjęcia decyzji. — Nie można też przeoczyć celowego umiejscowienia *miseri*: wyraz ten jest pomiędzy cezurą po 5. półstopie (po której jest bardzo wyraźna punktacja) a cezurą po 7. półstopie. Jest to w heksametrze miejsce bardzo szczególne. — W. **934** zaczyna się od poważnego molosa *Anchises*, poważny jest także spondej w drugim imieniu *Dauni*. — Od w. **935** prośba Turnusa staje się uroczystsza; wiersz ten rozpoczynają dwa spondeje (a trzy początkowe słowa to wyrazy monosylabiczne długie), myśl kończy się w wierszu następnym przerzutnią *redde meis*. — *Redde* to trochej, wyraz trocheiczny na początku wiersza ma bardzo wielką siłę ekspresji (u największych poetów ilość takich wierszy waha się od 11—16%). W końcowych trzech wierszach wypowiedź rwie się, bo Turnus jest ciężko ranny, mówi z trudem, z przerwami, a zatem punktacja jest mocna, w różnych miejscach. — W. **937** i **938** rozpoczynają daktyle, ale będące częścią wyrazów choriambicznych [choriamb -UU-]. W w. **937** po słowach *Ausonii videre* kończy się myśl. Obserwujemy tu zjawisko rzadkie: *videre* kończy się trochejem, co sprawia, że ważny³² przymiotnik *tua* jest szczególnie eksponowany.

II W. **930** *ILle humiLIs* — to powtórzenie dźwiękowe w arsach, które w tym wypadku tworzy ramę dźwiękową, obejmując początek wiersza i cezurę po trzeciej

³² Por. Lucr. II 871, Ovid. *Mt.* III 206, IV 544, IX 644.

półstopie³³. Spółgłoska *l* to głoska miękka, palatalna, *il, li* jest eufoniczne, „miękkie”. Sądę, że ta miękkość powtórzenia dźwiękowego odpowiada treści: Turnus, niegdyś hardy, twardy, bezwzględny wojownik, teraz pokornie błaga o życie, zmiekkł. Na poparcie tej tezy można jeszcze przytoczyć inne przykłady: *Eneida*: VI 512 (w podziemiu, poruszająca skarga Deifoba zabitego okrutnie) *his mersere maLIIs ILla haec monimenta reLIquit*, VIII 387-8 (czuła scena pomiędzy Wenerą i Wulkanem) *hinc diva Lacertis / cunctantem ampLexu molLI foveat. Ille repente ...* (liczne spółgłoski *l*!), IX 479 (matka zabitego Euryalusa szaleje z rozpacz) *prima petit non ILla virum non ILla pericLI* (w końcowych dwóch wyrazach powtórzenie dźwiękowe w klauzuli), Owid., *Mt.* IV 381 (narodziny Hermafrodyta) *semimarem fecisse videt molLItaque in ILLIs /membra*. — W. 930-31 Aliteracja: *supPlex ... PRECantem / PRotendens ... dePRECor*³⁴. — W. 930-8 Aliteracja: *DexTramque precanTem proTenDens ... / uTere sorTe Tua ... parenTis / Tangere ... eT Tibi Talis / ... geniTor Dauni ... senecTae /... spoliaTum ... / redDe ... vicisTi et vicTum TenDere ... / ... viDere Tua ... / ulTerius ne TenDe oDiis* (prośba Turnusa jest gorąca, troska o ojca serdeczna) — W. 934-5 Aliteracja: *Miserere ... / et Me ... luMine Mavis* (spółgłoska *m* jest „smutna”)³⁵. — W. 936-7 Aliteracja: *VICisti et VICtum ... VIdere ... laVinia*³⁶.

938

stetit Acer in Armis

939 Aeneas voluens oculos dextramque repressit; (semitemn. + semiquin. + semisept.)

940 et iam iamque magis cunctantem Flectere sermo (semiquin.)

941 coeperat, infelix umero c(um) ApPARuit Alto (semitemn. + semiquin. + semisept.)

942 BALteus (BALteus) et notis FULserunt cingula BuLLis (semiquin. + semisept.)

943 PALLantis Pueri, Victum quem VULnere Turnus (semitemn. + semiquin. + semisept.)

³³ Nie jest sprawą przypadku, że dwa początkowe wiersze inwokacji w *Panu Tadeuszu* rozpoczynają wyrazy *Lltwo ... ILle!*

³⁴ Por. np. Cic. *dom.* 113 *Pro ... Patres conscriPtos dePrecari et PoPulo supPlices*, Sallust. *Cat.* 31, 7 *voce supPlici Postulare a Patribus coePit*, Verg. *Aen.* IV 205-6 *supPlex ... suPinis iupPiter omniPotens*, V 744-5 *Pergameumque ... Penetralia ... Pio ... Plena supPlex*, Ovid. *Mt.* VIII 271 *supPlex Petiit Prece ... Petendi*, Tibul. I 2, 85 *PerrePere supPlex*.

³⁵ Por. np. Ennius, *Ann.* 138-9 *Miserum Mandebat hoMonem ... Membra*, Accius, *Trag.* 353-5 *Miserari ... MeMoras forMidas ... conMiserabam Magis ... Miserebar Mihi*, Caes. *civ.* II 24, 8 *Mortem Miserabantur ... comMendabant*, Catul. 101, 1-9 *Multas ... Multa ... Miseras ... Munere Mortis et Mutam ... Miser ... Munere ... Multum Manantia*, Cic. *Cluent.* 27 *Mater Misera ... Mali ... Mittit*, Petron. 89 w. 47 *Mors ... Miseros Mutuo ... Metu*, Verg. *Aen.* XII 646 *Mori Miserum ... Mihi Manes*.

³⁶ Por. Ennius, *Ann.* 192-3 *inVICti ... VTri ... / VICi VICtusque*, 493 *VIncit ... VICTor ... VICTus*, Lukr. I 72 *VIda Vis ... perVICit*, IV 1209-10 *VIrilem / VIm VICit ... VI*, Ovid. *Mt.* XIII 386 *inVICtum VIrum VICit*, XIV 570-2 *laVINia VIrgo / ... VICisse ... / ... VICtricia*.

944 *straVerat atque umeris INimic(um) INsigne gerebat.* (semitem. + semiquin. + semisept.)

938 Stał nieruchomo Eneas zbrojny, omiatając wroga spojrzeniem nieubłaganym, lecz powstrzymał prawicę. 940 I już słowa (Turnusa) wahaającego się (Eneasza) niemal zaczęły odwodzić od powziętego zamiaru, 941 gdy (Eneas) na wysokim ramieniu (Turnusa) ujrzał pas młodzieńckiego Pallasa, który miał przynieść mu (Turnusowi) zgubę, i rzemień błysnął znanymi guzami. 942-3 To Pallasa obezwładnionego raną zabił Turnus i (pas jego) nosił na ramionach jako trofeum zdobyte na wrogu.

I Wiersze powyższe najpierw wprowadzają do akcji przerwę, chwilowe uspokojenie, natomiast od w. 940 rozpoczyna się dramatyczny finał. Na początku wierszy jest równowaga daktyli i spondejów. — W. 941 Na początku jest daktyl + molos (nastrój powagi), podobnie zbudowany jest wiersz następny: daktyl *balteus*, a molos złożony jest z dwóch wyrazów *et notis* (*et* jest proklityczne). — W. 942-3 Bardzo ważne przerzutnie eksponujące słowa kluczowe: *balteus* i *Pallantis pueri*. — W. 944 Czasowniki na początku i na końcu wiersza! Oznaczać to może, iż zbliża się decydujący moment walki.

II W. 938-39 Aliteracja: *Acer ... Armis Aeneas*. W. 940 Anagram *sERMO ... uMERO*³⁷. — W. 941-3 Aliteracja: *apParuit ... / Balteus ... Bullis / Pallantis Pueri*. — W. 942 Rama dźwiękowa w dwóch kluczowych wyrazach *BaLteus .. Bullis*. Pas ze złotymi guzami zabrany Pallasowi skłoni Eneasza do zadania ciosu śmiertelnego³⁸. — W. 942-3 Pogłębiona aliteracja na początku wierszy *BALteus ... / PALLantis*³⁹. — W. 939-44 Aliteracja: *VolVens ... / Flectere ... / ... inFelix ... / FULserunt ... / ... Victum ... VULnere ... / straVerat*. Cyceon uznał, że spółgłoska *f* jest nieeufoniczna i przytoczył przykład aliteracji niemiłej dla uszu: *Orator 164 Finis FrugiFera et efferta arva Asiae tenet*. — W. 944 Cechuje się dużą ekspresją dzięki elizji *INimic(um) INsigne* oraz aliteracji pogłębionej.

945 *ill(e), oculis postquam saevi monimenta doloris* (semitem. + semiquin. + semisept.)

946 *exuviasque hausIt, furiIs accensus et Ira* (semitem. + semiquin. + semisept.)

947 *tERRIBilis: „tun(e) hINc spoliis INdute meorum* (semitem. + semiquin. + semisept.)

948 *ERIPiare mihi? Pallas t(e) hoc vulnere, Pallas* (semiquin. + semisept.)

949 *immolat et Poenam Scelerat(o) ex Sanguine Sumit*” (semiquin. + semisept.)

950 *hoc dicens FERR(um) adVERso sub pectore condit* (semitem. + semisept.)

³⁷ Ten sam anagram u Owidiusza *AA* II 504-5. Por. Ovid. *Mt.* XIV 212 *ORE ... MERO ... glOMERata*.

³⁸ Jest to już wcześniej zapowiedziane w wypowiedzi odautorskiej, por. X 500-5.

³⁹ Por. I. Korpanty: „De sonorum iterandorum...”, s. 45—46.

951 FER-Vidus; ast Illi solVuntur Frigore membra (semitern. + semiquin.)

952 Vitaque cum gemitu Fugit Indignata sub umbras. (semitern. + semiquin.)

945 Ów (Eneasza), gdy ujrzał łup wojenny, który na nowo zadał mu ból wielki, zapalony szaleństwem i w gniewie swym 947 straszny, (rzecze): „Czy ty, nosząc na sobie zdobycz zdartą z mego druha, z tego powodu [tj. ze względu na ojca] miałbyś uniknąć śmierci z mej ręki? To Pallas zabija cię w ofierze niczym zwierzę raną, jaką ci zaraz zadam, Pallas, wymierza ci karę za występki”. 950 To mówiąc, utopił miecz w piersi, 951 kipiąc gniewem. A jego (Turnusa) ciało omdlewa od chłodu i życie, nie bez sprzeciwu [bo Turnus jest jeszcze młody], z jękiem pierzcha pomiędzy cienie Hadesu.

I Wiersze te opracował poeta z najwyższą starannością. Ton przypomina początek omawianego przeze mnie epizodu i czyni nas świadkami dramatu przejmującego, pełnego wielkości i patosu. Eneasza zada Turnusowi cios śmiertelny, ale wcześniej musi wyrzucić z siebie swą wściekłość, swój szal wojownika, ból, jaki sprawiła mu śmierć Pallasa. Turnus, jak przystoi prosiącemu o litość⁴⁰, stosuje nieliczne ozdobniki retoryczne, natomiast Eneasza, kipiący gniewem, wybiera styl podniosły.

W. 946 Przerzutnia *exuviasque hausit* przypomina przerzutnię *balteus* (w. 942) i wskazuje na to, że szal, wściekłość Eneasza zaczyna się ujawniać pod wpływem widoku trofeum noszonego przez Turnusa. Po czasowniku *hausit* jest cezura po 5. półstopie, a po niej wyraz *furiae* (szaleństwo, szal), po którym jest cezura po 7. półstopie. Wyraz ten z wyrazem ostatnim omawianego wiersza — *ira* (gniew) uświadamia nam, jakie uczucia Eneasza są w tej chwili najważniejsze. — W. 947 Przerzutnia *terribilis* bardzo ważna, ten wyraz jest podkreślony, nie bez znaczenia jest jego brzmienie: *geminata rr* oraz samogłoski *i*. — Eneasza mówi do Turnusa podniecony, ożywiony, co podkreślają stopy daktyliczne. — Cezury: przed cezurą po 5. półstopie jest wyraz jednozgłoskowy *hinc*, co jest zjawiskiem wyjątkowym (ponieważ monosylaby nie mają wyraźnego akcentu; por. Owid., *Mt.* VI 296 *immoritur latet haec / illam trepidare videres*) — W. 948 Kolejna przerzutnia jest niezwykle ważna: *eripiare mihi*; czasownik *eripiare* ma aż 5 sylab, *-are* to trochej, który słowom Eneasza przydaje patosu. Patetyczne jest także powtórzenie *Pallás ... Pállas* (ze zmianą miejsca akcentu wierszowego), ma bez wątpienia dużą siłę wyrazu i jest cechą stylu podniosłego⁴¹. W. 49 Znów przerzutnia *immolat*. — W. 950 Cztery spondeje!, w moim odczuciu wyrażają one zimną determinację, z jaką Eneasza zadaje cios. — W. 951 Przerzutnia słowa daktylicznego *fervidus*⁴², po którym jest wyraźna punktacja. Daktyl stanowi kontrast z wierszem poprzed-

⁴⁰ Por. Quint. *Inst. orat.* IX 4, 102.

⁴¹ Por. *Rhet. Her.* IV 19 *Haec exornatio (scil. repetitio) cum multum venustatis habet tum gravitatis et acrimoniae plurimum. Quare videtur esse adhibenda et ad ornandam et ad exaugendam orationem.*

⁴² Por. VIII 230, IX 736, XII 293.

nim spondeicznym i podkreśla niecierpliwy gniew Eneasza. — W stopach 2, 3 i 4 spondeje kontrastujące z daktylem, jak gdyby śmierć Turnusa zbliżała się powoli, lecz nieubłagane. — W. 952 Turnus umiera, trzy początkowe daktyle oddają szybkość, z jaką dusza ucieka do podziemia. Spondej *indig(nata)* oddaje niechęć, opór, jaki stawia dusza nadaremnie, bo kolejny szybki daktyl *nata sub* świadczy o tym, że ostatnia podróż duszy trwa nadal.

II W. 945 *ILle ocuLIIs*, por. w. 930 *ILle humiLIIs*; aliteracja: *monimenTa Doloris* (dalszy ciąg tej aliteracji w w. 947). — W. 945-8 Samogłoska *i* pojawiająca się w arsach podkreśla gniew Eneasza; por. VII 425 *I nunc IngratIs offer te inrlse perIclis* (ironia). Tu z kolei jest dodatkowo powtórzenie dźwiękowe w długich sylabach klauzuli: *inrlse perIclis*, które także powiększa ekspresję słów (por. przypis 29). — W. 947 Kolejny raz powtórzenie dźwiękowe w arsach *terribillIS* ... *spoliIS* (cezury po 2. i po 7. półstopie; por. Owid., *Mt.* VI 595 *terribilis Procne furiisque agitata doloris*). Aliteracje: *Terribilis Tune* ... *inDuTe* (spółgłoski *t, d* podkreślają ogromne oburzenie Eneasza; por. tę samą aliterację w słowach Turnusa, w. 930 nast.); *hINc* ... *INdute*. — W. 947-8 Powtórzenie głosek w tej samej kolejności na początku wierszy niesie dużą ekspresję: *tERRIBIllis* ... / *ERIPiare*. Szczególnie ważna jest spółgłoska *r* oraz samogłoska *i*; por. IV 464-5 *praedicta priorum / terribili monitu horrificant. agit ipse furemtem*, IX 502-3 *corRIPlunt* ... *terRIBIllem*; X 788 *ERIPIT* ... *TREPIIdanti* (anagram). Ale i u wielu innych autorów dostrzegamy podobną świadomą instrumentację dźwiękową, ponieważ kakofonia ma tu uzasadnienie w sensie słów, zgodnie z zaleceniem Kwintyliana: *Inst. orat.* VIII 3, 17 *nam rebus atrocibus verba etiam ipso auditu aspera magis convenient* („bo dla treści budzącej grozę odpowiednie będą słowa niemiłe dla uszu”). Por. np. Ennius, *Ann.* 310 *Africa terribili tremit horrida terra tumultu*; *Scen.* 24 *alter terribilem minatur vitae cruciatum*, Waleriusz Flakkus, *Arg.* I 229-30 *horrore comarum / terribilis*, Petroniusz, *Sat.* 132,8 *ter corripui terribilem manu bipennem*, Kwint., *Inst. orat.* XI 3, 160 *agere, ut sit horror ille terribilis*, Ps.-Kwint., *Decl. maiores* 19, 5 *parricidium terribile*, Seneka, *Nat. quaest.* III 27, 10 *nox ... horrida ac terribilis*, Seneka, *Controv.* VII 1, 4 *et terribili fragore horridae tempestates*. — W. 949 Aliteracja: *Scelerato* ... *Sanguine Sumit*; por. IV 28-9 *Amores / Abstulit; ille hAbeat Secum Servetque Sepulcro* (aliteracje zdają się podkreślać, że postanowienie Dydony jest uroczyste i niezłomne), Owid., *Fasti* V 575 *Mars, ades et Satia Scelerato Sanguine ferrum*. Dodam jeszcze, że mamy świadectwa greckie i łacińskie o niemiłym brzmieniu spółgłoski *s*⁴³. — W. 950 Powtórzenie w arsach dwóch par głosek w kolejności odwrotnej: *hOC diCEns ferr(um) aduerso sub pECtore COndit*⁴⁴. — W. 950-2 Aliteracje: *Dicens...* *pec-*

⁴³ Por. J. Korpanty: „Der Lateinische Sigmatismus”. In: *Kommunikation durch Zeichen und Wort, Stätten und Formen der Kommunikation im Altertum IV, Bochumer Altertumwissenschaftliches Colloquium*. Band 23, 1995, s. 55–56.

⁴⁴ Por. I 238; 450, IV 172; 324, IX 429. Ovid. *Mt.* I 710, VI 194, IX 85, X 613, XI 85, XIII 655, XIV 757.

Tore conDit / ferviDus ... solvunTur ... viTaque ... gemiTu ... inDignaTa; FERRum adVERso ... / FERVidus ... solVuntur Frigore ... Vitaque ... Fugit. — W. 951-2 Powtórzenie czterech głosek w tej samej kolejności: *meMBRA ... uMBRA*s. Jest to zjawisko, które już wskazałem w w. 927, lecz tutaj występuje na końcu dwóch kolejnych wierszy; por. I 12-3 *coLONi ... LONge*, 113-4 *orONTem ... pONTus*, IV 78-9 *LABOREs ... AB ORE*, 221-2 *AMANTis ... taliA MANDat*, V 412-3 *GERE-Bat ... CEREBro*, VI 525-6 *pANDIt ... amANTI*, VII 117-8 *LABORum ... AB ORe*, Owid., *Mt.* II 822-3 *trUNCo ... UNGues*, III 147-8 *ORE ... cruORE*, VIII 520-1 *sorORES ... ORE Supremo*.

Przedstawiona analiza, chociaż obejmuje tylko niektóre wybrane zagadnienia, wystarcza — jak sądzę — abyśmy sobie uświadomili złożoność zjawisk składających się na antyczną sztukę słowa. Warto zatem dla potrzeb dydaktyki uniwersyteckiej opracować możliwie wszechstronnie wybrane fragmenty lektur greckich i łacińskich, aby studenci przekonali się, iż samo tłumaczenie słów może być tylko etapem wstępnym do zrozumienia wypracowanej przez Greków i Rzymian wyrafinowanej sztuki słowa, która wprawia nas w podziw.

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M. Terentius Varron dans la culture romaine et européenne

Abstract: The article presents the significance of M. Terentius Varro in Roman and European culture. The ancient sources and contemporary studies confirm that Varro was considered the most accomplished and refined scholar of his time (*vir Romanorum eruditissimus*). The influence of Varro's versatile texts can be traced in many fields of culture from antiquity onward to modern times.

Key words: M. Terentius Varro, Roman culture, ancient tradition, antiquity and the present

Dans mes travaux précédents sur la culture antique je ne m'occupais pas de Marc Terentius Varron (*Marcus Terentius Varro*). Tout simplement, sa personne n'était pas dans le cadre des groupes sociaux que j'avais examinés. Je n'ai pas pu le prendre en considération dans mon livre sur la culture intellectuelle des consuls romains¹ parce qu'il n'était pas consul. Je n'ai pas tenu compte de Varron non plus dans les travaux antérieurs sur *nobilitas* romaine² parce que — à la lumière de la définition d'usage de Matthias Gelzer — il n'appartenait pas à cette couche supérieure (*Oberschicht*) de l'ordre des sénateurs (*ordo senatorius*)³.

¹ Comp. T. Aleksandrowicz: *Kultura intelektualna rzymskich konsulów w schyłkowym okresie Republiki*. Katowice 2002.

² Comp. Idem: *Zainteresowania literackie rzymskiej "nobilitas" w schyłkowym okresie Republiki*. Katowice 1990; Idem: *Elita władzy a oratorstwo w schyłkowym okresie Rzeczypospolitej Rzymskiej*. Katowice 1996.

³ Comp. M. Gelzer: "Die Nobilität der römischen Republik". In: Idem: *Kleine Schriften*. Bd. 1. Wiesbaden 1962 [première édition en 1912], p. 60.

Les recherches sur Varron sont menées principalement en Europe. La meilleure bibliographie internationale consacrée à l'Antiquité *L'Année philologique*⁴ enregistre dans ses annuaires successifs des dizaines des plus prestigieuses publications au sujet de la personne et de l'œuvre de Varron. Seulement dans les dernières trente années on y a noté environ 800 positions bibliographiques. Parmi les monographies consacrées à Varron un livre publié par Francesco Della Corte pour la première fois en 1954 à Gênes⁵ et de nouveau à Florence en 1970, est toujours beaucoup estimé et souvent cité. Une vaste étude de Benedetto Riposati consacrée à Varron et ses ouvrages, publiée dans le premier volume des écrits, étant fruit de la conférence organisée à Rieti en 1974 à l'occasion du deux millième anniversaire de la mort de Varron⁶, a un caractère pareil. L'activité linguistique de Varron a été montrée entre autres par Jean Collart dans un livre publié à Paris en 1954⁷. La pensée théologique et philosophique de Varron a été présentée par Yves Lehmann dans une monographie publiée à Bruxelles en 1997⁸. Par contre, en 2002 est paru aussi à Bruxelles un livre d'Aude Lehmann, présentant Varron en tant que critique littéraire⁹.

La personne et l'œuvre de Varron ont été très minutieusement présentées et systématisées par Hellfried Dahlmann dans le sixième volume des suppléments à *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie*, ayant quelques dizaines de volumes, publié à Stuttgart en 1935¹⁰. Une publication plus modeste de Klaus Sallmann, présentée dans le douzième volume de *Der neue Pauly*, éditée à Stuttgart et Weimar en 2002¹¹, est également très précieuse. La bibliographie dans l'annexe, dressant environ une centaine des publications les plus importantes au sujet de Varron, constitue une valeur supplémentaire de cette publication la plus récente. Sa personne et son oeuvre

⁴ Comp. *L'Année philologique. Bibliographie critique et analytique de l'antiquité gréco-latine* (fondée par J. Marouzeau, continuée par J. Ernst). T. 77 (2006). Ed. P.-P. Corsetti. Paris 2008.

⁵ F. Della Corte: *Varrone. Il terzo gran lume Romano*. Genova 1954.

⁶ B. Riposati: "M. Terenzio Varrone. L'uomo e lo scrittore". In: *Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studi Varroniani. In occasione del bimillenario della morte di Marco Terenzio Varrone (116—27 a. C.)*. Vol. 1. Rieti 1974, pp. 59—89.

⁷ J. Collart: *Varron, grammairien latin*. Paris 1954; voir aussi Idem: "L'œuvre grammaticale de Varron". In: *Varron. Grammaire antique et stylistique latine*. Éd. J. Collart. Paris 1978, pp. 3—21; J. Collart: "Quelques remarques sur le style de Varron dans les *Satires Ménippées*. (La qualification)". In: *Studi su Varrone, sulla retorica, storiografia e poesia latina. Scritti in onore di Benedetto Riposati*. Vol. 1. Rieti—Milano 1979, pp. 101—106.

⁸ Y. Lehman: *Varron théologien et philosophe romain*. Bruxelles 1997.

⁹ A. Lehman: *Varron critique littéraire. Regard sur les poètes latins archaïques*. Préface J. Dangel. Bruxelles 2002.

¹⁰ H. Dahlmann: "M. Terentius Varro". In: *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Supplementband 6. Hrsg. W. Kroll. Stuttgart 1935, col. 1172—1277; voir aussi — H. Dahlmann: *Studien zu Varro "De poetis"*. Wiesbaden 1963; Idem: *Varrone e la teoria ellenistica della lingua*. Presentazione, note di commento e bibliografia a cura di G. Calboli. Trad. di P. Voza. Napoli 1997.

¹¹ K. Sallmann: "M. Terentius Varro". In: *Der neue Pauly. Enzyklopädie der Antike*. Bd.12/1. Hrsg. H. Cancik und H. Schneider. Stuttgart—Weimar 2002, col. 1130—1144.

ont été aussi prises en considération dans les synthèses connues de la littérature romaine par les auteurs tels que: Eduard Norden, Martin Schanz et Carl Hosius, Ettore Paratore, Ignazio Cazzaniga, Edward John Kenney ou Michael von Albrecht¹². Parmi des synthèses d'un caractère plus général, il vaut évoquer une monographie d'Elizabeth Rawson au sujet de la vie intellectuelle sous la République romaine tardive, publiée à Londres en 1985¹³.

En Pologne, les recherches les plus complexes sur Varron sont menées par Ireneusz Mikołajczyk¹⁴. Parmi d'autres savants polonais, on peut dénommer par exemple Jerzy Styka, qui s'occupait de la satire ménippée¹⁵, ou Maria Jaczynowska — une connaisseuse éminente de la religion du monde romain¹⁶. Kazimierz Kumaniecki a consacré un grand chapitre à Varron dans sa synthèse de la littérature romaine de la période cicéronienne¹⁷ et dernièrement Ignacy Lewandowski a marqué la position de Varron dans l'historiographie romaine¹⁸. Władysław Madyda a publié en 1966 un article concernant le style de Varron¹⁹ et Jan Wikarjak a édité une petite esquisse sur sa bibliothèque²⁰.

¹² Comp. E. Norden: *Die antike Kunstprosa*. Bd. 1. Leipzig—Berlin 1915; M. Schanz, C. Hosius: *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*. Tl. 1: *Die römische Literatur in der Zeit der Republik*. München 1959; E. Paratore: *Storia della letteratura latina*. Firenze 1962; I. Cazzaniga: *Storia della letteratura latina*. Milano 1962; E.J. Kenney: "Greek and Roman Literary Culture". In: *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature*. Vol. 2: *Latin Literature*. Ed. E.J. Kenney, W.V. Clausen. Cambridge 1982; M. von Albrecht: *A History of Roman Literature. From Livius Andronicus to Boetius. With Special Regard to its Influence on World Literature*. Revised by G. Schmeling and by the Autor. Transl. with the Assistance of F. Newman and K. Newman. Vol. 1. New York 1997.

¹³ E. Rawson: *Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic*. London 1985.

¹⁴ I. Mikołajczyk: "Czas powstania satyry menippejskiej *Sexagessis* Marka Terencjusza Warrona". *Meander* 1981, T. 36, pp. 163—171; Idem: "Próba rekonstrukcji satyry menippejskiej *Sexagessis* Marka Terencjusza Warrona". *Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensium* 1983, Vol. 6, pp. 117—131; Idem: "Interpretacja tytułu satyry menippejskiej *Sexagessis* Marka Terencjusza Warrona". *Eos* 1984, Vol. 72, pp. 135—141; *Traktat "Rerum rusticarum libri tres" Marka Terencjusza Warrona. Monografia historycznoliteracka*. Toruń 1992; Idem: "Sul trattato agronomico *Rerum rusticarum* di M.T. Varrone". In: *Agricoltura, ambiente e sviluppo economico nella storia europea*. A cura di L. Serge. Milano 1993, pp. 66—67; I. Mikołajczyk: *Rzymska literatura agronomiczna*. Toruń 2004; voir aussi — Idem: "Wstęp". W: M. Terencjusz Warron: *O gospodarstwie rolnym*. Z języka łacińskiego przełożył, wstępem i komentarzem opatrzył I. Mikołajczyk. Wrocław—Warszawa—Kraków 1991, pp. V—XXI.

¹⁵ Comp. J. Styka: "Satyra menippejska Warrona. Problem estetyczno-gatunkowej odrębności". W: Idem: *Studia nad literaturą rzymską epoki republikańskiej. Estetyka satyry republikańskiej. Estetyka neoteryków*. Kraków 1994, pp. 67—84.

¹⁶ Comp. M. Jaczynowska: *Religie świata rzymskiego*. Warszawa 1987, pp. 89—91.

¹⁷ Comp. K. Kumaniecki: *Literatura rzymska. Okres cyceironski*. Warszawa 1977, pp. 463—509; voir aussi — Idem: "Cyceiron i Warron". *Meander* 1962, T. 17, pp. 283—301.

¹⁸ Comp. I. Lewandowski: *Historiografia rzymska*. Poznań 2007, pp. 164—167.

¹⁹ Comp. W. Madyda: "Wartości literackie dzieła Warrona o rolnictwie". *Eos* 1966, Vol. 56, pp. 119—138.

²⁰ Comp. J. Wikarjak: "Biblioteka Warrona". *Filomata* 1974, nr 277, pp. 349—360.

Marc Terentius Varron (*Marcus Terentius Varro*) est né en 116, il est mort en janvier du 27 avant J.-C. Sa vie a duré donc pendant les dernières quatre-vingt-dix années de l'existence de la République romaine dont la chute définitive a eu lieu justement en 27 avant J.-C. Il est passé à l'histoire avec le surnom *Reatinus*, bien que Saint Augustin écrive qu'il est né et qu'il se formait à Rome (*Romae natus et educatus*)²¹ et non pas à *Reate* (actuellement Rieti), d'où venait sa famille et où il a passé son enfance et le début de sa jeunesse. Varron constituait une individualité très fortement attachée aux vertus romaines traditionnelles (*virtutes*) qu'il tentait de sauver, en vivant dans la réalité politique difficile de la République en chute. Il a acquis une excellente éducation sous la direction des philologues romains éminents — Lucius Accius et L. Aelius Stilo Praeconinus. Il fréquentait des conférences des fondateurs de la quatrième et la cinquième académie — Philon de Larisse et Antiochos d'Ascalon.

Initialement, Varron n'était pas un savant de cabinet. Il participait à la vie publique d'une façon active. Il atteignait des échelons successifs de *cursus honorum* romain. Malgré certains doutes de Thomas R.S. Broughton et de T. Corey Brennan, on estime qu'après l'an 76 et avant l'an 67 il est parvenu jusqu'à la préture²² donc à la magistrature deuxième d'importance dans la République romaine. Avant, il avait rempli de hautes fonctions militaires, d'abord dans les années quatre-vingt pendant la guerre dalmatienne en Illyrie, ensuite dans les années soixante-dix pendant la guerre avec Sertorius en Espagne et enfin dans les années soixante pendant une guerre très difficile avec des pirates. On date la composition des *Satires ménippées* justement sur ces années de guerres. En tant qu'intellectualiste, il réagissait vivement aux événements courants. Politiquement, il était lié avec Pompée, mais en 60 avant J.-C., après son accord avec Crassus et César, connu en tant que le premier triumvirat, il a écrit une brochure satirique intitulée *Trikaranos*. Pourtant, il a accepté de prendre part aux travaux sur la réforme agraire entreprise par César parce qu'il croyait qu'elle était nécessaire. Quand, cependant, dix ans plus tard a eu lieu une escarmouche directe de César avec Pompée, il s'est rangé du parti de Pompée parce que c'est en lui qu'il voyait un espoir de sauver la République. Après une défaite définitive des pompéiens dans la bataille de Pharsale en 48 avant J.-C. il a profité de la clémence de César (*clementia Caesaris*). Il était réaliste et il a constaté que la lutte suivante avec César n'avait plus de sens. Comme écrit Cicéron dans sa deuxième *Philippique*, Antonius avait l'intention de proscrire Varron mais César, séjournant alors en Alexandrie, s'y est opposé par écrit²³. Il est difficile de dire si le fait de dédier la deuxième partie de l'œuvre *Des choses humaines et divines antiques* (*Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum*) signifiait seule-

²¹ Aug. *De civ. Dei* 4, 1.

²² T.R.S. Broughton: *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*. Vol. 2. 99 B.C.—31 B.C. New York 1952, p. 466; T.C. Brennan: *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic*. Vol. 2. Oxford 2000 p. 752.

²³ Cic. *Phil.* 2, 103.

ment une gratitude pour lui sauver la vie ou bien une volonté d'offrir son aide à César qui remplissait une fonction du grand Pontife (*pontifex maximus*). Cependant, Varron n'était pas opportuniste parce qu'il a écrit aussi une monographie de Pompée perdu (*De Pompeio*).

Et alors César, fasciné par une célèbre Bibliothèque d'Alexandrie, a proposé à Varron d'organiser la première bibliothèque publique à Rome, ce qui a fructifié par l'œuvre *De bibliothecis*²⁴. La mort de César a rompu la réalisation de cette idée novatrice dans les conditions romaines. Mais déjà en 39 avant J.-C. cette idée a été réalisée par le sage Asinius Pollion qui a honoré Varron encore de son vivant, en plaçant son buste dans la bibliothèque fondée dans *Atrium Libertatis*.

Après la mort du dictateur, Varron s'est trouvé, de nouveau à cause d'Antonius, en tant que l'ancien pompéien, sur les listes de proscription, ce qui signifiait l'arrêt de mort. Comme écrit un historien grec Appien d'Alexandrie, des connaissances de Varron faisaient jalousie des démarches et se disputaient qui allait l'accueillir chez soi, le gagnant était enfin l'ancien consul Q. Fufius Calenus et il lui a donné l'hospitalité dans la propriété de campagne où Antonius s'arrêtait à chaque fois quand il passait par là. Pourtant aucun d'esclaves, ni ceux de Varron, ni ceux de Calenus, n'a dénoncé que Varron y faisait séjour²⁵. Cicéron n'avait pas cette chance, il a été arrêté et poignardé par les partisans d'Antonius le 7 décembre 43 avant J.-C.²⁶ Cependant Varron a perdu son atelier scientifique après le pillage de ses villas suburbaines où se trouvaient aussi des collections privées de livres²⁷. Après ces événements, le savant, âgé de soixante-douze ans, s'est définitivement retiré de la vie publique, en se consacrant aux recherches scientifiques et littéraires et en se jouissant des charmes de la vie tranquille dans ses villas en banlieue de Rome.

Selon Quintilien, Varron a écrit un nombre inouï de livres qui étaient très savants (*plurimos [...] libros doctissimos composuit*)²⁸. Son œuvre était en effet énorme. Probablement, elle comptait 74 ouvrages dans environ 620 livres. Seulement une œuvre en prose — *Économie rurale* (*Rerum rusticarum libri tres*) s'est conservée en entier, et parmi les œuvres poétiques, le plus grand nombre de celles conservées ce sont 600 fragments des *Satires Ménippées* (*Saturae Menippeae*) comptant 150

²⁴ Suet. *Iul.* 44; Isid. *Orig.* 6, 5, 1; voir aussi — T. Aleksandrowicz: "Oddziaływanie bibliotek hellenistycznych na kulturę Republiki Rzymskiej". W: *Studia bibliologiczne*. T. 9: *Prace ofiarowane Adamowi W. Jaroszowi*. Red. I. Socha, B. Zyska. Katowice 1995, pp. 103—112; T. Aleksandrowicz: "Bibliologiczne konteksty działalności Gajusza Juliusza Cezara". W: *Studia bibliologiczne*. T. 10: *Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Bronisławowi Zysce*. Red. I. Socha. Katowice 1997, pp. 131—135.

²⁵ App. *B. C.* 4, 202.

²⁶ Comp. F. Hinard: *Les proscriptions de la Rome républicaine*. Paris 1985, s. 275—293; A. Wright: "The Death of Cicero. Forming a Tradition. The Contamination of History". *Historia* 2001, Bd. 50, pp. 436—452.

²⁷ J. Wikarjak: "Biblioteka Warrona...", p. 358.

²⁸ Quint. *Inst.* 10, 1, 95.

livres. En plus, dans l'ensemble des œuvres en prose, on distingue surtout des œuvres dans le domaine de la linguistique, avec les six parmi vingt-cinq livres du traité *La langue latine* (*De lingua Latina*) à la tête. Ensuite, on mentionne des œuvres historico-littéraires. Le groupe suivant est constitué par des ouvrages d'antiquaire et d'histoire avec des écrits géographiques, et ensuite des ouvrages philosophiques, rhétoriques, juridiques et enfin de célèbres œuvres encyclopédiques.

Le personnage de Varron fascinait déjà des auteurs antiques. Cicéron, dans l'une de ses lettres à Titus Pomponius Atticus, a nommé Varron l'écrivain le plus polyvalent (*homo πολυγραφώτατος*)²⁹. Selon Quintilien, il était l'homme le plus érudit parmi tous les Romains (*vir Romanorum eruditissimus*)³⁰ et selon Plutarque de Chéronée — le plus lettré (*βυβλιακώτατος*)³¹. Également des auteurs chrétiens de l'Antiquité tardive écrivaient sur Varron avec admiration. Saint Jérôme a créé un catalogue des œuvres de Varron et Saint Augustin a décrit avec estime ses idées concernant la religion³².

Ces opinions très générales sur le sujet de Varron prouvent le fait que selon les auteurs antiques — ceux de son époque et ceux qui vivaient plus tard — il était l'un des personnages les plus éminents de la culture romaine, même quand on prend en considération des contextes rhétoriques et moralisateurs des jugements cités. Il faut pourtant constater que cette image est très générale, même superficielle. C'est pourquoi, en plus, il faut regarder le personnage de Varron en prenant en considération des opinions des hommes antiques concernant ses succès concrets. Puisque le but de cet article n'est pas seulement de présenter la place de Varron dans la culture de la Rome antique mais aussi dans la culture européenne, il est nécessaire également de tenir compte des opinions de connaisseurs vivant dans les époques suivantes. Il est aussi indispensable d'essayer de répondre à la question à savoir ce qui s'est avéré important dans l'œuvre de Varron, ce qui est une valeur durable, présente dans la culture européenne — de l'Antiquité par le Moyen Âge jusqu'à l'époque moderne et pour nous contemporaine.

Selon Quintilien, Varron était le plus grand connaisseur de la langue latine (*peritissimus linguae Latinae*)³³. Il a consacré quelques ouvrages aux questions de la linguistique. Dans l'œuvre *De lingua Latina* mentionnée ci-dessus, il a présenté des problèmes concernant l'étymologie, la flexion et la syntaxe. En ce qui concerne l'analogie et l'anomalie, il s'inclinait d'abord vers les anomalistes, ensuite vers les analogistes pour prendre enfin un point de vue intermédiaire. Il était d'avis que cette dispute est apparente parce qu'elle concerne le terme et non pas l'idée même³⁴. Selon lui, l'anomalie et l'analogie sont liées l'une à l'autre plus étroite-

²⁹ Cic. *Ad Att.* 13, 18, 1.

³⁰ Quint. *Inst.* 10, 1, 95.

³¹ Plut. *Rom.* 12, 3.

³² Aug. *De civ. Dei* 6, 5, 1—3.

³³ Quint. *Inst.* 10, 1, 95.

³⁴ Varro. *De ling.* 10, 6.

ment que les partisans de ces théories supposent³⁵. Il a finalement défini l'analogie en tant que déclinaison similaire des mots similaires, si l'usage reçu ne s'y oppose (*analogia est verborum similium declinatio similis non repugnante consuetudine co<m>muni*)³⁶. La lecture de dictionnaires contemporains de la langue polonaise peut nous convaincre de l'actualité de cette définition aussi dans la linguistique moderne.

Dans l'ouvrage historico-littéraire intitulé *De poetis*, Varron a présenté une image du développement de la littérature romaine dont le début y déterminé c'était une conférence de Livius Andronicus en 240. Cette détermination est communément acceptée aussi par des historiens contemporains de la littérature latine³⁷. Par contre, dans une petite œuvre *De poematis* il s'occupait de la théorie de la littérature, ce qui permet de mieux comprendre une innovation qu'il avait introduite dans les *Satires Ménippées*. Comme a souligné Quintilien, Varron a développé des éléments de prose dans la structure de prose métrique de la satire, en gardant une forme polymétrique dans les parties rimées (*Alterum illud etiam prius saturae genus, sed non sola carminum uarietate mixtum condidit Terentius Varro*)³⁸. Le caractère novateur de ce procédé est souligné aussi par Jerzy Styka³⁹.

Dans le catalogue des œuvres de Varron il y a aussi des ouvrages que l'on appellerait aujourd'hui des ouvrages de théâtrologie. Il s'y occupait entre autres des origines et du développement des spectacles scéniques (*De scaenicis originibus*), et aussi des didascalies (*De scaenicis actionibus*) et des masques théâtrales (*De personis*). Deux ouvrages consacrés à Plaute et à ses comédies (*Quaestionum Plautinarum libri quinque* et *De comoediis Plautinis*) avaient une signification particulière. C'est à ce deuxième ouvrage de Varron que les hommes antiques — et nous aussi — devaient la détermination de l'authenticité de 21 comédies de Plaute (*fabulae Varronianae*) d'entre 130 celles lui attribuées avant.

Cicéron, dans son ouvrage intitulé *Brutus*, a nommé Varron le plus diligent chercheur s'occupant de l'Antiquité (*diligentissimus investigator antiquitatis*)⁴⁰, selon Quintilien il était le plus grand connaisseur de toutes sortes des antiquités et le plus grand chercheur qui s'occupait de l'histoire grecque de même que celle romaine (*peritissimus [...] omnis antiquitatis et rerum Graecarum nostrarumque*)⁴¹. Dans ce domaine, il a écrit *Logistoricoi* philosophico-historique et *Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum* mentionné ci-dessus. Comme a écrit Kazimierz Kumaniecki, *Antiquitates* étaient non seulement une expression d'une grande éru-

³⁵ Varro. *De ling.* 10, 74.

³⁶ Varro. *De ling.* 10, 74.

³⁷ Comp. L. Deschamps: "Varron et les poètes". *Latomus* 1990, Vol. 49, pp. 591—612.

³⁸ Quint. *Inst.* 10, 1, 95.

³⁹ Comp. J. Styka: "Satyra menippejska Warrona...", p. 70.

⁴⁰ Cic. *Brut.* 60.

⁴¹ Quint. *Inst.* 10, 1, 95.

dition de Varron mais aussi une inépuisable source pour des poètes et des historiens suivants, de Virgile et Ovide jusqu'à Martianus Capella⁴².

En omettant ici plusieurs autres ouvrages de Varron traitant de l'histoire, je voudrais souligner qu'une position particulière dans son oeuvre est attribuée à l'ouvrage intitulé *Hebdomades vel de imaginibus libri quindecim*. C'est justement cet ouvrage qui a été le premier livre romain illustré et dans lequel Varron a présenté des portraits de 700 personnes célèbres, en les partageant en sept groupes et en ajoutant de courtes biographies en vers et en prose. En liant cette initiative, novatrice dans les conditions romaines, au susdit engagement de Varron dans la création de bases théoriques et organisationnelles des bibliothèques publiques romaines, on peut le percevoir aussi en tant que personne qui a joué un certain rôle dans l'histoire de la discipline que l'on appelle aujourd'hui la bibliologie⁴³.

Varron n'a pas créé son propre système philosophique. Dans ce domaine, il était éclectique. Les *Satires Ménippées* prouvent que c'est l'école cynique qui lui était proche. Pourtant *Hebdomades* montrent son attachement au chiffre sept, ce qui indique le fait qu'il sympathisait avec l'école pythagoricienne. Cependant, il était avant tout partisan de la philosophie d'Antiochos d'Ascalon qui liait le platonisme avec des éléments stoïques. Seul Varron était aussi auteur de trois ouvrages philosophiques (*Liber de philosophia*, *De forma philosophiae* et *De principiis numerorum*).

De même que Cicéron, Varron cherchait à profiter de la philosophie pour donner une nouvelle force à la religion romaine traditionnelle dont il respectait également l'aspect mythique et national. Selon Maria Jaczynowska, Varron était-il peut-être un seul Romain dans son époque qui, en se consacrant avec ardeur à sauver la religion romaine traditionnelle, a osé apercevoir aussi des valeurs dans le judaïsme⁴⁴. Un tel point de vue, pour des raisons évidentes, plaisait plus tard à des auteurs chrétiens, surtout à Saint Augustin qui nous a transmis le résumé des *Antiquitates* encyclopédiques de Varron⁴⁵.

Pourtant, probablement le plus grand rôle dans la culture romaine et européenne a été joué par une œuvre encyclopédique de Varron intitulé *Disciplinarum libri novem*, consacré à neuf arts libéraux (*artes liberales*). Martianus Capella a supprimé de ce canon la médecine et l'architecture, en créant les célèbres *septem artes liberales* qui sont devenus, pour longtemps en Europe, une base du système

⁴² Comp. K. Kumaniecki: *Literatura rzymska...*, p. 489.

⁴³ Comp. K. Migoń: "O nazwie dyscypliny, którą uprawiamy". *Przegląd Biblioteczny* 1993, T. 61, pp. 109—113; Idem: "Rola terminologii w prezentacji wiedzy księgoznawczej". *Przegląd Biblioteczny* 2003, T. 71, pp. 77—83; T. Aleksandrowicz: "Antyczne korzenie związku filologii z bibliologią". W: *Śląskie Miscellanea*. T. 7. Red. J. Malicki, K. Heska-Kwaśniewicz. Katowice 1994, pp. 17—21.

⁴⁴ Comp. M. Jaczynowska: *Religie świata rzymskiego...*, p. 91.

⁴⁵ Aug. *De civ. Dei* 6, 5, 1—3.

de l'éducation humaniste en tant que *trivium* et *quadrivium*. Cependant il faut lier les débuts de ce système à Varron.

La fixation de la date légendaire de la fondation de Rome constitue aussi une trace durable après Varron. À travers des calculs et plusieurs combinaisons, il est arrivé à la conclusion que la ville avait été fondée en troisième année de la sixième olympiade, cela veut dire en 753 avant J.-C. — comme l'a calculé Denys le Petit plus de cinq cent ans après Varron, en se trompant d'ailleurs de quelques ans dans la détermination du début de l'ère chrétienne⁴⁶.

L'ouvrage de Varron intitulé *Économie rurale* (*Rerum rusticarum libri tres*)⁴⁷ occupe une place particulière dans la culture romaine et européenne, au moins parce que c'est sa seule œuvre conservée en entier. Pourtant, le fait que justement cet ouvrage est sauvé et d'autres se sont perdus suscite la réflexion. Selon Władysław Madyda, il était tout simplement mieux écrit que des ouvrages précédents⁴⁸. Peut-être aussi qu'il était plus nécessaire pour une multitude de Romains pratiques pour qui la culture agraire (*agri cultura*) était plus importante que la culture intellectuelle (*cultura animi*). Cela peut être partiellement confirmé par le fait que la première œuvre latine conservée en entier c'est également une œuvre parlant de l'agriculture — *De agri cultura* de Caton l'Ancien.

Des œuvres érudites de Varron ont été repoussées par des ouvrages plus modestes des auteurs suivants, plus habiles du point de vue rhétorique et stylistique. Il n'était pas un bon styliste. Selon Cicéron, Varron sympathisait avec un style asianiste d'éloquence⁴⁹, Quintilien a ajouté que l'on peut tirer plus de profits de lui pour la science que pour l'éloquence (*plus tamen scientiae collaturus quam eloquentiae*)⁵⁰. Également des philologues contemporains ont une opinion que Varron n'était pas un bon styliste. Il utilisait avec excès des archaïsmes, il écrivait des ouvrages scientifiques d'une façon trop détaillée, trop hâtivement et sans soin. Ses critiques citent souvent une opinion d'Eduard Norden qui a défini *De lingua Latina* dans son ouvrage *Die antike Kunstprosa* comme «le plus grand oeuvre sur la langue latine écrite dans le pire style latin»⁵¹.

La signification de Varron dans la culture romaine a été exprimée le plus pleinement par Cicéron dans les *Secondes Académiques* (*Academicorum libri quatuor*) dont la deuxième rédaction a été dédiée justement à lui:

⁴⁶ Por. T. Aleksandrowicz: "W kręgu sporów o chronologię procesu upadku Republiki Rzymskiej". W: *W 2500-lecie powstania Republiki Rzymskiej*. Red. A. Kunisz. Katowice 1995, pp. 9—10.

⁴⁷ Comp. L. Deschamps: "Le titre donné par Varron à son *Économie rurale*". *Revue des Études Anciennes* 2002, Vol. 104, pp. 507—511.

⁴⁸ Comp. W. Madyda: "Wartości literackie dzieła Warrona...", p. 138.

⁴⁹ Cic. *Ad Att.* 12, 6, 1.

⁵⁰ Quint. *Inst.* 10, 1, 95; voir aussi L. Deschamps: "L'attitude de Varron face à la rhétorique dans les *Satires Ménippées*". In: *Studi su Varrone, sulla retorica, storiografia e poesia latina. Scritti in onore di Benedetto Riposati*. Vol. 1. Rieti—Milano 1979, pp. 153—170.

⁵¹ Comp. K. Kumaniecki: *Literatura rzymska...*, p. 480.

*Nam nos in nostra urbe peregrinantis errantisque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. Tu aetatem patriae, tu descriptiones temporum, tu sacrorum iura tu sacerdotum, tu domesticam tu bellicam disciplinam, tu sedum regionum locorum, tu omnium diuinarum humanarumque rerum nomina genera officia causas aperuisti; plurimum quidem poetis nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et uerbis attulisti atque ipse uarium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti, philosophiamque multis locis inchoasti*⁵².

Nous étions dans Rome errants et voyageurs comme des étrangers; grâce à vos livres, nous nous sommes, en quelque façon, retrouvés chez nous, en apprenant enfin à connaître où et qui nous étions. Vous avez révélé l'âge de Rome, l'ordre chronologique de son histoire, le droit religieux et sacerdotal; vous nous avez fait connaître ses institutions politiques et militaires, la distribution de ses quartiers, la situation de ses monuments; en un mot, les noms, les espèces, la destination et les causes de toutes les choses divines et humaines; vous avez répandu beaucoup de lumière sur les œuvres des nos poètes, et en général sur toute la littérature et la langue latines. Vous avez composé vous-même un poème plein de variété et d'élégance, où vous employez le jeu de presque tous les rythmes; enfin, vous avez mis en beaucoup d'endroits un premier trait de philosophie⁵³.

Cependant, l'époque dans laquelle tous les deux exerçaient leurs activités, a été nommée la période cicéronienne de la littérature et la culture romaines. La gloire de Varron s'est pourtant avérée plus faible. Ce fait a été déjà remarqué par Francesco Pétrarque qui, dans *Trionfo della Fama* (3, 38), a nommé Marc Terentius Varron la troisième grande lumière de Rome (*il terzo gran lume romano*), à côté de Cicéron et Virgile.

Varron était toutefois le plus grand savant de la Rome antique et philologue dans tout le sens du terme⁵⁴, mais aussi un homme de grandes valeurs éthiques

⁵² Cic. *Acad.* 1, 3, 9 (je cite d'après — Cicero: *Academica posteriora. Liber Primus*. Cicéron: *Secondes Académiques. Livre I*. Édition, introduction et commentaire de M. Ruch, Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences humaines de Nancy. Paris 1970; voir aussi — M. Tullius Cicero: *Academicorum ad M. Varronem liber primus [academica posteriora]*. Ed. C.F.W. Mueller. Lipsiae 1904; M. Tullius Cicero: *Academicorum reliquiae cum Lucullo*. Ed. O. Plasberg. Editio stereotypa editionis prioris (MCMXXII). Stutgardiae et Lipsiae 1996).

⁵³ Je cite d'après — M. Tullius Cicero: *Secondes Académiques. A M. Terentius Varron. Livre premier*. Traduction nouvelle par M.A. Lorquet, professeur de philosophie. In: *Oeuvres complètes de Cicéron*. Avec la traduction en français, publiées sous la direction de M. Nisard, maître de conférences à l'École Normale. T. 3. Paris 1840.

⁵⁴ Comp. B. Bravo: "Philologia. Przyczynek do badań nad kulturą intelektualistów antycznych od Tukidydesa do Synezyusza i św. Augustyna". *Przegląd Historyczny* 1968, T. 59, pp. 367—393; Idem: *Philologie, histoire, philosophie de l'histoire. Étude sur J.G. Droysen historien de l'antiquité*. Wrocław 1968; Idem: "Remarques sur l'érudition dans l'antiquité". In: *Acta Conventus XI "Eirene"*. Wratislaviae—Varsavia 1971, pp. 326—335.

(*sanctissimus atque integerrimus*)⁵⁵. Dans son activité scientifique il évitait des solutions extrêmes. Il était un homme serein et il traitait la vie heureuse en tant que synthèse des attitudes actives et contemplatives⁵⁶. En défendant tout ce qui est traditionnellement romain et italien⁵⁷ il était en même temps ouvert aux autres cultures. Il a également sa place dans la culture européenne par l'importance de ses succès aussi dans les siècles suivants. Son idée constitue la base du système de l'éducation fondé sur *artes liberales*. Il a déterminé le début de la littérature romaine, il a établi le canon de 21 comédies de Plaute et il a introduit des solutions innovatrices à la satire ménippée. Il était auteur du premier livre romain illustré et il a élaboré la conception de la première bibliothèque publique à Rome. Il reste toujours un auteur important entre autres pour des linguistes, des historiens et des théoriciens de la littérature et de la culture, des bibliologues et des historiens. Enfin, en fixant la date de la fondation de la Ville éternelle (*Urbs aeterna*), il a donné aux générations suivantes des Européens un point de repère au temps qui passe plus vite que nous aurions voulu.

⁵⁵ Cic. *Phil.* 2, 103.

⁵⁶ Comp. E. Laughton: "Humour in Varro". In: *Varron. Grammaire antique et stylistique latine*. Éd. J. Collart. Paris 1978, pp. 105—111.

⁵⁷ Comp. R. Roth: "Varro's *picta Italia* (RR I. ii. 1) and the Odology of Roman Italy". *Hermes* 2007, Bd. 135, pp. 286—300.

Politics and the Stars Elements of Augustan Ideology in Germanicus' *Aratea*

Abstract: Germanicus' *Aratea*, an astronomical poem from 1st century CE is one of the earliest Latin translations of Aratus of Soli's *Phaenomena*, a work well-known in antiquity. Germanicus brought a new value to the topic, not only translating a Greek poem, but in fact transferring it onto Roman ground by following great literary traditions.

Being a favourite of the princeps, the young poet thoroughly changed the Greek model's main theme from worshipping Zeus' power to praising a head of state and his arrangements. *Aratea* is filled with traces of Augustus' ideology: encouraging bringing back the "Roman virtues" (*pietas*, *clementia*, *iustitia* etc.), the princeps' idea of *pax* and shaping a new approach to religion. The purpose of the article is to find these traces and examine their role in the poem.

Key words: Germanicus, Augustus, *Aratea*, stars, propaganda

Stars seem to have no interest at all in any aspect of human life, even in things as important as politics. It is a purely human idea to make stars care about events taking place on Earth, and it is not difficult for a vivid imagination to enliven the human-like shapes that appear on the night sky and involve them in a story, design or ideology of some kind.

Germanicus Julius Caesar, a politician and a poet, left an example of such approach in his astronomical didactic poem, *Aratea*. He managed to mix politics into what we would expect to be a catalogue of stars in a form of a dactylic hexameter. Combining politics with poetry was not a new idea Germanicus' times¹.

¹ Cf. M. Zagórski: *Bogowie mieszkają na Palatynie*. Kraków 2006, p. 26ff.

The decline of augustan epoch was full of art involved in re-building Rome's best qualities from the olden days. But even this type of poetry being well-known, does it not seem too artificial to 'embroid' an astronomical poem with such a down to earth topic? Did Germanicus' *Aratea* serve only the purpose of praising Augustus' order or were the stars actually the main subject of the poem, with only a small trace of politics?

A brief description of Germanicus' poem is necessary. Firstly, because *Aratea*, as well as its source, is of minimal recognition, sometimes even to readers familiar with classical literature, not to mention wider public. Secondly, because understanding the peculiar character of the poem and its composition is important to comprehend the meaning of its ideological components and to place them properly in the poem's construction as a whole.

Aratea is based on an astronomical work *Phaenomena* by Aratus of Soli written in 3rd century BC, a work very popular and respected throughout the antiquity. This fame was well-deserved, as *Phaenomena* was a masterpiece which used poetry to present a topic that did not seem very attractive: a description of the constellations appearing on the sky and their constant movements. Aratus, a true Hellenic *poeta doctus*, managed not only to make the style smoother and the subject lighter² by adding some mythological tales, but more importantly, he added new meaning to the description of the Universe by making stars appear as the signs of Zeus, who was presented as a guardian of the human kind and as the one who established the principles of the world³. The *Phaenomena*'s popularity was long-lasting also due to the fact that it was thought of as an astronomy textbook, although its scientific value was very low. But, even the great astronomer Hipparchus, who wrote a critical commentary on the poem, correcting most of the errors, held Aratus in high esteem⁴. *Phaenomena*, a poem of 1154 verses written in dactylic hexameter, was later divided into two parts: proper *Phaenomena*, which contained the description of the constellations and *Diosemeiai*, the weather prognoses, based on the appearances of the stars throughout the year.

As far as Rome is concerned, "it seems difficult to be able to name any real astronomer"⁵, yet all the educated people were familiar with the *Phaenomena*. And

² Aratus based his poem on some tractate, probably on Eudoxus' *Phaenomena*. There is a legend which explains the origins of Aratus' work: king Antigonus II Gonatas (Aratus' patron) ordered the poet to compose a poem based on the tractate. Cf. J. Rostropowicz: *Król i poeta, czyli o „Fajnomenach” Aratosa z Soloj*. Opole 1998, p. 28.

³ C. Santini: "Il proemio degli »Arati Phaenomena« di Germanico. In: *Prefazioni, prologhi, proemi di opere tecnico-scientifiche latine*. Ed. C. Santini, N. Scivoletto. Roma 1990, p. 21.

⁴ Mark Possanza (*Translating the Heavens: Aratus, Germanicus, and the Poetics of Latin Translation*. New York, Oxford 2004: 90) has indicated an irony in the fact that nothing was left from the works of Hipparchus, one of the greatest astronomers of antiquity, except his commentary to a poem of a non-astronomer. Germanicus, in his attempt to make some scientific corrections to the original texts, used Hipparchus' commentary as a guide.

⁵ *L'astronomia a Roma well'eta Augusta*. Ed. D. Liuzzi. Galatina 1989, p. 13.

as Romans might not have had inclinations to make scientific discoveries or create original literary works, their talents for transferring achievements of other nations onto local ground are doubtless. In case of Aratus' work this meant translating *Phaenomena* to Latin. The authority of the Greek poet can be measured by great names that appear in respect to these translations. The first known *Aratea* (or *Aratus* as D.B. Gain suggested)⁶ was composed by young Cicero, but has been judged as a work of no great artistic value. Only about 400 verses are left of Marcus Tullius' early work. A lot less, 5 verses, were preserved from the *Aratea* by Ovid.

Nothing is certain about the third attempt to transpose Aratus' poem into Latin. This *Aratea* is believed to be composed by Germanicus Julius Caesar, son of Drusus. Many discussions were held concerning two basic problems of this translation: firstly, the date⁷, and secondly, the authorship of the poem, of which the latter leads to another question: who was the poem dedicated to? For the purposes of this article there is no need to engage in the first two matters⁸, and as for the last one, I am convinced by the reasoning of most of scholars⁹ that Germanicus' *Aratea* were dedicated to Augustus.

The preserved verses of Germanicus' *Aratea*, in the number of 725, are based on the first part of *Phaenomena*¹⁰, and consist of a proem, a description of the constellations of northern and southern hemisphere and also a depiction of celestial circles (i.e. the equator, the tropics of Capricorn and Cancer, the ecliptic and the Zodiac). This is parallel not only to the contents, but also to the number of verses of the original *Phaenomena*, for Germanicus' purpose was apparently to make his poem structurally as close to the original as possible. However, the essence of his

⁶ D.B. Gain: *The Aratus Ascribed to Germanicus Caesar, Edited with an Introduction, Translation & Commentary*. London 1976, p. 17.

⁷ The most commonly stated date is around year AD 17 (Cf. A. Le Boeuffle: *Germanicus, Les Phénomènes d'Aratos, texte établi et traduit*. Paris 1975, p. XI; C. Lausdei: "Sulla cronologia e sul proemio dei Phaenomena Arati". In: *Germanico. La persona la personalita, il personaggio: nel bimillenario dalla nascita: atti del convegno, Macerata-Perugia, 9-11 maggio 1986*. Roma 1987, p. 174), when Germanicus had been staying at Rome before his journey to the East. Another theory speaks of the *Aratea* being a work of a young man at the end of his education (Cf. M. Possanza: *Translating the Heavens: Aratus, Germanicus, and the Poetics of Latin Translation*. New York—Oxford 2004, p. 233).

⁸ I follow the general tendency to ascribe *Aratea* to Germanicus, as the arguments to support this theory are much stronger than for example those in favor of Tiberius' authorship. Cf. D.B. Gain: *The Aratus...*, p. 17; M. Possanza: *Translating...*, p. 218.

⁹ D.B. Gain: (*The Aratus...*) is the most sceptical about the authorship of Germanicus, others like Le Boeuffle (*Germanicus...*) and most recently Possanza (*Translating...*) think that it was Germanicus, son of Drusus, who wrote the *Aratea*. They base their theories on the testimonies of Lactantius (*Div. Inst.* 1.21.28 and 5.5.4) and of Hieronymus (*Comm. ad Ep. Pauli ad Titum* 1.12). But as these testimonies come from late antiquity, there are still many doubts on this view.

¹⁰ There are about 100 verses in 6 fragments, which are believed to be the another part of Germanicus' work. These are called *Prognostica* and their main subject is astrology, although they are not based on the second part of Aratus' poem, the *Diosemeiai*, which were mentioned earlier.

Aratea is quite far from the precursor¹¹. With the same subject, description of the night sky, there are many alterations, most important of which is changing the role of Aratus' Zeus: the god-protector is not the main theme any more. Also, more mythological tales can be found there¹², as well as elements of Latin literary traditions¹³.

Discussing the political elements of Germanicus' poem cannot be limited to analysing the poem itself. As its creator's life was inextricably intertwined, *Aratea* must be regarded as a poem written by a man closely connected to the princeps, who was a statesman first and then a poet¹⁴.

The presence of the head of state is noticeable from the beginning, since the poem starts with an announcement of moving the main theme from Jove to an earthly ruler (v. 1—4):

Ab Iove principium magno deduxit Aratus
carminis; at nobis, genitor, tu maximus auctor;
te veneror, tibi sacra fero doctique laboris
primitias. Probat ipse deum rectorque satorque¹⁵.

The four verses abound with meaning. Firstly, it is an announcement of changing Aratus' main topic, as has been said above: Germanicus states: "Aratus [...] at nobis" and then introduces a new recipient, "genitor", who is surely a head of state, as it is said further. Another opposition is formed: "Iuppiter (magnus) — genitor (maximus)", and because the "genitor" was defined as "greater" this may suggest rivalry between the ruler on Earth and the one in heavens. However, the phrase "Probat ipse deum rectorque satorque", where Jove accepts his sovereign, seems to suggest a united rule of the world¹⁶ of both god and human. Thus, the beginning of the *Aratea* clearly announces that the poem is going to become one of many politically-engaged literary works, the ones which were greatly represented in augustan times. Literature reflected reality vividly then, in the epoch of great changes, more vividly perhaps than in earlier times of Rome; it also became a medium of augustan propaganda.

¹¹ Perhaps Germanicus considered it a kind of challenge, trying to fit some more contents into an imposed number of verses.

¹² Mark Possanza (*Translating...*, p. 180) noticed that Germanicus followed here Ovid's way of narration, the one that Naso established in the *Metamorphoses*.

¹³ It is also due to the augustan literature's poetics that Germanicus decided to reformulate Aratus' poem.

¹⁴ Germanicus' father was Drusus. In AD 4 he became an adopted son of Tiberius by the orders of Augustus. He was a favorite of the Roman people, the historians have praised him for his placidity and qualities of character. Cf. Suet. *Vitae* 4.3.

¹⁵ All the fragments of *Aratea* quoted here come from André Le Boeuffe's 1975 edition, *Germanicus, Les phénomènes d'Aratos*.

¹⁶ Cf. C. Santini: *Il proemio...*, p. 24. This dividing of power appeared also in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* XV, pp. 858—860. Cf. M. Possanza: *Translating...*, p. 229.

Augustus' political programme was connected with an ideology that covered all aspects of human life, cultural and religious included, and it is noticeable in *Aratea* that Germanicus, the princeps' relative and favourite fully accepted his program. The purpose of this article is to find traces of augustan ideology among the stars depicted in Germanicus' poem.

Augustus has defined the virtues of an ideal Roman citizen. They were based on what was called the *mores maiorum*, *mores* of ancestors, believed to be cultivated by Romans of the olden days, and were supposed to heal the degenerated post-republican society. These virtues were *pietas*, *clementia*, *iustitia*, and *virtus* and greatest poets of augustan epoch, such as Vergil and Horatius, glorified them in their masterpieces — there was Vergil's *Aeneis* and Horatius' *Carmina*¹⁷.

Germanicus' subject, the figures appearing on the sky, proved to be very suitable when talking about morality: all the catasterisms (mythological transfer of a human or creature into the stars) lean on a personage's merit or fault.

Germanicus searched for augustan virtues most diligently of all the poets presenting the subject of the stars¹⁸. Let us look at some of the constellations that had earned their place on the sky for their merits towards the gods (*pietas*). At the beginning of the poem (vv. 24—47) there is a description of two Ursae (Bears), which are presented as new-born Jove's guardians, and because of this great merit they were made immortal as stars in the night sky. Germanicus sums up this contribution in few words: "Meritum custodia fecit" (v. 33) as he presents the infancy of the mightiest god. Later on, the poet names another constellation showing Jupiter's guardian, and ascribes her the same gratitude of the god¹⁹. It is the constellation of the She-Goat (*Capra*) (vv. 165—168):

[...] putatur
nutrix esse Iovis (si vere Iuppiter infans
ubera Cretaeae mulsit fidissima Caprae),
sidere quae claro gratum testatur alumnum

One more creature represents the main virtue, *pietas*, in the starry sky: the Dolphin. The description of this small but beautiful shape is not as graceful as in Ovid's *Fasti*, it is only said to have been Neptune's helper in courtship when the god of the sea tried to make advances to Amphitrite:

Delphin inde brevis lucet iuxta Capricornum
paucis sideribus; tulit hic Atlantida nymphen
in thalamos, Neptune, tuos, miseratus amantem.

¹⁷ Especially *Carmen* III 2 and III 24.

¹⁸ Cf. M. Hermann: *Obraz nieba gwiazdzistego w literaturze rzepuskiej epoki augustowskiej*. Kraków 2001, p. 141. Those other poets were Cicero, as was said above, the first translator of *Phaenomena*, Ovid with his *Metamorphoses* and *Fasti* and Manilius, the creator of *Astronomica*.

¹⁹ Describing two versions of the same mythological tale is characteristic to Germanicus' narration, he tends to present as many versions of a story as possible.

Perhaps these few verses (321—323) were sufficient for the poet and he did not want to ornament the constellation with a particularly sophisticated description as it is enough beautiful aesthetically all by itself, however, he might have wanted to add moral beauty to it. And thus he did, enriching the Dolphin with a virtue which made the short tale more interesting.

The *pietas* was not represented on the night sky by animal-like shapes only. There are also characters which, according to legends, were once people, but have earned such respect among the gods that were granted the permission to transform into stars and live eternally. One of them is the Bear Watcher, believed to be a worshipper of Bacchus, who was revived being accidentally killed by people whom he taught to grow grape-vine. After this event Bacchus gave him a place in the stars as a recompense for the harm

sive ille Arctophylax, seu Bacchi ob munera caesus
Icarus ereptam pensavit sidere vitam.
Non illi obscurum caput est, non tristia membra [...]
(vv. 91—93)

A half-human half-horse shape, the constellation of Centaur, is also a figure, which can be put among those characters, on whom Germanicus bestowed the “augustan virtues”:

[...] Dextra
seu praedam e silvis portat seu dona propinquae
placatura deos, cultor Iovis, admovet Arae.
Hic erit ille pius Chiron, iustissimus omnis
inter nubigenas et magni doctor Achillis.

As a *cultor Iovis*, who brings the prey to the Altar, the Centaur is another character to represent *pietas* towards Jupiter (Germanicus described him as *pious*) and, what is more, the poet describes him using the epithet *iustissimus*, but not among humans: the Centaur is the most righteous of “those who were given birth by the clouds”, the centaurs. But even if *iustitia* was a concept intended only for people (and gods, as we will see later), use of this epithet suggests that the Centaur is a respectable creature, “almost human” through his virtue, who deserved his cathasterism *honoris causa*.

But Germanicus, a true moralist, has not only used positive examples: many of the creatures presented on his sky are supposed to be miserable because of their faults. Verses 193—200 describe Cassiopeia, and although the poet is silent at first about her position in the sky and enigmatic about the cause of her being amongst the stars, he points at the expression of pain on her face and her pitiable gesture:

[...] Ipsa horrida vultu
sic tendit palmas, ceu sit planctura relictam
Andromedam, meritae non iusta piacula matris.

She is crying over her daughter, who was sacrificed to a sea monster. The reason of the sacrifice and Cassiopeia's horrid pain is explained later. Germanicus seems to gradate the tension, at first he calls her *sublimis* and *clara*, which pictures her as a dignified queen. Later he says:

[...] certaverat olim
qua senis aequorei natis, cum litore Cancri
Doridos et Panopes spectasset stulta choreas.

This merciless *stulta* shows that the fault was rightfully punished, because a human dared to compete with goddesses, committing the crime of *impietas* along with *superbia*, and so she not only suffers from the sacrifice of her daughter again, but is also dragged through the sky with her head down ("in caput atque umeros rapit orbis Cassiepiam, declinemque trahunt aeterni pondera mundi, corruptaque cadit forma" vv. 662—665). There is no place for dignity where there is no virtue.

Another recognizable mythical creation in the night sky as well as in ancient literature, whose fault was also *impietas*, is Orion. He shines brightly, and the constellation is enormous²⁰. The first description of Orion in *Aratea* points to his brightness and great stature (vv. 328—332). Repeated preposition *sic* expresses the admiration for the aesthetical beauty of the shape: "sic balteus ardet, sic vagina ensis pernici sic pede lucet" (vv. 331, 332). The collection of terms signifying brightness allocated close to each other: "flammae" (v. 330), "ardet" (v. 331) and "lucet" (v. 332) emphasize the beauty of the constellation. Similarly to how Cassiopeia is described, also here a strong condemnation of the giant is shown later in the text (vv. 648—651):

[...] virginis intactas quondam contingere vestes
ausum hominem divae sacrum termerasse pudorem.
Devotus poenae tunc impius ille futurae
nudabatque feris ambusto stipite silvas [...]

Orion's fault was more horrid than Cassiopeia's: not only did he offend the goddess Diana, he also dared to try to violate her virtue. Germanicus defines him as *impius*, but the giant's fault was also *superbia* and his sin seems to terrify the poet so much that he begs the goddess to forgive him for even speaking about this event. He only takes liberty of mentioning it, because some poets before him did it already:

Sis vati placata, precor, Latonia virgo;
non ego, non primus, veteres cecinere poetae [...]
(vv. 646, 647)

²⁰ Orion is one of the largest and brightest constellations on the sky. His stars are placed on the celestial equator, thus they are visible from any place on Earth. The constellation contains a characteristic element – Orion's belt, consisting of three stars.

It is thus well noticeable that in Germanicus' poem morality not only completes visual beauty, but even exceeds it: aesthetics is nothing, if it is not fulfilled by virtues. A conclusion rises here: Germanicus' understanding of beauty is closely connected to stoical doctrine, which is considered to be the official philosophy of Augustus' politics.²¹

There is one more extended mythical tale in *Aratea* worth noticing, where the most moralistic contents have been placed together — the tale of the constellation Virgo, whom Germanicus identifies with Roman goddess Iustitia. Augustus introduced her cult in the year AD 13. Germanicus gives her the features of Hesiod's Dike²² and binds her with the tale of the four ages of human kind (golden, silver, bronze and iron). Many elements can be found in this description, that respond to augustan moral ideology. Let us bring up a few fragments of the long myth (vv. 96—139): it is the most meaningful, if regarding the subject of augustan ideology in the *Aratea*:

Virginis inde subest facies, cui plena sinistra
fulget spica manu maturisque ardet aristas.
Quam te, diva, vocem? [...]
Aurea pacati regeres cum saecula mundi,
Iustitia inviolata malis, placidissima virgo [...]
[...] mediis te laeta ferebas
sublimis populis nec dedignata subire
tectis hominum et puros sine crimine, diva, penatis [...]
Nondum vesanos rabies nudaverat ensis
nec consanguineis fuerat discordia nota [...]
At postquam argenti crevit deformior aetas [...]
nulliusque larem, nullos adit illa penatis.
Tantum cum trepidum vulgus coetusque notavit,
increpat: "O patrum suboles oblita priorum,
degeneres semper semperque habitura minoris,
quid me, cuius abit usus, per vota vocatis?" [...]

The tale of a new goddess, purely augustan, we could say, let Germanicus develop the problem of morality, and he followed the instructions of Augustus' propaganda. The goddess herself is a personification of one of the virtues, the justice, as her name indicates. The poet addresses her with respect and in further verses shows that she was the only being who was granted the permission of choosing for herself a location on the sky ("deseruit propere terras iustissima virgo et caeli sortita locum [...] vv. 137—138). The other important issue is evoking *mores maiorum*:

²¹ As far as *Aratea* is concerned, traces have been found not only of stoicism, but also of neopythagorean doctrine. Cf. A. Le Boeuffe: *Germanicus...*, p. XXVIII.

²² *Dike* appeared in Hesiod's *Works and Days*. Transl. D.W. Tandy, W.C. Neale. Berkeley 1996, v. 256.

the golden age humanity represents the Roman ancestors, who were the model of morality for Augustus, an example which should be followed by everyone. But along with mentioning the progenitors, a harsh reproach towards the people of the iron age is formed, and this is a reproach to be heard by Germanicus' fellow citizens: he as well as Augustus considered contemporary Romans as degenerated; they forgot all about the morals of their ancestors ("O patrum suboles oblita priorum, degeneres semper semperque habitura minoris"). He mentions things familiar to the Romans as to ensure who is to be condemned: he speaks of Lares and Penates, the household gods of early times.

Moral renewal of Roman society was one of the most important issues in Augustus' political programme, and Germanicus, perhaps pointed by the princeps to be his successor and a continuer of the politics' foundations, showed his approval of Augustus' ideas in his literary work, as had done many before him. He is believed also to be accepting the plan of replacing great Greek literature with great literature of Romans²³. With Vergil as the new Homer and Horatius as the new lyrical poet in the place of Alcaeus and Sappho, Germanicus was to be a Roman Aratus (for the early work of Cicero was not well received). This of course cannot be regarded as the only reason for undertaking such a work by a young "prince", but must have been encouraged by the princeps himself²⁴.

Besides the renewal of *mores maiorum*, Augustus' propaganda was deeply involved in renovation and shaping a new approach towards religion, cults and perception of the gods. One of the princeps' aims was to strengthen the authority of old sacerdotal collegiums and restore traditional religious festivities, build new temples and renovate the old ones. The concept of *pietas*, that had been depicted earlier in this article, was of great importance in the new Roman religiousness. We could see that Germanicus held this value in high esteem. He shows his respect to the gods several times. His way of addressing Diana, when he recounts the myth of Orion's unfortunate attempt to violate her dignity, shows not only this deep respect, but may also be a way of indicating the importance of this goddess in recently formed cult. Augustus considered Apollo and his sister to be his protectors and was trying to make them more important in the renovated Roman religion, which was made clear during the Ludi Saeculares in AD 17, of which the culmination was making sacrifice to Apollo and Diana²⁵.

Germanicus' gods are dignified and just, although the poet allows himself to mention some of Juppiter's questionable behaviors: the kidnapping of Europe ("Corniger hic Taurus, cuius decepta figura Europe, thalamis et virginitate relictis, per freta sublimis tergo mendacia sensit litora [...]", vv. 536—539) and of Gany-mede ("Iovis ales (i.e. the Eagle)... unguibus innocuis Phrygium repuit Gany-

²³ Cf. R. Piętka: *Kaliope i Urania. Rzymskie poematy astronomiczne*. Poznań 2005, p. 109.

²⁴ If we assume that he was aware of the making of the new poem, or maybe it was published even before Augustus' death (cf. M. Possanza: *Translating...*, p. 233).

²⁵ Cf. M. Jaczynowska: *Religie świata rzymskiego*. Warszawa 1987, p. 118.

meden”). However, these tales do not speak of Jupiter as the kidnapper directly; the guilty ones are the animals, yet still they are being rewarded by the king of gods and have their place in the sky *honoris causa*. However, there are few phrases, which could be read as a sign of mythological scepticism. The first one is included in the tale of the two Bears (vv. 31—32): “Veteris si gratia famae Cresia vos aluit”, the other also concerns Jupiter’s guardian, the She-Goat (vv. 166—167): “[...] si vere Iuppiter infans ubera Cretaeae mulsit fidissima Caprae”. The last example can be found in the part describing the Pleiads and concerns Atlas’ work as the sky bearer, (vv. 264—265) “[...] si vere sustinet Atlas regna Iovis superosque atque ipso pondere gaudet”: this picture of the Titan supporting the sky seems to have an ironical tone, although Mark Possanza²⁶ is convinced that Germanicus used this poetical expression to show the indescribability of the events reconciled by the poet. It may also signify that there are other versions of the narrated story. Germanicus, aspiring to his predecessor’s title of *poeta doctus*, might have used the sophisticated formula “[...] si vere”. But if it is a manifestation of true scepticism, it can be another sign of augustan ideology: the gods should not be a subject of frivolous tales any more, they should be worshipped with a solemnity that they deserve. The gods in Germanicus’ poem are noble and people need to fear them, as he warns after he had described Orion’s punishment: “Parcite, mortales, numquam levis ira deorum” (v. 656).

All of the aspects of Augustus’ political programme and his propaganda which was used to convince Romans of the necessity of changes and reminded them of the princeps’ essential merits in building a better Rome, were bound together: the social, cultural, religious ideology were joined by the idea of *pax*, freedom from war, especially civil war, although there were repeated battles on the verges of Roman territories. Octavian was considered as the one who liberated the republic from the fratricidal war, the greatest misfortune for the Romans.²⁷ Germanicus evoked *pax* in the proem of *Aratea*:

Quantum etenim possent anni certissima signa,
qua sol ardentem Cancrum rapidissimus ambit
diversasque secat metas gelidi Capricorni
quave Aries et Libra aequant divortia lucis,
si non tanta quies, te praeside, puppibus aequor
cultorique daret terras, procul arma silerent?
Nunc vacat audacis in caelum tollere vultus
sideraque et mundi varios cognoscere motus [...]

Not only is the idea of peace important as a political achievement, it also gives freedom — especially to the poets.

²⁶ M. Possanza: *Translating...*, p. 120.

²⁷ Cf. Ibidem, p. 229; C. Lausdei: “Sulla cronologia...”, p. 181.

Germanicus' approval of the princeps' politics and ideology has been presented above, but what does the poet say about Augustus himself? Tacitus and Suetonius depicted the young son of late Drusus as a well-educated, respectable man²⁸, devoted to his family, a favourite of Augustus, loved by the people of Rome, a man who could have, but would not cause a *coup d'état*²⁹. From this we do not expect that he would have offended Augustus in any way, and indeed he did not. He praised his relative in the *Aratea*, although he did not do that directly: a straightforward apostrophe appears only once (in the proem Augustus' name does not occur), when he describes the constellation of the Capricorn, the one which princeps chose to be his protector in the stars³⁰. This piece was written after Augustus' death and there are certain difficulties in establishing the date of composing the poem:

Hic, Auguste, tuum genitali corpore numen
attonitas inter gentis patriamque paventem
in caelum tulit et maternis reddidit astris.

The poet substitutes what should be "animus" with "numen", shows the divinity of Augustus' soul, and points out his origins, suggesting that he had come down from the stars to the Earth and after death was brought back where he belonged. This also is a trace of Augustus' constant and systematic path to divinity, which begun with announcing his "father", Julius Caesar, a god³¹. However, Germanicus does not call him a god yet.

The young poet's attitude towards augustan ideology was wholly approving, as the examples above illustrate. Again, Germanicus' situation was different from Vergil's, Horatius' or even Ovid's, firstly because he was the princeps' relative and a member of his court, secondly because his poem was created at the end of the epoch of great changes — he did not need to manifest his support of new ideas, which was the task of earlier poets, because in Germanicus' times the political system that Augustus had created was already well functioning. So this could have been either a *captatio benevolentiae* of the princeps or an attempt to follow the new literary tradition of Rome. The third possibility, and a very probable one, is that the young poet truly believed in all the ideas, among which he had been brought up, as his life of brave soldier and an honest man certainly proved. Besides, the younger generation of poets was still involved in politics³². Germanicus' idea of placing

²⁸ Cf. Tacitus: *Annales...*, II, 73 and Suetonius: *De vita Caesarum...*, IV, 3.

²⁹ Cf. Suet. IV, 3.

³⁰ The fact that Germanicus mentions the Capricornus as Augustus' Zodiac sign once again indicates that he follows the propaganda. Octavian was born under the sign of Libra, but apparently as far as astrology was concerned, Capricornus was more appropriate for the head of the state. Cf. Germ. v. 560, Le Boeuffle *ad loca*.

³¹ Cf. M. Jaczynowska: *Religie...*, p. 120.

³² Cf. M. Hermann: *Obraz nieba...*, p. 94.

political ideology in an astronomical poem seems inadequate at first, but as works of earlier great poets had shown, this combination does not have to be unbearable. On the contrary, Germanicus managed to put ideology into a poem in a way that neither Horatius nor Vergil would be ashamed of, for there is nothing insolent or artificial. The moral, religious and social ideas of augustan times are carefully embroidered onto the cloth of the night sky. It seems that the stars, although distant and appearing as indifferent, can be after all slightly involved in human lives.

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De providentia in orbe terrarum malis adflicto a Seneca Philosopho depincta*

Abstract: In the work titled *De providentia* Lucilius, the addressee of *Epistulae morales* and *Naturales quaestiones*, is given the role of Seneca's interlocutor, although in fact the text is not a dialogue, but a monologue — the philosopher's conversation with himself is moulded in the shape of a Cynic or Stoic diatribe. The book was probably composed when Seneca removed himself from public life in the years 62—65 A.D. The main theme of the opusculum is why good people suffer from various inconveniences. Herein the philosopher uses words *providentia* and *deus* as synonyms. *Fortuna*, in his opinion, submitted to providence. *Fatum* in this work is both the force (the synonym of providentia) which governs the world, and a determined lifetime of people. Seneca affirms that providence is a divine force, but imputes to it explicit person's features.

Key words: Seneca, providence, Deus, dialogue, *De providentia*

Volterus putavit motum terrae, quo Ulisbona anno 1755 affecta est, documento esse, quod mundus sine dubio optimus non esset et Deus, magnus fabricator, hominibus operam non daret. Cicero in exordio librorum, qui *De natura deorum* inscribuntur, dixit quaestiones, quae ad naturam caelestium atque eorum erga nos homines animum pertinerent, esse maximi momenti et difficiles ad explicandum. In opere, quod supra nominavimus, Arpinas ait se fere idem sentire atque Stoici. Sed scimus illum oratorem saepissime in utramque partem disputavisse et ex philosophorum doctrina id, quod sibi probabile videretur, accepisse. Conicere ergo possumus Ciceronem de providentia nonnumquam dubitavisse, nam in libris

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De divinatione Stoicos castigat¹. Re vera Arpinas vestigia Academicorum, qui Carneadem sequebantur, premit. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, qui Zenonis sectatorum numero habetur, saepe tamen cum Platonis discipulis consentit. De se ipse ita scribit: *Disputare cum Socrate licet, dubitare cum Carneade, cum Epicuro quiescere, hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum Cynicis excedere* (*De brevitate vitae* XIV, 2). Capite 5 epistolae 16 ad Lucilium tria principia alternata, quibus mundus regitur, ab Seneca distincta esse videntur, scilicet fatum, divina providentia vel casus: *sive nos inexorabili lege fata constringunt, sive arbiter deus universi cuncta disposuit, sive casus res humanas sine ordine inpellit et iactat, philosophia nos tueri debet. Haec adhortabitur ut deo libenter pareamus, ut fortunae contumaciter; haec docebit ut deum sequaris, feras casum* (*Ep.* 16, 5). In providentia (quae Graece πρόνοια dicitur) describenda Seneca orthodoxum Stoicum se praebeat, sed novo modo eam depingit². In *Naturalium quaestionum* libro II contendit Deum simul fatum, naturam, providentiam et mundum dici posse³. Itaque Seneca suis in scriptis alternatim nominibus fati⁴ et providentia utitur, cum de vi, qua mundus temperatur, dicit.

Seneca suis in litteris creberrime voce fortunae utitur. Fortunae nomini⁵ apud auctores Romanos multae significationes insunt, vicinae vocibus *fors*, *casus*⁶, *sors*, *felicitas*, *infelicitas*, *situs*, *opes*, *dignitas*. Lucani patruus fortunam dupliciter intellegit. Primum, ea res, quae homines sua in vita praevidere non possunt, est. Illa

¹ Sed afferri oportet etiam e *Tusculanis disputationibus* placita (V 20, 57 ss.). Aurelius Augustinus in libris *De civitate Dei* inscriptis cum Cicerone dissentit (vide e.g. *Civ. Dei* V 9), sed Stoeae sectatoribus in vitiis etiam reprehendit.

² G. Reale Italice ita explicat: „La Stoa piegherà, specie nell’ultima sua stagione, verso il teismo, pur senza sapervi giungere pienamente” (*Storia della filosofia antica. III. I sistemi dell’età ellenistica*. Milano 1993, p. 366).

³ Vide *Nat. quaest.* II 45: *eundem quem nos Iovem intelligunt: custodem rectoremque universi, animum ac spiritum mundi, operis huius dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne convenit, vis illum fatum vocare, non errabis: hic est ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa causarum; vis illum providentiam dicere, recte dices: est enim cuius consilio huic mundo providetur, ut inoffensus exeat et actus suos explicet; vis illum naturam vocare, non peccabis: hic est, ex quo nata sunt omnia, cuius spiritu vivimus; vis illum vocare mundum, non falleris: ipse enim est quod vides totum [...].* Cf. Lucani dictum ad opinionem, quae nostris temporibus pantheismus dicitur, pertinens: *Iuppiter est quodcumque vides [...]* (*Bel. civ.* IX 580).

⁴ [*Fatum*] *existimo necessitatem rerum omnium actionumque quam nulla res rumpat* (*Nat. quaest.* II 36).

⁵ Τύχη, quae Latine fortuna interpretatur, primum apud Hesiodum inveniri potest, Homerus autem de ea ne mentionem quidem fecit (de qua re Macrobius in *Commentario in somnium Scipionis* scribit). Constat τύχην sicut deam aetate, quae Hellenistica vocatur, magnopere cultam esse. Romani quoque Fortunam multis cognominibus ornatam decorabant. Cicero in libris *De divinatione* scripsit fortunam contrariam esse sapientiae. Re vera, illa quae a Pacuvio tragico caeca dicitur, nullam prudentiam habet. Fortuna res fortuita intellegi potest. Quasi genius quoque magnis ducibus proprius exempli gratia a C. Sallustio Crispo describitur.

⁶ Cf. Arpinatis verba: *Quid est enim aliud fors, quid fortuna, quid casus, quid eventus, nisi cum sic aliquid cecidit, sic evenit, ut vel aliter cadere atque evenire potuerit?* (*De div.* II 6, 15).

fortuna in dignitatibus, opibus et vita, quae vulgo felices videantur, aut in eorum omnium rerum absentia manifesta est. In ea depingenda Seneca personificatione fruitur. Hoc significatione fortuna providentiae dissimilis est⁷: *Numquam ego fortunae credidi, etiam cum videretur pacem agere. Omnia illa, quae in me indulgentissime conferebat, pecuniam, honores, gratiam, eo loco posui, unde posset sine motu meo repetere. Intervallum inter illam et me magnum habui. Itaque abstulit illa, non avulsit* (*Ad Helv.* V, 4). Res adversae solum illum hominem debilitare possunt, qui rebus secundis deceptus sit (cf. *ibid.* V, 4—5). Libro *De providentia* vox fortunae malum colorem habet. Cum aliis locis Seneca de rebus secundis dicens eodem nomine utatur, opere de quo sermo est, res secundae ab voce felicitatis designantur.

Deinde, apud Neronis magistrum fortuna synonymum aliquorum nominum est. Horum numero voces fati, Dei, providentiae et naturae insunt; viri docti illam fortunam teleologicam appellaverunt.

Philosophus Cordubensis putat mundum mentem divinam esse; divina decreta mutari non possunt⁸. Tametsi divinitas nocere nescit, hominibus benigne operam dat, bene eis volens⁹, tamen *multa incommoda iustis viris accidunt* (*Ep.* 74, 10). Haec verba similia sunt illis, quae titulo opusculi *Quare aliqua incommoda bonis viris accidunt, cum providentia sit, sive de providentia*¹⁰ inscripti occurrunt. Hoc scriptum numero 10 operum, qui dialogi dicuntur, asservatum est. Saeculis X aut XI in abbatia Cassini Montis optimus atque nunc veterrimus codex, deinceps

⁷ Vide *De beneficiis* IV, VIII 3. Cf. Augustinus, *Retractationes* I 1, 2: *verumtamen paenitet me sic illic nominasse fortunam, cum videam homines habere in pessima consuetudine, ubi dici debet: „Hoc Deus voluit”, dicere „Hoc voluit Fortuna”*. Vide quoque A. Kuc: *Dyskurs z Filozofii w „Consolatio philosophiae” Boecjusza*. Katowice 2005, p. 112 ss.

⁸ Quamquam Seneca Deum imprimis impersonalem ideam habebat, auctores Christiani intellexerunt philosophum similia sibi dixisse. Fama est Senecam Christi fuisse sectatorem. Probabilissimum tamen videtur Christianos a Neronis magistro esse cognitos (vide M. Sordi: „I rapporti personali di Seneca con i cristiani con Appendice di I. Ramelli, Aspetti linguistici dell'epistolario Seneca-San Paolo”. In: *Seneca e i Cristiani*. A cura di A. Martina. Milano 2001, pp. 113—127; nota bene verba, quae in epistula ad Philippenses 4, 22 legi possunt: ἀσπάζονται ὑμᾶς πάντες οἱ ἄγιοι, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Καίσαρος οἰκίας). Maior natu Senecae frater, Gallio (cui, antequam ab sui patris amico adoptatus est, Marco Annaeo Novato nomen erat), proconsul Achaiae annis 51—52, Paulum e Tarso damnare noluit, dicens inter alia haec etiam: κριτὴς γάρ ἐγὼ τούτων οὐ βούλομαι εἶναι (vide *Actus Ap.* 18, 12—17). Hieronymus e Stridone, postquam *Epistolas Senecae, magistri Neronis imperatoris, ad Paulum Apostolum et Pauli ad Senecam compositas* legit, de Seneca ita scripsit: *Seneca Cordubensis, Sotionis stoici discipulus et patruus Lucani poetae, continentissimae vitae fuit; quem non ponerem in catalogo sanctorum, nisi me illae epistulae provocarent [...]*. (*De viris illustribus* 12). Quo tempore re ipsa illae litterae compositae sint, nostra aetate quoque sub iudice lis est.

⁹ Cf. L.A. Seneca: *I Dialoghi*. Vol. primo [...] a cura di G. Viansino. Oscar Mondadori, p. 13.

¹⁰ Cf. Boëthius, *Consolatio philosophiae* I 4, 96: *siquidem Deus [...] est, unde mala? bona vero unde, si non est?*

⁸ Scripta...

Ambrosianus vocatus, compositus est, quo codice haec scripta inveniri possunt¹¹. Libro de providentia Seneca unam quaestionem cum ea coniunctam ponit, scilicet difficile intellectu problema mali, quod mundo a bono Deo¹² administrato observare possumus; difficillimum intellectu est illud malum in vita hominum bonorum. Primus mundo Graeco de providentia Plato scripsit, sed iam pristinis mythis de potestate Iovis et Moirae (vel Moirarum) decretis sermo est. Quam maximi momenti providentia in Stoicorum sapientia fuerit, ex Minucii Felicis verbis cognosci potest: *Zenon et Chrysippus et Cleanthes sunt ipsi multifformes, sed ad unitatem providentiae omnes revolvuntur* (Octavius 19, 10). Multi Zenonis sectatores opera Περί προνοίας composuerunt, quae Senecae ignota non fuerunt. Hi philosophi Stoeae, quae vetus et deinde media vocatur, providentiam mundo insitam esse putabant¹³. Sed exceptionem addere debemus: nam Cleanthes hymnum in Iovem composuit, quo carmine Iuppiter in modum personae introductus est. Seneca similiter dialogo *De providentia* Deum depingit.

Quod opusculum intra annum 62—65 compositum esse putatur, Seneca a palatio Neronis amoto. Petrus Grimal dicit librum vere et aestate anni 63 esse scriptum¹⁴. G. Viansino animadvertit, ut numero dialogorum sola de providentia disputatione Maecenatis mentio facta sit. De hoc Octavianiani amico saepissime Seneca opere *De beneficiis* et in *Epistulis moralibus* narrat, quare ille vir doctus putat tria illa opera fere eodem tempore esse composita. N. Terzaghi quoque opinionem protulit Senecam senem ad opusculum de providentia scribendum se applicavit¹⁵. Cuius rei testimonium possit esse passus e libris *Naturalium quaestionum*, quae compositae sunt, cum Seneca a Nerone recessisset. Ad Lucilium ita scribit: „*At quare Iuppiter aut ferienda transit aut innoxia ferit?*” *In maiorem me quaestionem vocas, cui suus dies suus locus dandus* (Nat quaest. II 46). His verbis philosophus opus novum de rebus, quae libro de providentia tractantur, pronuntiare videtur¹⁶. Scimus Senecam operi magno de providentia studuisse. Opere tamen infec-

¹¹ De ea re L. Joachimowicz in praefatione Senecae operum a se in linguam Polonam translatis mentionem brevem facit (L.A. Seneca: *Dialogi*. Warszawa 1989). Si plura de codicibus Senecanis in Bibliotheca Ambrosiana Mediolani scire velis, opusculum M. Navoni *Seneca all'Ambrosiana* (in: *Seneca e i Cristiani*, pp. 159—237) lege.

¹² Cf. *De ira* II, 27 1 s: *Quaedam sunt quae nocere non possunt nullamque vim nisi beneficam et salutarem habent, ut di immortales, qui nec volunt obesse nec possunt; natura enim illis mitis et placida est, tam longe remota ab aliena iniuria quam a sua.*

¹³ G. Reale tradit de modo quo Stoici providentiam intellexerunt: *una Provvidenza immanente e non trascendente* (G. Reale: *Storia della filosofia*..., p. 370). Vox providentiae cum voce prudentiae coniungitur et habitum (ἐξί) designare potest. Macrobius in *Commentario in somnium Scipionis* scribit: *prudentiae insunt ratio, intellectus, circumspectio, providentia, docilitas, cautio* (Comm. 1, 8, 7).

¹⁴ P. Grimal: *Seneca*. In linguam Polonam transtulit J.R. Kaczyński. Warszawa 1994, p. 390.

¹⁵ N. Terzaghi: *Storia della letteratura latina da Tiberio a Giustiniano*. Milano 1949, p. 87.

¹⁶ Vide I. Lana: *Lucio Anneo Seneca*. Torino 1955, p. 143. Hic auctor locos similes *De constantia sapientis* operi monstrat, scilicet: longa exordia; Catonis et Socratis laudatio; opinio improbos

to auctor mortuus est¹⁷. Falli potest, qui putat Senecae opera dialogorum nomine inscripta eodem modo, quo Platonis et Aristotelis dialogi esse composita. Potius eos monologos appelles, nam disputator haec dicit, quae altera pars audire velit, ut auctor facilius respondere possit. Ei diatribae a Cynicis et Stoicis compositae, quam deinde Marcus Aurelius suscepit, viciniore sunt.

Scimus opusculum *De providentia* a Seneca ad Caium Lucilium Minorem esse scriptum¹⁸. Qui circa annum 62 procurator Siciliae fuit. Lucilius adulescens animo amico in Epicureos erat. Nunc tamen discipulus Senecae fuisse videtur et cum philosopho multum ac familiariter egisse. Liber in sex capita dividitur. Lucilius speciem sermonis quaerere videtur, nam opusculi auctor cum se ipso imprimis loquitur¹⁹, quae figura sententiarum subiectio vocatur.

In capite primo Seneca rem dilucidat: *quaesisti a me, Lucili, quid ita, si providentia mundus ageretur; multa bonis viris mala accidere* (*De prov.* I 1)²⁰. Auctor de vita cotidiana scribere vult, ideo voce incommodorum opusculum titulo instruens utitur. Nota bene dictionem *bonis viris*. Seneca non de calamitatibus, quae Stoico sapienti accidunt, sed de eis, quae contingant hominibus *quibus recta placuerunt* (*De prov.* VI 3) disputat. Dictio *vir bonus* et ei similes²¹ cum ea, quae Seneca de se ipso opinabatur, comparari possunt. Philosophus se ipsum virum bonum, quem providentia temptat, habet.

Prima opusculi sententia, quam supra attulimus, philosophus scribit mundum agi a providentia²². Ex quo sequitur Lucilium in providentiam credidisse putandum esse. Quod Seneca ipse probat: *tu non dubitas de providentia, sed quaeris* (*De*

bonis nil mali facere posse. I. Lana coniecit opusculum *De providentia* eodem tempore quo ad Serenum scriptum vel paulo ante esse compositum. Hic vir doctus Senecam exulem in Corsica *De providentiam* librum scripsisse dicit.

¹⁷ Vide *De prov.* I, 1; 4. Sunt viri docti, qui putent tragoediam *Hercules Oeteus* inscriptam exemplo *De providentia* libro fuisse. Nonnulli tamen dicunt eam esse spuriam. Seneca *De remediis fortuitorum* opus etiam scripsit.

¹⁸ Constat philosophum Cordubensem ad Lucilium quoque libros *Naturalium quaestionum* et *Epistularum moralium* scripsisse. Fuerunt viri docti, qui poema *Aetna* inscripta a Lucilio compositum esse contenderent. Polonici versionis illius carminis auctor dicit *Aetnam* ab incerto auctore esse scriptam.

¹⁹ Cf. *Premessa*. In: L.A. Seneca: *I Dialoghi*. Vol. Primo. A cura di G. Viansino. Oscar Mondonari, p. 8.

²⁰ Fragmenta *De providentia* libri ex hac editione refero: L. Annaei Senecae Opera quae supersunt. Recognovit et rerum indicem locupletissimum adiecit Fridericus Haase, prof. Vratislav. Vol. I, Lipsiae, Teubner 1871.

²¹ Synonyma dicto *vir bonus* opusculo haec sunt: *vir fortis, magnus vir, optimus quisque, generosus spiritus, fortissimus vir, vir cum cura dicendus*. Cf. I. Lana: *Lucio Anneo Seneca...*, p. 138 et T. Sinko: *De Romanorum viro bono*. Cracoviae 1903. Apud Macrobius legimus: *his virtutibus* [sc. *prudentia, fortitudine, temperantia, iustitia* — annotatio auctoris] *vir bonus primum sui atque inde rei publicae rector efficitur, iuste ac provide gubernans, humana non deserens* (*Comm. in somnium Scipionis* 1. 8, 8).

²² Verbum *agere* hoc loco idem, quod *regere* designat; cf.: *Epist.* 71, 12: *deo agente ducatur; Oed.* 980: *Fatis agimur, cedite fatis*. Vide quoque B.A. Nauta: *Annotatio in L.A. Senecae librum de providentia*. Lugduni Batavorum 1828.

prov. I 5)²³. Ea de quibus agitur sola particula e toto, Seneca teste, est. Inde ab Leibniz haec theodicea vocatur. Adversari tamen videtur malum mundo inesse et *aliquem custodem* (cf. *De prov.* I 2), Graece σκοπόν, regere. Seneca in providentia describenda nova elementa introducit. Providentia adeo humanis qualitatibus instruitur, ut persona vera et non idea vana esse videatur²⁴. Seneca Cleanthis vestigia premere videtur. Primo in capite legimus: *praeesse universis providentiam et interesse nobis deum* (ibid. I 1). Divinitas non solum cuncta regit, sed etiam cum singulis est. Neronis magister aliter ac alii Romani providentiam depingit, nam praecipue personalem naturam divinitatis exponit. Hoc modo scribit: *Scire, illos esse, qui praesident mundo, qui universa vi sua temperant, qui humani generis tutela gerunt, interdum curiosi singulorum* (*Epist.* 95, 50). Deus ipse hominibus consulit, *ubique et omnibus presto est*.

Seneca partes oratoris et mediatoris agit, qui re vera *pro domo sua* tractat. Qui profitetur: *faciam rem non difficilem, causam deorum agam* (*De prov.* I 2) et *in gratiam te reducam cum dis* (I 5). Philosophus inconsultius rem tractandam facilem vocat, qua identidem multi vexati sunt. Ea est res immensi operis, quam ne Hieronymus (vide illius 123, 16—17 *Epistulam*) quidem alique viri docti solvere potuerint. Cavendum est ne simplicia responsa dentur. Sed ad opusculum redeamus. Mirari potes, cur voces *deus, dei, providentia* simul comparatae sint. Parum probabile videtur Senecam cultorem multorum deum fuisse. Procul dubio in deos, ut ita dicam, populares non credidit. Fortasse sidera deos nominabat vel aliquos δαίμονες, summo Deo servientes, confitebatur.

Quamvis Seneca dicat opus non esse ut existentia providentiae confirmetur, exempla e natura ad providentiam affirmandam (*interesse nobis deum*, I 1) profert. Quod praeteritio dici potest, qua re argumenta fortiora sunt. Hoc loco philosophus de omnium rerum proprio ordine, aeterna lege, qua mundus temperatur, et communi causalitate dicit. Ea scribens cum Horto certare videtur.

Boni homines cum dis vinculo non solum amicitiae²⁵, sed etiam similitudinis et consanguinitatis coniuncti sunt. Deus tamquam *parens magnificus* introducitur,

²³ Alii (e.g. E. Hermes, L.D. Reynolds) hoc loco tamen *quereris* legunt.

²⁴ Apud Ciceronem (*De nat. deorum* 29, 73 s) Balbus Stoicorum placita referens vetat has opiniones de providentia a Velleio Epicureo deformari. Horti philosophus providentiam quasi senem deam depingere vetatur. Hoc fragmento ea, quae risum lectori movent, distinguere possunt. Dicimus de repetitionibus, figuris imperativi II et nominibus *sal, inrideo*. Balbus mundum a *providentia deorum* (ergo vi impersonali) regi affirmat. Viri docti accuratius vocem personae (Graecae πρόσωπον) definiverunt, cum de Trinitate controversiones essent ortae. Boëthius putavit vocem personae Graece ὑπόστασιν reddi. In libro *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium* III 4 ita de persona scripsit: *naturae rationalis individua substantia*. Nostris temporibus varias definitiones illius nominis in unum congregavit opusculo suo L. Zagzebski ("The Uniqueness of Persons". *Journal of Religious Ethics* 2001, 29/3, p. 401—423).

²⁵ Nobile est quod Sallustius scripsit: *idem velle atque idem nolle, ea demum firma amicitia est* (*Cat.* 20, 4, cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 20, 5). Cicero putavit amicitiam esse omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benivolentia et caritate consensionem (*Lael.* 6, 20).

qui prolem suam, scilicet bonos viros, severe educat. Stoicus Deum in speciem hominis depingit, nam cum patribus familias eum comparat. Quod Romanis praecipue cordi sit. E Senecae disputatione tamen non discimus quam ob rem Deus ita hominibus utatur. Conicere possumus Deum velle, ut mortale genus ei simile fiat, qua re virtutem assequi et Dei conviva esse possit²⁶.

Initio capitis secundi Seneca denuo quaestionem ponit *Quare multa bonis viris adversa eveniunt?* (*De prov.* II 1). Hic *adversa* et *mala* idem sunt. Si philosophum intelligere vis, omnia, quae tibi mira videantur, vera accipere debes. Seneca respondit paradoxis Stoicis Cynicisque communibus utens: *Nihil accidere bono viro mali potest*. Hoc quoque loco Neronis priscus magister de sapienti Stoico tacet²⁷. Vir bonus calamitatibus afficitur, sed fortior quam haec est. Seneca exemplaria dare solet, ut placita sua claritudinem, illustrationem (Graece ἐνάργεια) habeant. Huic exemplo athletae confligentes sunt, quorum certamina figura est vitae a bonis actae. De fato, qui hoc loco sortem, Graece μοῖραν vocatam, designat, queri nolit (*De prov.* II 4). Denuo auctor Deum in personae speciem depingit, scribens patrium animum in bonos haberi a divinitate²⁸. Aliter Deus hominibus utitur ac molles matres. Seneca putat ullum ictum ab inlaesa felicitate non ferri²⁹. Boni viri cum mala fortuna certantes spectaculum deis et denique uni Deo dignum sunt. Deus ideo spectatorem hoc loco nobis se ostendere videtur³⁰. Sed apud Senecam est *intentus operi suo* (*De prov.* II 9). Haec res inde a Platone originem ducens, *theatrum mundi* vocatur³¹.

Sequenti parte capitis secundi Seneca primum Catonem Uticensem laudat³²; sed totum scriptum ἔπαινος proborum esse videtur. Catonis censoris progenies re vera vitiis non carebat³³. Opusculi auctor tamen putat illum dignum esse, ut ab ipso

²⁶ Cf. B.A. Nauta: *Annotatio...*, p. 20.

²⁷ Sed elementa e Stoicorum doctrina hausta hic distinguere possumus. Vir bonus (alias sapiens) perturbationibus animi, naturae contrariis, non movetur.

²⁸ Nota bene, qualem rem Agamemnon filiae suae, Iphigeniae (Iphianassae apud Homerum, *Ilias* IX et apud Lucretium, *De rerum natura* I) fecit.

²⁹ *De prov.* II, 6; cf. *Ad Helviam matrem* II, 3: *Fleant itaque diutius et gemant, quorum delicatas mentes enarvavit longa felicitas et ad levissimarum iniuriarum motus conlabantur: at quorum omnes anni per calamitates transierunt, gravissima quoque forti et immobili constantia perferant.*

³⁰ Similiter: de spectatore et non actore praecipue aetate, quae illuminatio est vocata, philosophi scribent.

³¹ De qua re plura legere potes apud J. Kotarska: „Topos *theatrum mundi* w poezji przełomu XVI i XVII wieku”. W: *Przełom wieków XVI i XVII w literaturze i kulturze polskiej*. Red. B. Otwinowska, J. Pelc. Wrocław 1984, p. 145—169. Cf. Minutius Felix, *Octavius* 37, 1: *Quam pulchrum spectaculum deo, cum Christianus cum dolore congregitur, cum adversum minas et supplicia et tormenta componitur [...]*.

³² Libro *De providentia* de Catone octies sermo est: II, 9—12; III, 4, 14, sed hic numquam *sapiens* nominatur. Seneca non nescius fuit verum sapientem perraro nasci, semel in 500 annos. Qua re Phoenici similis est.

³³ Metellus Scipio libello in Catonem Uticensem invecus est, quo ei furta obiecit. Caesar suis *Anticatonibus* iam mortuum adversarium ultus est. De *Vita Catonis*, quam Plutarchus scripsit, Ada-

Iove³⁴ spectetur. Seneca vult, ut oratio a Catone habita plena virium sit³⁵. Nam cum animo suo Cato ita loquitur: *eripe te rebus humanis* (*De prov.* II 10). Caesari inimicus se posse liberum esse, si ferro uteretur, sensit; rei publicae nil prodesse posse. Cato etiam animam efflans a deis temptabatur. Dei ludos sibi fecisse videntur, cuius rei tamen Seneca mentionem non fecit vel facere non vult³⁶. Vix cum Seneca deos spectantes defendente consentire possumus. Priscus Neronis magister dicit, ut providentiae ratione inest possibilitas Catonis vivendi et moriendi³⁷. Seneca suis scriptis contendit vitam praeparationem mortis esse. Quae tamen philosopho in novam vitam non inducere videtur. Vir doctus Georgius Williams putat Lucani patrum procul hominibus esse ideoque de morte persaepe meditari³⁸. Non fallemur, si dicemus, cur Cato in opusculum introductus sit. Caesaris adversarius vixit aetate, quae Senecae temporibus similis erat. Italo Lana scribit: *E chiaro che Catone è il modello di Seneca*³⁹.

Initio tertii capitis Seneca sententias, quas defensurus est, dicit. Quamquam haec omnes paradoxa sunt, tamen nil mirandum est, nam Seneca non solum e Stoicorum, sed etiam Cynicorum sapientia hausit. Haec expositio materiei capitis dici potest. Philosophus id agit, ut Lucilius alique lectores putent re ipsa incommoda mala non esse. Quamvis hoc loco dicat universorum maiorem dis curam quam singulorum esse (*De prov.* III 1), tamen amorem atque curam divinitatis erga bonos non negat. Seneca implicite animadvertit aliam esse felicitatem veram, aliam eam, quae haec dicitur. Priusquam priscus Horti amator quaerere ab Seneca aliquid possit, hic ipse rogabit: *Pro ipsis est, inquis, in exilium proici, in egestatem deduci liberos, coniugem ecferre, ignominia adfci, debilitari?* (*De prov.* III, 2; cf. *ibid.* VI, 2). Hic ad Annei vitam pertinentia distinguere possumus. Seneca in exilium eiectus et opibus spoliatus est; filiolum XX diebus ante amisit. Morte uxoris et exsul calumniis affectus est. Saepe in morbos cadebat⁴⁰. Omnia illa tamen bono evenire, similiter sectionibus medicorum, Seneca

mus Mickiewicz mentionem fecit. Qui putat Catonem esse exemplo omnibus, qui libertati studeant (vide Polonicum epos *Pan Tadeusz* I 57 ss.).

³⁴ Scilicet hoc loco non de Iove ab poëtis pincto agitur.

³⁵ Cf. Lucanus, *Bellum civ.* IX, 402b—410: „[...] *serpens, sitis, ardor harenae / dulcia virtuti; gaudet patientia duris; / laetius est, quotiens magno sibi constat, honestum. / sola potest Libye turba praestare malorum, / ut deceat fugisse viros*”. sic ille [sc. Cato, ann. auctoris] *paventis / incendit virtute animos et amore laborum, / inreducemque viam deserto limite carpit; / et sacrum parvo nomen clausura sepulchro / invasit Libye securi fata Catonis*. Vide quoque: S. Śnieżewski: *Wojna, pokój i bogowie w starożytnym Rzymie*. Kraków 2006.

³⁶ Cf. notissima Lucani verba: *Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni* (*Bel. civ.* I 128). S. Śnieżewski exponit: „W okresie cesarstwa rozpowszechniło się [...] przekonanie, że bogowie postępują z ludźmi nieuczciwie, gdyż nie udzielają im *felicitas* zgodnie z poczuciem sprawiedliwości” (*Salustiusz i historia Rzymu. Studia porównawcze na tle historiografii greckiej i rzymskiej*. Kraków 2003, p. 41).

³⁷ Vide J.M. Rist: *Stoic Philosophy*, Cambridge 1969, p. 246.

³⁸ Vide G. Williams: *Change and Decline. Roman Literature in the Early Empire*. University of California Press, 1978, p. 177.

³⁹ I. Lana: *Lucio Anneo Seneca...*, p. 139.

⁴⁰ Vide *ibidem*, p. 135.

contendit. Quam ad rem confirmandam Demetrii Cynici opinio refertur. Hic olim opinatus est infelicissimum esse cui nihil umquam evenisset adversi. Si quidam ab acerba fortuna premitur, procul dubio virtute insignis est, nam fortuna viros fortes ad pugnandum eligit. *Magnum exemplum nisi mala fortuna non invenit* (*De prov.* III 5). Seneca proceres Romanorum atque Socratem philosophum felicissimos appellat, ut magnis doloribus affecti sint⁴¹. Hoc loco gradatione philosophus usus esse videtur, nam primum ignis, deinde paupertas, exilium, tormenta, tandem mors enumerantur. In proborum Romanorum numero hi sunt: Mucius Scaevola, qui coram Porsenna ultro dextram suam accenso foculo inicit⁴²; Gaius Fabricius omnibus virtutibus praeditus; Rutilius Rufus, in exilium iniuste pulsus, quod pecunias in provinciis repetivit; Marcus Atilius Regulus, qui ius iurandum etiam Carthaginensibus datum servavit; denique Cato Uticensis⁴³. Rutilium Rufum animadvertas velimus, *l'uomo giusto ingiustamente condannato dai malvagi*⁴⁴. Philosophus clarissimus⁴⁵ procul dubio cum hominibus supra nominatis, praecipue Rutilio et Catone, se comparat. Hoc modo suos labores bonorum morum pignora esse demonstrat et eos compensat. Seneca Maecenatem non esse imitandum putat⁴⁶. Qui dives amatoris doloribus mersus Rutilio opponitur. Non est dubium, quin Catoni fuerit sors tragica. A natura (hic scilicet Deo) Cato electus est: *toto terrarum orbe pro causa bona tam infelicitur quam pretinaciter militet* (*De prov.* III, 14)⁴⁷.

Capite quarto Seneca monstrare vult, ut rebus adversis virtus augeatur. Cui una occasio crescendi in calamitatibus fortiter ferendis posita est. Malum est felicem semper esse. *Calamitates terroresque* (*De prov.* IV 1), de quibus Stoicus disputat, scrutinia probitatis illi, qui vir bonus dicitur, sunt. Quin etiam nonnumquam hic incommodis gaudet. Quos Deus ex hominibus honestissimos facere vult (*ipsis ... deus consulit*, IV 5), his rerum difficultati non parcat. Mirum est, quod legi potest:

⁴¹ Cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, 470 XXVI E, Boëthius, *Cons. phil.* IV 4, 49.

⁴² Vide Livius, *Ab Urbe condita* II, 12.

⁴³ Cf. *Ad Helviam matrem* XIII, 7: *Ducebatur Athenis ad supplicium Aristides, cui quisquis occurrerat, deieciebat oculos et ingemiscebat, non tamquam in hominem iustum sed tamquam in ipsam iustitiam animadverteretur.*

⁴⁴ I. Lana: *Lucio Anneo Seneca...*, p. 137. Inimici hunc Stoeae philosophum, eundem proconsulem Asiae ultii sunt. Anno 91 a. Chr. n. Rutilius in exilium eiectus est. Quamquam Sulla eum Romam revocavit, hic redire noluit. [*Philosophiae studiosus*] *exilium vanum nomen putat et ait „quid enim est mali mutare regiones?“* (*De vita beata* XXI, 1). *Ad Helviam* scribens Seneca dicit exilium nil mali esse, sed *loci commutationem*. Quibus de verbis ipse negat, nam exsul conditioni suae ingemescebat et deinde *Ludum de morte Claudii* scripsit. Qua satira Menippea mordacem se praebuit. Fortasse putabat sortem suam illae Ovidianae (cuius *Metamorphoses* libro *De providentia* affert) aut Ciceronianae esse similem.

⁴⁵ Ita Johannes Calvinus, qui adhuc Romanam fidem confitebatur, de Seneca in editione sua eius scriptorum dixit (vide M. von Albrecht: *Momenti della presenza di Seneca nella tradizione cristiana*. In: *Seneca e i Cristiani...*, p. 5).

⁴⁶ Vide Seneca, *Epist.* 101, 10 et 114, 4.

⁴⁷ Bellis iniustis (nam etiam *bella iusta* esse putantur, cf. Stanislaus de Scarbimiria, *De bellis iustis*) Pompeius Caesarque vincebant.

res adversae documentum divinae amoris sunt, nam *hos itaque deus quos probat, quos amat, indurat, recognoscit, exercet* (*De prov.* IV 7)⁴⁸. Apud Senecam Deus magister idem strategus bonus esse videtur. Qui tantis molibus patientes eligit. Dii praeceptores nominantur, nam in bonis habent rationem eandem, quam in discipulis magistri, scilicet *plus laboris ab iis exigunt, in quibus certior spes est* (IV 11). Hic illa providentia claret. Ut opiniones suae confirmentur, philosophus e Spartanis moribus exemplum haurit. Scimus in Sparta iuvenes verberibus caesos esse, ut virtus probaretur⁴⁹. Ex quo non sequitur, ut patres suos liberos non ament. Seneca tamen de fine illius probamenti, scilicet de multorum morte, silet. Neronis priscus magister voce *temptat* utitur, cum de Dei in bonos animo, et vocibus *verberat* atque *lacerat*, cum de fortunae animo scribit. Passu IV 12 edocemur libro *De providentia* fortunam variam providentiae et huic esse subiectam⁵⁰. Id, quod divinitas agit, *temptationes* esse videntur. Una sola solutio est: *patiamur*. Quod idem *praebere se fato* (V 8) est. Hoc Senecae praeceptum hortatio ad ignaviam esse videtur. Ex altera parte de sedula Deo oboedientia agitur. Quid aliud id est, quam fati decreto stare et naturam sequi? Secundum naturam vivit, qui ultro eligere non solum potest, sed etiam debet. Seneca nil miratur bonos malo affici. Quod legere eo libro possumus. Philosophus Cordubensis ad Lucilium loquens sibi ipsi persuadere videtur. Scribit: *quid miraris bonos viros, ut confirmentur concuti?* (IV 15—16). Notandum est, ut Seneca nullo scripti loco de Deo vel sorte queratur. Ne sinat quidem aliquem queri posse. Fortasse re vera philosophus primum exsul et deinde Neroni iam ingratus aliter putavit.

Capitis quinti initio Seneca opinionem profert pro universis labores a bonis suscipi. Quorum vita in militando sumitur⁵¹. Philosophus de οἰκείωσει, hominum deumque unitate, putavisse videtur. Mala, quae bonis accidunt, non sunt mala, nam

⁴⁸ Cf. *Qui bene amat, bene castigat* et Hbr 12, 6—11.

⁴⁹ In Sparta quosdam mores castigandos fuisse constat, dicimus de liberis aegris in Taegeto occidendis. Quam ob rem nostris temporibus dicto *philosophia Taegetea* utuntur ii, qui obviam his et similibus Spartanis moribus eunt.

⁵⁰ Boëthius quoque negabat fortunam aliquid sua vi posse. Libris *De consolatione philosophiae* fortunae nomini multae significationes insunt, sed imprimis de facto Dei voluntatem, qua vita hominibus varie manifestatur, auctor ita designat. Similiter in scriptis Procopianis, de qua re legere potes apud D. Brodka: *Die Geschichtsphilosophie in der spätantiken Historiographie. Studien zu Prokopios von Kaisareia, Agathias von Myrina und Theophylaktos Simokattes*. Frankfurt am Main 2004. Anicius fere ita disputat: nonnumquam sentire non possumus, qua re alii felicitate (fortunae prosperae dono) gaudeant, alii mala fortuna afficiantur. In generis humani vita multa sine causa evenire improvisa ac necopinata videntur, quod vulgo casus vocatur. Boëthius tamen negat casum aliquem esse, nisi Aristotelis et Platoniorum casus definitio accipiatur. Opere suo id potissimum agit, ut homines putent Deo curam de omnibus esse. Dicit *perpetuam rationem* (vide *Consolatio phil.* III m. 9, 1; IV 6, 30 et cf. J. Cochranovius, *O żywocie ludzkim* I 101, 1) esse, qua *rector*, bonum—persona, mundum gubernat (vide *Consolatio phil.* III m. 6, 2; III 12, 59 n).

⁵¹ Cf. *Epist.* 96, 5: *Atqui vivere, mi Lucili, militare est. itaque hi, qui iactantur, et per operosa atque ardua sursum atque deorsum eunt et expeditiones periculosissimas obeunt, fortes viri sunt primoresque castrorum*. Initio capitis quinti semel libro *De providentia* sapiens nominatur.

improbi quoque eis afficiuntur. Vera mala enim solis improbis disponuntur, vera bona probis. Oratione procedenti de iustitia in mundo instar rei publicae concepto Seneca dicit. *At iniquum est bonum virum debilitari aut constringi aut adligari, malos integris corporibus solutos ac delicatos incedere* (*De prov.* V 3). Bonorum numero milites, pia virgines et patres conscripti habentur. His laborantibus vilissimus quisque socordia otium conterit. Sed bonos quidem de rerum natura bene iudicare philosophus putat. Onera suscipiunt *volentes quidem, non trahuntur a fortuna, sequuntur illam et aequant gradus. Si scissent, antecessissent* (ibid. V 4)⁵². Seneca re ipsa de paucis dicere videtur. Quorum numero Demetrius supra nominatus fuit. Hic deis omnia reddere potis fuit et iis adsensus est. Seneca Stoicus universa determinata esse contendit (cf. V 6: *certa et in aeternum dicta lege*; V 8: *inrevocabilis ... cursus*), ergo re vera casum esse negat. *Causa pendet ex causa*, omnibus rebus tempus est datum, sed sine hominis aliqua participatione⁵³. Nil opus est indignari vel queri. Hominibus, naturae particulis, nihil perit de suis rebus; hi omnia sua secum portare videntur. Vita, mors, di alicui rei subiecti sunt, quam rem Seneca explicite definire nescit. Cuius rei necessitas etiam deos adligat. *Omnium conditor et rector quoque fatis* a se scriptis paret. Hoc loco *fata* immutabiles sortes hominum, quibus unum *fatum* manifestetur, significant. Ea, quae sunt naturae impossibilia, Deo possibilia non sunt. Haec est Senecae opinio. Quae cum ita sint, Seneca scribit: *deus tam iniquus in distributione fati fuit, ut bonis viris paupertatem et volnera et acerba funera adscriberet* (V 9). Philosophus clarissimus allegoria utitur de Phaetonte⁵⁴ mentionem faciens. Nasonis *Metamorphoses* (II 63 ss)⁵⁵ refert. Memoria dignum est, ut Seneca Phaetontem, qui insubordinatum vel improvisum se praebuit, laudet. Cuius facinus ὕβρις nominari potest et finis laetus non fuit. Philosophus Cordubensis persuadet hominibus, ut per alta eant.

Sextum caput ab paraphrase tituli, quo opusculum instructum est, incipit: *Quare tamen bonis viris patitur aliquid mali deus fieri?* (VI 1). Philosophus negat hoc verum esse. Sed non nescit etiam innocentes concuti rebus adversis. Quae difficultas ut tollatur, Seneca dicit vera mala esse *scelera*, et *flagitia*, cogitationes improbas *avida consilia*, *libidinem caecam* et *alieno imminensem avaritiam*. Quibus a rebus boni ex definitione procul sunt. Malum apud Senecam re ipsa solum est improbitas. Inconsulti animi ista definitio esse videtur. Paulo longius (VI 6) philosophus tamen concedet bonos *tristibus, horrendis, duris toleratu* subductos esse. Ne Leibniz qui-

⁵² Cf. Epist. 107, 11: *ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt*.

⁵³ Acerbum est illud Senecanum placitum, similiter acerbum Epicureorum de caeca ratione opinio. In ambobus rebus modus adhibendus esse videtur.

⁵⁴ *Seneca, che [...] non accetta la pratica stoica di allegorizzare il mito [...], dà interpretazioni alegoriche solo delle Danaidi (dial. 10, 10, 5) e di Fetonte [...]. Ma Fetonte, «magnanimo» (= μεγαθυρος: Lucrezio 5, 400) [...] è un fantasma che accompagna Seneca fin dai tempi in cui scrive il dialogo VII (cap. 20, 5 = Ovidio, met. 2, 328) ed il dialogo IX (cap. 17, 11) (Premessa in: L.A. Seneca: Dialoghi..., p. 18).*

⁵⁵ Cf. Vergilius, *Georgica* I 121—124.

dem negabat malum non solum peccatum, sed etiam esse infirmitatem et dolorem. Oratione procedenti Seneca prosopopoeia utitur (ad Lucilium scribens: *puta itaque deum dicere*, VI 3), nam Deus Stoicorum modo personae loquitur⁵⁶. Hoc loco Deus donatorem verae felicitatis se praebet. Bonis falsa felicitate (i.e. splendore) spoliatis fortiter ferrenda incommoda sunt. Quibus ipsum Deum antecedere possunt. Paupertas, mors⁵⁷ et fortuna contemnendae sunt. Seneca haec quoque verba Deo imputat: *si pugnare non vultis, licet fugere* (VI 7). Oratione habita a Deo humana forma exornato opusculum finitur.

Quod a Seneca infectum esse videtur. Altera ex parte probabile videtur Senecam voluisse, ut lectores illo scripto commoti essent. Recte dixerit quispiam id, quod philosophus praecipit capite ultimo, contrarium esse ad pugnandum et *fato* oboediendum hortationi.

Ad finem haec res spectat, ergo denuo placita Senecana, quae ad sortem humanam et providentiam illo libro pertinent, referamus ac conclusiones monstremus. P. Grimal dicit paraenesin semper ab auctore ad se ipsum esse scriptam⁵⁸. Seneca cum Nerone in gratia non manens solacio se levat. Philosophus clarissimus dicit mundum certa lege gubernari. Haec lex vel fatum vel Deus vel providentia nominari potest⁵⁹. Voce fati usus Seneca immutabilitatem λόγου exponere vult (cf. *De prov.* V 7). Cuius vox numero singulari ac plurali determinatas vices vitae humanae designari potest (vide III 11). Fortuna eo libro alia ac providentia est. Illa vis animata, plerumque homini inimica est, qua providentia utitur, ut bonos etiam meliores fiant. Providentia bonis viris consulit, quamquam res adversas ab eis non removet. Vera enim felicitas ipsis hominibus inest. Apud Senecam legi potest Deum ad homines probandos demittere mala. Quorum numero Cato Uticensis habetur. Cato iustus putabatur; sed di rei publicae defensorem a malis non defenderunt. Seneca opusculo *De providentia* similiter Cleanthi Deum depingit. Apud philosophum Deus custos (*De prov.* I, 2), pater severus et amans (ibid. I, 5—6; II, 5—6; IV, 11), dux (ibid. IV, 8) putatur. Neronis priscus magister aliter ac multi veteres auctores providentiam introducit. Sane dignum est quod memoremus Philonem Alexandrinum, qui *Περί προνοίας* quoque scripsit, a Seneca esse notum posse⁶⁰.

⁵⁶ Boëthius Senecam et alios secutus est, cum in libro *De consolatione philosophiae* II fortunam loquentem introduxit.

⁵⁷ Senecae animum vagum cognoscere possumus: *contemnite mortem: quae vos aut finit aut transfert* (*De prov.* VI 6). Cf. *Epist.* 65, 2: *Mors quid est? Aut finis aut transitus*. De morte Cicero scribit in *Tusc.* 2, 2.

⁵⁸ Grimal, ibidem, p. 160.

⁵⁹ Vox fortunae idem ac fatum (cuius alia nomina sunt μοῖρα, εἰμαρμένη, πρόνοια) apud varios auctores aliisque Senecae scriptis significare potest. De qua re S. Śnieżewski scribit in libro *Koncepcja historii rzymskiej w Ab Urbe Condita Liwiusza. Aspekt filozoficzno-polityczny* inscripto. Kraków 2000, p. 39.

⁶⁰ Constat Senecam intra annos circa 26—31 fuisse in Aegypto. De similibus locis inter Senecam et Philonem scribit Eckard Lefevre in dissertatione (*II De providentia di Seneca e il suo rapporto con il pensiero cristiano*), libro *Seneca e i Cristiani* sita, pp. 55—71.

Seneca cum Epicuro variat, cum hic providentiam negat. Stoicus dicit mundum agi et regi a summo Deo, qui interest hominibus. Aliorsum ad Lucilium scribit: *prope est a te deus, tecum est, intus est. Ita dico, Lucili: sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos; hic prout a nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat. Bonus vero vir sine deo nemo est: an potest aliquis supra fortunam nisi ab illo adiutus exsurgere? Ille dat consilia magnifica et erecta. In unoquoque virorum bonorum (quis deus incertum est)*⁶¹ *habitat deus* (Ep. 41, 15). Quae opiniones non solum Socratis aut Platoniorum de daemone placitis similes sunt, sed etiam Christianae doctrinae de Spiritu. Quam ob rem nonnulli putant philosophiam Senecanam elementum *praeparationis evangelicae*⁶² fuisse. Sed non est nunc in hanc disputationem transeundum, nam ea res magni momenti plura verba petit.

⁶¹ Cf. carmen a N. Sęp Szarzyński, Polonico poeta, scriptum, *Pieśń I. O Bożej opatrności na świecie*, 9—12.

⁶² Si de ea ratione legere vis, cape, quaeso, opusculum a J. Domański compositum, „»Scho-lastyczne« i »humanistyczne« pojęcie filozofii”. W: „Studia Mediewistyczne” 19. T. 1. Wrocław—Warszawa—Kraków—Gdańsk 1978. Anno 2005 haec dissertatio liber edita est.

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De mortibus boum — sielanki ostatnie starcie

Abstract: *Carmen Bucolicum de mortibus boum* was firstly edited in 1586 and from that time it has been published many times. Despite many editions it is still hard to tell who the author was and when the poem was written. Publishers used to give many inconvenient pieces of information, in which two names are being repeated: *Severus Sanctus* and *Endelechius Rhetor*. The main problem is that we cannot tell which one was the composer so editors mixed together two names and created *Severus Sanctus Endelechius*. What's more the main theme of this poem — attack of terrible pest — disagrees with a pastoral tradition and the question is, whether *De mortibus boum* should be called a bucolic eclogue or not. One thing is sure, this poem is the only preserved example of Christian pastoral poetry and indicates influence of Christianity on Roman literature.

Key words: Latin literature, pastoral, Endelechius

Utwór *De mortibus boum* — *Pomór bydła* stanowi jedyny zachowany przykład chrześcijańskiej poezji pasterskiej i wydaje się ostatnią sielanką w literaturze łacińskiej schyłkowego okresu Cesarstwa Rzymskiego. Choć kwestionuje się nie od dziś, czy można go zaliczyć do sielanki jako gatunku, jak np. *Eklogi* Wergiliusza, stanowiące wzorzec poezji pasterskiej na gruncie rzymskim, trudno jednak jego treść sklasyfikować inaczej — mamy do czynienia z wycinkiem życia pasterzy i jednocześnie zachowany jest przynajmniej jeden z podstawowych elementów poezji pasterskiej, a mianowicie postaci pasterzy o tradycyjnych imionach: Bukulos, Egon i Tityrus. Treść utworu wypełnia jednak nie agon pasterski, lecz opowieść-lament jednego z pasterzy, o tym jak szerząca się zaraza wyniszczyła jego stado. Odnaleźć można także wyraźny element propagandowy — nie panegiryczny, jak miało to miejsce np. w twórczości Kalpurniusza Sykulusa¹, ale

¹ *Ec.* I, IV, VII.

zachęcający do przyjęcia religii chrześcijańskiej. Autor tej sielanki chce przede wszystkim pokazać moc, z jaką nowa wiara może oddziaływać na życie zwykłych pasterzy. Pozostaje jednak do rozwiązania zasadniczy problem, kto jest autorem omawianej sielanki.

Pierwszym wydawcą *De mortibus boum* był Petrus Pithoeus. Wydał ten utwór najpierw w zbiorze *Veterum aliquot Galliae Theologorum scriptis*, opublikowanym z Paryżu w 1586 roku, i opatrzył podpisem: „Severi, Rhetoris et poetae Christiani carmen bucolicum”. Cztery lata później, w 1590 roku, również w Paryżu Pithoeus wydał ten utwór wśród *Epigramów i wierszyków dawnych* (s. 573), ale jego podpis różni się od podpisu z poprzedniego wydania: „Incipit Carmen Severi Sancti, id est Endeleichi Rhetoris, de mortibus boum”. Niestety, nie wiadomo, skąd Pithoeus czerpał wiedzę na temat autora. Najwięcej kontrowersji budzi rola zwrotu *id est* — czy Pithoeus chciał przezeń doprecyzować wiadomości o autorze, dodając jego kolejny przydomek, czy może przeciwnie — wskazać, że chodzi jedynie o Endeleichusa Retora, a nie o Świętego Sewera. Kolejni wydawcy utworu, np. Johannes Weitz i Wolfgang Seber, po prostu korzystali z interpretacji Pithoeusa, co nie znaczy, że z nią nie polemizowali. W wydaniu Pithoeusa z 1590 roku zastanawia, skąd wzięł on przydomek *Endeleichus*, skoro wedle Wersdorfa nie pojawia się on w żadnym z dawnych kodeksów. Wydaje się zatem, że Pithoeus albo popełnił błąd, albo miał dostęp do jakiegoś źródła (do którego obecnie nie możemy dotrzeć), a w nim natrafił na takie treści, które pozwoliły mu uzupełnić informacje o imieniu autora. Następni wydawcy powielając podpis Pithoeusa, stworzyli imię *Severus Sanctus Endeleichus Rhetor*. Niestety, nie znamy żadnego autora, posługującego się tym imieniem, co więcej — jeden z późniejszych wydawców, Ferdinandus Piper, pisze wręcz, że imię *Endeleichus* jest bardzo rzadkie i występuje tylko dwa razy w całej twórczości literackiej². Mamy tu do czynienia najprawdopodobniej z błędem pierwszego wydawcy, który przypuszczalnie połączył imiona dwu różnych postaci. Na trop autora sielanki mogą nas naprowadzić wzmianki u innych autorów tego okresu, z których najcenniejsze wydają się te mówiące o osobach zajmujących się pisarstwem. Paulin z Noli bowiem w liście do Sulpicjusza Sewera wspomina swojego przyjaciela Endeleichusza Retora, który miał być autorem dziełka o Cesarzu Teodozjuszu³:

Alius libellus ex his est, quos ad benedictum, id est Christianum virum, amicum meum Endeleichum scripsisse videor, non tamen edidissem convincar. Is enim mihi auctor huius in domino opusculi fuit, sicut ipsius epistola, quae libello meo pro themate praescribitur docet.

² Zob. *Severi Sancti Endelechii, rhetoris et poetae christiani, carmen bucolicum de mortibus boum*. Ed. F. Piper. Gottingae 1835, s. 79.

³ Paul. Nol. *Epist.* IX.

W innym liście zwraca się do pewnego Sanctusa (i jego brata Amandusa)⁴, który miał uprawiać poezję: “Hymnos quos desiderabam accepisse gratulor: quo munere Sancte frater admonuisti me [...]”. Wernsdorf uważał, że list zaadresowany został właśnie do twórcy omawianej sielanki, choć brakuje na to jakichkolwiek dowodów.

Auzoniusz, kolejny autor okresu Cesarstwa, wspomina Flawiusza Sanctusa, swojego krewniaka, którego polecił jako prefekta *agri Rutupini*⁵. Wernsdorf uznał, że wspominany przez Paulina *Sanctus* był synem owego Flawiusza, o którym mówił Auzoniusz. Sydoniusz Apolinary w jednym z listów wymienia, razem z Gallicinusem, krewnego *Sanctusa*, sprawującego funkcję biskupa Burdigali⁶. Wszyscy wymienieni byli Akwitanami, wywodzącymi się ze starego, znanego i cenionego galijskiego rodu Sanctusów. Żaden z nich nie nosił jednak przydomka *Endelechius*. Trudno powiedzieć coś więcej na ich temat, bo — jak utrzymuje Wernsdorf, jeden z komentatorów z 1835 roku — wielu Galów nosiło przydomek *Sanctus*.

Wzmiankę o Endezechiuszu znajdziemy natomiast w uwadze do *Codex Apulleanus* Crispusa Sallustiusa, którą podają również komentatorzy Sydoniusza Apollinarego — *Sirmondus*⁷, cytowanego już Paulina z Noli — *Rosweidus*⁸, czy Tacyta — *Curtius Pichena*⁹. Brzmi ona następująco:

Ego Sallustius legi et emendavi Romae felix Olibrio et Probino V.C. coss.
in foro Martis controversiam declamans oratori Endelechio. Constantinopoli
recognovi Caesario et Attico coss.

Jak widać, nie ma żadnych przesłanek, wedle których imię Severa Sanctusa należałoby łączyć z Endezechiuszem — nigdzie bowiem nie dodaje się Endezechiuszowi przydomku *Sanctus* ani żadnemu ze wspomnianych już Sanctusów przydomku *Endelechius*. Mamy do czynienia z dwiema różnymi osobami: Sewerem Sanctusem i Endezechiuszem Retorem, których imiona omyłkowo połączono. Prawdopodobnie działali w tym samym czasie i musieli być uznanymi twórcami. Należy zdecydowanie wykluczyć imię *Endeleichus*, jak wynik błędu Pithoeusa. Nie ma takich informacji, które pozwoliłyby jednoznacznie stwierdzić, jakie imię nosił autor. Skłaniałibyśmy się jednak ku Sewerowi.

Spróbujmy zatem określić czas, w którym mógł żyć i tworzyć autor *De mortibus boum*. W cytowanej wcześniej uwadze z *Codex Apulleanus*, w której pojawia się imię Endezechiusza, wspomniane zostały konsulatory, najpierw Olybriusza

⁴ Paul. Nol. *Epist.* XXVI.

⁵ Auson. *Parent.* XVIII.

⁶ Sidon. *Epist.* VIII, 2.

⁷ Sirmond. *Not. in Sidon.* IV, epist. 8.

⁸ Paul. Nol l.c.

⁹ Praef. append. not. in Tac.

i Probinusa, następnie Cezariusza i Attyka. Na tej podstawie wiadomo, że Endelechiusz Retor działał na pewno w 395 roku, kiedy konsulami byli bracia Anicjusz Olybriusz i Anicjusz Probinus. Z początkiem tego roku zmarł też Cesarz Teodozjusz i nastąpił podział Imperium Romanum na Wschód oraz Zachód. Drugi ze wspomnianych konsulatów przypadł na rok 397. Na tej podstawie wiemy, że Endelechiusz Retor na pewno przebywał w Rzymie w latach 395—397. Nie ma jednak żadnych informacji o tym, czy, a jeśli tak, to kiedy mógł napisać *De mortibus boum*. Podobnie trudno ustalić fakty dotyczące Sanctusa Sewera. Ze świadectwa utworu i wzmianki u Paulina z Noli wynika, że również on żył za czasów Teodozjusza. Problem jednak tkwi w tym, że Endelechiusz działał jako retor lub gramatyk w Rzymie, a Sewer w Galii — najprawdopodobniej w Burdigali — i nie był Rzymianinem¹⁰. Możemy zatem stwierdzić, iż stykamy się nie z jedną, ale dwiema różnymi osobami, które działały w tym samym czasie. Natomiast nie można jednoznacznie ustalić cezury między nimi, ponieważ wzmianki o nich są rzadkie i mało treściwe. Niemniej jednak Pithoeus błędnie dodał Sewerowi Sanctusowi przydomek *Endeleichus*, a pozostali wydawcy i uczeni poprawili jedynie, jak im się mogło zdawać, literówkę pierwszego wydawcy i stworzyli Sanctusa Sewera Endelechiusza¹¹, zupełnie bezpodstawnie łącząc imiona dwu różnych osób, co więcej — przyznając autorstwo utworu Endelechiuszowi. Ten błąd może wynikać również z tego, że Sanctus wzmiankowany przez Auzoniusza w *Parentaliach* przebywał w Burdigali i mógł działać tam jako retor. Brakuje jednak dowodów na potwierdzenie takiej tezy. Jak widać, nie mamy zbyt wielu pewnych informacji na temat twórcy. Po prostu ich nie ma i pozostają nam jedynie domysły uczonych z poprzednich stuleci.

W określeniu ram czasowych powstania utworu pomocna jest opisana w utworze zaraza. Nastąpiła ona wraz z atakiem Wizygotów pod wodzą Alaryka i wtargnięciem na teren Imperium Zachodniego od strony Panonii i Ilyrii, co miało miejsce w 408 roku, a w 410 roku Wizygoci zdobyli i splądrowali Rzym¹². Trzeba pamiętać, że od roku 375 trwał na terenach Europy wielki ruch plemion (zwany wielką wędrówką ludów) związany z najazdem plemion mongolskich — Hunów. Plemiona te zagrażały Wizygotom, którzy szukali schronienia w granicach Imperium. Cesarz Teodozjusz, chcąc w pewnym stopniu powstrzymać nacisk Wizygotów na wschodnie rubieże Cesarstwa, zezwolił im na osiedlenie się na terenach Ilyrii. O zarazie z czasów tego najazdu pisał Rufinus do biskupa Akwleji Chromatiusa¹³:

¹⁰ Zob. *De mortibus boum* v. 21—24. Egon wspomina, że zaraza poważnie strawiła Panonię, Illyrię i Belgów. Należałoby się zastanowić, czy Endelechiusz, przebywając w Rzymie, mógł mieć taką wiedzę, ewentualnie w jakim czasie taka informacja mogła dotrzeć do Rzymu.

¹¹ Anonimowy wydawca z 1715 roku w przedmowie wykazuje wątpliwości, czy czasem wielu ludzi nazwanych tym samym imieniem uważanych jest niewłaściwie za jedną osobę.

¹² Zob. M. Jaczynowska: *Historia strożytnego Rzymu*. Warszawa 1974, s. 381—382.

¹³ *Hist. eccles. praefat.*

Quod tu quoque, Venerande Pater Chromati, medicinae exsequens genus, tempore quo diruptis Italiae claustris ab Alarico duce Gothorum se pestifer morbus infudit et agros, armenta, viros longe lateque vastavit, populis tibi a Deo commissis feralis exitii aliquod remedium quaerens [...].

Zatem opisywany w utworze pomór miał miejsce ok. 408 roku i był skutkiem splądrowania Imperium Zachodniego przez plemiona barbarzyńskie¹⁴. Ambroży w komentarzu do Ewangelii wg św. Łukasza (lib. X cap. 21, tom. IV Op. p. 739) pisze, że owa zaraza szalała pośród wojen i ciągłych wędrowek ludów:

Quanta proelia et quas oppiniones accepimus proeliorum! Quae omnium fames, lues pariter boum atque hominum, caeterique pecoris, ut etiam nos, qui bellum non pertulimus, debellatis tamen pares fecerit pestilentia.

Bardzo możliwe, że Sewer opisał atak groźnej, zakaźnej, a co gorsza śmiertelnej wirusowej choroby bydła, znanej w Polsce pod nazwą księgosusz lub pomór bydła¹⁵ (ang. *rinderpest*). Jest to choroba wywoływana przez morbilliwirusy z rodziny *Paramixoviridae*, atakująca niemal wszystkie gatunki bydła (brak predyspozycji wiekowej i płci). Rozprzestrzenia się przez bezpośredni kontakt, a także drogą kropelkową. W postaci klasycznej występują takie objawy, jak: gorączka połączona z depresją, przekrwienie błon śluzowych jamy gębowej, nosa i spojówek, obfite ślinienie, ropny wypływ z worków spojówkowych, krwawa biegunka, odwodnienie i wycieńczenie. Śmierć następuje po 8, 12 dniach. Księgosusz od dawna wiązano z wojnami i niekontrolowanymi masowymi ruchami ludności (i bydła). Wędrowka i atak Hunów na Europę pod koniec IV wieku po Chrystusie spowodowały wybuch epidemii księgosuszu, a po raz pierwszy miał tę chorobę zidentyfikować właśnie Sewer w swojej sielance¹⁶. Podsumowując naszą dotychczasową wiedzę, możemy stwierdzić, że autor żył na przełomie IV i V wieku po Chrystusie, sam utwór powstał prawdopodobnie na początku V wieku.

Jak już wspomnieliśmy, autor wprowadził do utworu wyraźny element propagandowy. Wypełnia on wersy 99—132. Jeden z bohaterów, Tityrus, oświadcza zrozpaczonym pasterzom, że ocalić ich może jedynie znak krzyża uczyniony na czole inwentarza, i nawołuje ich do przyjęcia nowej religii. Tylko w ten sposób można poskromić szalejącą zarazę, nie pomogą żadne pogańskie obrzędy, praktykowane jeszcze na wsi. Wiemy dzięki temu, że czas powstania utworu przypada na okres silnej ekspansji religii chrześcijańskiej, która jako religia państwowa niszczyła wszelkie ślady tradycyjnego kultu. Za panowania Teodozjusza nastąpiło

¹⁴ Inna zaraza przeszła przez Italię około 386 roku, co poświadcza Ambroży, ale raczej nie ona jest przedmiotem *De mortibus boum*.

¹⁵ Księgosusz w Polsce udało się wyeliminować w 1921 roku.

¹⁶ Zob. T. Barret: *Vaccination spells the end for a devastating plague, Microbiology today* — feb. 07, 2007, s. 21—23.

jej ostateczne zwycięstwo. W 391 roku Teodozjusz wydał edykt całkowicie zakazujący kultu tradycyjnego, a rok później zabronił, pod groźbą surowych kar, nawet prywatnego kultu bogów. Wzmianka Sewera oznacza, że dawna tradycja zachowała się jeszcze na wsiach, a on sam chce doradzić swoim krajanom, że w ogólnej klęsce trzeba szukać pomocy Chrystusa i popierać jego kult i religię. Tylko takie działanie może wyzwolić od śmiertelnej zarazy. Poezja pasterska wiązała się także z dawną tradycją, kultem bogów. Możliwe, że Sewer — chcąc uniknąć konsekwencji sięgania do tradycji pogańskiej — celowo wprowadza element chrześcijański.

Wydawcy zwykli określać *De mortibus boum* terminem *carmen bucolicum* lub *ecloga bucolica*. Tego określenia jako pierwszy użył wydawca Petrus Pithoeus. Jednak określenie owo nie pojawia się ani w kodeksach, ani sam autor nie nazywa tak swego dzieła. Wernsdorf pisze wręcz, że ten utwór nie jest godny miana sielanki¹⁷. Ma rację, bo w żaden sposób nie osiąga stylu, który ma np. sielanka Wergiliusza czy Kalpurniusza Sykulusa. Tymczasem nawet Kalpurniusz nie pozostaje wierny tradycji pasterskiej do końca; ekloga V jest poematem dydaktycznym, a nie pieśnią pasterską, a mimo to nie odmawia się jej przynależności do sielanek. W utworze Sewera pojawiają się uświęcone tradycją imiona pasterzy, rzecz dzieje się gdzieś na polach Imperium, ale też nie ma nic ponadto. Intencją Sewera na pewno było zbliżenie się do formy sielanki, ale czy to wystarczający powód, by jego utwór nazywać *carmen bucolicum*?

De mortibus boum składa się z 33 strofek asklepiadejskich — w układzie trzy asklepiadeje mniejsze i glikonej. Utwór podzielony jest nieudolnie na dwie części: pierwsza to opis zarazy (w. 1—98), druga stanowi pochwałę nowej religii (w. 99—132). Tematyka pierwszej części została zaczerpnięta z *Georgik* Wergiliusza¹⁸, ale forma metryczna wzorowana jest na Horacym¹⁹. Wprowadzenie pochwały Chrystusa i nowej religii wiąże się z tendencjami w rozwoju literatury schyłkowego okresu Cesarstwa Rzymskiego. Sewer zrywa też zupełnie z tradycją bukoliki, która nakazywała układać sielanki wyłącznie w heksametrze daktylicznym. Popełnia przy tym dwa błędy metryczne:

w. 17 *Nunc lapsā pēnītūs spes opis est meae* epitryt zamiast choriambu

w. 128 *Christi et numēn āgnōscimus* coniectura Wernsdorfa *numina nos-*
cimus

Sewer z sielanki pasterskiej uczynił swego rodzaju panegiryk, chwalcący zalety i działanie religii chrześcijańskiej. Rezygnując z metrum daktylicznego odszedł od tradycyjnej poezji pasterskiej. Jednak jego dzieło należy potraktować jako jej

¹⁷ Wernsdorf cytuje opinię przedmówcy editio Leidensis: „[...] neque Severum auctorem ita appellavisse, neque carmen ipsum dignum esse, quod inter bucolica veri nominis numeretur [...]”.

¹⁸ *Georg.* III 474—566 opis zarazy w Noricum.

¹⁹ Por. *Carm.* I 6, 15, 24, 33, *Carm.* II 12, *Carm.* III 10, 16, *Carm.* IV 5, 12.

koniec. Przestał być już potrzebny utwór chwalący sielskie życie pasterzy, jakby w oderwaniu od reszty świata, pozbawione innych zmartwień niż nieodwzajemniona miłość. Nikomu nie potrzeba już idyllicznego krajobrazu, świata bogów — który zastąpił jeden Bóg chrześcijański — pasterskich agonów na łonie przyrody itp. Sewer próbował jakoś nawiązać do tradycji, jednocześnie propagując nowe treści, związane z ekspansją chrześcijaństwa. Jest to dzieło interesujące ze względu na to, że jest jedynym zachowanym chrześcijańskim utworem, który możemy nazwać sielanką, ostatnią sielanką świata starożytnego.

Prezentowany dalej polski przekład jest jednym z nielicznych, jeżeli nie pierwszym, publikowanym w języku polskim. Oparty został na angielskim wydaniu z 1838 roku z Londynu. Jest to kompletne wydanie tekstu zachowanego przez Pithoeusa z uwagami uczonych J. Weitzza, W. Sebera, J.Ch. Wernsdorfa.

Severus Sanctus Endelechius

Pomór bydła

Aegon, Buculos, Tityrus,

Aeg. Cóż to za żale wylewasz samotny
Bukulosie, boleśnie opuściwszy oczy?
Czemuż to policzki masz mokre od łez ob-
fitych? Mów, by się dowiedział ten, kto
cię miłuje.

Buc. Egonie, proszę, pozwól niech cisza
głęboka całkowicie mnie w chorych po-
grąży zmysłach;
ranę bowiem otwiera ten, kto złe rzeczy
wyjawia. Zamyka, kto sekret wstrzymuje.

Aeg. Inaczej jest niż twierdzisz, racji wca-
le nie masz, bo we dwu lżej jest dźwigać
ciężar. A jak się coś przykrywa, gwałtow-
niej wrzeć w środku zaczyna. Rozmowa
pomaga, gdy się cierpi.

Buc. Wiesz Egonie jak zasobny w trzody
byłem, a moje zwierzęta pasąc się wypeł-
niały rzek wszystkie doliny, pola i gór
szczyty.

Teraz nadzieja na życie w dostatku płonną
się stała, a życia owoce, co na trudzie mi
zeszło i znoju, w dwa dni przepadły.
Tak szybko nieszczęście uderza.

Aeg. Mówi się, że to złowieszcza szerzy się zaraza. Wcześniej Panonię, Ilirię także i Belgów mocno rozbiła, a teraz biegiem występny do nas się zbliża.

Lecz Ty, któryś potrafił zgubę szkodliwą leczniczymi odegnąć sokami, dlaczego ciosu nie uprzedziłeś strasznego, i nie przyłożyłeś dłoni, które uzdrawiają?

Buc. Nic zła tak straszliwej nie zapowiadało napaści, a co choroba porwie, już tego nie odda. Opieszałości nie znosi, na zwłokę nie pozwala. Tak śmierć przed zarazą przychodzi.

Zaprzągłem do wozów wołów wybranych cielska krzepkie, tak szybko, jak tylko sił mi starczyło, A na ich czołach bliźniaczych dzwonki pieśnią dźwięczały zgodną.

Wiek całkiem podobny i sierść, i umaszczenie, ta sama łagodność i krzepkość ta sama.

Ach doloż moja! Bo para jednaką pokonana śmiercią w pół drogi runęła.

Zupełnie osłabionemu jenom orkisz dawał; ziemia od wód obfitych gniła napływu, pług łatwo przez bruzdy sunął, nigdzie lemiesz nie utknął.

Lewy wół szybko od ataku pada, a dopiero zeszłego lata kark schylił pod jarzmo. Towarzysza smutnego natychmiast wyprzęgam, niczego złego więcej się nie bojąc.

Lecz od słowa szybciej ten za śmiercią zdąży, co zdrów i tęgi był zawsze. Teraz w długich konwulsjach potrząsając brzuchem, pokonaną złożył głowę.

Aeg. Dławi mnie smutek, cierpię i płaczę. Serce moje nad Twoimi się pochyla troskami, jakby i mnie to spotkało. Uważam jednak, że bezpieczne masz stada.

Buc. Odtąd koczuję jak biedak, co mnie bardziej dręczy. Pociechą bowiem by było czy raczej złem aż nie tak wielkim, gdyby mi przychówek następny dał, co obecna zaraza zabrała.

Ale kto mógłby sądzić, że potomstwo podobnie zostanie zabite?

Cielną jałówkę ujrzałem schyloną ku ziemi, dwie dusze widziałem w jednym zgubione cielsku.

Tam znów odmawiając wody ze źródła, trawy niepomna, błąkała się jałówka o zgiętych pęcinach. Nie uciekła daleko, lecz od pęt śmierci kulejąc, z impetem na ziemię runęła.

Albo ten byczek, który dopiero co skakał psotnie, gdy się do matki przysunął, wnet z chorego wymienia zarazę wyssał sobie.

Matka groźną zmożona raną, gdy oczy ujrzała cielaka zamknięte, ryk powtarzając i jęcząc rozpaczliwie padła, umrzeć wołała.

Ale jakby się bojąc, że pragnienie pysk opanuje wyschły, gdy tak leżała umierając, wymiona zmarłemu przysuwa. Miłość przetrwa po śmierci!

Dalej byk, stada przywódca i ojciec, co kark miał twardy i czoło wysokie, wesół, bo się sobie nad miarę podobał, w trawia-stą łękę pada.

Jak las chłodne wiatry z gęstwy liści obnażają, jak runo śniegu obfite spada zimą na ziemię, tak samo ciągle zarazy natarcia sieją pustkę wśród trzody.

Cały majątek stał się cmentarzem, ciała pęcznieją, gdy puchną brzuchy, oczy bieją, gdy sinymi chmurami zachodzą, od napiętych kopyt sztywnieją golenie.

Już żalosnych i złowieszczych krążą ptaków chmary, już psów stada z trzewi poszarpanych korzystać poczęły...
Ach! Czemu nie z moich także!

Aeg. Cóż to, pytam, co to jest, że śmierci żalosna dola jednych omija a innych powala? Oto rad ze zdrowego stada Tityrus ci idzie!

Buc. Też go widzę. Mów mi tu zaraz Tityrze, jakież to Bóg Ciebie od tych nieszczęść odsunął, by bydła pomór, co sąsiadów spustoszył, dla Ciebie był niczym.

Tit. Znak, jak go zważ, Krzyża Pańskiego, co należy do Pana, czczonego w wielkich miastach jako bóg jedyny, Chrystus, sława bóstwa wiecznego, którego jest synem jedynym.

Ten znak na czoł poczyniony środkiem,
zdrowie zapewniał krowom wszystkim.
Dlatego właśnie Bóg ten potężny Zbawicielem został nazwany.

Dzika zaraza, co szalała tak długo, znikła.
Choroba na nic nie mogła sobie pozwolić.
Jednak jeślibyś chciał tego Boga przebłagać,
uwierzyć wystarczy. Tylko wiara wystarczy,
by prośby wysłuchał.

Ołtarz od ofiar nie ocieka żadnych, ni bydła pomoru mord nie odpycha,
Proste duchowe oczyszczenie pozwala radować się tym, czego ktoś pragnie.

Buc. Jeśli te rzeczy za pewne uznajesz Tityrze, przeciwko nic nie mam, bym został sługą obrzędów prawdziwych. Błąd dawny chętnie porzucę, zwodniczy jest bowiem i pusty.

Tit. Już mój umysł się pali, by Największego Boga świątynie zobaczyć. Nuże Bu-

kulosie! Czy razem w tę długą podróż się nie wybierzemy, żeby poznać boską moc Chrystusa?

Aeg. Do tak dobrych planów i ja się przyłączę. Czemuż to miałbym wątpić, że człowiekowi także znak ten przez życie całe będzie pomagał, skoro chorobę tak straszną pokonać jest w stanie?

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The Language and Style of Cassia's Secular Poetry

Abstract: "Cassia having lost her chance to be an empress, put on a nun's habit and started writing many canons, *stichera* and other remarkable poetry" we read in a work entitled *Scriptores originum Constantionopolitanarum* about the only Byzantine female poet who wrote not only religious but also secular poetry. In this article I shortly describe Cassia's story and her works but the main subject of the text is the issue of language and style of her secular poetry. First, I present definitions of Byzantine levels of style and their characteristics. The analysis of Cassia's language in some of the most clear examples leads to the conclusion that we can classify Cassia's *gnomai* as an example of the middle style of Byzantine literature. She usually uses Attic Greek, but she does not avoid some popular expressions; she imitates classical models as well as the Bible and contemporary writers; she is creative in "proper" Attic word formation, but she also creates a noun based on an occupation which was not known to Attic authors, which was considered as "wrong practice". All in all there are some vernacular elements in her poetry as well as posh, classical ones but they are integrated in such a manner that Cassia's language is coherent, understandable and pleasant. I also do a short analysis of the dodecasyllable, a metre used by Cassia in her poems and I come to the conclusion that Cassia's *gnomai* are written in purely unprosodic dodecasyllable. This fact determined Cassia's poetry to be seen as not "classical" at the very first glance. But since she used this "vernacular" metre for her sentences written in learned language we can see it as a final proof that Cassia's *gnomai* are a part of the development of Byzantine literature as a link between the classical, posh, and official literature and the later, vernacular literature on which it depended.

Key words: Byzantium, antiquity, Cassia, poetry, language

This article focuses on an idea of language and style of Cassia's *gnomai*. I would like to show a coexistence of classical and Byzantine elements in Cassia's secular poetry and classify it as a middle-style Byzantine literature.

Since Cassia is not a very well known figure I'll start with giving some information about her life and work. We assume that she was an author of many religious hymns¹ and some verses of secular poetry known as epigrams or *gnomai*². She was born probably about 800 or 805 A.D., the daughter of a *candidatos*, an official at the imperial court in Constantinople. She was well educated and as a young girl she had corresponded with the famous Abbot (Hegoumenos) Theodore of the important imperial monastery of Studion in Constantinople (though reservations must be expressed as to whether this is really credible³). She was a Christian of course and she wanted to be a nun. She eventually became a nun, but before she did, something else had happened. Like in the fairytale about Cinderella, the Empress-mother Euphrosyne invited all beautiful (and rich) young ladies from all over the Empire in order to introduce them to her son (stepson in fact). He — Emperor Theophilus (829—842) — was expected to choose one of them to be his wife. With a golden apple in his hand, as Johannes Zonaras describes the scene⁴, Theophilus strolled among the ladies in order to give the apple to whom he liked the most. One of the beauties was Cassia, and she was the one whom Theophilus chose. While giving her a gold apple he said (and it was a statement, not question): ἐκ γυναικὸς ἐρρῦν τὰ φαῦλα ('women had been the source of evil'). Cassia calmly answered: ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ γυναικὸς πηγάζει τὰ κρείττω ('but women had been also the source of better things'). So the story ends. Offended Theophilus gave the golden apple and the Empire to Theodora from Paphlagonia and Cassia missed her opportunity to be empress. We can speculate and

¹ She is believed to write 49 hymns (23 of them are probably really written by her), 47 troparia and 2 canons. Cf. A. Tripolitis: *Kassia. The Legend, the Woman and Her Work*. New York—London 1992, pp. XII—XVIII (Introduction).

² Almost 300 verses of secular poetry by Cassia preserved in four manuscripts, these are: Cod. British Museum Addis. 10072 p. 15, Vol. 93 and 94, Cod. Laur. LXXXVII 16, Cod. Marc. Gr. 408, and Cod. Bibli. of Metochios 404 fol. 3, 4 and 303 (after B.A. Mystakides: "Kasia — Kassiane, onoma autes kai gnomai". *Orthodoxia* 1926, p. 250).

³ Cf. V. Grumel ("Cassia". In: *Dictionnaire d'Histoire et Géographie Ecclésiastiques* 11, 1949, pp. 1312—1315) considers Cassia as addressee of all three letters written by Theodore to some Cas(s)ia, F. Drexel ("Kasia". In: *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* 5, 1933, p. 861) and J. Psichari ("Cassia et la pomme d'or". In: *Annuaire de l'Ecole pratique des hautes études. Section des sciences historiques et philologiques*. 11, 1910) think that letter 270 (ed. by J. Cozza-Luzi. NBP, Vol. 8, pt. 1, Rome 1871) was addressed to the poet Cassia, and A. Gardner (*Theodor of Studium, His Life and Times*. London 1905) thinks that it was letter II 205 (ed. by J.J. Sirmond: "Sancti Theodori Studitae epistulae, aliaque scripta dogmatic". Vol. 5. In: *Opera varia*. Ed. J. de la Baume. Paris 1696) which can be considered as written to the poet Cassia. However E.E. Lipšic („K voprosu o cvetskich tecenyiach v Vizantijskoj kulturi IX w. (Kasja)". *Vizantiiskii vremennik* 1951, No 4, pp. 132—148) claims that we cannot identify the addressee of Theodore's letters with the poet Cassia. See also I. Rochow: *Studien zu den Person, Werken und den Nachleben der Dichterin Kassia*. Berlin 1967, p. 1.

⁴ J. Zonaras: *Epitomae historiarum*. Hrsg. Th. Büttner-Wobst. Bonn 1897, III, pp. 354—355.

debate whether the story is true or not, but the final conclusion remains that Cassia never became empress of Byzantium.

But it is an ill wind that blows nobody any good — the end of her political or social career is the beginning of our work. In *Patria Constantinupoleos* we read: Ἡ οὖν Εἰκασία τῆς βασιλείας ἀποτυχούσα τὸ τῶν μοναζουσῶν ἐνδιδύσκεται σχῆμα, κανόνας πολλοὺς καὶ στιχερά καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ ἀξιοθαύμαστα ποιήσασα⁵ — “So Ikasia⁶ having lost her chance to be an empress, put on a nun’s habit and started writing many canons, *stichera* and other remarkable poetry”. Leaving all her religious poetry which is well described and analysed by many scholars to one side I shall focus on ἄλλα τινὰ ἀξιοθαύμαστα — [her] “other remarkable poetry”. From the study of Karl Krumbacher we have some knowledge about Cassia’s secular poetry⁷. There are nearly 300 verses of epigrammatic or just gnomic poetry preserved in manuscripts with the name of our poet. During this analysis I will use the oldest edition of these verses, because it is the only full and critical edition; it is Krumbacher’s study mentioned above.

There is no need to describe the genre of epigrams or *gnomai*, the only thing to underline is that it was a very popular genre throughout the Byzantine period, and especially during the so-called Dark Ages, when it was nearly the only poetic genre still in use⁸. This is important because Cassia is classified as a representative of this times, by some schools of interpretation⁹.

To make the following analysis clear, we should define what we mean when talking about the language and style of Byzantine literature. According to *The Oxford English Dictionary* there is no great difference between these terms. We read that language is “the form of words in which something is communicated; manner or style of expression” or just “the style of a literary composition”¹⁰,

⁵ *Scriptores originum constantionopolitanarum*. Rec. Th. Preger. Lisiae 1907, p. 276.

⁶ Ikasia is one of versions of her name which are: Kasia, Kassia, Ikasia, Eikasia, Kassianne. The explanation for these differences should be seen in scribal errors as a result of changed pronunciation of Greek language in Byzantine times. Ikasia and Eikasia are combinations of a name and an article ἡ. This letter was pronounced in the same way as *ei* and *i*, so we can be sure that it is just a fusion of an article and a noun, and the fact that version Ekasia (Ηκασία) is not found should be rather proof of this hypothesis than its weak point, as I. Rochow suggested (cf. I. Rochow: *Studien zu den Person...*, pp. 4—5), because if a scribe (and a reader) see series of letters *ηκασία* most likely he/she thinks that *η* is an article.

⁷ K. Krumbacher: „Kasia“. In: *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-philologische und der historischen Classe der k.b. München* 1897.

⁸ Cf. “Literature”. In: *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*. Ed. A. Kazhdan. New York 1991, Vol. 2, p. 1235.

⁹ When writing about Dark Ages I follow The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium (mid-7th C. — ca. 800) and it means that Kassia’s poetry doesn’t belong to this period, but some scholars want Dark Ages to last longer.

¹⁰ Cf. “Language”. In: *The Oxford English Dictionary*. Eds. J.A.H. Murray, H. Brandlay, W.A. Craigie, C.T. Onions. 2nd ed. Oxford 1989, Vol. 8, p. 634.

while a style is “a symbol of literary composition”¹¹. What can we say about them in terms of Byzantine literature? Firstly, we deal with the situation of *diglossia* not only in Byzantine society but also in Byzantine literature. Proper literary texts are written in the so-called *Hochsprache*, and they are of ‘high style’; the rest are written in vernacular language and are considered to be ‘low style’ literature. It would be naive to be so sure that the distinction was really so straightforward and uncomplicated. However, we cannot forget that there are differences between modern and Byzantine linguistic norms. About such a basic difference Ihor Ševčenko wrote:

Students of style in a modern language compare their evidence with some norm of which a given style is a specialized or individual variant. For them, the ‘conversational’ or ‘usual’ speech or prose of an average educated person is such a norm and ‘high style’ is then seen determined as a deviation from it. In the wake of our Byzantine predecessors, we Byzantinists proceed in the opposite way: we assume with them that works in high style provide the norm, even if we can guess that such works had little to do with the language spoken by their educated authors. Unlike modern linguists, we cannot directly confront the subjects of our study. But we do have at our disposal a large body of prose that can be considered the Byzantine counterpart of the average modern educated speech and can serve as a norm by which to judge Byzantine high style¹².

In other words, we assume that a high style is a norm and, what is more, just a “normative” norm, correctly defined by Byzantine grammarians. They decided what is considered as “Attic” and good (or rather posh), and what as “non-Attic” and bad (or maybe just ordinary). For instance contracted forms of nouns and verbs, Attic declensions, the indefinite pronoun (particularly in their shorted forms τού, τῷ), reduplication instead of the pluperfect with auxiliary verb, the middle voice, the optative, the accumulation of negations, the pleonastic use of particles, the perfect with present tense meaning, the *figura etymologica*, and many other forms were preferred because they were held to be Attic. On the other hand they avoided Latin expressions or names of people and lands which were not known to Attic authors, so they did not use them in their works¹³.

If they defined the characteristics of high style in so strict a manner, they had to be aware of at least two levels of styles — the high, which followed all the rules

¹¹ Cf. “Style”. In: *The Oxford English Dictionary*. Eds. J.A.H. Murray, H. Brandlay, W.A. Craigie, C.T. Onions. 2nd ed. Prep. by J.A. Simpson, E.S.C. Weiner. Oxford 1991, Vol. 16, p. 1008.

¹² I. Ševčenko: “Levels of Style in Byzantine Literature”. *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 1981, Vol. 31 (1), p. 309.

¹³ I follow H. Hunger: “On the Imitation (ΜΙΜΕΣΙΣ) of Antiquity”. *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 1969—1970, Vol. 23, pp. 30—32.

they described, and the low, which ignored the rules. Byzantinists, however, distinguish one more level — the middle one — according to ancient theories (as, for example, the one by Dionysios of Halicarnassus which was known to some Byzantine theoreticians as well¹⁴). Ševčenko proposed a return to the ancient theory of styles, which is also used by modern linguists as the Theory of Three Style. He claims that according to this theory, Byzantine scholars will “instinctively” classify as a high style work which

uses periodic structure; its vocabulary is recondite, puristic and contains *hapax legomena* made up on a classical template; its verbal forms, especially its pluperfects, are for the most part Attic; its Scriptural quotations are rare or indirect and its classical ones, plentiful. In a work of middle style, periods are rarely attempted and fill-words and clichés, more abundant; it requires a use of patristic lexicon; and its Scriptural quotations are more frequent than classical ones. A work in low style uses largely paratactic structures; its vocabulary contains a fair number of words unattested in standard dictionaries or coming from languages other than Greek; its verbal forms are not Attic; its Scriptural quotations, more frequently than not, come from New Testament and Psalter¹⁵.

The first group gathers the highest educated people of those times who wrote for a handful of similarly educated people. The second group, which is the most numerous, is also the most interesting one, because authors who can be classified as writing in middle-style manner are engaged in both learned and vernacular literature. On the one hand, leaving strict rules of so-called Atticism they were precursors of a vernacular literature; on the other hand they brought some elements of ordinary speech into the learned literature. When we accept this level of style in Byzantine literature we can see it as more natural and we can reject a rigid division into puristic learned literature and a completely independent vernacular one. Rather we can consider the proposition of Erich Trapp, who wrote:

[...] scholars of Byzantine studies have been mostly used to accepting a rather strong contrast between learned and popular literature. This contrast is mainly founded upon the evident intention of the literary circles, especially at the court of Constantinople, to emulate ancient writers, a phenomenon somewhat called ‘Atticism’. But on the other hand, as Byzantium in many aspects of life evidently had been a combination of old and new elements, so to say an empire of both the New and Old Center, why shouldn’t this be true of literature too?¹⁶

¹⁴ I. Ševčenko: “Levels of Style...”, p. 290.

¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 291.

¹⁶ E. Trapp: “Learned and Vernacular Literature in Byzantium: Dichotomy or Symbiosis?” *Dumabarton Oaks Papers* 1995, Vol. 47, p. 116.

If we examine Byzantine literature in this way, a common opinion that this literature had little aesthetic value and was an inferior continuation of its Greco-Roman and patristic or biblical models¹⁷ is not proper any more, as we can see a living language expressed in original texts, reflecting in their form the complicated Byzantine world. Therefore this mixture of old and new is also reflected in Byzantine literature on various levels — language is only one of them.

To find a point in time when this coexistence of learned and vernacular language had started we should look for it in the 6th century, when the preparatory phase of the vernacular literature had its beginning (according to E. Trapp¹⁸), what means that from this time we can see a tendency to use vernacular words and phrases in official literature. This tendency was apparently strengthened in the Dark Ages after George of Pisidia and restrained in the age of Photios and later by Symeon Metaphrastes during the times of Macedonian Revival (9th—10th century). Somewhere between these epochs we meet Cassia's poetry. In which of these epochs should we locate her poetry, or by which was it more influenced, these are the questions we cannot answer wholeheartedly unless we analyse its language and even then we should be very careful about opinions. But our task is to describe the language of these particular epigrams/*gnomai* and use this analysis to determine their style in terms of the Theory of Three Styles mentioned above. What I want to do is just show some characteristics of Cassia's language and, comparing them with rules I quoted at the beginning, define her style as high-, middle- or low-.

The first opinion about Cassia's language was formulated by K. Krumbacher saying, that her language is simple, easy to understand and learned without being over-wrought¹⁹. That is true, all the *gnomai* are written in simple and understandable manner. Understandable for these people who know ancient Greek, of course (probably that is what Krumbacher meant). Generally we can read Cassia's *gnomai* using the Liddell—Scott—Jones Dictionary²⁰. Generally, but not always — the vocabulary the poet uses is usually Attic, but sometimes we meet some confusing word or form which we have to look for in a patristic dictionary²¹, *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Period*²², *Lexicon of Medieval Greek Folk Literature*²³ or even modern Greek lexicons. There are not many such words or phrases but they are important for our study, so we can deal with them at the beginning.

¹⁷ Cf. "Literature". In: *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*. Ed. A. Kazhdan. New York 1991, Vol. 2, p.1235.

¹⁸ E. Trapp: "Learned...", p. 116.

¹⁹ K. Krumbacher: „Kasia...", p. 338.

²⁰ I use two editions of this dictionary, these are: *A Greek-English Lexicon*. Compiled by H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A New Edition Revised and Augmented throughout by H.S. Jones. Oxford 1940, Vol. 1—2 and *A Greek-English Lexicon*. Compiled by H.G. Liddell and R. Scott. Oxford 1901.

²¹ *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*. Ed. G.W.H. Lampe. Oxford 1995.

²² *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Period*. Ed. E.A. Sophocles. New York 1975.

²³ Λεξικὸ τῆς Μεσαιωνικῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Διμῶδους Γραμματείας. Ed. E. Kriara. Thessaloniki 1973, Vol. 1—14.

In this section I would like to focus only on some forms, these would be: a comparative ἡδύτερος (I, 22), nouns γεννητρία (I, 55), ἰσασμός (I, 2), περισσοπράκτωρ (I, 144) and verbs διαρρήσσω (I, 44, 48) and συναντάω (I, 13) with its syntactic connections. All of them are not Attic and are closer to usual speech than to highly learned one.

The comparative ἡδύτερος comes from the adjective ἡδύς and its regular comparative form is ἡδίων. The form ἡδύτερος is not a mistake if we consider it as a part of Byzantine Greek language, it was used by many authors from 4th and later, especially by John Chrysostom (he used it 26 times). We should also notice that the great Photios uses both Attic and popular forms of comparative, so perhaps in the 9th century the comparative ἡδύτερος was such a common form that even for him it sounded well. This excuse does not change the fact that for linguistic purists this form was incorrect.

The noun γεννητρία is interesting for similar reasons, which is not visible at a first glance by the way. The Liddell—Scott—Jones Dictionary says that γεννητρία means the same as γεννήτειρα (which can be found in Plato's *Cratylus*) and according to this dictionary it is a feminine form of γεννητήρ which does not exist, but happily means the same as γεννητής which means *begetter* or *parent*, so using this classical dictionary we can find a meaning. But to find out something more about the form we need use other lexicons. The *Patristic Dictionary*, according to its function, informs us that the noun γεννητρία is used by the Church Fathers (found in *Apophthegmata Patrum* for instance) and means *mother* or *source*. The most interesting information is given by the *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Period*, which compares this form to the Latin *genetrix*. As the ancient feminine form of this noun is γεννήτειρα, the form γεννητρία is likely to have been influenced by Latin *genetrix* especially as it was created in times of Latin and Greek languages coexistence. Later, when people in the East no longer knew Latin, forms like this were probably not considered as strange since the root was Greek and the ending was so similar to Greek. And of course γεννήτειρα and γεννητρία in modern pronunciation sound really similar. However, if there was no semantic difference between these forms (and as we know there was not), Byzantine linguistic purist would have chosen the form used by Plato.

We deal with a similar situation in case of the verb διαρρήσσω which is a Byzantine variant of the Attic διαρρήγνυμι. We find the form διαρρήσσω in the New Testament, in works of the Church Fathers (such as John Chrysostom or Origen) and some Byzantine writers (such as Gregory Monachos, Hesychius, Romanos Melodos or Socrates Scholasticus). In Cassia's poem verb διαρρήσσω is used together with πατάσσω, so we may suspect that she chose this form on purpose, in order to strengthen an impression of destruction (which is included in the meaning of both these verbs) by sound effect. And probably she really did that, but even so we cannot be sure that she knew both forms διαρρήσσω and διαρρήγνυμι, and that she made conscious choice between them. The interesting thing is that the form

used by Cassia can be considered as a “truly Byzantine” one, because it was used only in this period. The Modern Greek verb διαρρηγνύω comes direct from the ancient διαρρήγνυμι (as modern Greek σβήνω from Attic σβέννυμι or αναμινύω from Attic μείγνυμι), so the verb διαρρήσσω may be seen as a part of the Byzantine spoken language from the 9th century onwards.

We can say the same about the noun ἰσασμός which is also very Byzantine. But the difference is that this form existed in Antiquity and later disappeared from the learned language. However, the existence of this form in Antiquity is not very well proved — it can be found in work of Epicurus²⁴ but only in one, uncertain place. The Liddell—Scott—Jones Dictionary gives us a meaning of this noun — ‘equalisation’ — which comes from a verb *to* ‘equalise’ and is created in the same manner as a Greek noun ἰσασμός from a Greek verb ἰσάζω (perfectum ἴσασμαι). Such a way of creating words was very common among the authors of Byzantine Chronicles, as *Grammatik der Byzantinischen Chroniken*²⁵ says, and probably it was considered as a classicizing word formation. But since we know that a noun ἰσασμός was a common word in the late Byzantine period among folk writers, we should suppose that Cassia used the popular vernacular word rather than she created her own deriving it from ancient verb as some other authors did.

Another example of using contemporary language is the verb συναντάω. As Attic it should have a dative form as an object, but in Cassia’s poetry it is connected with the accusative. Such a syntax was proper only among Asiatic Greeks. But since we know that modern word συνανδῶ has an αἰτιατική — accusative as an object and that the dative form, which does not exist at all (apart from occasional stock phrases) in modern Greek, in Byzantine Greek was less and less used, we can think that it is again a mistake of using common, contemporary forms instead of the ancient ones. Apart from this one point, there are no more syntactic mistakes (in terms of Attic syntax) in Cassia’s *gnomai*, or at least not such evident ones. We can see as a syntactic mistake also abuse of particle δέ which in some verses (I, 15, 16, 19, 27, 64 and 112) is used without syntactical reason, which could of course be a wrong imitation of Menander’s sentences taken out of a context, as Krumbacher suggested²⁶.

These few examples show why Cassia’s language is not so Attic and “posh” as every good snobbish Byzantine author wanted to be. However, apart from very few non-Attic forms and formulas (those mentioned above and some similar ones) Cassia’s syntax is correct and her language is completely understandable for everyone who knows ancient Greek. What is more, sometimes she shows her linguistic abilities for instance in the field of word formation. As examples of this practice

²⁴ Epicur Phil.: *Deperditorum Librorum reliquiae*. Treatise 29, Fragment 22.

²⁵ Stamatios B. Psaltēs: *Grammatik der Byzantinischen Chroniken*. Göttingen 1974, pp. 257—258.

²⁶ K. Krumbacher: *Kasia...*, p. 343.

we can consider the participle ὑπερπλουτισθέντες and the adjective φαυλῶδες which occurs in a poem on the Armenians (III, 42 and 34 respectively).

The first of them, ὑπερπλουτισθέντες comes probably from the verb ὑπερπλουτίζω. Probably, because apart from Cassia no-one uses this participle (and the verb it probably derives from). There is a similar verb ὑπερπλουτέω in ancient Greek used (or even created) by Aristophanes which means 'to be exceedingly rich'. A difference between πλουτέω and πλουτίζω is simple, the first means 'to be rich, wealthy' while the second means 'to make wealthy'. Cassia then created a new word based on the existing terms and her ὑπερπλουτίζω by analogy means 'to make exceeding wealthy', which in this particular case is 'made exceeding wealthy'.

Also the next example, an adjective φαυλῶδες is made by analogy to an existing ancient word. There is the adjective φαῦλος with the suffix -ώδης which ending is characteristic of ancient rather than of medieval Greek. And the analogy is obvious because we have an adjective μανιῶδες in a very next verse.

Another situation is the noun περισσοπράκτωρ which probably comes from the verb περισσοπρακτέω — 'to exact more taxes than is due' rather than from a conjunction of περισσός — 'beyond a natural number or size' and πράκτωρ — 'one who does' which is what A. Tripolitis suggests by her translation²⁷. I agree with A. Kazhdan who underlines that Cassia created a neologism "possible hinting at the imperial administration in which the *praktor* was an important financial official"²⁸, which means that she created a term strictly connected with contemporary world what was bad seen in terms of high style language as was told earlier.

But returning to proper and praiseworthy practices, we come back to the epigram on Armenians. Despite the virtue of word formations mentioned above, this epigram is also good example of creative imitation of classical models. If we look at the last verse we find a superlative φαυλεπιφαυλότατοι, which could be considered as another example of Cassia's word formation initiative since we had not already found it somewhere else. The same complicated superlative was used by Demodokos from Leros, who wrote a poem on the Cappadocians. Comparing these two poems — Cassia's epigram on the Armenians and Demodokos's on the Cappadocians²⁹ we can see similarity in their construction. From verse III, 37 (which is the 5th verse of this epigram) Cassia imitate Demodokos's poem introducing this imitation by words: εἶπε τις σοφός. In next 4 verses she uses an adjective φαῦλος and its degrees in the same manner as Demodokos did. She takes a form, a structure of epigram from the ancient writer and fills it with contemporary content.

²⁷ She translates this noun as "person inclined to overdo". Cf. A. Tripolitis: *Kassia. The legend...*, p. 125.

²⁸ A. Kazhdan: *A History of Byzantine Literature*. Athens 1999, p. 324.

²⁹ *Anthologia Graeca*. Ed. H. Beckby; *Anthologia Graeca*, 4 Vols., 2nd ed. Munich 1965—1966, TLG, book 11, epigram 238.

The opposite situation is a poem on Destiny (I, 71—73) which is an imitation of Palladas's distich. The main thought in these poems is the same and first verses nearly identical. Only the form make a difference — Cassia's poem is in dodecasyllable verse and Palladas's is an elegiac distich. So, in this case our poet puts an ancient content into a contemporary metrical form.

These are not the only imitations or intextual allusions in Cassia's poetry. We also find there some similarities with such an important genre as ancient drama; however we can be nearly certain that she did not know all ancient tragedies but only some pieces included in the school syllabus or widely known from some *florilegia*. But even so verses I, 141, 142 and III, 62 can be considered as an imitation of the ancient tragedy practice because of the many exclamations as παπαῖ, ἰώ, φεῦ, οὐαί, πόποι, οἴμοι used together like it was in tragedies.

There are also imitations of Menander's verses, but only his verses, not whole comedies. Few examples: Cassia's verse I, 20 Φίλος τὸν φίλον καὶ χώρα χώραν σῶζει and Menander's: Ἀνὴρ τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ πόλις σῶζει πόλιν³⁰ or Cassia's κρείσσον καὶ νόσος τῆς κακῆς εὐεξίας (I,78) and Menander's νόσον δὲ κρείττον ἐστὶν ἢ λύπην φέρειν³¹.

However she imitates not only the classical models. For instance verse III, 97: θεὸν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος is a paraphrase of Gregory of Nazianzus's ἀρχὴν ἀπάντων καὶ τέλος ποιοῦ θεόν. Also verses I, 138—143 (and III, 4—7) are imitations of Gregory's epigram (I, 2. 22) which starts with the same word δεινόν and ends with nearly the same verse. A. Kazhdan suggests that whole epigram on the Fool (which included verses mentioned above) is related to the *Wisdom of Jesus ben Sirach* which is full of invectives against μωρός — the fool³².

According to this short analysis and to the rules I presented at the beginning, we can classify Cassia's *gnomai* as an example of the middle style of Byzantine literature. She writes usually Attic Greek, but she does not avoid some popular expressions; she imitates classical models as well as the Bible and contemporary writers; she is creative in "proper" Attic word formation, but she also creates a noun based on an occupation which was not known to Attic authors, which was considered as "wrong practice". All in all there are some vernacular elements in her poetry as well as posh, classical ones but they are integrated in such manner that Cassia's language is coherent, understandable and pleasant. This pleasure of reading Cassia's *gnomai* is caused also by stylistic figures which we find in these texts. And the analysis of language and style would not be complete if I did not mention at least some of them.

³⁰ *Fragmenta comicorum Graecorum*. Ed. A. Meineke. Vol. 5.1. Berlin 1857, repr. De Gruyter, 1970 TLG, Menandri Sententiae I, 29.

³¹ *Ibidem*, I, 383.

³² Cf. A. Kazhdan: *A History...*, p. 324.

A Kazhdan expresses an opinion that Cassia's "favourite play is polyptoton (traductio) and similar figures which bind the sentence lexically"³³ as for instance verses I, 2—3 φίλω φιλοῦντι χαρίζου τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, τῷ δ' ἀγνώμονι εἰς κενὸν τὸ φιλεῖσθαι where a noun φίλος and related verb φιλέω are repeated four times in two lines. A similar figure is alliteration which we can see for instance in verse I, 57 πλουτῶν πλήθυνον τοὺς φίλους ἐκ τοῦ πλούτου where an effect of polyptoton πλουτῶν — πλούτου is braced with one more word — πλήθυνον which is of a different root but beginning with the same sound. Talking about her favourites we have to mention an anaphora used for instance in an epigram about hatred, which fills whole II collection (and is partly included in I, 85—92) where each single verse begins with a verb μισῶ. If verses I, 77—82 are considered as one epigram, we have an anaphora again, but not in the whole poem as before, because the poet decided to abandon a figure of anaphora in the last 2 verses in favour of developing a thought from verse 80. Another interesting example is the long epigram III, 74—97, where Cassia uses a combination of anaphores. There are 3 verses beginning with a word μοναχός, the next 5 verses beginning with a phrase μοναχοῦ βίος then she returns to the expression μοναχός ἐστιν (six verses) and again to phrase (a little changed) βίος μοναστοῦ. There are only 2 verses in whole epigram which are excluded from this anaphoric play (77 and 89) and their function is to separate the first group of verses beginning with μοναχός ('monk') from verses beginning with μοναχοῦ βίος or βίος μοναστοῦ ('monk's life').

I might add that she avoids tautologies, accumulation of synonyms and hendiadys but instead her expressions are direct and strong as in the epigram with the anaphoric use of μισῶ, especially verse: μισῶ τὸν μοιχόν, ὅταν κρίνη τὸν πόρνον (I, 86 = II, 2). And I end this part of the analysis by saying one more important thing.

All poetry is distinguished from the rest of literature by one thing — its form. And this form is named versification. Today it seems to be less important but in ancient poetry a metre was a constitutive aspect of every piece of poetry. I will not write at length about ancient and Byzantine metric, but there are some essential things which should be underline.

First of all, ancient metric was prosodic what means that they distinguished long and short syllables and built their metrical patterns on a basis of the syllables' "quality". And one day Greek language users realised that they could not hear a difference between long and short vowels any more. But as they were brave and resourceful; they did not stop writing poetry based on prosodic patterns. That is the reason why Byzantine poets still tried to write hexameters, anacreontics, elegiac distichs and iambic trimetre. The fun was great: especially for those who wrote, probably for those who read too. But here we have another catch — ancient poetry was not created in order to be read but in order to be recited and to be heard. And

³³ Ibidem, p. 325.

Byzantine poetry was the same³⁴. So, more time passed and Byzantine society realised that their iambic trimetre was slightly different from the ancient one, because their iambic trimetre was “pure”. This means that it consisted of 12 syllables. After some long time 19th century scholars decided that these trimetres are not iambic trimetres any more, but they are Byzantine dodecasyllables. It is quite easy to describe this “new” metre: Byzantine dodecasyllables generally need 12 syllables, a stress on penultimate 1, a pause (cezura) after the fifth syllable (penthemimeres) or after the seventh one (hephthemimeres)³⁵. These are most important rules. There are some minor ones, described very precisely by H. Hunger³⁶ and P. Maas³⁷, but since there is no place and no time to characterize them, I shall say only that Cassia’s dodecasyllables deal with all of them perfectly, and that she did not write even one prosodic iambic trimetre (apart from 8 verses based on Menander’s ones).

Why it is so important? Because it determined Cassia’s poetry to be not “classical” at the very first glance. As M. Lauxtermann says:

Cassia is not a member of the club of classicizing verse mongers. Her dodecasyllables are purely accentual and show complete disregard for prosody. [...] the unprosodic variant of the dodecasyllable is essentially a metre used for two genres only: gnomic epigrams, such as the ones by Cassia, and Aesopic fables “translated” into Byzantine Greek

and

gnomic epigrams and metrical fables are forms of Byzantine lowbrow literature. They make use of ‘vulgar’ unprosodic dodecasyllable. Their style is unpretentious, their language plain and unadorned³⁸.

That is true, Cassia’s *gnomai* are written in purely unprosodic dodecasyllable, but it is worth underlining that since such a metre in 9th and even in 10th century was used very rarely and usually in a genre of gnomic epigrams we can consider Cassia as an one of the authors who first used this essentially Byzantine metre. And she not only used it in very proper way, according to all major and minor rules, but she also used it for her sentences written in learned language. And that is

³⁴ Cf. P. Marciniak: “Byzantine Theatron — A Place for Performance?” In: *Theatron. Rhetorische Kultur in Spätantike und Mittelalter*. Ed. M. Grünbart. Berlin—New York 2007, pp. 282—285.

³⁵ These pauses concern early dodecasyllables, later we have a strong pause in the middle of a verse, after the sixth syllable.

³⁶ H. Hunger: *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner*. München 1978, Vol. 2, pp. 92—93.

³⁷ P. Maas: “Der byzantinische Zwölfsilber”. *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 1903, Vol. 12, pp. 278—323.

³⁸ M. Lauxtermann: *Byzantine Poetry from Pisides to Geometres*. Wien 2003, p. 253.

the point — Cassia's *gnomai* are a part of the development of Byzantine literature as a link between the classical, posh, and official literature and the later, vernacular literature on which it depended. Studying the language and style of her poetry we may see how classical, highly sophisticated elements characteristic of Byzantine high style literature are mixed with some truly live pieces of contemporary language. And we can pompously say that such a poetry proves Erich Trapp's reflection I noted at the beginning: "[...] as Byzantium in many aspects of life evidently had been a combination of old and new elements, why shouldn't this be true of literature too?"³⁹ Since we find them in Cassia's language, it is true.

³⁹ E Trapp: "Learned...", p. 116.

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East — West. The Theory of *Guna* in A.W.Schlegel's Translation of the Bhagavadgita Notes on Translation

Abstract: Schlegel's translation of Bhagavadgita documents a landmark attempt of assimilating and popularizing an important Indian text within the European mind. Presented in this article analysis of the translation suggests that Schlegel's utilitarian goals overshadowed his efforts to accurately present some of Bhagavadgita's key terms. Furthermore, by reason of an assumption in regards to the existence of factual equivalents of these terms in the Western culture, the ambition of layering the system of *guna* onto the Western mind resulted in an unclear representation of the underlying content found in the original Bhagavadgita; proper interpretation of the terms in accordance with their cultural heritage became impossible. In conclusion, contrary to Schlegel's technique, modern inclinations and guidelines for sustaining philosophical terms in harmony with their original pronunciations are more likely to decrease the risk of stumbling upon copious doorways for interpretation and heading for resignation. Such approach may also help diminish the presence of excessive europocentrism in future processes of understanding the Indian mind and philosophy.

Key words: intercultural translation, Bhagavadgita, *guna*, *sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*, Schlegel.

Throughout the Western culture, oriental mind has remained a topic of considerable interest for over two hundred years. Along with moral transformations, during the time of the 20th century, new angles on anthropology, psychology, and social sciences eased the process of integrating elements of Eastern and European cultures, as they became more visible and practicable. Among others, a significant portion of popularity belonged to the idea of ahimsa or a concept of personal retreat and introspection. Also, vegetarianism, melodic sutras, and compassionate

asans became equally stimulating to the public, despite them being perceived on a shallow intellectual level astray from the complex and diversified Indian ways of thinking. Nevertheless, in a historical context, the study of Indiology, to some extent, remained under the influence of European points of view. This makes the comprehension of Eastern ideology nearly impossible, as the European views tend to focus either on the antithetical aspects of Western and Eastern mind-sets¹, as seen in the works of Hegel or A. Garwoński², or a tendency to seek harmony and coincidence, as seen in the works of Deussen³. Such tendencies are criticized in the post-war Indiology by the majority of scholars such as S. Schayer, H. Nakamura.

An attempt to understand the East through Western ways of thinking, as exemplified in many translations of religious Sanskrit texts into European languages, remains a problem worthy of examination. A.W. Schlegel's translation of Bhagavadgita into Latin in 1823 is representative of such predicament; the translation of terms from the Indian system of *gunas* exemplifies, in the case of *sattva*, a process of inaccurate imposition of Western philosophical content into the Indian philosophical system and an effort of excessively verbatim translation of two terms: *rajas* and *tamas*. In such case, an analysis of the mentioned translations may provide explanations of how accurate and viable cultural translation may be under given circumstances. Also, further analysis of the texts may provide more information on how the translation of Indian texts may influence the general understanding of non-occidental ways of thinking.

Schlegel's translation was the second attempt to translate the Sanskrit original into a European language. Ch. Wilkins' translation in 1785⁴, which was the first of such documents, served as an aid to Schlegel's project. As a pioneer in the study of the Sanskrit and Indio-European linguistics, Schlegel paid considerate attention to structural adequacy within his translations, focusing on issues such as: grammatical accident, syntax, word formation, and rhythmic aspects of a language. The author decided to use Latin for the purpose of his translation, in view of the language as a great resource of ideas for literary expression⁵. In the end, Schlegel's work was published in the midst of a strong fascination with the Indian ways of thinking which, in turn, served an important purpose for romantics who sought guidance to their lives on a more spiritual plain. Furthermore, the printed edition of Schlegel's work caused a stir in the minds of many intellectuals at the time; for

¹ E.g. irrational — rational; synthesis — analysis, intuition — logic, maximalism — moderation.

² A. Gawroński: "Między Wschodem a Zachodem". *Przegląd Współczesny* 1924, No 26, pp. 321—336.

³ S. Schayer gives a critical judgement in: "O filozofowaniu hindusów". In: Idem: *O filozofowaniu hindusów*. Ed. M. Mejer. Warszawa 1988, pp. 131—153.

⁴ See: *Bhagavad-gita id est thespeion melos sive Krishnae et Arjunae colloquium de rebus divinis*. Trans. A.G. Schlegel. Bonnae 1823, p. XXI.

⁵ See: ibidem, pp. XXII—XXIII.

example, grasped by the beauty of the translation, von Humboldt postulated integrating yoga into everyday life, and F. Schlegel, together with A. Schopenhauer, and his student P. Deussen remained the most prominent propagators of the Indian mind. They considered it to be reviving and cathartic in the realms of the modern world. Naturally, an ability of the European to accurately comprehend such text cannot be compared to the complexity of comprehending it by the Indian. Therefore, Schlegel was pressured to create a masterpiece fairly easy to interpret; a text convincing to the reader through self-explanatory content. Only then could such document serve as a means of popularization, as it had become soon after the first edition. Nevertheless, Schlegel clearly neglected simple and direct transcription of certain terms found in the Sanskrit. He wrote:

Video nonnullos, cum in notiones philosophis Indicis peculiare incident, a sensu nostro adeo remotas, ut vix ullum vocabulum nobis usitatum iis plane respondeat, ipsum vocabulum Sanscritum in interpretationem suam inferre solere. Atqui, ex mea quidem sententia, hoc non est e peregrino sermone in nostrum convertere, sed nihil aliud quam verba Sanscrita litteris Latinis scribere. Ergo conatus sum omnia Latina facere, et notionum quoque philosophicarum veram vim et indolem exprimere, quatenus id sine longis verborum ambagibus fieri posset⁶.

In the long run, Schlegel, the writer, became a teacher of philosophical knowledge, who served as a bridge connecting distant cultures⁷. Yet, his facility to maintain such status so was limited to the level of his own competence and reason.

Because the theory of *gunas* is essential to many trends and fields in philosophy, anthropology, and cultural trends within India as a nation, explaining and transposing the *guna* is a problematic and hazardous process.

Ontological studies related to the theory of Sankhya, Yoga, and all Vedic counterparts define *gunas* as basic units of matter, or rather modal properties of matter⁸. Such units are always present in correlation with each other; and this very correlation is the condition for any life form. Units that make up matter contain explanations to all biological, physical, and psychological phenomena; they outline human character, tendencies, behavior, and goals. Therefore, as pointed out by Eliade, *gunas* are both subjective and objective, for they give basis for the existence of external world and also the existence of internal self and

⁶ Ibidem, p. XXIV.

⁷ Schlegel's contemporaries, as Hegel and Humboldt were also concerned with the problem of translating philosophical terms, see: M. Sato: *Das Problem des interkulturellen Verstaendnisses bei der Uebersetzung philosophish- religioeser Texte*. On: <http://www.kclcl.or.jp/humboldt/msatog.htm>

⁸ The term modes is used by Dasgupta: *History of Indian Philosophy*. On: <http://www.full-books.com/A-History-of-Indian-Philosophy-Vol-17.html>, p. 243. Eliade uses "modi of being" in: *Patañdzali i Joga*. Trans. I. Kania. Warszawa 2004, p. 29.

the dynamics of psychological processes associated with that self. Furthermore, *gunas* continue to represent the elements of all matter. Such belief has a deep impact on the Indian mind, for it permits the acceptance of unity of life under any manifestations of life⁹. The conviction about universal unity of life is observable in medicine, cuisine, erotica, and psychology. Indian axiology is too based on the modal properties of matter. Furthermore, the properties are built into the soteriology of yoga as starting points, basic elements of human experience, transgression of which leads towards the ultimate liberation (*moksa*)¹⁰. When put together, the entities are classified into three classes – *sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas* – in accordance to their individual properties. For the purposes of his translation, Schlegel decided to complete his work by incorporating terms that were to some extent known to the general public; he made use of their connotations with specific groups of ideas and terms to those found in the Indian context. Schlegel uses his technique consistently throughout the text, in contrast to his other translations in which poetic elements were far more important than the philosophical facets. Christian Lassen, who was responsible for the second edition of the text, did not impose any amendments in this area¹¹.

The equivalent of *sattva* is found in the expression *essentia*. However, a rich philosophical basis responsible for the formation of term *essentia* and a series of contexts related to the term caused the connection between *essentia* and *sattva* significantly more difficult to understand. A faulty sense of integrity between the two expressions becomes evident, possibly resulting from lack of sufficient comparative analysis and too much self-confidence in the author's intuitive approach. Attempts to interpret *sattva* through various interpretations of the term *essentia* do not lead to proper understanding of *sattva*. For example, a simple interpretation of the *sattva-essentia* as a principle of being, the nature of things¹², and a form that represents the basic elements of identity ("essentia significat quod est"¹³) may easily be associated with the concept of *gunas* rather than the *sattva* itself. The Indian term, being a modus of matter does not constitute the *per se* actual characteristics of being, such characteristics are a result of a correlation between the previously mentioned three qualities of *gunas*. The amount of differing contexts and links to philosophical ideas makes it virtually impos-

⁹ H. Nakamura elaborates on that particular question in: "Indie". In: Idem: *Systemy myślenia ludów Wschodu*. Trans. M. Kanert, W. Szkudlarczyk-Brkić. Kraków 2005, pp. 21–175. Not mentioning the *guna* is caused by methodological framework of his paper.

¹⁰ Vide: L. Cyboran: "Joga klasyczna. Filozofia i praktyka". *Studia Filozoficzne* 1976, No 10–11, pp. 84–101. Also: S. Kumar: "The Nature of Human Existence". In: *India in Warsaw*. Eds. D. Stasiak, A. Trynkowska. Warszawa 2006, pp. 174–184.

¹¹ *Bhagavadgita id est thespeson melos sive Krishnae et Arjunaee colloquium de rebus divinis*. Trans. A.G. a Schlegel. Bonnae 1846.

¹² TLL, sub voce: "essentia", p. 862: "Veteres, qui haec nomina non habebant pro essentia et substantia naturam vocabant".

¹³ TLL, ibidem, p. 864.

sible to determine the author's intentions; accordingly, an accurate perception of the term is unlikely.

The term *essentia* as "actio vel status essendi" or "res subsistens vel existens" or "genus vel qualitas essendi"¹⁴ is more easily associated with the theory of all *gunas*. In the context of *sattva*, it overshadows the actual meaning of the term and overlooks *sattvas* qualities of dynamic matter; brightness, beneficence, and the power to redeem¹⁵. Furthermore, *essentia* may lead to false assumptions about *sattva* as intangible substance, that conditions being.

Translation of *sattva-essentia* may only be understood as a translation of the Sanskrit stem *sat-* which, among other things, defines being (and reality) and has an equivalent derivative of *esse*, with an abstract formant *-entia*. However, such observation is not evident due to abundant interpretations concerning the term. Eliade writes about *sattva* as "the modal property of brightness and intelligence"¹⁶. Słuszkiewicz describes it as "goodness, an element of decency"¹⁷. Schlegel focuses on one other aspect, the harmony of actual existence in the midst of the inertia of *tamas* and the movement of *rajas*. Whereas, the actual definition is a synthesis derived from the dialogue contained within the above interpretations.

Eliade describes *rajas* as "the modal quality of energy and all psychological processes"¹⁸, Słuszkiewicz explains it as "dust, fog, and passion"¹⁹, Dasgupta simply sees it as "energy-stuff"²⁰. On the other hand, Schlegel denoted the meaning of the term through *impetus*, which remained consistent with a commonly accepted interpretation. *Rajas* is a dominant factor responsible for elements that constitute activity, change, and motion. Objectively put, it is responsible for all motion, even the passing of time²¹. From an anthropological / psychological standpoint, *rajas* is the cause of emotions, it "gives birth to desire and longing, fetters the incarnate with craving for act"²², "impells for action"²³.

The meaning of Latin term *impetus* resembles the meaning behind *rajas* in two ways; it depicts both the abrupt and soft motion²⁴ of elements and their role as the stimuli for feelings (in a figurative sense in classical Latin)²⁵. In result, *impetus*

¹⁴ TLL, ibidem, p. 863.

¹⁵ *Bhagawadgita, czyli Pieśń Pana* XIV, 6; 14; 18. Trans. J. Sachse. Wrocław 1988.

¹⁶ M. Eliade: *Joga. Nieśmiertelność i wolność*. Trans. B. Baranowski. Warszawa 1997, p. 35.

¹⁷ E. Słuszkiewicz: *Pradzieje i legendy Indii*. Warszawa 1980, p. 382.

¹⁸ M. Eliade: *Joga...*, p. 35.

¹⁹ E. Słuszkiewicz: *Pradzieje...*, p. 382.

²⁰ Dasgupta: *History...*, p. 244.

²¹ L. Cyboran: *Filozofia jogi*. Warszawa 1973, p. 60.

²² *Bhagawadgita, czyli Pieśń Pana*, XIV, 7.

²³ Ibidem, XIV, 9.

²⁴ TLL, sub voce: "impetus", pp. 606—607.

²⁵ TLL, ibidem, p. 608.

reflects the two most important planes necessary for understanding the Indian concept. Generally, Sanskrit texts do not contain connotations of *rajas* characterized by aggression (“de actione hostili, in re militari”²⁶).

The usage of the term *impetus* remains compelling also in the theory of pre-classic mechanics. The first concepts rejecting peripatetic theory of natural motion, as described by Ibn Badga, John Philoponos and John Buridan, were based on the assumption that motion of a body is maintained by means of accumulated energy within that body. This energy had been known as *impetus*. In this case, however, in its most important aspect, *impetus* had described internal properties of motion of a body. Therefore, an actualization of the meaning in post-classical Latin becomes evident in this case. The importance of this lies in the fact that close connection between *impetus* and *rajas* as objective sources for physical movement existed.

Tamas, the third type of *guna* and also on an axiological level an opposition to *sattva*, reflects the lowest level of human spiritual development. The term illustrates darkness, dusk, eclipse, illusion, weight, and lack of knowledge²⁷; consequently, *tamas* prevents salvation or deliverance. It is the basic element of all structured matter, the cause for existence of mass and consistency of objects (e.g. subtle psychological acts dominated by *sattva* are not structured as matter, dominated by *tamas*, would be structured in the Western ideology). *Tamas* is “the modal property of static inertness”²⁸. On its objective side, *tamas* was the foundation of all physical phenomena and structures, even conceptual classifications and ideas. On the subjective part (psychophysiological, axiological, and soteriological), it is like “a shadow over human consciousness”, which blocks access to clear and accurate knowledge. “A person whose consciousness is polluted with an excessive amount of *tamas* becomes heavy, lazy, dull, numb, as his mind is filled with routine, literally, »thickly« expresses matters of spirituality”²⁹. With his decision to translate *tamas* into *caligo*, Schlegel most likely focused on the literal and first meaning of the word: *caligo* that is *obscuritas*, *nox*, *tenebrae*³⁰. As a metaphor, Latin term *caligo* pertains to intellectual burden (“*caligo animi vel mentis*”), often times illustrated as a fog covering visibility. Terms such as *error* and *ignorantia* can be used as synonym for *caligo* and play an important role in understanding *tamas*. The decision to use such translation, however, left out the physical aspect of the context — the objective function of mass, durability, permanence, and heaviness.

Based on the above examples it is reasonable to conclude, that Schlegel prioritized literal projection of terms taken from Sanskrit. In the first case, an abstract

²⁶ TLL, ibidem, p. 606.

²⁷ Cologne Digital Sanskrit Lexicon, sub voce: “*tamas*”. On: <http://webapps.uni-koeln.de/tamil/>

²⁸ M. Eliade: *Joga...*, p. 35.

²⁹ L. Cyboran: “O etyce indyjskiej”. In: *Klasyczna joga indyjska*. Ed. L. Cyboran. Warszawa 1986, p. 378.

³⁰ TLL, sub voce: “*caligo*”, p. 161.

noun was modeled by creating an analogical Latin derivate of the word; however, the process should not be confused with neologism, as the derivate could easily be applied to a wide variety of philosophical contexts and therefore be misinterpreted when applied specifically to Indian meaning. In the remaining cases, Schlegel used direct literal translations of relevant terms; this process, on the other hand, narrowed the capacity of interpretation to Latin milieu. *Sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* are all elements of a coherent conception of matter, and their meanings are modified in accordance to a corresponding philosophical setting or background. Such expansive denotation is virtually impossible when applied in the context of unfamiliar ideology. Translation of complex philosophical texts, such as the translation of Bhagavadgita is not confined but contingent upon many factors, primarily due to the fact that it must inevitably relate to the construct of the entire philosophy it was based upon.

The key goal during Schlegel's time, the popularization of Indian mind, benefited from the simplified terminology to a limited extent. That is mostly because the masterpiece remained accessible and comprehensible to an average recipient; nevertheless, it was not enough from the perspective of a scientist, philosopher, or any serious and interested amateur. Cyboran makes a good observation that "plain substitution of equivalent terms from European philosophy is less confusing to a layman than a historian of philosophy; the first one will either understand or not, while a specialist of philosophy will always understand, but he will understand it either properly or improperly, depending on whether he will take pleasure in the formal presentation of the content"³¹. More modern translations primarily contain terms mentioned in this text through transliteration³², which requires annotation but also opens more space for interpretation. This change has been a direct result of how euro-centrism has had lesser presence in today's texts about Indian culture. This, in fact, is "the only proper humanistic way of dealing with cultures"³³.

³¹ L. Cyboran: *Filozofia jogi*..., pp. 29—30.

³² E.g.: S. Gambhirananda's and dr S. Sankaranarayana's English translations or excellent Polish translation by J. Sachse.

³³ S. Schayer: In: M. Mejor: "O indologii słów kilka". In: *India in Warsaw*..., p. 59.

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